Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion

Volume III: The Consummate Religion

G. W. F. HEGEL

Edited by Peter C. Hodgson

LECTURES
on the
PHILOSOPHY
of
RELIGION

Lectures on the Philosophy of religion

Volume III: The Consummate Religion

Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion represent the final and in some ways the decisive element of his entire philosophical system. His conception and execution of the lectures differed significantly on each of the occasions he delivered them, in 1821, 1824, 1827, and 1831. The older editions introduced insoluble problems by conflating these materials into an editorially constructed text. The present volumes establish a critical edition by separating the series of lectures and presenting them as independent units on the basis of a complete re-editing of the sources by Walter Jaeschke. The English translation has been prepared by a team consisting of Robert F. Brown, Peter C. Hodgson, and J. Michael Stewart, with the assistance of H. S. Harris. Now widely recognized as the definitive English edition, it is being reissued by Oxford in the Hegel Lectures Series. The three volumes include editorial introductions, critical annotations on the text, textual variants, and tables, bibliography, and glossary.

'The Consummate Religion' is Hegel's name for Christianity, which he also designates 'the Revelatory Religion'. Here he offers a speculative interpretation of major Christian doctrines: the Trinity, creation, humanity, estrangement and evil, Christ, the Spirit, the spiritual community, church and world. These interpretations have had a powerful and controversial impact on modern theology.

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GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL

LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

VOLUME III

THE CONSUMMATE RELIGION

Edited by

PETER C. HODGSON

Translated by

R. F. BROWN, P. C. HODGSON, and J. M. STEWART

with the assistance of

H. S. HARRIS

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ABBREVIATIONS, SIGNS, AND SYMBOLS

SIGNS AND SYMBOLS

[. . .] = Editorial insertions in the text.

⟨ . . . ⟩ = Passages in the margins of the *Ms.*, including both passages integrated into the main text and unintegrated passages that are footnoted.

˜ . . . ˜ = Passages in the main text that correspond to footnoted variant readings. These symbols are used only in the case of textual variants, which offer a different version of the designated passage, usually from a different source, not textual additions, which occur at the point marked by the note number in the main text. Normally the variant is placed in the notes at the end of the parallel in the main text; exceptions are noted.

– = Freestanding en dash indicating a grammatical break between sentence fragments in footnoted *Ms.* marginal materials.

[1] [2] [3] etc. = Footnotes containing (a) unintegrated marginal materials from the *Ms.;* (b) textual variants, additions, and deletions; (c) special materials from *W* and *L*, both variant readings and additions; (d) editorial annotations. The type of note is designated by an initial italicized editorial phrase in each instance. Notes are at the bottoms of the pages and are numbered consecutively through each text unit.

[*Ed.*] = Editorial annotations in the footnotes; materials following this symbol are editorial.

34 | = Page numbers of the German edition, on the outer margins with page breaks marked by vertical slash in text. The German edition is *Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte,* Vol. 5, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, III: Die vollendete Religion.* Edited by Walter Jaeschke. Hamburg, 1984.

[73a] = Sheet numbers of the *Ms.*, in the text at the point of occurrence; "a" and "b" refer to the recto and verso sides of the sheets.

PUBLISHED SOURCES

$W\ W_1\ W_2$ = *Werke.* Complete edition edited by an Association of Friends. Vols. 11–12 contain *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion.* 1st ed., edited by Philipp Marheineke (Berlin, 1832) (W_1); 2d ed., edited by Philipp Marheineke and Bruno Bauer (Berlin, 1840) (W_2). When no subscript is used, the reference is to both editions. Part III is contained in vol. 12 of both editions under the title *Die absolute Religion.*

L = *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion.* Edited by Georg Lasson. 2 vols. in 4 parts. Leipzig, 1925–1929 (reprint, Hamburg, 1966). Part III is contained in vol. 2/2 under the title *Die absolute Religion.*

UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

Ms. = Hegel's lecture manuscript of 1821

D = Deiters transcript of the 1824 lectures

G = Griesheim transcript of the 1824 lectures

Ho = Hotho transcript of the 1824 lectures

K = Kehler transcript of the 1824 lectures
P = Pastenaci transcript of the 1824 lectures
An = Anonymous transcript of the 1827 lectures
B = Boerner transcript of the 1827 lectures
Hu = Hube transcript of the 1827 lectures
S = Strauss excerpts from a transcript of the 1831 lectures

SPECIAL MATERIALS IN W AND L

These are given in parentheses and identify the no-longer-extant sources of the variant readings and additions making up the special materials found in *W* and *L*. Since the source of special materials in *W* relating to the *Ms.* cannot be identified with certainty in each instance, the source designation is omitted from these passages, although the probability in most cases is that it is from *Hn.*

(Hn) = Henning transcript of the 1821 lectures
(MiscP) = Miscellaneous papers in Hegel's own hand
(1827?) = Unverified transcripts of the 1827 lectures
(1831) = Transcripts of the 1831 lectures
(HgG) = Notes by Hegel in the copy of *G* used by W_1 and W_2
(Ed) = Editorial passages in W_1 and W_2
(Var) = Variant readings in *W* or *L*

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FREQUENTLY CITED WORKS

WORKS BY HEGEL

Werke = *Werke.* Complete edition edited by an Association of Friends. 18 vols. Berlin, 1832 ff. Some volumes issued in second editions.

GW = *Gesammelte Werke.* Edited by the Academy of Sciences of Rhineland–Westphalia in association with the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. 40 vols. projected. Hamburg, 1968 ff.

Vorlesungen = *Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte.* 10 vols. Hamburg, 1983 ff. Vols. 3–5 contain *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion,* edited by Walter Jaeschke.

Berliner Schriften = *Berliner Schriften 1818–1831.* Edited by J. Hoffmeister. Hamburg, 1956.

Briefe = *Briefe von und an Hegel.* Edited by J. Hoffmeister and J. Nicolin. 4 vols. 3d ed. Hamburg, 1969–1981.

Early Theological Writings = *Early Theological Writings.* Partial translation of H. Nohl, *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften,* by T. M. Knox and R. Kroner. Chicago, 1948.

Encyclopedia (1817, 1830) = *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences.* Translated from the 3d German ed., with additions based on student transcripts and lecture manuscripts, by W. Wallace and A. V. Miller. 3 vols. Oxford, 1892 (reprint 1975), 1970, 1971. *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse.* 1st ed. Heidelberg, 1817: forthcoming in *GW,* vol. 13. 3d ed., Berlin, 1830: *Werke,* vols. 6–7 (containing additions based on student transcripts and lecture manuscripts); forthcoming in *GW,* vol. 19. 6th ed., based on the 3d ed. without additions, edited by F. Nicolin and O. Pöggeler, Hamburg, 1959. Citations given by section numbers in the 1817 or 1830 editions.

Faith and Knowledge = *Faith and Knowledge.* Translated by W. Cerf and H. S. Harris. Albany, 1977. *Glauben und Wissen, oder die Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjectivität in der Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen, als Kantische, Jacobische, und Fichtesche Philosophie.* Tübingen, 1802. *GW,* vol. 4 (edited by H. Buchner and O. Pöggeler).

History of Philosophy = *Lectures on the History of Philosophy.* Translated from the 2d German ed. (1840) by E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson. 3 vols. London, 1892. *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie.* Edited by C. L. Michelet. 1st ed., Berlin, 1833: *Werke,* vols. 13–15. Because of variations between the two German editions, the English translation often does not correspond exactly to the cited German texts. A new German edition is being prepared by P. Garniron and W. Jaeschke: *Vorlesungen,* vols. 6–9.

Nohl, *Jugendschriften* = *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*. Edited by H. Nohl. Tübingen, 1907 (reprint, Frankfurt, 1966). These and other early writings will be newly edited and appear in *GW*, vols. 1–2.

Phenomenology of Spirit = *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford, 1977. *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Bamberg and Würzburg, 1807. *GW*, vol. 9 (edited by W. Bonsiepen and R. Heede).

Science of Logic = *Science of Logic*. Translated by A. V. Miller. London, 1969. *Wissenschaft der Logik*. Vol. 1, *Die objektive Logik*. Nuremberg, 1812–13. *GW*, vol. 11 (edited by F. Hogemann and W. Jaeschke). Vol. 2, *Die subjektive Logik*. Nuremberg, 1816. *GW*, vol. 12 (edited by F. Hogemann and W. Jaeschke). 2d ed. of vol. 1, Book 1, *Die Lehre vom Sein*. Berlin, 1832. Forthcoming in *GW*, vol. 20 (edited by F. Hogemann and W. Jaeschke). The English translation uses the 2d ed. of vol. 1, Book 1, hence there is not an exact correspondence between it and *GW*, vol. 11, Book 1.

WORKS BY OTHER AUTHORS

Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* = A. G. Baumgarten. *Metaphysica*. 7th ed. Halle and Magdeburg, 1779.

Descartes, *Discourse on Method, Meditations, Principles of Philosophy* = René Descartes. *A Discourse on Method and Selected Writings*. Translated by John Veitch. New York and London, 1951. Contains: *Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences* (1637); *Meditations on the First Philosophy* (1641); *The Principles of Philosophy* (1644).

Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe* = Johann Gottlieb Fichte. *Gesamtausgabe.* Edited by the Bavarian Academy of Sciences. 30 vols. Stuttgart–Bad Canstatt, 1962 ff.

Kant, *Critique of Judgment* = Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Judgment.* Translated by J. C. Meredith. Oxford, 1952. *Kritik der Urteilskraft.* 1st ed., Berlin and Libau, 1790; 2d ed., Berlin and Libau, 1793. *Werke,* vol. 5.

Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason* = Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Practical Reason.* Translated by L. W. Beck. New York, 1956. *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.* Riga, 1788. *Werke,* vol. 5.

Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* = Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Pure Reason.* Translated from R. Schmidt's collation of editions A and B by N. Kemp Smith. London, 1930. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft.* 1st ed., Riga, 1781 (A); 2d ed., Riga, 1787 (B).

Kant, *Werke* = Immanuel Kant. *Gesammelte Schriften.* Edited by the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences. 24 vols. Berlin, 1902–1938.

Leibniz, *Philosophische Schriften* = Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. *Die philosophische Schriften.* Edited by C. J. Gerhardt. 7 vols. Berlin, 1875–1890.

Leibniz, *Selections* = Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. *Selections.* Edited by Philip P. Wiener. New York, 1951. Contains *The Monadology* (1714), *The Principles of Nature and of Grace, Based on Reason* (1714), and other writings.

Lessing, *Sämtliche Schriften* = Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. *Sämtliche Schriften.* Edited by K. Lachmann and F. Muncker. 3d ed. Leipzig, 1886–1924.

Neander, *Gnostische Systeme* = August Neander. *Genetische Entwickelung der vornehmsten gnostischen Systeme.* Berlin, 1818.

Schleiermacher, *Der christliche Glaube* or *Glaubenslehre* = Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher. *Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelische Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt.* 1st ed. 2 vols. Berlin, 1821–22 (cf. Schleiermacher, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe,* Div. 1, vol. 7/1–2, edited by H. Peiter [Berlin and New York, 1980]). 2d ed. 2 vols. Berlin, 1830–31. The two editions differ considerably; Hegel knew only the first. Comparative references to the 2d ed. may be checked by paragraph number in the English edition: *The Christian Faith.* Translated from the 2d German ed. by H. R. Mackintosh, J. S. Stewart, et al. Edinburgh, 1928.

Spinoza, *Chief Works* = Benedictus de Spinoza. *Chief Works.* Translated by R. H. M. Elwes. New York, 1951. Contains: *Theologico-Political Treatise* (1670); *The Ethics* (1677); *On the Improvement of the Understanding* (1677); *Correspondence.*

Wolff, *Theologia naturalis* = Christian Wolff. *Theologia naturalis methodo scientifica pertractata. Pars prior, integrum systema complectens, qua existentia et attributa Dei a posteriori demonstrantur.* Editio nova. Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1739. *Pars posterior, qua existentia et attributa Dei ex notione entis perfectissimi et natura animae demonstrantur.* 2d ed. Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1741.

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EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

1. Text, Title, and Translation

This volume contains Part III of Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion;* its subject matter is the Christian religion, for which Hegel's philosophical designation is the "consummate" or "revelatory" religion.

The lectures on the philosophy of religion were delivered four times over the eleven-year period 1821–1831. Hegel's conception and execution of them differed so significantly on each of the occasions they were presented that all past attempts to conflate the several series into a single, editorially constructed text have unavoidably done violence to the materials. Hence the fundamental principle of this edition is to establish authentic and critical texts by separating the lectures and publishing them as independent units on the basis of a complete reediting of the available sources. These include Hegel's own lecture manuscript (*Ms.*), composed for the first lecture series in 1821; auditors' notebooks or transcripts of the 1824 lectures, of which the principal one was prepared by K. G. Griesheim;[1] the text of the 1827 lectures contained in G. Lasson's edition of 1925–1929, as compared with the two editions of the *Werke* (1832 and 1840) and checked against several recently discovered 1827 notebooks of lesser quality; excerpts by D. F. Strauss from a transcript of the lectures of 1831, of which all

1. The 1824 transcript by C. Pastenaci breaks off at the end of Div. I of Part III, leaving essentially only Griesheim as the source of the main text, checked against P. F. Deiters's much briefer transcript and supplemented by the variant passages from H. G. Hotho's freely edited notebook.

of the original transcripts have been lost; and those passages in the *Werke* for which original sources are no longer extant, which have been footnoted at appropriate places in relation to the *Ms.* and the 1824 and 1827 texts.

Details concerning editorial principles and procedures are contained in the Editorial Introduction to Volume 1 of this edition,[2] while a comparative analysis of the structure and development of Hegel's treatment of "The Consummate Religion" in each of the lecture series is provided in Sec. 2 of the present Introduction.

The most difficult editorial question relating to Part III of the lectures concerns its title, since Hegel himself used several titles. In the lecture manuscript he first wrote *Die vollendete Religion* ("The Consummate Religion"), but added the words *oder offenbare* ("or Revelatory") below the title, as an addition to it. The heading in the Griesheim transcript of the 1824 lectures is *Die offenbare Religion,* although Hegel began these lectures immediately by describing Christianity as *die vollendete Religion.* C. Pastenaci offers as a title *Die vollendete Religion oder die geoffenbarte Religion, christliche Religion,* while P. F. Deiters gives *Die notwendige, die offenbare, die christliche Religion,* and H. G. Hotho *Die christliche Religion.* Of the transcripts used by Lasson for the 1827 lectures, the Königsberg Anonymous had as its heading *Die offenbare Religion,* while J. E. Erdmann offered as a title the words used by Hegel in the opening sentences of the 1827 lectures: *Die vollendete Religion, die Religion, die für sich ist, oder die Religion, die sich selbst objektiv ist.*[3] Finally, according to Strauss's excerpts, the title in 1831 was *Die vollendete Religion.*[4]

2. G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion,* Vol. 1, *Introduction* and *The Concept of Religion,* ed. P. C. Hodgson (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1984) (*Vorlesungen,* Vol. 3). Vol. 2, *Determinate Religion* (*Vorlesungen,* Vol. 4), is scheduled for publication in 1986 or 1987.

3. *L* 2/2:237. Among the presently available transcripts for 1827, the title in the Berlin Anonymous is *Die geoffenbarte Religion,* while J. Hube uses *Christliche Religion,* and I. Boerner is similar to Erdmann, except that *offenbar* replaces *vollendet.*

4. This is confirmed by the introductory paragraph of the 1831 lectures as transmitted by *W* (see 1827 lectures, n. 3).

It is evident that the two most frequently occurring titles are *Die vollendete Religion* and *Die offenbare Religion.* The former has been selected as the title of the new edition because it appears to be the primary heading in the *Ms.* and because it occurs more frequently in the body of the texts of all the lecture series. Unfortunately, both *vollendet* and *offenbar* are adjectives that resist felicitous translation into English. For the former we have preferred "consummate" to alternatives such as "final," "perfect," or "complete," since it encompasses all of these meanings, and all are indeed intended. For *offenbar* we have settled on "revelatory" in order to stress the *process* of "making open" or "becoming manifest" and thus to be able to distinguish *offenbar* from *geoffenbart,* which refers to something that *has been* "revealed" in historical, positive fashion. Hegel clearly intended a distinction as well as a relation between these terms (see 1827 lectures, p. 252). In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* he described Christianity as *Die offenbare Religion,*[5] whereas in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences* he titled it *Die geoffenbarte Religion;*[6] thus the usage in the philosophy-of-religion lectures indicates a return to the earlier (and more suggestive) title. In some contexts we translate *offenbar* as "manifest," but for the title we prefer a term that also suggests the connection with *geoffenbart* and maintains whatever distinction Hegel may have intended between *offenbaren* and *manifestieren.*

Notably, none of the manuscripts or transcripts in our possession contains the title *Die absolute Religion.* While this phrase occurs in the text of the lectures along with all the others, it is reasonably certain that Hegel did not use it as a title. Instead, Marheineke introduced it when he published the lectures in 1832—possibly viewing it as more felicitous than *Die vollendete Religion* and assuming that *vollendet* and *absolut* meant roughly the same thing for Hegel (see especially the Introduction to the 1824 lectures). Although this is the title by which Part III of the philosophy-of-religion lectures has become familiar (Lasson perpetuated the tra-

5. *Phänomenologie des Geistes,* chap. VII.C (*GW* 9:400 ff.). Unfortunately, both Baillie and Miller translate this term as "revealed."

6. *Encyclopedia* (1830), §§ 564 ff.

dition), it is probably the least suitable of any of the titles. While there are indeed similarities between "consummate" (in the sense of "final" or "perfect") and "absolute," the two terms have distinct nuances. Christianity is the "consummate" religion in the sense that the concept of religion has been brought to completion or consummation in it; it simply *is* religion in its quintessential expression. But while the object or content of religion is the absolute, religion itself does not entail absolute knowledge of the absolute: that is the role of philosophy. The representational forms of religious expression, even of the Christian religion, must be "sublated" (annulled *and* preserved) in philosophical concepts. Thus in Hegel's scheme of things there is an *absolute knowledge* (the science of speculative philosophy) but a *consummate religion*. Whether religion as such is to be superseded by philosophy is another question, which we shall consider in due course.

As an alternative to all of the philosophical (or system-related) names for this religion, one might employ as a title its historical name, "the Christian religion," which also occurs in the texts of the lectures. This was in fact the solution adopted by the volume that was a forerunner to this one, *The Christian Religion: Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Part III: The Revelatory, Consummate, Absolute Religion.*[7] However, in the context of the systematic structure of the philosophy of religion, and of the place of religion in the philosophical system as a whole, the historical names of the religions are out of place, and Hegel used them only rarely (though he does indeed speak of the "Christian religion" more freely than he does of the others). Certainly very concrete historical realities lie behind Hegel's philosophical redescriptions, but the redescriptions are designed precisely to elicit a grasp of the distinctive stage of *consciousness* present in each religion, and for this purpose the historical names are of little service. In any event, to maintain consistency with Volumes 1 and 2, it is appropriate that Volume 3 be entitled *The Consummate Religion*. To bring out the fact that Hegel commonly used *two* titles or names for Part III, our title

7. Ed. and trans. Peter C. Hodgson (based on the edition by Georg Lasson), American Academy of Religion Texts and Translations Series, no. 2 (Missoula, Mont., 1979).

could have been *The Consummate or Revelatory Religion,* thus approximating the complete title as found in the *Ms.* But such a title is unwieldy, and it is advisable in any case to maintain consistency with Volume 3 of the German edition, which is titled *Die vollendete Religion.*

For all intents and purposes, what is offered here is a new edition, not a revision of *The Christian Religion.* While distinguishing the sources (indeed more clearly and accurately than the Lasson edition, on which it was based), *The Christian Religion* wove them together under a common set of section headings. This was feasible since Hegel treated the topics of Part III in roughly the same *order* in all of the lectures. The advantage of being able to compare what Hegel had to say on the same topic at different times was offset by obscuring the still significant structural and substantive differences that obtained between the four series of lectures. To bring the latter out clearly, and thus to provide the textual context in terms of which valid interpretations of Hegel's developing thought can be established, is the primary objective of the present edition. Thus the four lecture series (the *Ms.*, 1824, 1827, 1831) are distinguished and presented as autonomous units (the latter only in outline form, on the basis of Strauss's excerpts). Just as important, all of the texts have been completely reedited on the basis of the original sources, and the translations are based on the newly edited texts. Lasson's treatment of the *Ms.* and the 1824 lectures still left much to be desired in Part III, although what he offered was a distinct improvement over his work on Parts I and II. However, Lasson's version of the 1827 text serves as the primary source for our new edition, since the best of the original transcripts for these lectures have all been lost.[8] Thus, with the exception of the 1827 lectures, the reader will discover that the new edition bears only a distant resemblance to *The Christian Religion.*

The translation of Hegel's lecture manuscript has been prepared by P. C. Hodgson; of the 1824 lectures and of the materials in the Appendix, by J. M. Stewart; and of the 1827 lectures, by R. F. Brown and P. C. Hodgson. All translation drafts have been thor-

8. For details, see Secs. 3-5 of the Editorial Introduction to Vol. 1.

oughly checked and revised by H. S. Harris and put into final form by the editor with the assistance of J. M. Stewart. In addition to his detailed editorial work on the German text, W. Jaeschke has helped with some of the translation puzzles for the English edition.

The Appendix to this volume is of special note. The first item contains the text on the ontological proof from the 1831 lectures as provided by the *Werke* at the end of volume 12.[9] In the 1831 lectures Hegel once again treated the proofs for the existence of God in relation to the various religions, as he had done in the *Ms.* and in 1824, whereas in 1827 all of the proofs were drawn into *The Concept of Religion*. The proof that corresponds to the Christian religion is the ontological proof, for reasons Hegel makes clear, and thus the proper location for this material is in Volume 3. However, it cannot appropriately be attached to the *Ms.* or the 1824 text (and obviously not to the 1827 text, which in other respects the 1831 lectures approximate); hence we have placed it in the Appendix.

The second item in the Appendix is the text for Part III of the excerpts prepared by D. F. Strauss of a transcript of the lectures of 1831.[10] Because of the decision on the location of the proofs, Hegel found it necessary in 1831 to adopt the structural arrangement of the 1824 lectures; he thus included a section on "The Abstract Concept of God," where the ontological proof is discussed. (Strauss's excerpted version may be compared with the full text transmitted by the *Werke*.) In other respects the substance of the 1831 lectures approximates that of 1827, although an interesting rearrangement of materials on "natural humanity" and the question of good and evil occurs,[11] and Hegel introduces for the first time as a divisional principle the reference to the three "kingdoms" of the Father, Son, and Spirit,[12] which was adopted by both editions of the *Werke*.

The third item in the Appendix contains several of the loose sheets of notes used by Hegel in preparing those portions of the

9. See below, *Ontological Proof*, n. 1.
10. See below, 1831 *Excerpts*, n. 1.
11. See below, 1831 *Excerpts*, nn. 14, 26.
12. See below, 1831 *Excerpts*, n. 7.

lecture *Ms.* that treat Greek, Roman, and Christian religion (the notes on Greek and Roman religion are appended to Volume 2). These sheets are from the literary estate of Karl Rosenkranz (Hegel's former student and biographer), now deposited in Houghton Library of Harvard University. It is not clear how these sheets came into Rosenkranz's hands, but it is clear that they do not belong to the miscellaneous papers used in preparation of the later lectures, and it is unlikely that they were composed after the *Ms.* was completed and inserted into it (as was for instance sheet 3 of the *Introduction*). Rather they were almost certainly a preliminary sketch of portions of the *Ms.*, probably completed in mid-July 1821.[13] This is evident from the content, which is similar to the *Ms.*'s depiction of the relation of Christianity to previous religions, although the sheets are much more schematic and the conception less fully articulated. Moreover, they contain materials found only in the *Ms.*, such as the outline of the concluding section on "the passing away of the community" and references to ending "on a note of discord." They also contain allusions and references, such as to the Low Country "beggars" (the Gueux), that did not find their way into any of the lecture series. These sheets help us to understand how Hegel composed his lectures: he worked from preliminary sketches to a more fully articulated manuscript, to which he later added papers containing revisions and elaborations. Normally the preliminary sketches would have been destroyed once the manuscript had been composed.

Finally there are found in the Appendix several brief fragments from lost transcripts of the 1821 and 1824 lectures prepared by Carl Ludwig Michelet. The second of these transcripts, described by Philipp Marheineke as having been written "with unmistakable care,"[14] was used by Bruno Bauer in preparing the second edition of the *Werke,* and portions of it (while unidentifiable) are included among the variant readings from W_2 given in our footnotes to the 1824 text. Michelet himself quoted a few passages from his own notebooks of Hegel's lectures in his *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel,* Part 2 (Berlin,

13. On the dating, see below, *Loose Sheets,* n. 20.
14. See his preface to W_2 (11:vii).

1838). These recoverable fragments, all of which are from Part III of the *Lectures,* are of value primarily as a confirmation and correction of the Griesheim version of the 1824 lectures at certain points. The second of the fragments from the first lecture series confirms the text of the *Ms.* on an interesting point. Our notes accompanying the fragments set them in their appropriate contexts.

Following the Appendix, and a table showing the pagination of the original sources, the German-English glossary is found, which in its successively amended versions has served as a translation guide for all three volumes. We stress the term "guide" since there are obviously contexts in which the equivalences listed in the glossary are inappropriate. The glossary is limited to a selection of frequently used and/or technical terms, especially those posing problems in translation; it certainly is not an exhaustive list of Hegel's systematic vocabulary. The general principles guiding the translation of the *Lectures* as a whole are discussed in Sec. 6 of the Editorial Introduction to Volume 1, and the specific arrangement of the glossary is explained at the beginning of the listing.

Some adjustments in the translation of specific terms have occurred in Volume 3 as compared with Volume 1, occasioned partly by the different context in which they occur and partly by the experience of the translation team. For *anschauen* in some instances we are now using "envisage," and for *Anschauung,* "envisagement," although the standard term remains "intuition." When *Bestimmung* means "vocation" in the sense intended by Fichte, we so translate it. For *seiend* we have experimented with "subsisting" as an alternative to the awkward expression "having being," especially in phrases such as *eine in sich seiende Weise,* "an inwardly subsisting mode," or *der ansichseiende Geist,* "the implicitly subsisting spirit." Similarly, for *Seiende,* when it refers to finite entities, we have employed "subsisting being" and sometimes even "entity." The disadvantage of this policy is that it is then no longer possible to reserve "subsist" exclusively for *bestehen.* In the case of *Vorstellung* we have found it necessary to be more flexible when it is used in nontechnical contexts, as it often is in Volume 3. We have employed "image" or "imagination" (as when one has a hundred thalers in one's "imagination"), "view" (e.g., the Reformed "view" of the sacrament of Communion), and even "notion," although rarely

(such "notions" are not worthy of further consideration). To maintain the distinction between *Vorstellung, Begriff,* and *Idee,* we *never* use "notion" for *Begriff* or "idea" for *Vorstellung,* and we avoid such expressions as "conceptual picture" or "picture thinking" for *Vorstellung. Begriff* is consistently translated as "concept," *Idee* as "idea," and in its technical sense *Vorstellung* remains "representation." Finally, when *Geist* clearly refers to the Holy Spirit or the Spirit of God in the context of discussions of the Trinity or the community of faith, it is appropriate to capitalize it in translation. Here *Geist* is being used as a religious *Vorstellung* rather than as a philosophical *Begriff.* For the sake of consistency, capitalization normally occurs when the term is preceded by a definite article: thus "the Spirit," but "spirit."

Hegel's citations of biblical passages, of which there are a good many in this volume, are often imprecise. Generally we translate Hegel's version into modern English (guided by the Revised Standard Version), and if this version is sufficiently accurate, we simply give the reference in square brackets following the quotation; otherwise additional necessary information is provided in the footnotes. In the case of Synoptic parallels, the source closest to Hegel's quotation (frequently Matthew) is cited. References to classical authors are given in the abbreviated form customary today, without attending to the question of which editions Hegel may have used. Information on symbols, abbreviations, and frequently cited works in the footnotes is provided at the beginning of the volume. We have avoided the repetition of detailed information found in the editorial footnotes to Volume 1, giving instead cross-references to these notes.

2. The Structure and Development of "The Consummate Religion"

As pointed out in the Editorial Introduction to Volume 1, this edition makes possible for the first time a comprehensive comparison of the four series of lectures Hegel presented on the philosophy of religion as well as an analysis of the development in his conceptualization and treatment of this subject. A comparative analysis of Parts I and II will be found in the Introductions to the first two volumes; we turn now to Part III, *The Consummate Religion.* The attentive reader will discover that differences of nuance, emphasis,

and substance are much greater among the several lecture series for Part III than had earlier been suspected, despite the similar ordering of topics. The altered polemical context, especially for the 1824 and 1827 lectures, reverberates through to the very end.

For what follows, readers will be helped by referring to the table providing a synopsis of the structure of *The Consummate Religion*, which is printed on pp. 54–55. The section headings in the *Ms.* are part of the original document except for those enclosed in square brackets, which have been added by the editor. However, the numbers and headings in all the other documents are the work of the editor without being specifically identified as such. Even when headings occur in the original transcripts, we must assume that they are not attributable to Hegel himself but rather to the transcribers. Thus we have felt free to revise and supplement the headings in the transcripts in order to bring out the systematic structure of Hegel's lectures as clearly as possible. They certainly do have such a structure even if Hegel did not make a point of enumerating and identifying the stages of his oral presentation in just the way we have done, though the formulations used for our headings are frequently suggested by wording in the texts themselves. References are made to the more detailed discussion of specific matters in the editorial footnotes, so as to avoid repetition between the Introduction and the notes.[15] In this Introduction, we can offer only a brief sketch, which provides at most merely the foundations of an interpretative commentary, and which does not attend to the growing body of secondary literature.[16]

a. Hegel's Lecture Manuscript

Introduction

Hegel starts (in Sec. 1) by reminding his hearers that "this religion" was earlier defined (at the very end of the general *Introduction*

15. These references are cited not by page numbers but by note numbers, which run consecutively through each text unit. By using the running heads, readers can readily identify the appropriate text units.

16. For a survey of this literature, especially as it relates to Part III of the lectures, and for a commentary on aspects of Hegel's philosophical interpretation of Christianity, see Walter Jaeschke, *Die Religionsphilosophie Hegels* (Darmstadt, 1983).

to the *Ms.*) as the one in which the concept of religion has returned to itself or become objective to itself by becoming an object of human consciousness explicitly. Since, as pointed out in Part I of the *Ms.* (Sec. B.2, 3), the concept of religion *is* the relationship of finite consciousness to its absolute object, God, and ultimately the unity between them based on the absolute's self-mediation or self-consciousness, the religion in which this relationship is made fully manifest is the "consummate" and the "revelatory" religion (see *Ms.*, nn. 3, 16). Hegel continues (in Sec. 2) by establishing that the Christian religion, as thus defined, has certain "characteristics" (*Bestimmungen*), the chief of which is that it is the religion of *revelation.* It is so, not because *something* is revealed in historical or positive fashion, but because the very being of God is to be open, manifest, revelatory. God's eternal nature *is* his "revelatory action," which is to say that God *is* spirit—infinite spirit revealing itself to finite spirit, the absolute idea "appearing" to worldly consciousness, and thus returning to itself as infinite self-consciousness or absolute spirit. From this fundamental characteristic of the Christian religion several others follow: it is the religion of truth, reconciliation, and freedom—the first because *the true* is its content and is cognized *as* it is, the second because the implicit unity of divine and human nature has now become explicit (in at least one individual), and the last because freedom means to be at home with oneself in the other.

The Two Triads

In the lecture manuscript, Hegel's philosophical redescription of the Christian religion is structured in two triads, one within the other.[17] The outer triad is an analytic framework already applied to each of the determinate or finite religions in Part II. This analysis considers first the "abstract concept" of divinity of the religion in question; then its "concrete representation" of divinity and of humanity's relationship to it in terms of specific symbols, images, and other thought-categories (the "theoretical" relationship to God); and finally the practices of its "cultus" by means of which there is an actual participation in or communion with deity (the "practical"

17. A second inner triad is found in Sec. C and is discussed below, but it is not of significance for the overall structure of the *Ms.*

relationship to God). In the 1827 lectures, Hegel also uses this framework to structure his presentation of the concept of religion in Part I. If the concept of religion is absolute spirit in its self-mediation (a matter on which Hegel achieved clarity at the end of the 1824 *Concept*), then we can expect that religion as such will reflect the development or self-realization of absolute spirit in the three moments of its substantial self-unity, its self-differentiation, and its self-reunification or return to self.

The inner triad sets forth the concrete representation of God that is found in the Christian religion. As is clear from the "division of the subject" found at the beginning of Sec. B, this triad is composed of: (a) the idea of God in and for itself (the immanent Trinity); (b) the idea in diremption or differentiation (creation and preservation of the natural world); (c) the appearance of the idea in finite spirit (the "history" of estrangement, redemption, and reconciliation). At this point a tension in Hegel's thought emerges. If what constitutes the "concrete representation" of God in the Christian religion is the self-mediation of the triune God both inwardly and outwardly—and this is indeed Hegel's view of the matter—then one would expect a trinitarian structure. But what is in fact offered is a philosophical triad, drawn from the three branches of philosophy—the logical idea, nature, and (finite) spirit—and recapitulated in Hegel's depiction of "the revealed religion" in §§ 567–570 of the *Encyclopedia*. It has the peculiar result that the "Son" (anthropology and christology) occupies the third moment of the triad rather than the second. The third trinitarian moment, the "Spirit," becomes a kind of appendage, treated under Sec. C of the outer triad, "Community, Cultus." What is required, then, to give an adequate account of the distinctively Christian idea of God is to combine the second and third moments of the philosophical triad (nature and finite spirit) in the second moment of the trinitarian dialectic (God's self-differentiation or self-diremption by creating a world of *both* nature *and* finite spirit as God's own otherness *ad extra*) and to incorporate the third moment of the outer triad (community, cultus) into the third moment of the trinitarian mediation (God's return-to-self in and through the transfigured subjectivity of the community of Spirit). The philosophical triad is grounded

in the dialectic of thought itself, namely, the three logical moments of the syllogism: universality (*Allgemeinheit*), particularity (*Besonderheit*), and singularity (*Einzelheit*).[18] But genuinely trinitarian speculation requires a modification so that the moments become: abstract unity (universality), differentiation (particularity + finite singularity), return (subjectivity or infinite singularity)—or, as Hegel finally expressed it in 1831, the kingdoms of the Father, Son, and Spirit.

Hegel made just such an adjustment in the later lectures. Sec. C of the *Ms.* becomes the "third element" of the development of the idea of God, "Community, Spirit" (1824 and 1827),[19] or the "Kingdom of the Spirit" (1831). And Secs. b and c of the inner triad in the *Ms.* are combined into the "second element," namely, God's "representation" and "appearance" in the world (1824 and 1827), or the "Kingdom of the Son" (1831). Thus the original analytic scheme of "abstract concept," "concrete representation," and "community, cultus," is broken apart, and the inner triad is converted into genuinely trinitarian moments. With respect to the second moment of the latter (namely, God's worldly appearance or the kingdom of the Son), there are still two phases, but they no longer correspond to the philosophical distinction between nature and finite spirit. Rather they are the phase of differentiation (including now not only the natural world but also the "fall" of humanity into estrangement and evil) and the phase of reconciliation (beginning with the appearance of the idea of divine-human unity in a single individual). The "turning point"—the extreme of divine self-divestment and the moment initiating the return—is no longer the creation of the first Adam (as the *Ms.* depicts it) but the incarnation and crucifixion of the second Adam (see n. 88). In 1824 the structure of the lectures is adjusted accordingly, so that Secs. b and c.α of the inner triad in the *Ms.* together comprise the moment

18. See *Science of Logic,* pp. 600 ff., 664 ff. (*GW* 12:36 ff., 132 ff.), and *Encyclopedia* (1830), §§ 181 ff.

19. There is already an anticipation of this in the words Hegel added to the heading of Sec. B in the *Ms.*—whether immediately or in preparation for the 1824 lectures is not certain—namely, that concrete representation involves the "determination," i.e., the "development of the idea [of God]," and "weaves itself by itself into the cultus." See *Ms.,* n. 39.

of differentiation, while Sec. c.β comprises the moment of reconciliation. In this way the disproportionately large amount of material in Sec. B.c—over a third of the entire *Ms.* text for Part III—is spread out, and the disproportionately small amount of material in Sec. B.b is supplemented.

The Abstract Concept of God

Under Sec. A of the outer triad, Hegel considers the form of the proof of the "existence" of God appropriate to the revelatory religion, namely, the ontological proof, following the pattern already established in the treatment of the determinate religions, where the cosmological and teleological proofs were taken up in relation to the abstract conception of divinity found in the various "finite" religions.

The *concept* of God in this religion is that he is the absolute idea, or is the idea of *absolute spirit.* It must now be shown that this concept has "reality" (*Realität*), that "being" (*Sein*) or "existence" (*Existenz*)[20] is contained in it. This is the case because the very concept or idea of absolute spirit is to be the unity of divine and human nature. Spirit is a process of actualization, of manifestation, "the living process by which the implicit unity of divine and human nature becomes explicit, or is brought forth." Therefore, *if* God is properly defined as absolute spirit, he necessarily has reality, is indeed the most real of all realities.

The *abstract* definition of this idea of spirit is the unity of concept and being, and the so-called ontological proof shows this unity in a *formal* way. At the strictly formal, logical level, the proof is quite simple, since logic shows that the *concept* (*Begriff*) is "the third to *being* [*Sein*] and essence [*Wesen*], to the *immediate* and to *reflection.* Being and essence are so far the moments of its *becoming;* but it is their *foundation* and *truth* as the identity in which they are

20. In Part I of the 1824 and 1827 lectures, Hegel makes it clear that the usual expression "existence of God" (*Dasein Gottes*) is at best imprecise and in the strict sense inaccurate, since God does not "exist" like other finite entities in the sense of having "determinate being" (*Dasein*). Normally he speaks of the "being" or "reality" of God, but occasionally uses the loanwords *Existenz* and *existieren.* See Vol. 1, 1827 *Concept,* pp. 414 ff., and the discussion of the translation of the terms *Sein* and *Dasein* in the Editorial Introduction to Vol. 1, pp. 57–58.

submerged and contained."[21] In the *true* concept, being as the most empty, indeterminate, and immediate philosophical category is contained, and in this respect it is not saying very much to say that God "has being." But Hegel acknowledges that "the concept in our sense is not what is ordinarily meant by 'concept.'" What is ordinarily meant is that concepts (or thoughts) are just in the head and that what is *real* is life, the immediate world, empirical human being, and the like. This is the point of view of subjectivity, of the understanding, and it is from this point of view that Kant and others have criticized the Anselmian proof. Anselm (according to Hegel) argued that the concept of God is that he is the "most perfect" and that being (or reality) is necessarily contained in this concept since, as everyone knows, what is unreal or merely imagined is less "perfect" than what is real. This is "quite correct," says Hegel, and Anselm was also correct in recognizing that the unity of concept and being could not just be presupposed by religion and philosophy; it had to be *demonstrated,* even if Anselm's proof still had the form of understanding. Of course, it is just this classical presupposition of the unity of concept and being, of thought and reality, that has broken down in modern times, Anselm's proof to the contrary notwithstanding. This is why Kant's critiques of reason are such a watershed in the history of consciousness. Kant is correct "in the finite realm": being or reality certainly is *not* contained in the *subjective* concept (i.e., in the thoughts we have in our brains). The task of speculative philosophy is to demonstrate, in the light of critical philosophy, that the subjective or finite concept is not the *true* concept. Only this can serve any longer as the philosophical basis for the fundamental presupposition of religion that God *is.*

Concrete Representation

We come now to the three moments of the inner triad of the *Ms.* to which reference has already been made.

1. The *first* of these, Sec. B.a, concerns "God in his eternity, the idea in and for itself, *God as triune,*" which is also the "absolute idea of philosophy," a "purely speculative content" (n. 51). This section remains relatively constant across the four lecture series,

21. *Science of Logic,* pp. 577 ff., cf. pp. 82 ff. (*GW* 12:11 ff., 11:33 ff.).

although the wealth of material it contains is gradually worked out more consistently. By the term "Trinity" Hegel ordinarily means the immanent, logical, or preworldly Trinity—that is, the *actus purus* of the inner divine life, the process of differentiation and return contained *within* the eternal idea ("the show of finitude . . . has not yet taken place"). At the same time Hegel recognizes that the divine differentiation *ad intra* is the ground for the possibility of God's relation to the world *ad extra* and that the outward relations reenact the inner distinctions without simply reduplicating or repeating them (see n. 79)—in effect a correspondence between (not an identity of) the immanent and economic Trinities. The truth of the Trinity is most adequately grasped in purely speculative, logical categories as the dialectic of unity, differentiation, and return. It is a mystery, but a rational mystery—the mystery of reason, of thought itself. The truth of the Trinity may also be grasped in the representational language of love and personality. Love entails a union mediated by relationship and hence distinction; to be a person means to be reflected into self through distinction, to find one's self-consciousness in another, to give up one's abstract existence and to win it back as concrete and personal by being absorbed into the other. But when the understanding enters in and tries to count three divine "persons," it falls into irresolvable contradictions and the "harsh" equation $3 \times 1 = 1$. Thus, in the *Ms.* at least, Hegel is not much attracted to the representational language of traditional trinitarian doctrine and its central symbols, "Father," "Son," and "Spirit." Nonetheless, truth is present in these symbols, as it is in the prefigurations of the Trinity in the triads of Hindu and Greek religion, of Plato and the Pythagoreans, of Alexandrian Neoplatonism and Gnosticism, and finally of Boehme and Kant.

2. In Sec. B.b, Hegel addresses the difficult question of the relation between God and the *natural world.* The latter *corresponds* to the second moment of the inner dialectic of the divine life, but Hegel makes it clear many times that the created world is not simply *identical* with God in the moment of self-differentiation ("the eternal Son of the Father") (see n. 79). This would entail a crude pantheism, which he consistently avoids.[22] His position is rather

22. See especially Sec. A of *The Concept of Religion* in the 1827 lectures, where Hegel defends himself vigorously against the charge of pantheism.

that of panentheism: the world exists in God and is dependent on God (creation is a continuous preservation), but is not in any empirical sense identical with God. Yet the element of explicit and present *difference* does seem to presuppose an implicit and teleological *identity,* for the vocation of both God and world is to achieve actuality together, to move toward union in an eschatological consummation. The quality of the natural world, as a "disappearing moment" in this process, is precisely to sublate itself, "to pass over," "to take itself back into the final idea." Here Hegel's affinity with Neoplatonism and German mysticism is evident. At the end of this section he considers briefly the presence of the idea (the "wisdom of God") in nature and the emergence of spirit out of nature.

3. Sec. B.c is the lengthiest and most complex of the *Ms.,* for reasons already discussed (see also n. 88). By means of the Greek letters α and β Hegel divides it into two parts. In the *first part* (α) he treats finite spirit qua finite—as estranged, cloven, "natural humanity"—that is, theological *anthropology.* Human being is "natural" and merely finite when it chooses to exist according to the immediacy, particularity, and externality of the natural world (n. 90). This is the life of desire, of singularity, of utter dependence on nature. This is in fact the "original condition" of humanity; but also, because human being is spirit, it is not false to represent the original condition mythically as our having been created in the image of God: spirit is *implicitly* the divine idea itself. This original condition, however, is neither "good" nor "evil," and it is wrong to think of human being as either good or evil "by nature," which is a doctrine of "recent times."

Humanity becomes either good or evil (for the most part, evil) with the *transition* from its so-called original condition (whether primitive or mythical) to the actual conditions of historical existence and culture. The transition involves essentially an act of *cognition* or *knowledge* (Hegel's term is *Erkenntnis*), the willful choice of what is natural and immediate, a choice for which human beings are responsible, with the result that they are guilty. It is this knowing choice that is in the strict sense evil. The role of knowledge in the occurrence of evil is the central theme of *the story of the fall,* but Hegel is primarily concerned with the contradictions that are present in the story. First there is a contradiction with respect to *knowl-*

edge: on the one hand, the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is forbidden by God, yet on the other hand it is precisely this knowledge that is the likeness of God in humanity, without which Adam would be just like the beasts. Then there is a contradiction with respect to *mortality* (see n. 118): is it a punishment for sin (the penalty of death for eating of the fruit), or is it a concomitant of finitude (in order to gain immortality Adam would have to eat of the tree of life but misses the chance)? By bringing out these contradictions we are able to see through the mythical form of the story and to grasp its speculative truth: cognition is the spiritual essence of humanity and intrinsically good; yet when conjoined with finitude it yields the choice of nature rather than of spirit, and hence inner rupture and outward evil. Evil is now seen to be a dialectical necessity in the rise of consciousness, not an inscrutable, absurd force. Cognition both "gives the wound and heals it."

In the *second part* (β) of Sec. B.c, Hegel attends to the reversal out of this situation, the "elevation" of spirit out of its natural will and evil and into consciousness of the universal, of God—in other words, *christology.* He clearly demarcates the stages of this lengthy analysis by a series of Greek letters ((α) through (ε)). The first point to be established (point (α)) is that humanity is conscious of the universal as its *own* essence, its *own* infinity: *both* absolute essence *and* infinite subjectivity are essential. This can be otherwise expressed as "*the unity of divine and human nature*" or simply the "divine idea," which humanity bears implicitly within itself, the consciousness of which "consummates religion as the cognition of God as spirit." But in the second place (point (β)), because of ignorance and evil this cognition must *come to* us, this implicit idea must *appear* explicitly, and it must appear in such a way that it is empirically universal for immediate consciousness, which is the state that most of us are in. This means that it must appear in a "wholly temporal," "completely ordinary" human being—but one who is at the same time known as the divine idea, not merely as a teacher. Such an immediate certainty and presence of divinity is the "Is" of truth for natural consciousness—divine truth present as an empirical, historical *fact* in all its "isness."

At this point Hegel sums up the steps of the argument and further elaborates them. First, the divine idea is present implicitly *in* the *whole* of humanity immediately (a recapitulation of point (α) above). The quotations from Schiller and Goethe support this point, if our reading of them is correct (nn. 129, 131): "the *entire* realm of spirits," with all its "anguish," is needed in order that God may enter into possession of his own infinitude. Second, the divine idea is realized *for* humanity in a *single individual.* First it must be shown that *individual subjectivity as such* is the true form in which universality appears ("substance is subject"). But then it must be established that only *one* single, unique individual can be the ultimate appearance of the universal, for otherwise divinity would become an abstraction, and the idea of divine-human *unity* would be dispersed. "Once is always. . . . In the eternal idea there is only one Son." (On the arrangement of these points, see n. 133.)

That any particular historical individual should be this "holy one" for us requires "a local and exclusive occasion." In the case of the Christian religion, this occasion is Christ (i.e., Jesus of Nazareth[23]). Even though the only true attestation that he is the divine idea is the witness of the Spirit in forming the community of faith, *Christ's teaching* (point (γ)) is a kind of attestation since it unifies the whole of his life and destiny in which the divine idea is portrayed (*dargestellt*). "The words of Christ confirm the truth of the idea, what he has been for his community." In a fairly detailed exegesis, which has its own rigor, though certainly not of a historical-critical kind, Hegel distinguishes three aspects of the teaching: its concentration on inwardness and intentionality, displacing all worldly interests, elevating its hearers to the "heaven within," the "universal soil" and "homeland" of spirit—the kingdom of God, of which communal love is the closest approximation; its "revolutionary" opposition to all the established orders (of religion, family, civil society, and the state); and the relationship of Christ to God and humanity ("he states very specifically his identity with the Father" and "refers to himself as the Son of Man"—i.e., the one man who is humanity as such).

23. In accord with the conventions of his time, Hegel uses the word *Christus* as a proper name (see n. 211).

The burden of the next section (point (δ)) is to show that *the life and death* of this teacher are in conformity with these teachings in the sense of actualizing their content, the kingdom of love, so that it can indeed be said that "it is the divine idea that courses through this history." Hegel never shows very clearly what it is about Christ's *life* that manifests this conformity other than the teaching itself "and the love with which he conducted himself." Rather it is Christ's *death* that is central. In passages that are among the most powerful of the *Ms.*, he argues that since death is the ultimate destiny and negativity of finite spirit, the death of *this* individual is the supreme portrayal of the *unity* of the divine and the human, the highest divestment of the divine idea—this and not the divine *imago* in fallen Adam, as suggested earlier. "God himself is dead." This death is both the deepest anguish and the highest love, because love means the supreme surrender of oneself in the other. The "speculative intuition" is that the "monstrous unification" of the absolute extremes of divinity and death, of the eternal God and mortal humanity, is love itself—the very love that was the substance of Christ's teaching. As if that were not enough, this is no ordinary death but the dishonoring death of a political criminal; yet what the state dishonors is converted into the highest honor (here we are given a preview of the decadence of the Roman Empire, with which Hegel will shortly compare our own time).

The redemptive death of Christ (we have not discussed Hegel's views on satisfaction) already represents the "transfiguration" of human finitude, the beginning of the "return" of the divine idea to itself. But what has still to be added is the "envisaged consummation" of this return. This first appeared for immediate consciousness in the mode of actuality as something that happened to a single individual—*the resurrection and ascension* of Christ (point (ε)). Although Hegel does not say so directly, this has nothing to do with a physical miracle or visible appearances: "resurrection" rather means the "death of death," and "ascension" the "festive assumption of humanity into the divine idea." Hegel makes no attempt to unpack these metaphors at this point. Rather, as he surveys and summarizes the three spheres (the inner triad) of "Concrete Representation" at the conclusion of this section, he empha-

sizes that Christ's return and elevation to the right hand of God is only *one* aspect, only one side of the consummation of the third sphere, which includes not only one single individual but also the community of the Spirit: the divine idea is brought to completion in the world of actuality only when the *many* single individuals have been brought back into the unity of the Spirit, into the *community* (see n. 184). In other words, given the arrangement of the *Ms.*, Sec. C of the outer triad, "Community, Spirit," really ought to become point (ζ) of the second part of the third sphere of Sec. B, since it consummates the return of the divine idea to itself out of its worldly diremption. In this fashion, "concrete representation" "weaves itself by itself" into "community, cultus" (n. 39). Hegel is already cognizant of the tensions present in his original design, according to which Son and Spirit both belong to the third sphere, while the second is occupied solely by the natural world.

Community, Spirit

Sec. C is composed of another inner triad, which is neither theological nor philosophical but historical, namely, the sequence of origin, preservation, and perishing that applies to all historical phenomena. Preceding this triad, however, is a transitional section ("The Standpoint of the Community in General"), which expands upon the transitional remarks at the end of Sec. B. The transition is one from the sensible to the spiritual presence of God—that is, from the Christ of history to the community of the Spirit. We must make this transition without at the same time shunning sensible presence "in monkish fashion." The transition is necessary because the single individual in whom God was present has been "removed from the senses and raised to the right hand of God"; God is now present in the inwardness and subjectivity of the spiritual community. The subjectivity in question is a renewed, transfigured, communal subjectivity—in essence a unique and unsurpassable *intersubjectivity,* distinguishable from all other forms of human love and friendship. Privatistic and exclusivistic modes of existence are set aside, as are all distinctions based on mastery, power, position, sex, and wealth, and in their place is actualized a truly universal justice and freedom. The symbol "Holy Spirit" refers to the unifying

and liberating power of divine love arising from infinite anguish—the same love that was objectively represented on the cross of Christ but that now works inwardly, subjectively, building up a new human community. "This is the Spirit of God, or God as the present, actual Spirit, God dwelling in his community." This spiritual community is the same as the kingdom of God proclaimed by Christ: "The kingdom of God *is* the Spirit," or more precisely, "the kingdom of the Spirit." Thus already in the *Ms.* Hegel has introduced the term by which he will eventually characterize the third moment of the consummate religion, the moment of the return of the divine idea to God and of the consummation of all things in God.

Sec. C.α on the "origin" of the community is concerned with the question of the "verification" of the divine mission in Christ. The speculative aspect of the question ("Does God have a Son whom he sends into the world?") is properly dealt with in the framework of the trinitarian mediation of spirit as grasped philosophically. But the historical aspect of the question ("Was this Jesus of Nazareth the Christ?") cannot be answered by supposed historical proofs based on miracles. The only genuine proof is the witness of the Spirit, the evocation of faith by the outpouring of the Holy Spirit upon the departure of Christ. This is the "origin" or "arising" (*Entstehung*) of the community, and indeed the existence of the community is the "proof" of Christ. While the community has a specific historical referent and founder, the proof of the identity of this founder as the Christ—the proof that the history of his teaching, life, death, and resurrection was "strictly adequate to the idea"—is a proof of faith and the Spirit, not a proof of history.

Sec. C.β considers the "being" (*Sein*) of the community. First, this is a community of faith and teaching. Faith is the certainty of absolute truth for spiritual consciousness as a whole; since it has a content or is a form of *objective* truth (and not mere subjective feeling), it can be taught, and this teaching must be secured in fixed expressions (as tradition and doctrine). Second, the developed community is a *church,* which takes on the form of a worldly organization and even generates the principles of civil and political life out of itself. Finally, the central act of the community is *cultic*—"an eternal repetition of the life, passion, and resurrection of Christ in the members of the church." The focus of the cultus is accordingly

the sacraments, and above all the sacrament of Holy Communion or the Lord's Supper. This sacrament entails not only a "mystical union" with but also a sensible "partaking" of God in Christ (*Genuss* is the word Hegel customarily uses for "communion," and it has the connotation of sensible enjoyment or physical partaking). It is only with respect to the cultus that the Western Christian confessions differ from one another: the Catholics venerate the host as such because it is divinity present in sensible form, while the Lutherans claim that the sacrament is efficacious in faith, and the Reformed theologians regard it as a mere memorial. This section concludes with a look at various ways in which the relation between the objectivity of God ("grace") and the subjectivity of human volition and freedom has been understood; it seems to anticipate elements of the discussion in the 1824 lectures of spiritual "rebirth" and the "realization" of faith in the world.

Everything historical eventually passes away (Sec. C.γ). Is the same to be said of the community of the Spirit?[24] Such would seem not to be the case if the kingdom of God has been established eternally and if the gates of hell shall not prevail against Christ's teaching and church, although, to be sure, single individuals perish and pass over to the kingdom of heaven. This would be to end on a discordant note, and the signs of the time (n. 251) do indeed point to a considerable discord in this respect. Our age is like that of the Roman Empire in its abandonment of the question of truth, its smug conviction that no cognitive knowledge of God can be had, its reduction of everything to merely historical questions, its privatism, subjectivism, and moralism, and the failure of its teachers and clergy to lead the people. It is indeed an apocalyptic time, but the world must be left largely to its own devices in solving its problems. Philosophy can resolve this discord only in a manner appropriate to itself, by zealously guarding the truth, but it must recognize that its resolution is only partial. The community of Spirit as such is not passing away, but it does seem to be passing over from the ecclesiastical priesthood to the philosophical; if so, the truth of religion will live on in the philosophical community, in which it must now seek refuge.

24. In what follows we do not attend to the variant readings in W_2, some of which are significant. See nn. 248, 250, 256, 259.

b. The Lectures of 1824

Introduction

The Introduction is considerably expanded in the 1824 lectures and is divided into four sections, although only two of them are clearly marked (see 1824 lectures, n. 2). In the first section, Hegel enlarges upon his "definition of this religion" found at the beginning of the *Ms.* Against the danger of subjectivism in theology, of which he was especially cognizant in 1824,[25] Hegel stresses the objectivity and absoluteness of content of the Christian religion. The "absolute identity" of "infinite and finite spirit" is religion, and since it is the absolute that constitutes this identity—an identity that includes dialectically the element of difference—the absolute itself *is* religion. Since the consummate religion is the awareness of just this content, it is also the "absolute religion" (a title that Hegel employs more frequently in the 1824 Introduction than elsewhere). But the absolute is not simply an external object that lies permanently beyond subjective consciousness; rather it is present in a profound unity with the subject and is itself *absolute* or *infinite subjectivity.* In this way the "great advance" of our age—the turn to the subject—may be affirmed, but only when it is properly defined. The proper subject matter of religion is not the sensibility and feeling of the finite subject, which abandons any cognition of God, but the infinite self-consciousness of the absolute subject, which encompasses finite subjects within itself. If religion lacks divine content, then it will be filled with contingent, empirical content, and a similarity with "Roman times" arises; the comparison that Hegel made at the end of the *Ms.* is thus transferred to the beginning of Part III of the 1824 lectures.

Secs. 2 and 3 expand upon the other "characteristics" of this religion as adumbrated in Sec. 2 of the *Ms.* Introduction, namely,

25. Hegel has in mind the theology of feeling of Schleiermacher in particular but also of Jacobi and Fries. See Vol. 1, 1824 *Intro.*, n. 52; and 1824 *Concept,* nn. 20, 37. One consequence of surrendering all objective content in theology, in Hegel's view, was the turn to a purely historical attitude, which investigates what was said and done in the past but makes no judgments as to its truth or present-day validity. Theologians are like "countinghouse clerks" (Vol. 1:166). Thus we find not only an antisubjectivist but also an antihistoricist polemic in Hegel's 1824 lectures.

that it is the revelatory religion and the religion of truth, freedom, and reconciliation. The material is presented more clearly and in somewhat different form, but no new themes are introduced. The concluding brief survey of the relation of the consummate religion to the preceding religions (Sec. 4) anticipates a much fuller articulation in 1827; in the form presented in 1824, it has overtones of the stages of consciousness as delineated in the *Phenomenology of Spirit.*

The Metaphysical Concept of God

This is no longer the first moment of an outer triad but the first of the two main divisions of the 1824 lectures. The contrast between these divisions is between the *abstract* and the *concrete* concepts of God in the consummate religion. Abstractly, God is the absolute idea; concretely, he is the inward and outward self-mediation of absolute spirit, by which it "develops" and "actualizes" itself. But this distinction is not hard-and-fast, since even the "abstract" or "pure" or "metaphysical" concept must objectify or realize itself; precisely this is the proof of God's "being" or "existence."

Hegel's summary of the ontological proof in its classical (Anselmian) form and of the modern (Kantian) refutation of it is very similar to the text in the *Ms.*, especially to certain marginal passages that were added when he lectured in 1824. What is primarily new in 1824 is Hegel's attempt to go beyond the Anselmian form of the ontological proof and to develop a modern, post-Kantian version of it based on his own logic. The primary problem with Anselm's version is that it is circular: it presupposes metaphysical "perfection," that is, the unity of concept (thought) and being (reality), and therefore its conclusion is already contained in the presupposition. But the presupposition of the unity of thought and reality is precisely what is at issue in our time. This presupposition must be questioned, even though the modern presupposition that what is most real is sense experience is no more satisfactory. Today we must start from the *difference* between being and thinking, the real and the ideal, and show how their unity results only from the *negation of their antithesis.* Only in this fashion can it be *shown* (as opposed to being merely presupposed) that being is contained

in the concept. This is the case because the concept is a *movement* that determines itself to *be;* it is the process of "self-determination into being," it *realizes* itself, "it objectifies itself for itself." The self-objectification of the concept is the idea. "The *idea* is truth in itself and for itself—the absolute unity of the concept and objectivity."[26] Such an argument is based on Hegel's doctrine of the concept as elaborated in volume 2 of the *Science of Logic*[27]—the progression from subjectivity to objectivity to idea—but here he gives only the barest sketch of it and does not really present it in the form of a proof of the being of God. Perhaps he could assume that his students were familiar with its logical foundations, especially since he was lecturing on logic and metaphysics during the same term.

The Three Elements

We have already explained how and why the two triads of the *Ms.* become the "three elements" (or "forms") of the self-development of the idea of God in the 1824 lectures. Hegel himself alludes to this altered conception (see n. 68). At the outset he establishes a link with the preceding section by claiming that the "concrete" development and realization of the *idea* of God is a further specification of the impulse toward realization already present "abstractly" in the *concept* of God. He then proceeds to an exposition of the three elements or of the moments of the "divine history" by developing the distinctions involved in four different categorial frameworks, those of logic, consciousness, space, and time. Presumably he does this because of his insistence that the idea of God must be available not only to philosophers but also to ordinary religious folk, not only to conceptual thought but also to representational expression.

The four frameworks may be set forth in tabular form as shown on the following page.

Of the several observations that could be made about this schema, we shall limit ourselves to two. First, the logical category "particularization" (*Partikularisation*) seems intended to include both the "particularity" (*Besonderheit*) of nature and the individual

26. *Encyclopedia* (1830), § 213.
27. *Science of Logic,* pp. 575 ff. (*GW* 12:5 ff.).

Logic	*Subjective Consciousness*	*Space*	*Time*
Universality eternal being, within and present to self	Thought present to self in pure thought	Outside the World God in and for self in his own place	Eternity outside of time, time in and for itself
Particularization appearance, diremption, being for others (both natural and spiritual)	Representation consciousness in relation to others	World divine history as real, God's *Dasein* in the world	Past appearance in mere history, a "show"
Absolute Singularity return into self, absolute presence to self, being in and for self through others	Subjectivity thinking of free spirit	Inner Place community, cultus: relationship of finite spirit to absolute spirit	Present + Future spiritual now of individuals & community + future consummation in universality

"singularity" (*Einzelheit*) of finite spirit, so that the second and third phases of the inner triad of the *Ms.* are combined in the second moment of the divine history. The third moment of the latter, "*absolute* singularity," must be understood as the *infinite subjectivity* of absolute spirit, which is intrinsically *inter*subjective, encompassing all individual spirits in the single unity of the whole. It is singularity at a higher level, singularity "as such." The second observation is that the schema as a whole seems to represent an economic Trinity, the first moment of which comprises the inner-trinitarian relations (the immanent or preworldly Trinity), while the second and third moments reenact these inner relations in the real world of space and time (the *oikonomia*).

The First Element: The Idea of God In and For Itself

In the Christian religion, the "thinking" of God as he is in and for himself first takes the representational form of the doctrine of the *Trinity*. The problem with the terms "Trinity" and "triune" is that number-categories are applied to the infinite self-mediation

of absolute spirit, which can be properly grasped only in purely conceptual fashion. When numbers enter in, the understanding can see only contradictions and puzzles endlessly about how "three equals one." It cannot grasp the dialectic of love, life, friendship, personality.

Thus far, Hegel has not advanced much beyond the *Ms.* But now he makes the observation that reason can employ all the *relationships* of the understanding, but only insofar as it destroys the *forms* of the understanding. The "forms" by which the understanding expresses the trinitarian "relationships" are above all the three "persons" of "Father," "Son," and "Spirit." In themselves, these are childlike (*kindlich*), figurative (*bildlich*) ways of expressing a relationship, and they must be destroyed insofar as they suggest that what we have are three persons rather than personhood as such, which is constituted by inward and outward relationships. But beyond the destruction is a retrieval or a translation; the relations symbolized by the persons can be reformulated logically. The "Father" is the universal, the all-encompassing, the One; the "Son" is infinite particularity, God in the mode of appearance; the "Spirit" is singularity as such, that is, infinite or absolute singularity. But in truth all three are *spirit;* the third is also the first. Here we must shift from the religious to the philosophical understanding of *Geist.* Absolute spirit is a "process" that it itself "works through" but that gives rise to nothing new. What is brought forth is already there from the beginning; it is "presupposed," and spirit is its own "presupposing" (see nn. 66, 90, 93). The differentiation that the divine life goes through is not an external process but solely inward, "a play of self-maintenance." The reenactment of this process outwardly is a matter not of the doctrine of the Trinity in the strict sense, as Hegel sees it, but of the second and third elements.

Much of the actual content of the first element in the 1824 lectures, as in the *Ms.*, is concerned with the "hints and traces" of the Trinity found in the Trimurti, in Plato and Aristotle, and in the pre-Christian and early-Christian Gnostics. While these anticipate the true category, Hegel's intention now is to expose more clearly their deficiencies, using as his criterion the logical definition just worked out.

The Second Element: Representation, Appearance

"This is the element of representation as such or of appearance," writes Hegel, but other terms could also be used to characterize the second element such as "particularization" or "diremption." The element as a whole is divided into two phases, which we have characterized as "differentiation" (*Unterscheidung*) and "reconciliation" (*Versöhnung*), following clues in the text. The distinction is not between nature and finite spirit, as in the *Ms.*, for reasons given above. The phase of differentiation (Sec. 1) corresponds to both Sec. B.b and Sec. B.c.α of the *Ms.*, while reconciliation (Sec. 2) corresponds to *Ms.* Sec. B.c.β.

We have further divided Sec. 1 into four subsections (a-d), although there are no such markings in the Griesheim transcript. Sec. 1.a is a revised version of *Ms.* Sec. B.b. We have given it the title it bears because Hegel begins by distinguishing between and comparing differentiation *within* the divine life (here he simply recapitulates what already has been said about the immanent Trinity) and differentiation *in* the world. The former ("the eternal Son") is the element of self-differentiation within an unbroken identity, while the latter is a *positing* of the distinction as such, a going forth, an appearing of God in the realm of finitude. The treatment here is even briefer than in the *Ms.*

Secs. 1.b-d contain a reworking of *Ms.* Sec. B.c.α. Hegel starts by asking in what sense we can speak of humanity as either good or evil "by nature." The answer is that we are not good or evil by nature but only in and through *cognition,* although cognition itself is not evil. What cognition entails is essentially a *cleavage, rupture,* or *severance* (*Entzweiung*)[28] within the self and from whatever is outside the self; the "divided will" of Romans 7 is probably in Hegel's mind at this point (see n. 127). The evil that results from cleavage is the consciousness of "being-for-myself" in opposition both to external nature and to the inward universal. It means "singularizing myself in a way that cuts me off from the universal." But such "singularization" (*Vereinzelung*) is a necessary step in the

28. On the comparison of the terms *Entzweiung* and *Entfremdung,* see *Ms.* n. 90.

process of becoming a self, a single individual (*Einzelheit*). Humanity, in order to become human, "has to progress to this antithesis of being-for-self as such." Thus evil is a dialectically necessary step in the process of humanization. Cleavage "is what produces the disease and is at the same time the source of health." Cognition is the principle of spirituality: it both occasions the "injury of separation" and heals it. It is the principle of divinity in humanity—which even God recognizes when, communing with himself, he says, "See, Adam has become like one of us." This is the essential meaning of the story of the fall. In contrast with the *Ms.,* in 1824 Hegel engages in an extended speculative discussion of these matters, losing touch almost completely with the text of the biblical story.

The division of Sec. 2 ("Reconciliation") into three subsections is guided by the summary that Hegel gives toward the end of it, namely, that the three moments are the idea of reconciliation (the *concept* of this standpoint for consciousness), the historical presence of Christ (what is *given* to this standpoint, what actually exists for the community), and the transition to spiritual presence (i.e., to the community) (see n. 156).

The first of these (Sec. 2.a) combines points (α) and (β) of *Ms.* Sec. B.c.β. Although Hegel does not express it quite this way, it presents an argument for the *possibility, necessity,* and *actuality* of the incarnation, that is, of the "appearance" of the idea of reconciliation in a single individual. If we ask, "What is it that effects reconciliation?" the answer is that the apparent "incompatibility" between the cloven, evil subject and the infinite God is not the "truth"; the truth is the *unity*—the implicit unity—of divine and human nature, of infinite and finite. This is the necessary "presupposition," the condition of possibility, for the occurrence of divine-human reconciliation, without which it would be ontologically impossible. Philosophy must not simply accept this presupposition but must demonstrate it, this being the task of speculative logic.

But then a second question may be posed: "Cannot the subject bring about this reconciliation by itself, through its own efforts, its own activity?" In the first place, any such activity presupposes the

divine-human unity, which cannot itself be posited by the subject (any more than the moral world order can be posited by doing good deeds). The truth of this unity must therefore *appear* to the subject. But *how* can it appear to humanity in the latter's present condition of immediacy, rupture, evil, anguish, being-within-self, and so on? It is *God* who appears, the concrete God, in sensible presence, in the shape of the singular human being, which is the one and only sensible shape of spirit. (Lacking from the argument at this point is any real explanation of why the appearance must be *sensible* and *singular*.) A second aspect of the question of necessity concerns the being of God as distinct from the condition of humanity: "God, considered in terms of his eternal idea, *has* to generate the Son, has to distinguish himself from himself." This has already been established in the first element and is founded in trinitarian dialectics.

Finally we may ask whether God has appeared in *this* particular human being at *this* time and in *this* place. This is what we have called the question of actuality, requiring historical rather than philosophical considerations. We may be able to show, from the course of world history, that the "time had come." But an actual proof that this particular human being is the one in whom God has appeared requires a proof of the Spirit rather than a proof of history, since only the community of faith is able to affirm and confirm that God was sensibly present in this individual.

The next question concerns the *content* that presents itself in this appearance. It is "the divine history as that of a single self-consciousness which has united divine and human nature within itself." The first aspect of this history is the single, immediate human being in whom it is believed that this has occurred, "in all his contingency, in the whole range of temporal relationships and conditions." This is what is taken up in the next section (b), which focuses on the teaching of Christ. Hegel no longer suggests, as he does in the corresponding section of the *Ms.* (B.c.β(γ)), that this external, sensible history and this teaching offer a kind of verification of what is claimed to be true about him by the community. In 1824 his polemic against the historicizers seems to have altered

his evaluation of the significance of historical information about Christ. The presentation of the teaching of Christ is briefer than that in the *Ms.* but similar to it.

It is not primarily the *teaching* that mediates the content that presents itself in this appearance; nor is it the *life* of Christ (see n. 145), nor is it even his *passion* and *death*. The first part of the final section (c) is based on point (δ) of *Ms.* Sec. B.c.β, but its discussion of the death of Christ is quite brief and does not attribute the same significance to it that the *Ms.* does.

Rather, the focus for the 1824 lectures, beginning with the third paragraph of the final section, is on the "transition [from sensible] to spiritual presence." Here Hegel draws upon and reorganizes material not only from *Ms.* Sec. B.c.β(ε) but also from the transitional section at the beginning of *Ms.* Sec. C, "Standpoint of the Community in General." For the spiritual community, immediate presence has passed away, and the community itself is formed with the passage from the sensible presence of Christ to the presence of God in the Spirit—the "Comforter" who can come only when sensible history in its immediacy has passed by. The Son "has been raised up to the right hand of God." To say this means that in his history the nature of God is accomplished; his story is the story of God. But only the community can say this: it *identifies* him or *recognizes* him as the one who has been raised up, not as him who was once here in sense experience. Therefore all sensory verification falls away, including the miraculous proofs. "We have already discussed that"—indeed, at great length in the treatment of the cultus at the end of Part I of the 1824 lectures (Sec. B.3.b); here only a brief reminder is necessary. The proper way to preserve sensible presence is to let it pass away, because by its very nature it is singular and momentary and cannot be repeated but only remembered. Means of repeating and prolonging it are readily available when needed (relics, holy images, etc.), but they engender an illusion and the spiritual community should have no need of them.

The Third Element: Community, Spirit

The relation of the "third element" in 1824 and 1827 to Sec. C of the *Ms.* has already been considered. The *Ms.*'s transitional in-

troduction on "the standpoint of the community in general" is dispersed into the last section of the second element and the first section of the third element in 1824 and 1827. In both of the later lectures, the final element is divided into three sections, concerning the "origin," "subsistence," and "realization" of the community. The first two correspond to *Ms.* Secs. C.α and C.β, respectively. The third section replaces *Ms.* Sec. C.γ, "the passing away of the community," although some of its content is anticipated by the discussion of the antinomy between freedom and grace at the end of *Ms.* Sec. C.β. Hegel no longer speaks of the "passing away" of the community; rather it seems to be "passing over" into various forms of worldly, reflective, and conceptual "realization," in the process of which the community itself will be "transformed."

Sec. C.1 on the "origin of the community" evidences Hegel's continuing preoccupation with the question of the transition from sensible to spiritual presence, or the question of the sense in which faith has a historical foundation and/or verification. Much of this material is repetitive, but some points are brought out more clearly than before. Hegel insists that "sensible history constitutes the point of departure for spirit," and that accordingly the faith of the community began from the individual founder. But "that single human being is transformed by the community; he is known as God, characterized as the Son of God." His "entanglement" with finitude and temporal history is cast off, and the content that is mediated by him sensibly is transposed into spiritual, universal truth. "Having left that starting point behind, spirit now stands on a soil of quite a different worth." Thus there can be no question of a sensible verification based on miracles, for such "proofs" must themselves be verified; but then an "infinite number of objections" can be raised, and at best only a relative certainty is attainable. Yet "the church has been right to condemn the attack upon the miracles, the resurrection, etc., because such attacks entail the assumption that these things are what establish that Christ is the Son of God." Hegel concludes this section with the famous statement that "the simply present content" of spirit can be justified only by philosophy, not by history. "What spirit does is no history [*Historie*]" (see n. 190). Spirit is of course in essence a historical (*geschichtlich*)

process, and religious faith has of necessity a sensible, historical foundation, but the *truth* of faith and of spirit cannot be proved by historical (*historisch*) investigations of past events. The only proof is the witness of the Spirit, the pouring out of which is the origin of the community. Hegel's position on this question can be expressed in surprisingly Kierkegaardian terms: faith *does* have a "historical point of departure," but it is not possible "to base an eternal happiness upon historical knowledge."[29]

Sec. C.2 on the "subsistence" of the community is similar to the discussion of the "being" of the community in the *Ms.*, even though it is structured differently. The question is how the content of faith is *accomplished* in and for the individual; the answer is through the sacrament of *baptism,* the *rebirth* of the individual by means of doctrine or teaching, and the *partaking* of divine reconciliation through the sacrament of communion.

The final section of the 1824 lectures (C.3) expands certain elements in Sec. C.β of the *Ms.* and replaces Sec. C.γ entirely. Over against the inwardness and spirituality of the community stands a multifaceted objective reality, which opposes or resists reconciliation in various ways, but within which faith must realize itself. Such a "realization of faith" also entails a "transformation of the community."

The first aspect of this objective reality is the external, immediate world, symbolized by the natural heart with all of its passions, self-seeking, and corruption. When it takes upon itself these worldly passions and inclinations, the community becomes a *church,* which both falls into worldliness and struggles against it. Thus the realization of faith in the church remains ambiguous.

The second aspect of objective reality confronting faith is what Hegel calls "reflection," that is, the reflective philosophy of subjectivity of the Enlightenment (n. 204). The reflective critique of religion, which challenges the validity of religion's central symbols

29. See the question on the title page of Søren Kierkegaard's *Philosophical Fragments,* trans. D. F. Swenson (Princeton, 1936). In the background, of course, is Lessing's "ugly, broad ditch": "accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason" (G. E. Lessing, *On the Proof of the Spirit and of Power,* in *Lessing's Theological Writings,* trans. H. Chadwick [Stanford, 1957], pp. 53, 55).

and thought-processes as well as its authority, leads in the direction of subjectivism, secularism, deism, and finally atheism, since everything is reduced to a reflection of finite mind, and heart and heaven are "emptied" of objective content. Reflection is an abstract kind of thinking, which cannot tolerate dialectical distinctions and relations. It oscillates between the abstract and empty self-identity of the subject and the equally empty beyond, the "supreme being" of deism. It is encountered in two forms in the modern world, according to Hegel: on the one hand, the ideology of Enlightenment rationalism, which is intrinsically antireligious (n. 207); and on the other, Islamic religion, which is fanatically religious, submerging the human subject totally in the one, absolute God (on Hegel's treatment of Islam, and the comparison of it with the Enlightenment, see nn. 210, 213, 215). Despite the hostility of rationalism toward Christianity, there *is* a realization of faith here, since at least the principle of subjective freedom comes to consciousness in it, and the inwardness of the community is now developed within itself. (A comparable statement is not made with reference to Islam: here Christianity simply "finds its antithesis.")

Against the attacks of reflection, religious content may take refuge in the concept, which is the third and most valid form of the realization of faith. Speculative philosophy finds itself opposed by both the church and the Enlightenment—by the former because it refuses to be bound to the forms of representation and the authority of tradition; by the latter because it refuses to renounce the truth or be indifferent toward religious content. Its goal is to cognize God, in comparison with which nothing else is worth troubling about. Philosophy, then, shows forth the rational content of religion (of the Christian religion in particular), and the purpose of these lectures has been "to reconcile reason with religion in its manifold forms, and to recognize them as at least necessary" (a phrase reminiscent of the *Ms. Concept,* Vol. 1:198). The conclusion, while not nearly as dramatic as in the *Ms.,* does reaffirm that the conceptual cognition of religion has now devolved upon the community of philosophy, the "third estate," which is not as universal as the first or as popular as the second, but is the custodian of the truth (see n. 224).

c. The Lectures of 1827

Introduction

The brief opening section goes back to the definition of the consummate religion found in the *Ms.*, avoiding the expansion that occurred in the 1824 lectures. The polemic of the latter against the subjectivism and historicism of present-day theology is now past, and a new adversary is on the scene in the form of an antispeculative Neopietism, which has brought the charge of pantheism—or even worse, atheism—against Hegel's philosophy of religion.[30] One aspect of this charge is that speculative philosophy does not take finite, "positive," historical reality seriously but simply identifies the world with God. Hegel is essentially responding to this charge in the new and lengthy introductory section on "the positivity and spirituality" of the Christian religion (see 1827 lectures, n. 6). Thus at some points the 1827 lectures emphasize the very things that were deemphasized in 1824 in the struggle against those who vacate religion of all cognitive content and reduce theology to merely historical studies.

It is now necessary to say that the absolute religion is both *revelatory* and *revealed:* that is, not only is the absolute truth made open and manifest in it, but also this truth has come to humanity from without, in positive, historical fashion. This is true not just of religion but of everything with spiritual or rational content—ethics, laws, scientific discoveries, and so on. "Everything that is *for* consciousness is *objective* to consciousness. Everything must become to us from outside." But the validity or truth of the content is not constituted by positivity as such but by its conformity to what is rational or conceptual. "The spiritual . . . cannot be directly verified by the unspiritual, the sensible." Thus we find already in religion itself a critique of proofs based on miracles, and we are led to the insight that the only true verification is by the witness of spirit. Hegel understands the witness of the *Holy* Spirit to occur in

30. See Vol. 1, 1827 *Intro.*, nn. 17, 18; 1827 *Concept*, n. 20. These charges were brought especially by F. A. G. Tholuck, *Die Lehre von der Sünde und vom Versöhner*, 2d ed. (Hamburg, 1825); and *Die speculative Trinitätslehre des späteren Orients* (Berlin, 1826). See also Anonymous [Hülsemann], *Ueber die Hegelsche Lehre, oder: Absolutes Wissen und moderner Pantheismus* (Leipzig, 1829).

and through the witness of *our* spirit to spiritual truth (see n. 16).[31] This can occur in diverse ways, ranging from a kind of preconscious "resonance" to the good and the true to the conceptual system of philosophy. But "it is not required that for all of humanity the truth be brought forth in a philosophical way." For some people, indeed for most, belief on the basis of authority and testimonies still has a place.

The Bible is for Christians the fundamental basis that strikes a chord within them; but, although many people lead pious lives just by holding to it, we must move beyond it to thought, that is, to theology. Indeed, this is unavoidable once attempts are made to interpret the *meaning* of the words of the Bible. Presuppositions are brought in that are not in the Bible itself. Present-day presuppositions such as that humanity is good by nature or that God cannot be cognized make it exceedingly difficult to interpret the Bible, and it is necessary to work through these presuppositions critically and conceptually: that is the task of philosophy. Similarly, the fundamental doctrines of Christianity have by and large disappeared from present-day dogmatics because of its presuppositions, and it is now philosophy that is orthodox, maintaining and preserving the basic truths of Christianity. Hegel ends this second section with the well-known statement that "we" shall not set to work in "merely historical" (*historisch*) fashion but rather shall proceed "conceptually" or "scientifically" (n. 41). Thus, while attending to historical starting points and historical details, these must finally be "put aside" in the speculative redescription of the truth of this religion.

The third introductory section, "Survey of Previous Developments," is also new in 1827, expanding upon a brief concluding treatment of the relation to previous religions in 1824, and building upon the surveys found in the discussion of the theoretical and practical aspects of the concept of religion in Part I of the 1824 lectures. The survey is based on a logical grasp of the dialectics of the relation of finite and infinite, which yields the insight that the "elevation" of the finite to the infinite is at the same time the return

31. See also Vol. 1:337 n. 149.

of the infinite to itself (n. 44). "Our" treatment begins with the concept of religion, then advances to the realization or actualization of the concept as "idea." The idea first appears in the form of immediacy, or the *natural religions* (n. 49), a second phase of which involves the withdrawal-into-self of spirit from its submersion in the natural (Buddhism, Hinduism, n. 50). The second main stage in the development of religion is *spiritual religion,* for which the natural is not an independent content but only the appearance of something inward. This inwardness is for Greek religion the beautiful human form and soul, and for Jewish religion the one spiritual, personal God ("who first merits for us the name of God") (see nn. 52, 55). Finally, there is the *religion of purposiveness* or Roman religion (n. 56), which represents a phase distinct from spiritual religion, and indeed does not understand the gods as spiritual subjectivities but rather as abstractions instrumental to the well-being of the state.

Before completing this section, Hegel offers yet another version of the argument based on the logic of the concept: the concept becomes spirit only insofar as it has traversed these finite forms, has achieved determinacy through this circuit. At first, spirit is only a presupposition; it comes to be spirit only through the circuit of self-diremption and self-return. The absolute *idea* is the implicit unity of concept and reality (objectivity); it comes to be *spirit* when this unity has been actualized. At this point Hegel is incorporating elements of the ontological proof, which establishes the identity of concept and objectivity, thinking and being, in terms of the self-mediation of the concept. The ontological proof itself is missing from Part III of the 1827 lectures, having been transferred to Part I along with the other proofs. But traces of it are still discernible in the old location.

The removal of the ontological proof means that the "Division of the Subject" becomes the final section of the Introduction. Of the four categorial frameworks used to articulate this division in the 1824 lectures, Hegel starts with that of subjective consciousness in 1827. The "three ways by which the subject is related to God," or the "three modes of God's determinate being for subjective spirit," are (1) thought or thinking, (2) sensible intuition and rep-

resentation, (3) sensibility and subjectivity. He then repeats the division in a way that draws together the categories of logic and space-time: (1) Universality—the absolute, eternal idea in and for itself, God in his eternity before the creation of the world and outside the world; (2) Particularity: God creates the world of nature and finite spirit, first positing the separation, then reconciling what is alien to himself; (3) Singularity: through this process of reconciliation, God is the Holy Spirit, the Spirit present in its community. This schema makes it clear that reconciliation is a process that begins in the second moment and reaches its consummation in the third.

The First Element: The Idea of God In and For Itself

The treatment of the Trinity is quite lengthy in 1827 (n. 68), but it is no more clearly organized than in the earlier lectures. Well into the section, Hegel offers an inclusive definition of the triune God in speculative categories, which could helpfully have been placed at the beginning: "God in his eternal universality is the one who distinguishes himself, determines himself, posits an other to himself, and likewise sublates the distinction, thereby remaining present to himself, and is spirit only through this process of being brought forth." We can express this in the mode of sensibility by saying that "God is love," for "love is a distinguishing of two, who nevertheless are absolutely not distinguished for each other." Thus God as love "is this distinguishing and the nullity of the distinction, a play of distinctions in which there is nothing serious, distinction precisely as sublated, i.e., the simple, eternal idea" (n. 71). This obviously has reference to the immanent Trinity; the economic or worldly Trinity, God's relation to otherness *ad extra,* involves (we might say) a play of distinctions that is "deadly serious"—to the extremity of death on the cross, which is the death of God.

Much of this section is devoted to the argument that the speculative idea of God cannot be grasped by the categories of sense experience or of the understanding, for neither is able to grasp the speculative truth of *identity in difference.* For the understanding, God is either an abstract, undifferentiated monad or a sum of distinct and mutually contradictory predicates that express God's

relation to himself or to the world. For sensible consideration and the understanding, the Trinity remains an impenetrable μυστήριον, as does life itself, with its alternation of distinction, contradiction, and annulment. The situation is not eased by the fact that, "because religion is the truth for everyone," the content of the divine idea appears in forms accessible to sense experience and understanding, namely, the symbols of the trinitarian "persons." The understanding is baffled by the seeming contradiction that there is one God, yet three divine persons—even though personality, too, has this dialectic of identity and difference within itself ("the truth of personality is found precisely in winning it back through this immersion . . . in the other").

The conclusion of the section is taken up by an expanded discussion of anticipations of the triad as the true category in earlier religions. The main thing to know is that "these fermentations of an idea" (n. 105), "wild as they are, are rational." Jacob Boehme knew this because he recognized that the Trinity is the universal foundation of everything, and he perceived traces of it "in everything and everywhere," even though his way of representing this was "rather wild and fanciful." Hegel's own agenda, especially in the 1827 lectures, might be understood as that of demonstrating traces of the Trinity in everything by showing the rational, dialectical structure of all reality. Thus the idea of the triune God is not an impenetrable mystery or mere theological "decoration," as was being suggested by recent attacks on the Trinity to which Hegel was at pains to respond.[32]

The Second Element: Representation, Appearance

The arrangement of the second element in 1827 is similar to that of 1824, with one exception (n. 118), and we have adopted the same section headings for both lecture series.

Sec. 1.a is presented more clearly than in the earlier lectures. Differentiation within the divine life is basically a matter of the inner-trinitarian dialectic: "the act of differentiation is only a movement, a play of love with itself, which does not arrive at the seriousness of other-being, of separation and rupture." In this state it

32. See above, n. 30; also Vol. 1, 1824 *Intro.*, n. 34.

is still only an abstract distinction, lacking realization and reality. But it belongs to the absolute *freedom* of the divine idea that, "in its act of determining and dividing, it *releases* the other to exist as a free and independent being. The other, released as something free and independent, is *the world* as such." In other words, because otherness is already a (sublated) moment within the divine idea, the idea is free to allow this its own *other* also to obtain "the determinacy of other-*being,* of an actual entity," without losing itself or giving itself up. It can give freedom and independent existence to the other without losing its own freedom: "It is only for the being that is free that freedom *is.*" This independence, however, is not autonomy: the truth of the world is its *ideality,* not its reality; it is something posited or created, and has being, so to speak, only for an instant. Its destiny is to sublate this separation and estrangement from God and return to its origin. Hence the second element as a whole is "the process of the world in love by which it passes over from fall and separation into reconciliation."

The analysis of the creation and fall of humanity, of good and evil, and of knowledge and estrangement in the next three sections is also presented more clearly than in either the 1824 or 1821 lectures. The section on "natural humanity" (1.b) focuses on the ambiguity in the statements that humanity is good or evil "by nature." Humanity is *implicitly* good because created in the divine image; but the human vocation is not to remain in the condition of implicitness. If it does, if it chooses to do so, to exist according to nature, then it is evil; but likewise, passing beyond the natural state is what first constitutes the cleavage, which in turn introduces evil. The story of the "fall" is discussed next (1.c), for the reasons indicated in n. 138. Hegel once again attends to the details of the story, as he did in the *Ms.,* but his concern is not so much to highlight its "contradictions" as to extract the conceptual truth hidden in its representational form—the truth about the involvement of the whole of humanity, about knowledge, about labor, and about immortality.

These themes are drawn together and brought to a conclusion in the final section (1.d), which we have called "Knowledge, Estrangement, and Evil." The linkage between these terms is a com-

plex and important matter in Hegel's thought. Cognitive knowledge (*Erkenntnis*) entails an act of judgment or primal division (*Ur-teil*); it thus issues in separation, cleavage, rupture into two (*Ent-zweiung*) (n. 141). This cleavage or estrangement (*Entfremdung*)—the words are quite similar, n. 138—is not, strictly speaking, in itself evil, but rather is the inherent condition of finite spirit just because it is consciousness and cognizes, but finitely, that is, is unable finally to overcome the divisions posited by its acts of knowing. It involves evil potentially, however, since self-seeking is necessarily one aspect of what is known, cognized, experienced. Thus it is the *precondition* or *occasion* of evil, since evil entails the conscious or deliberate actualization of the state of separation, the choice to live in isolation from the depths of spirit, to cut oneself off from both the universal and the particular, to gratify immediate desires, to exist "according to nature" (*nach der Natur*). Yet self-rupture or self-estrangement gives rise not only to evil but also to the need for reconciliation, which may be seen when estrangement is associated with the anguish (*Schmerz*) of Jewish religion and the misery or unhappiness (*Unglück*) of Hellenistic-Roman culture. This is a matter emphasized in a special way by the 1827 lectures. Anguish arises from the awareness of the seemingly unbridgeable gulf between the infinite and the finite, the good God and evil humanity, whereas misery expresses the awareness of the inability of human beings to find true happiness in finite and worldly ends. When the awareness of estrangement and evil had intensified to the extreme degree—or "when the time had fully come"—there arose a recognition of the need for a reconciliation that is universal, divine, and infinite.

In Sec. 2 of the "Second Element," Hegel turns specifically to the theme of reconciliation, for which he has so carefully prepared the soil. In the first subsection (a), he addresses the question of why the idea of reconciliation can appear and must appear in a single historical individual. The argument is similar to that presented in 1824. The *condition of possibility* for reconciliation is that the antithesis between divinity and humanity is already implicitly sublated. Because other-being or difference is already present within the divine idea (indeed, is what makes it *spirit*), "the other-being, the finitude, the weakness, the frailty of human nature is not to do

any harm to that divine unity which forms the substance of reconciliation." The *necessity* of a divinely mediated reconciliation has already been considered at some length: the subject is aware of the incongruity, of the *need* for reconciliation, but cannot bring it about on its own account. The necessity that reconciliation should appear in a single historical individual is grounded in the fact that it must be brought forth not merely for the standpoint of philosophical speculation but in a form accessible to the whole of humanity, namely, the form of *sensible certainty.* Therefore, "God *had* to appear in the world in the flesh"—not just flesh as such, which would be an abstraction, but the flesh of *singular* human being. *Many* or even *several* single incarnations will not do, however, because what is involved here is something that stands *over against* immediate, subjective consciousness in its condition of need. "The unity in question must appear for others as a singular human being *set apart;* it is not present in the others, but only in *one* from whom all the others are excluded." This one is the human being who is what humanity implicitly is (*das Ansich,* n. 172), humanity in itself as such (*der Mensch an sich,* n. 171); there can be only one such ultimate. For this one, the church has used the "monstrous compound," the "God-man."

The question of *actuality* ("*Who was* this one individual?") is reserved to the next subsection (b). Upon addressing this question in 1827, Hegel initially makes a quite sharp distinction between a "nonreligious" and a "religious" perspective. The nonreligious perspective views Christ as an ordinary human being in accord with his external circumstances; it views him as a Socrates, a teacher of humanity, a martyr to the truth. Yet it must be said that, as Hegel proceeds to expound the nonreligious perspective, the distinction between it and the religious perspective becomes blurred. Although Christ is born and has needs like all other human beings, he does not share the corruption and evil inclinations of others or pursue worldly affairs. "Rather he lives only for the truth, only for its proclamation." He *is,* his identity is in, his teaching. Hegel's presentation of the teaching must go back to the *Ms.,* since it is fuller than in 1824, and the same argument is implicitly present, namely, that this is not such an ordinary teacher after all. Christ speaks not

merely as a teacher but as a prophet, that is, as one who expresses the demand *immediately* from God, and by whom God himself speaks it and confirms it. The one who says this is essentially human, but his is an essential humanity in which essential divinity is present. "It is the Son of Man who speaks thus, in whom this expression, this activity of what subsists in and for itself, is essentially the work of God—not as something suprahuman that appears in the shape of an external revelation, but rather as [God's] working in a human being, so that the divine presence is essentially identical with this human being." If this much can be said from the nonreligious perspective—and Hegel insists that this is all that is involved so far—then the "nonreligious" history of Christ does seem to offer a kind of attestation of the truth of the religious perspective, the witness of spirit that God is definitively and reconcilingly present in this individual. On the one hand Hegel is guarding against historical proofs, in accord with the predominant emphasis of the 1824 lectures; but on the other hand he is holding on to the religious and philosophical significance of this particular history in its specificity and detail, thus harking back to a leitmotiv of the *Ms.*

The death of Christ can also be viewed from the nonreligious perspective: he died as a martyr to the truth, who sealed his faith and his teaching by the manner of his death (see the end of Sec. b and n. 196). But his death also inaugurates the transition into the religious sphere, and this is the topic taken up in Sec. c. "Comprehended spiritually," the death of Christ "becomes the means of salvation, the focal point of reconciliation." The "Lutheran" statement, "God himself is dead," represents a spiritual interpretation, because it means that everything human, fragile, and finite is a moment of the divine, that "God himself is involved in this," and that what is happening is a "stripping away" of the human element, an entrance into glory.

When the history of the life and death of Christ obtains a spiritual interpretation, there begins "the history of the resurrection and ascension of Christ to the right hand of God." Since the community of faith also begins at this point, we must assume that the history of the resurrection and the history of the community are in some sense coterminous, although Hegel does not elaborate. The com-

munity is founded on the consciousness and certainty of divine-human unity and divine reconciliation. For it, Christ's history is a "divine history," "the eternal history, the eternal movement, which God himself is." To say that "Christ has died for all" is to understand this not as an individual act but as a moment in the divine history, the moment in which other-being and separation are sublated. All this is predicated on the witness of the Spirit, but the point is not as heavily stressed in 1827 as in 1824.

The Third Element: Community, Spirit

The third element is briefer in the 1827 lectures than in 1824 and 1821; Hegel had run out of time, with only two lectures remaining before the end of the semester (n. 212). In Sec. 1, on the "origin of the community," the matter of the verification of faith could be passed over lightly since it had already been considered in Sec. 2 of the Introduction to Part III, and Hegel was no longer as preoccupied with the polemic against historical proofs based on miracles and other testimonies as he had been in 1824.[33] Instead of this he introduces a new theme, namely, that the community "begins with the fact that the truth is at hand"—the truth that God is a triune God (the recurring affirmation of which is, as we have seen, a leitmotiv of the 1827 lectures). Faith is the inward, subjective appropriation of this truth, the truth that reconciliation is accomplished with certainty by the self-mediation of the triune God. The difficulty residing in the fact that faith is initially the act of single individuals is overcome by taking finite subjectivity up into the infinite subjectivity of the absolute (or Holy) Spirit, which is no longer isolated and singular. Individual human subjects are, as it were, "essentialized" in the transfigured intersubjectivity of the spiritual community.[34]

33. An interesting twist between 1824 and 1827 is that in the former year Hegel argued that the church has been right to condemn the attack upon miracles, the resurrection, etc., while in the latter year he argued that it has been right to refuse to acknowledge investigations into such matters. The reason is the same in both cases: these things, whether confirmed or questioned, do not establish the truth about Christ.

34. The language here is not exactly Hegel's, but the content is. What Hegel says is that individual subjects still do not exist in a way appropriate to their "inward,

The community as *realized* or *subsisting* (Sec. 2) is the *church,* which is the "institution whereby its subjects come to the truth." The foremost of its institutions is *doctrine,* which is now something presupposed, fixed, taught as universally valid and authoritative. The church is essentially a teaching church. No longer is a person elevated to the absolute by the outpouring of the Holy Spirit; rather he or she is instructed by the appropriate authorities, and this instruction must be assimilated in a process of education and cultivation. The individual partakes of the truth of reconciliation qua individual through the rite of *baptism;* one's transgressions are wiped out through the practice of *repentance* or *penitence;* and believers appropriate God's presence in the sacrament of *Holy Communion.*

Sec. 3, the "realization of the spirituality of the community" in universal actuality, is built upon the corresponding section in 1824, but its structure is worked out in a more rigorously logical form, and the contents are unusually suggestive (Hegel's final lecture [n. 242] was tightly packed!). Reconciliation must be actualized not only in the individual heart and in the church but also in the world in the form of rational freedom. The "community" should not remain simply ecclesiastical, nor will it simply pass away; rather it is to become a world-historical community. Three moments of this realization may be distinguished, which are not only logical types but also historical stages:

(a) The first is *real,* or reconciliation in *life,* worldly realization as such. This moment, in turn, is composed of three stages: that of immediacy or renunciation of the world, inner religiousness (primitive Christianity); that in which religiosity and worldliness remain external to each other, and the church has dominion over the world yet takes worldliness into itself (the medieval Catholic church); and

substantial, essentiality," and that in reconciliation, finitude is reduced to an "inessential" state. The language of "essentialization" comes from Friedrich Schelling and has been adopted by Paul Tillich, who also employs the expression "spiritual community." See Tillich, *Systematic Theology,* vol. 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 149 ff., 400 ff. See also Hegel's statement in the 1831 lectures that in the life of the community the "privatism" of individuals is "consumed" (n. 258).

that in which religion and world are reconciled in the "ethical realm" (n. 249), where the principle of freedom has penetrated into ethical life and its institutions of family, civil society, and state (the modern secular-bourgeois world).

(b) The second moment of realization is *ideal,* or reconciliation in *thought.* In the modern world this takes two forms (see n. 261). The first is that of the philosophy of the *Enlightenment.* Since its principle is one of abstract identity, it is directed not merely against externality but also against everything that is concrete—including the idea of the triune God. Since nothing concrete can be known of God, God is not known at all, and the Enlightenment ends with the "servitude of spirit in the absolute region of freedom." The other form is that of *Pietism*—"an inward weaving of spirit within itself," the pious life of feeling, which acknowledges no objective truth and which is "turned polemically against the philosophy that wants cognition." It was from this quarter that Hegel found himself attacked for his "pantheism" and speculative trinitarianism, and this attack served as the polemical context for the whole of the 1827 lectures. Thus it is not surprising that in 1827 he substituted a counterattack on Neopietism ("subjectivity devoid of content") for the treatment of Islamic religion that stood in this place in 1824.

(c) The third and final moment is the *ideal-real:* subjectivity develops beyond itself in accord with the necessity of the content, which is objective. This is the standpoint of *speculative philosophy,* according to which "the content takes refuge in the concept and obtains its justification by thinking" (see n. 262). Here we find the true mediation of content and concept, of reality and thought, of the real and the ideal. Such a philosophical mediation is the justification of religion by showing how the content of religion accords with reason. Philosophy "is to this extent theology" because it presents the reconciliation of God with himself and with the otherness of nature and finite spirit—the "peace of God" that does not "surpass all reason" (n. 266) but is what reason is all about.

d. The Lectures of 1831

The excerpts by Strauss are supplemented by a number of substantial passages from the *Werke* (see 1831 *Excerpts,* n. 1), to which

reference is made in the following analysis. Since these passages were transmitted by the *Werke* primarily because they represent points at which the 1831 lectures differ from or supplement the earlier lectures, they are especially useful for our purposes. Where 1831 text closely parallels 1827 text, we may assume that the *Werke* preferred the generally fuller 1827 version or conflated the sources into a text that differs in minor details from the pure 1827 text transmitted by Lasson.

Introduction

The Introduction appears to treat two themes briefly: the definition of the consummate or revelatory religion, and the transition to this stage. Gone is the lengthy discussion of the positivity and spirituality of this religion (1827 lectures, Sec. 2), as well as the survey of previous developments (Sec. 3). Hegel may have appended such a survey to the end of Part II in 1831 since there is an allusion to it in the introductory paragraph transmitted by the *Werke* (1827 lectures, n. 3). The latter also indicates that in 1831 Hegel defines religion as the *self-consciousness of God.* The God who distinguishes himself from himself and is an object for himself, while at the same time remaining identical with himself, knows himself in a consciousness that is distinct from him; therefore finite consciousness is itself a moment in the divine process.

The Abstract Concept of God

Since in 1831 Hegel is once again treating the proofs of the "existence" of God in relation to the various historical religions, the proper locus of the ontological proof is the Christian religion, and the 1831 lectures return to the structural arrangement of 1824, even though their content is similar to 1827. Fortunately, the *Werke* gives the full text of this section in an appendix at the end of volume 12 (see *Ontological Proof,* n. 1), and our analysis follows this version rather than Strauss's.

In 1827 and 1831 Hegel's treatment of the ontological proof achieved its mature form.[35] The 1831 version had the advantage of benefiting from Hegel's *Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God,* which he delivered in the summer of 1829, preparations

35. For the 1827 version, see Vol. 1:433-441.

for the publication of which were virtually complete when he died in the fall of 1831. There was the added advantage of being able to consider this proof directly in relationship to the revelatory religion, which was not possible in 1827 or in the separate *Lectures*. The revelatory religion has both the *abstract concept* of God (the free, pure concept) and the *determinate being* (*Dasein*) of God in his consummate manifestation in and to finite spirit. These determine the two main parts of the treatment of this religion, and the task of the ontological proof is to demonstrate the identity of the two (or better, the organic life-process within God that moves from the one to the other).

Whereas in the cosmological and teleological proofs we had an "ascending" from determinate or contingent being to being-in-and-for-itself, with the ontological proof we start with the free, pure concept, and it is the only genuine proof. The summary of the classical form of the proof in Anselm and others, and of Kant's critique of it, goes back to the *Ms*. We have pointed out that in 1824 Hegel attempted to develop a post-Kantian version of the proof, one based on his own logic, which would respond to the Kantian critique. His effort in 1824 did not go much beyond laying the foundations for such an argument; this is where the 1827 and 1831 lectures make a considerable advance.

The problem with the classical argument from "perfection" is that it *presupposes* the very unity of concept (thought) and being (reality) that must be demonstrated. What must be shown is that the finitude of subjectivity is sublated in the concept itself and that the unity of being and concept is not a presupposition but a *result*. To be sure, the concept necessarily contains being implicitly, for being is simple immediacy or relation to self, while the concept, properly defined, is pure mediation in which all categorial determinations, including being, are present and sublated. But the concept does not merely have being within itself implicitly; it sublates its subjectivity and objectifies itself—just as, when human beings realize their purposes, what was at first only ideal becomes something real. The concept "makes itself reality and thus becomes the truth, the unity of subject and object."

In the Christian religion the self-realization of the concept of God is fully manifest. The concept of God realizes itself, takes on

determinate being (*Dasein*), concrete being, in the consciousness of finite spirit—in the outward, worldly reenactment of the inward mediation. The identity of the concept of God and the being of God is the result of an absolute process, the living activity that God himself is. And the "being" in question is not simply the infinite, purely conceptual actuality that God is as absolute idea; it is *also* the finite, determinate being that God takes on in and through the process of self-diremption and self-return by which he becomes absolute spirit. That is why, in the final analysis, it is not inappropriate to speak of the *Dasein Gottes*.

The Idea of God in Representational Form

The contrast between the two main divisions of the revelatory religion is between the abstract concept of God and the concrete representational forms in which God is manifest for this religion (1831 *Excerpts,* n. 7)—a contrast that harks back to the *Ms.*

Strauss gives a full and clear synopsis of the division of the subject, as confirmed by the 1831 text transmitted by the *Werke* (1827 lectures, n. 67). As we indicate in n. 7 of the *Excerpts,* the 1831 division introduces for the first time the designation of the three elements as the "kingdoms" of the Father, Son, and Spirit, which offers a further reinforcement of the Trinity as the central Christian symbolism (a trajectory already established in 1827). The governing principle of the division appears to be divine *self-revelation* in three forms or modes. The moments of the idea of God that correspond to the three kingdoms are universality (or pure ideality), diremption, and reconciliation. The symbol "Father" properly signifies the inner dialectic of the preworldly Trinity (1831 *Excerpts,* n. 8), while the symbol "Son" has two referents—*un*differentiated otherness within the divine life (the "eternal Son"), and differentiated, externalized, worldly other-being (the incarnate Son or the "kingdom of" the Son) (n. 9). With the transition from external or natural history to "divine history," we have the transition to the kingdom of the Spirit (the consciousness of reconciliation on the part of human beings, and the realization of this consciousness).

If the 1824 lectures are characterized by a polemic against subjectivism, and the 1827 lectures by a defense against the charge of

pantheism, those of 1831 are marked by the attempt to elaborate the trinitarian structure of the Christian religion as clearly as possible. While the worldly mediation of absolute spirit is given special stress in 1831, it is balanced by the insistence that the condition of possibility for God's self-realization in and through world process is his ideal self-relatedness. The ground of the difference between God and world is (to borrow Whitehead's terminology) their "primordial" and "consequent" identity.

The Kingdom of the Father

The treatment of the Trinity in the 1831 lectures is almost identical with that in 1827, with the exception of the "amplification" transmitted by the *Werke* (1827 lectures, n. 93). This amplification represents a further attempt to unpack the trinitarian symbols, "Father," "Son," and "Spirit." With help from Aristotle and the Scholastics, we may say that God as *actus purus* is the activity of pure knowing: "to knowing belongs an other, which is known, and since it is knowing that knows it, it is appropriated to it" (reference might also have been made to Augustine, but Hegel does not seem familiar with his thought). What God distinguishes from himself by knowing does not take on the shape of an other-being but remains identical with that from which it has been distinguished. The natural relationship of father and son "is only figurative and accordingly never wholly corresponds to what should be expressed." If we speak of the Father as "begetting" the Son, and of the Son as "obeying" the Father, we must understand that God himself is the entire activity, the totality, and that as such he is the Spirit. God is *alpha* and *omega,* the beginning and the end, and the eternal process that links them, Father-Son-Spirit. The whole of nature and finite spirit is pressing dialectically toward this central point as its absolute truth, and it is the task of the whole of philosophy to *show* that this is the truth. Because the dialectic of identity and difference (identity *in* and *through* difference and as the condition of possibility *for* difference) cannot be grasped by the abstract categories of numbers, they do not help at all in comprehending this mystery.

The Kingdom of the Son

The first paragraph of Strauss's excerpted version of Sec. B, together with the passage transmitted by the *Werke* (1827 lectures,

n. 128), makes it fairly clear that the only topic Hegel treated under the rubric of "differentiation" (B.1) in 1831 was the transition from divine differentiation *ad intra* to worldly differentiation *ad extra*. God is involved in world process, both as its presupposition and as its result. To this discussion, however, he appends an analysis of the sense in which God is "revealed" to finite spirit in nature, concluding that, while God can indeed be cognized in nature, all such cognitions are finally inadequate. This provides a smooth transition to the spiritual revelation of God in the flesh of a human being. The discussion of natural humanity, estrangement, and good and evil, is transferred to Sec. C.1, while the story of the fall drops out completely (see 1831 *Excerpts*, n. 14).

Although the *Werke* transmits a full version of the 1831 text for Sec. B.2.a (1827 lectures, n. 173), it differs from the 1827 version primarily only in the clarity with which the arguments for the possibility and necessity of the incarnation are presented. Here Hegel makes the point that individual human subjectivity is the only proper "form" or "shape" (*Gestalt*) in which God can appear.

Despite a slight rearrangement of order, Sec. B.2.b in 1831 is also similar to 1827, taking up the contrast between religious and nonreligious perspectives, the teaching of Christ, and the comparison with Socrates. For the latter the *Werke* transmits a lengthy text (1827 lectures, n. 196), which indicates that Hegel developed this point more fully in 1831. Like Socrates, Christ "sealed the truth of his teaching by his death"; and like Christ, Socrates "brought inwardness to consciousness." Even "unbelief" can go this far (see 1831 *Excerpts*, n. 19). But at the same time Christ's teaching has a "different hue" and contains "an infinitely greater depth than the inwardness of Socrates."

Strauss gives an unusually detailed synopsis of Sec. B.2.c, and it is a topic to which Hegel evidently devoted considerable attention in 1831. With the death of Christ we have a transition to the "divine view," according to which it is the nature and history of God that is revealed in Christ. Faith is the certainty that the divine life is "envisaged" (*angeschaut*) in the course of this human life. But in order that the divine life may be so envisaged, there are, says Hegel, "certain conditions": the teaching of Christ, his statements about himself (which are "prima facie his assurances" with respect to his

oneness with God), and his miracles (which are manifestations of divine power in this individual). These are historical facts, in Hegel's view, and they (together with recognition of the difference between Christ and Socrates) at least provide a *basis* for the reversal in consciousness that begins with the death of Christ. Thus the distinction between the perspectives of "unbelief" and "faith" is not quite as sharp as Hegel had earlier seemed to suggest. But this is by no means a *proof* of faith. Faith rests on the witness of the Holy Spirit, and it "gives to the [historical] appearance of Christ *its full meaning.*" In terms of their nuancing of this complex matter, the 1831 lectures return to the point of view first articulated in the *Ms.*, which was altered in 1824 and partially restored in 1827.

At this point the 1831 lectures depart completely from 1827. The *Werke* transmits a lengthy text of the additional material (1827 lectures, n. 199), but since Strauss's synopsis is so clear (and confirmed in details by the *Werke* passage), we shall continue to follow it. "The impulse, generated by the shattering of the particular folk-spirits and of the natural deities of the people, to know God in a *universal* form as *spiritual*"—this is what is fulfilled by the manifestation of the infinite subjectivity of God in an actual human subject, and then by the outpouring of the Holy Spirit upon the community of faith, which is intrinsically a nonprovincial, universal community. Unlike the folk-spirits and the natural deities, it is above all the *death* of Christ that is the "touchstone" of faith, the comprehension of which requires the witness of the Spirit. The three meanings of the death of Christ—the full presence of both humanity and divinity, the despair that God himself is dead, and the reversal, the putting to death of death and the resurrection into life—these are, as it were, a reenactment of the divine history. "The abstractness of the Father is given up in the Son—this then is death. But the negation of this negation is the unity of Father and Son—love, or the Spirit." In other words, it is the abstract God, the supreme being, the Father, who dies in the death of the Son, and who is, as it were, reborn as concrete, world-encompassing Spirit. This is "the speculative Good Friday."[36] Finally, the redemption accomplished by Christ is no moral or juridical imputation but an overcoming

36. See *Faith and Knowledge*, p. 191 (*GW* 4:414).

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURE OF "THE CONSUMMATE RELIGION"

Manuscript	*1824 Lectures*
Introduction (73a)	Introduction
1. Definition of This Religion (73a)	1. The Consummate Religion
2. Characteristics of This Religion (73a)	2. The Revelatory Religion 3. The Religion of Truth and Freedom
	4. Relation to Preceding Religions
A. Abstract Concept (74a)	I. The Metaphysical Concept of God
B. Concrete Representation (76a) [Division of the Subject]	II. The Development of the Idea of God [Division of the Subject]
a. The Idea In and For Itself: The Triune God (77a)	A. The First Element: The Idea of God In and For Itself
b. The Idea in Diremption: Creation and Preservation of the Natural World (80a)	B. The Second Element: Representation, Appearance
c. Appearance of the Idea in Finite Spirit: Estrangement, Redemption, and Reconciliation (82a)	1. Differentiation a. Differentiation within the Divine Life and in the World
α. Estrangement: Natural Humanity (82b)	b. Natural Humanity
(α) The Original Condition (83b)	c. Knowledge, Estrangement, and Evil
(β) The Fall (85b)	d. The Story of the Fall
β. Redemption and Reconciliation: Christ (88a)	2. Reconciliation
(α) Idea of Divine-Human Unity (88a)	a. The Idea of Reconciliation and Its Appearance in a Single Individual
(β) Appearance of the Idea in a Single Individual (88b)	
(γ) The Teaching of Christ (89b)	b. The Historical, Sensible Presence of Christ
(δ) The Life and Death of Christ (91b)	c. The Death of Christ and the Transition to Spiritual Presence
(ε) Resurrection and Ascension of Christ (94a)	
C. Community, Cultus (95b)	C. The Third Element: Community, Spirit
Standpoint of the Community in General (95b)	1. The Origin of the Community
α. The Origin of the Community (98a)	
β. The Being of the Community; the Cultus (101b)	2. The Subsistence of the Community
γ. The Passing Away of the Community (104a)	3. The Realization of Faith

Note: Sections that are aligned horizontally correspond to each other; exceptions are indicated. Reconstruction of the 1831 lectures is based on the Strauss excerpts and therefore is uncertain.

1827 Lectures	*1831 Lectures*
Introduction	Introduction
(*Ms.*) 1. Definition of This Religion	1. Definition of This Religion
2. The Positivity and Spirituality of This Religion	
3. Survey of Previous Developments (*Concept of Religion,* Sec. B.e)	2. Transition to This Religion
	I. The Abstract Concept of God
	II. The Idea of God in Representational Form [Division of the Subject]
4. Division of the Subject	
A. The First Element: The Idea of God In and For Itself	A. The Kingdom of the Father
B. The Second Element: Representation, Appearance	B. The Kingdom of the Son
1. Differentiation	1. Differentiation
a. Differentiation within the Divine Life and in the World	
b. Natural Humanity	
c. The Story of the Fall	
d. Knowledge, Estrangement, and Evil	
2. Reconciliation	2. Reconciliation
a. The Idea of Reconciliation and Its Appearance in a Single Individual	a. The Idea of Reconciliation and Its Appearance in a Single Individual
b. The Historical, Sensible Presence of Christ	b. The Historical, Sensible Presence of Christ
c. The Death of Christ and the Transition to Spiritual Presence	c. The Death of Christ and the Transition to Spiritual Presence
C. The Third Element: Community, Spirit	C. The Kingdom of the Spirit
1. The Origin of the Community	1. The Self-Consciousness of the Community
2. The Subsistence of the Community	
3. The Realization of the Spirituality of the Community	2. The Realization of Religion

of finitude, death, and evil in general by their being sublated in the divine life. To *know* that *this* is the reconciliation of the world is to bring mere "consideration" to a halt and to be drawn into the anguish of one's own estrangement.

The Kingdom of the Spirit

In 1831 Hegel combined the previously separate sections on the "origin" and "subsistence" of the community into a single new unit, to which he added the materials on natural humanity, estrangement, and evil that were dropped from consideration under "differentiation" (see 1831 *Excerpts,* n. 26). His reasons for doing so are evident once the text is analyzed. The "kingdom of the Spirit" concerns the relationship of the subject to the three moments of the divine history, which it must itself traverse, thereby bringing itself "conclusively together with its original spiritual nature." The "soil" upon which this movement occurs is the *community,* and the stages of the community's "self-consciousness" (in which individual self-consciousnesses are shaped) correspond to the "three stages of God's process": immediacy, sublation of immediacy, and assurance of reconciliation. Thus the first stage is the origin of the community and the baptism of the individual believer. The second stage is that of repentence or penance—doing battle with, and working off, naturalness and evil. This is the subsistence of the community, and it is here that materials on natural humanity and good and evil are worked into the discussion. Finally, there is the sacrament of Holy Communion ("the midpoint of Christian doctrine," 1827 lectures, n. 240), by which the subject receives not merely the assurance of unity with God but the actual enjoyment and vouchsafing of it. This is the consummate realization of religion in the community of faith.

But religion must also realize itself in the worldly sphere, and the imperialism of church over world must give way to the institution of a "just and ethical civil life." The supplementary text provided by the *Werke* at this point (1827 lectures, n. 250) expresses it in distinctive fashion: "It is in the organization of the state that the divine has broken through into the sphere of actuality; the latter is permeated by the former, and the worldly realm is now justified

in and for itself, for its foundation is the divine will, the law of right and freedom." This is the "authentic discipline of worldliness." As we have seen, this is a characteristic concern of Hegel in 1831.[37] The lectures end with the assurance that philosophy does not place itself above religion but only above the representational forms of faith.

37. See the section on "The Relationship of Religion to the State," printed as an item in the Appendix to Volume 1, with which the 1831 *Concept of Religion* ends.

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PART III
THE CONSUMMATE RELIGION

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THE CONSUMMATE RELIGION
HEGEL'S LECTURE MANUSCRIPT[1]

1

[73a]

[Introduction]

[1. Definition of This Religion]

[2]This religion [was] earlier defined[3] as the one in which the *concept* of religion has become *objective* to itself; [it is] the totality in which

1. *Ms. heading:* Part III. The Consummate Religion *Ms. adds (below the heading):* or Revelatory *Ms. adds (above the heading):* History – Greek, free spirit – abolition of finitude – objective, absolute freedom *Ms. adds (in the margin):* ⟨Concept of religion – side of reality developed. Christian religion wholly speculative – can only be grasped as speculative content. Most sublime and only genuine idea of philosophy in it – object of faith – Tertullian⟩

[*Ed.*] Hegel is probably alluding here to Tertullian's stress upon the knowability of God in Christianity as contrasted with the noncognizability of God in Greek (especially Platonic) philosophy. In the fragment "Volksreligion und Christentum," he refers to Tertullian's *Apology,* chap. 46, in this connection (Nohl, *Jugendschriften,* p. 11); and in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 3:8 (*Werke* 15:104), he writes: "The new religion has made the intelligible world of philosophy the world of common consciousness; thus Tertullian says that nowadays even children have a knowledge of God, which the wisest men of antiquity alone attained to." Tertullian did not refer to children but to "the Christian workman" (*opifex Christianus*).

2. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Witness of the Spirit – from the concept – begun with the purpose – [of viewing] the subject as infinite⟩

3. [*Ed.*] See Vol. 1:110–111. The concept of religion is the *relationship* and ultimately the *unity* of subjective consciousness and its object, namely God as absolute essence or absolute spirit. The consciousness that knows, and the absolute object that is known, are both spirit, and hence the concept of *spirit* is what relates humanity and the absolute to each other. When the concept of religion becomes objective to itself, then it is above all this relationship that is thematized. Because the Christian religion has this relationship as its central theme—expressed representationally by the doctrine of the incarnation—it is the "consummate" religion.

the concept of religion—developed in different ways to yield its determinate moments—is *posited;* it has existence for others and so becomes an object of consciousness. ⟨[First we had] humanity, the side of consciousness, God as reflected in spirit, in spirit vis-à-vis God, [in] finite spirits. When the time [was] fulfilled,[4] the soil prepared, finitude had to [be] abolished from the side of finite spirit—it [had to abolish it] on its side, the finite side. [Thus spirit became] sufficiently capable of absolute consciousness for God to reveal or manifest himself. [Spirit is] precisely this image [of God].⟩

[5]Religion [is] defined generally as the consciousness of God, of God the absolute object; but God's consciousness and subjectivity—the genuine object—is the whole. That God whom we designated as a mere object *over against* consciousness is an abstraction. [6]God [is] this whole; hence he is the universal, ˜the absolutely universal power,˜[7] the substance of all existence, the truth—but as consciousness, ⟨[as] infinite form, infinite | subjectivity,⟩ that is, as *spirit.* 2
⟨[God's] infinite form [is] (α) an object, content, or spirit; and (β) one. God *is* as a process, [he is] self-consciousness, [he is] as an object, as truth.⟩ In this fashion the concept of religion [is] objective to itself, i.e., [it is] in its object. It is not the case that religion as subjectivity makes religious feeling its object, [for] religious feeling, [which] itself [is] subjectivity, ⟨is rather the annulment of religion.⟩ [8]Rather, the *concept* of religion, in pure objectivity *as* an object, is the content of religious consciousness, but precisely therewith and therein it [is] also subjective, and the subjective religious self-consciousness has spirit indwelling[9] in it, God is manifest in it. ⟨This

4. [*Ed.*] Hegel alludes to the New Testament idea of the fullness of time. See Mark 1:15, Gal. 4:4, Eph. 1:10.

5. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(α) absolute content⟩

6. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(β) object of self-consciousness⟩

7. *Hegel's abbreviation in the Ms. should perhaps read:* the absolute universal, the power,

8. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Subject as free, thereby present to itself – *is* free in spirit, in its essence – represented in Christ as this other. *Knowledge* of this determination, this subjectivity, is something different; this knowledge is the modern assertion that the only thing that matters is religion, what is subjective, not the content⟩

[*Ed.*] This statement about religion is found especially in the 1827 lectures in Part I (See Vol. 1:162–163), but in Part III this theme appears above all in the introduction to the 1824 lectures (see below, pp. 167–168). Possibly this marginal passage belongs to the latter lectures.

9. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(γ) wholly speculative⟩

manifestation of God occurs in spiritual self-consciousness, and this [is] an infinite form of his reality—i.e., his reality as [one] side. God himself is one in all. Nature reveals itself, [is] for an other. Two things [belong] to this revelation: (α) nature, (β) consciousness. Nature is not these two but only one of them. Spirit reveals itself and is itself these two.⟩

This, as has been said earlier, [is] the infinite form and unity, the universality, the determination of what *revelation* is.

[2. Characteristics of This Religion]

For this reason, the Christian religion is the religion (α)[10] of *revelation*. What God is, ⟨and the fact that he is known *as* he is,⟩ not merely in historical or some similar | fashion as in the other religions, 3
is manifest [*offenbar*] in it. Revelation [*Offenbarung*], manifestation [*Manifestation*] is itself its character and content. That is to say, revelation, manifestation [is] the being [of God] for consciousness, ⟨[indeed, the revelation] for consciousness that he is himself spirit for [spirit], i.e., [that he *is*] consciousness and *for* consciousness.⟩ God is *only* manifest[11] as one who particularizes himself and becomes objective, initially in the mode of finitude, which is his own. ⟨God has created the world, has revealed himself, etc. [This is not to be represented as] a beginning, as something *accomplished*, i.e., as a single act, once and for all, not to be repeated, an eternal decree of the [divine] will, and therefore arbitrary; on the contrary, this [is] his eternal nature. [With respect to divine revelation, there are] two sorts of forms: (α) predicates and (β) actions, deeds.⟩ Already in Greek and Roman religion, this mode of finitude [is predicated of] the other—but only the mode of abstract finitude, ⟨which [grasps] the other as finite, not simultaneously as infinite.⟩ (Once finitude [is] forgotten, [we have] this antithesis.) [73b] The nature of spirit itself is to manifest itself, make itself objective; this is its activity and vitality, its sole action, and its action is all that spirit is. This separation and finitization is therefore initially defined here

10. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(α) Revelation means the infinite form revealed by God. Of course – for God can only reveal *himself*. It is only God who can reveal himself, not an external force or understanding that might unlock him.⟩

11. *Ms. margin:* ⟨nature reveals itself but is not the act of revealing, is not *what is* manifest⟩

as itself a divine moment (as [the word] "Creator"[12] already [indicates]). ⟨[This is] precisely the divinity of spirit, [which subsists] without the positing of opposition religiously (but not merely as nature [where we have] common, sensible consciousness). In the positing of opposition, the opposition [is] sublated; [it appears] as spirit, as equal to itself. This [is] manifest only to spirit—just as spirit, [when it is] an object in the religious sense, [is] at the same time nothing other,⟩ because this objectification is infinite form, a manifestation at the same time taken back into the infinite. The universal [is] *in* the finite, but the finite [is] not transfigured [into] the shape of spirit, or beauty. In the other religions, God is still something other than what he reveals himself to be: ⟨one God, the
4 necessity | above the gods.⟩ God is the inner and the unknown; he is not as he appears to consciousness. But precisely here [in the Christian religion it is maintained]: (α) that he appears, he reveals his own definition; (β) [that] precisely this appearing—implicitly of the universal, not in a fixed, finite determinate form but as subsumed, the transfigured divine world—is an appearing as he is. (God's being is his action, his revelatory action itself.)

[The Christian religion is] (β)[13] the religion of *truth*. But if by "truth of the Christian religion" [we mean] that it is historically accurate, this [is] not what [is intended] here; rather *the true* is its content. Whoever possesses it knows the true and cognizes God as he is. A Christian religion that did not cognize God, [or in which] God [is] not revealed, would be no Christian religion at all. Its content [is] the truth itself in and for itself, and it consists in the being of truth *for* consciousness. ⟨Likewise [it knows] God only as spirit (see above), only as manifest, as truth in and for itself. Feeling [is] the opposite of truth.⟩ This content, however, is *spirit;* it is the concept, which is absolute reality, existence, appearance, outgoing [movement]. Objectivity occurs in accord with the concept and is only the empty form of other-being. The concept [is] the entire content of reality. Spirit is itself the process of giving itself this show [*Schein*] and sublating it, of positing it as sublated; both together

12. [*Ed.*] *Schöpfer* comes from the verb *schöpfen,* which means literally to draw or scoop out, hence to separate.

13. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(β) infinite content: truth – concept and reality – certainty – objective to itself – spirit [is] in spirit – only thus [is it] spirit⟩

are revelation since this show is the appearing [*Scheinen*] of God, an infinite appearing yet not beyond appearing.

[The Christian religion is] ⟨γ⟩[14] the religion of *reconciliation*—of the world with God. God, it is said [2 Cor. 5:18–19], has reconciled the world with himself. The fall of the world from God means that it has fixated itself as finite consciousness, as the consciousness of idols, consciousness of the universal not as such but rather in external ways or in regard to finite purposes. To desist from this separation is to turn back [to God], and to *intuit* this turning back of reality [to God]—finitude being taken up into the eternal—[is] to be implicitly the unity of divine and human nature, and the process of eternally positing this unity. | ⟨In this intuition of the truth, [consciousness has] absolute certainty of itself. This certainty seals all subjectivity within itself; it is in spirit, and in the truth of subjectivity, that subjectivity finds itself.⟩ Hence [it is] the religion of *freedom*—the speculative, objective, universal, self-sufficient, absolute passage to being-in-and-for-self.[15]

⟨[We have] already [dealt with] the concept [of this religion] in *The Concept of Religion* itself.⟩[16] [74a]

A. ABSTRACT CONCEPT[17]

Already [we have developed] the concept [of the consummate religion] in [dealing with] religion [as such]. Metaphysically [it has] this form: God is spirit, God ⟨has reality;⟩[18] he exists [*existiert*] in virtue of his concept. Proof of the existence of God [derives] from

14. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(γ) both together – reconciliation⟩

15. *Ms. adds:* and it [religion] itself.

16. [*Ed.*] Since the concept of religion has become objective to itself in the consummate religion (see above, n. 3), it is evident that the concept of religion in general and the concept of the Christian religion are implicitly identical. Hegel's presentation of *The Concept of Religion* in Part I, with its focus on the religious relationship, the self-knowing of absolute spirit, and its echoing of such themes as incarnation and Trinity, is already Christian theology philosophically transfigured, but still only implicitly so, and by its own intention applicable to all forms of religious consciousness.

17. *Ms. margin:* ⟨8 August 1821⟩

18. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Representation of God [is] subjective – the transition [entails] doing away with subjectivity⟩

his concept. Previously [we had] the transition from finite being to infinite, ⟨universal⟩ being, ⟨i.e., from immediate being to being in its truth, [or from being to] concept;⟩ now [comes the transition] from concept to being.[19] The concept [is] the presupposition.[20]

The definition of God [is] that he is the *absolute idea*—i.e., that he is *spirit*. However, [three things may be said about] spirit as the absolute idea: (α) It *is* only as[21] the *unity of concept and reality*, so that the concept in itself is the totality, and likewise the reality.[22]
6 (β) But this reality, | as was previously shown, is *revelation*—the manifestation that has being on its own. ˜Finite self-consciousness, or what is called human nature, [stands] over against this concept.˜[23] Since we call the absolute concept the divine nature, the idea of spirit is to be the unity of divine and human nature. Humanity has arrived at this intuition. But the divine nature is itself only this, to be absolute spirit; hence precisely the unity of divine and human nature is itself absolute spirit.

(γ)[24] The truth cannot be expressed in a proposition, however.[25] The two—the absolute concept and the idea as the absolute unity—are also distinct from their reality. Spirit, therefore, is the living

19. [*Ed.*] Here Hegel contrasts the cosmological and ontological proofs of the existence of God. With reference to the former, he has in mind the treatment in Part II of the cosmological and physicotheological proofs as related to the metaphysical concepts of nature religion, Jewish religion, and Roman religion (see Vol. 2, *Ms.* sheets 32b–33b, 42a–43a, 62b–64a).

20. *Ms. adds:* The concept of this religion [is given] already with [our treatment of] religion [as such].

21. *Ms. margin:* ⟨The pure, universal, infinite end is the concept itself – end – for this reason the end [is] so highly regarded⟩

22. *Ms. margin:* ⟨The metaphysical concept is the pure, abstract concept without its concrete determination as spirit, but with a content, to be sure. [It is] the God of representation. The proof in fact reduces itself to the point that the concept is real through itself. The concrete concept is spirit; spirit is its reality, and only in this way is it spirit. Spirit [subsists] as totality of another spirit. Here: (αα) the concept in general, definition of the concept, its reality, being. High standpoint, pertaining to the modern world. Not proceeding from determinate being, but thought beginning from itself, then the transition to reality. Concept, infinite negativity, the starting point – set firmly in the center [of attention].⟩

23. W_2 *reads:* Since the manifestation also has within itself the moment of distinction, it includes as well the mode of determinacy of finite spirit, of human nature, which as finite stands over against this concept.

24. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(α) Ostensibly: concept of God and reality of God. With *this* content, reality is contained in the concept. [It is] this content itself that demands it.

process by which the *implicit* unity of divine and human nature becomes *explicit,* or is brought forth. What is *in itself* must likewise be *brought forth* [as] an end, and nothing is brought forth that is not in itself. ⟨The cultus is thus brought forth and drawn into play by the idea itself.⟩

The abstract definition of this idea [of spirit] is the unity of the concept and of being, and it is this abstract definition | that meta- 7
physics [74b] is glimpsing[26] in the so-called *ontological* proof of the existence of God; it is concerned to show the unity of concept and being in a formal way.

In the other so-called proofs that we have already dealt with,[27] the transition is made from a finite being to an infinite being, [to] a power necessary in and for itself, acting in accord with its ends; [the proofs] do not proceed by way of representation, a representation is not laid down as the basis of the process. The proofs proceed from being, and the problem is only about the definition of this being; they proceed from finite (and therewith subjective) objectivity, and make a transition to the universal, to true objectivity and the concept of true objectivity, and (because the concept of contingent being is [that of] necessity) to purposiveness. [In these proofs] relation is the concept itself of truth and substance.

But here the transition [is] from the concept itself to objectivity. ⟨This [may be defined] more precisely: (α) Here [the proof] begins from the concept; earlier, from existence [*Dasein*]. The truth of the latter is the concept, the universal—the universal, absolute power that has being in and for itself; here the converse [is the case]. Both [are] necessary, hence both may occur as something posited, i.e., their one-sidedness [is] sublated; from each of them the show of immediacy [is] taken away.⟩

(β) But the content is common to the two. Hence there must be a transition as such from concept to reality.

(γ) The content [is] presupposed, but it [is] itself precisely this unity, which [is] therefore not presupposed but proved, i.e., [exhibited] in its very determinations. The transition is to be exhibited.⟩

25. [*Ed.*] See Hegel's *Science of Logic,* pp. 91, 623 ff. (GW 11:49, 12:53 ff.).

26. *Ms. margin:* ⟨[Its starting point is] not finite; [it proceeds] not from a being or from something finite.⟩

27. [*Ed.*] See n. 19.

⟨(β) In and for itself,⟩ this unity itself is presupposed in the concept of God. God is just this; there is no other concept of him. At the point of entry into religion, this unity must be demonstrated, it must be present. The concept is this subjectivity or process realizing itself within itself, giving itself objectivity; [this is its] goal, which is found only in the form of other-being. Being—this abstract quality[28] is so impoverished that it is just not worth talking about;[29] this immediate identity is only the entirely empty ⟨moment⟩ of the
8 unity of the concept with itself. |

⟨(γ)⟩ Being, however, is very much in antithesis to the concept or to representation, to fixed subjectivity. ⟨The appearance of the antithesis is a sign of the standpoint of subjectivity subsisting on its own account. That is, the antithesis is sharp because precisely at the depths at which spirit is found is where the self-contained totality of the subject belongs; it is substantial subjectivity, and therewith infinite antithesis. The concept appears not to need being, just as the soul appears not to need the body.⟩ That this subjectivity is a nullity is a matter of interest for reason. On the present level of discussion, which concerns the concept of God, the antithesis now becomes this highest antithesis between representation or subjectivity on the one hand, and objectivity or being on the other. Previously, the antithesis [was] only between finite and infinite being, so that being [was] the common factor, and the antithesis was subordinated to this generality. This [is] the interest of reason; the importance of the antithesis is first present in the totality of the two sides.

⟨(δ) [The question] thrusts itself [upon us] how the antithesis between thinking and being [is] to be resolved. In this connection it becomes apparent that, because this antithesis—subjectivity on the one side, [objectivity on the other]—is *only* subjective, the concept comes off very badly: we have concepts in the head, hence [they have] no reality. But what are they opposed to? Here [we encounter] real subjectivity: the empirical subject [is] the whole, from which the concept as one of its abstract modes is separated and made into a mere "only." The human being *is:* there is no question about that. Human beings have concepts and thoughts,

28. *Ms. margin:* ⟨a priori⟩
29. [*Ed.*] See *Science of Logic,* pp. 82 ff. (*GW* 11:43 ff.).

but these are only a few of the many things they have; and in contrast with their concrete nature, these concepts etc. are one-sided.

This disparagement of the concept springs from the same comparison that is involved in the proof of the existence of God that we are about to consider. This proof presupposes God as *content,* as the most perfect being, in comparison with which the mere *concept* of God is imperfect. Why does God exist? Anselm answers: because God is perfect, i.e., he is the unity of concept and reality.[30] [But] why [is] the concept of God *only* a concept? [This is] the modern question, and the answer [is]: because | human being is a 9
concrete identity, the unity of concept and being. (α) The conclusion [is drawn] that we must therefore hold on to this "only." But on the contrary, [we must] give up this "only."[31] (β) Such perfection [is found] not in intuition but in thought. "Perfection" is unsatisfying because [it is an indeterminate expression].⟩[32] [75a]

⟨In any case this is what happens in the modern point of view, and precisely this empirical unity of thinking and being is maintained as the affirmative, authentic reality—i.e., the empirical human being, the immediate world. Just as [there is] the representation of perfection in Anselm, the thought of what is most universal, so in the modern view [there is] the existence of the concrete [human being].⟩[33] [74b]

30. [*Ed.*] Hegel summarizes Anselm's argument in his own terms. Anselm himself defines God as "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" (*Proslogion* 2). Equivalents to the language of "perfection" are found elsewhere in the *Proslogion* (Preface, chap. 3), but not as premises of the Anselmian proof.

31. [*Ed.*] Because, according to Hegel's *Logic,* the true concept (*Begriff*) does not exclude but rather includes being (*Sein*) in its various modifications, taking it up into the unity of being and essence (*Wesen*), or immediacy and reflection, it is inappropriate to speak of the concept as "only" a concept. Just as the concept without being is an empty representation or subjective opinion, so being without the concept is mere externality and appearance (see fourth paragraph below). The antithesis between concept and being must be overcome and their unity demonstrated, this being the task of the ontological proof. See *Science of Logic,* pp. 577 ff. (*GW* 12:11 ff.).

32. [*Ed.*] Hegel's criticism of the indeterminacy of Anselm's expression is anticipated by Gaunilo's *Response* appended to the *Proslogion.* (See Vol. 1:434 n. 155.)

33. [*Ed.*] This marginal addition at the top of sheet 75a follows the one at the bottom of 74b before the main text resumes at the bottom of 74b.

His metaphysical proof takes this course: (α) The concept of God is within itself a possible concept—[the concept of] the most real essence,[34] [but] merely positive, i.e., abstractly positive; (β) being is reality; therefore, (γ) [the concept of God belongs] among these realities. [75a]

(α) Against this proof Kant [objected] that one could not "pluck" [*herausklauben*] being out of the concept, for being is something other [than] the concept. Being is not ⟨a reality,⟩ it is not a definition or a predicate [*Begriffsbestimmung*]; it adds nothing to the content of an object, therefore it [has] no reality but [is] in any event merely a form.[35]

(β) [With] Anselm, the proof [goes] simply as follows: God should be what is *most perfect;* if God were merely a representation, he would not be the most perfect, for we regard as perfect that which is not merely a representation but to which being pertains also. [This is] quite correct. Perfection is presupposed; generally speaking, the true is [identical with] what representation or the concept is, but [only when] the opposite determination is added to it also, namely, being. [This is also] quite correct. The presupposition, "perfection is this unity [of concept and being]," is present in, lies at the basis of, our representation—[that of] all of us, and of all philosophers. If it is permitted to make presuppositions, then surely this one can be made. Every human mind contains it *actu,* not like the laughable logical proposition, A = A, what is, is. ⟨This last they cannot deny, but in good company, i.e., within the guild, [it may be smiled at].⟩ ⟨Against this,⟩ the understanding ⟨now says⟩:
10 | concept and being are different. Quite so: thus separated, they are finite, untrue, and it is precisely the concern of reason and of ordinary, rational human sense not to remain with the finite and untrue, nor to take them as something absolute. ⟨Thinking is universal within itself, objective.⟩ The concept without any objectivity is an empty representation or opinion; being without the concept [is mere] evanescent externality and appearance.

34. [*Ed.*] Hegel alludes here, as does Kant (*Critique of Pure Reason,* B 624 ff.), to the concept of the *ens realissimum,* which he associates with that of the *ens perfectissimum,* as found especially in Descartes, Wolff, and Baumgarten.

35. [*Ed.*] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* B 631, B 626.

Metaphysics has subjected the simple thoughts of Anselm to the formality of argument, and has thereby deprived them of their true meaning and content.[36]

(α) The concept of God [as] the most real—this content [is] the abstract affirmation. Not the concept of God [in the sense] that [it] might be one of several concepts, [among which there are others] equally good. God is not *a* concept but *the* concept; this ⟨is⟩ the absolute reality ⟨and ideality.⟩ [75b]

(β)[37] God [is] all reality, and hence the reality of being too; i.e., being is contained in the concept [of God]. (αα) [This is] correct; [as we said] earlier, being, this immediate identity, [is] a moment of the concept. However, (ββ) the concept as subjectivity [is] differentiated from being, and our concern is precisely the superseding of this distinction, or the removal of subjectivity from the concept. Being ⟨is to be⟩ exhibited in the concept ⟨as a reality, i.e., in the form of attributes, predicates, as in the representations "human being," "reason," etc. In general, the concept as such is what subsists, the subject of being as its predicate.⟩ We have thereby shown that the concept [in our sense] is not what is ordinarily meant by "concept," i.e., something opposed to objective reality, | something 11
that is *not supposed* to have being in it. The concept negates its character of being subjective; this character is negated, or rather the concept itself is this dialectic [of negation and being negated]. This condition or turn constitutes the true transition. It is a question, then, of the negation of the subjectivity of the concept in itself; and

36. [*Ed.*] What Hegel is criticizing here is the modern reformulations of the Anselmian proofs in terms of the concept of the *ens realissimum* or *ens perfectissimum,* and of the *ens necessarium.* Cf. Descartes, *Meditations,* chaps. 3, 5 (esp. pp. 115, 137); Leibniz, *Principia philosophiae,* §§ 40–41, 45 (*Philosophische Schriften* 6:607–623); Wolff, *Theologia naturalis,* Pars posterior, pp. 4 ff.; Baumgarten, *Metaphysica,* § 810.

37. *Ms. margin:* ⟨The concept [must] do away with its finitude by its own means:

(α) [it must do away with what is] contained in it, i.e., distinguished from it; when one supposes that one has got rid of what is opposed to it—being—that is just when [the concept is] dialectical;

(β) for itself, the concept [is] the activity, [has] the goal, of objectifying itself.

(α) The concept is precisely the concept: A = A; good, but in this form [it is] finite, untrue; (β) not to hold fast to the untrue, the finite; in general, (γ) not to presuppose perfection with reference to God. Finitude [entails] this distinction between the concept and objectivity, reality.⟩

this is not accomplished—unless, as with Anselm, it is explicitly stated, at least as a presupposition or absolute foundation, that the perfect or the true consists solely in this unity of the concept with reality.

⟨Kant says that [being] is not a predicate. Nothing is added to the content, to the concept of a hundred thalers if [in addition] they also *are*.[38] (αα) [This is] correct, precisely because and insofar as [being] is already contained in the concept itself. But (ββ) just the meaning [of Kant's statement] is that [being is] *not* contained in the concept, at least not in the subjective concept. Such a subjective concept or merely subjective representation is what he has in mind, as in the example of the hundred imagined thalers. Here the content as such, i.e., as represented, [is] distinguished from its being. Nothing is added to the content by being; therefore [being is] not a predicate in the sense in which a predicate is used in ordinary demonstrations. The concept is that which encompasses the predicates, as distinguished from the form, i.e., in this case, being. [This is] correct in the finite realm.

But in God the content [is] both concept *and* being; this is the entire content of Anselm's metaphysics; this is the perfection he presupposes. But what right [does he have to] make this presupposition? Here [it is] precisely a question of no longer presupposing that God is the content or the most perfect being, but rather that the unity of concept and being is precisely what is most perfect—the absolute truth. The presupposition is just what has to be proved, and indeed the pure concept as such, (α) not [that of] God, (β) not a finite concept, i.e., [one] in which thought and existence are and remain separated.⟩

Therefore Anselm's thought [is] on the whole quite correct; [it] is evident to a healthy human understanding were it to succeed in isolating the representation as such. But at the same time God
12 himself is just | this unity for Anselm. This unity of subject and being is subjective, hence for him it is senseless to be held up by this definition of it. But the formal procedure [of metaphysics] sets forth the concept of possibility and others like it, such that these concepts and this possibility are intended to remain, while the interest of reason is precisely to sublate them.

38. [*Ed.*] *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 627.

⟨The [following] distinction [is made] by modern presuppositions: we have (α) concrete, empirical humanity—a union of reason and sensible [nature]; (β) *only* a concept [of God], beyond which one cannot go, [so that] the contradiction with (α) [remains] unresolved.⟩ [76a]

B. CONCRETE REPRESENTATION[39]

[40]Determinateness as (or *in*) reality—the mode of being in regard to the idea—is the determinateness of the concept itself. This [was] indicated earlier;[41] here, ⟨in the spirit (God is spirit),[42] [it occurs]

39. *Ms. reads:*

b. Concrete Representation
or rather determination – i.e., development of the idea
weaves itself by itself into cultus

[*Ed.*] The words beneath the title anticipate a significant structural shift between the lectures in 1821 and 1824 (whether they were added immediately or later is not certain). In 1821, the presentation of the Christian religion is arranged according to the now-familiar categories of "Abstract Concept," "Concrete Representation," and "Community, Cultus"—categories inherited from the concept of religion and applied to the determinate religions. "Concrete Representation" contains three "spheres" or "moments" (see below, pp. 76–77): (a) the idea of God in and for itself (the immanent Trinity); (b) the idea in diremption or differentiation (creation and preservation of the natural world); (c) the appearance of the idea in finite spirit (the "history" of estrangement, redemption, and reconciliation). But the 1824 lectures are divided into only two main sections, "The Metaphysical Concept of God" (the ontological proof) and "The Development of the Idea of God." The divine idea "develops" in terms of three elements: its being in and for self, its self-differentiation in the otherness of the world and in the history of estrangement and redemption (including parts b and c of the 1821 "Concrete Representation"), and its return-to-self through the transfigured subjectivity of the community of faith (replacing the 1821 separate section, "Community, Cultus"). The cultus is now included as the third element of the development of the idea of God rather than standing as a separate category following "concrete representation," into which the latter "weaves itself," as in the 1821 lectures. In other words, in the consummate religion the idea of the Trinity, which is implicit in all religions and in the history of religion, now becomes explicit as the structuring principle. The "concrete" or "determinate" representation of God in the Christian religion is as the triune God, who is self-developing in the three moments of self-identity, self-differentiation, and self-return. (On this matter, see further Sec. 2.a of the Editorial Introduction.)

40. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Reality is the determinacy of the concept, developing from it, posited through it.⟩

41. [*Ed.*] See Vol. 1:110–111.

42. *Ms. adds in margin:* ⟨distinction, self-reflecting totality⟩

in the concept of revelation, manifestation.⟩ Precisely this his reality is his determinateness; it is the concept—the fact that the absolute is spirit. What spirit or its concept is can be explicated only through its realization or totality because its concept is precisely to be the idea.[43]

Ordinarily the matter is represented as follows: this concept ⟨and its determination⟩ [come first], followed by an appropriate realiza-
13 tion. This | is how it was earlier [in our discussion]:[44] e.g., [first there is] the power of the Lord, of the One; reality,[45] external being, [is] determined by this Lord as the power of reality, the reason being that the determination of the concept is abstract; external being therefore is differentiated, and the determination of the Lord occurs only in regard to it. Similarly the Greek gods [are subordinated to] external necessity [and exist in] the shapes of isolated elements and powers. But if the concept now [is grasped as] *idea*—the identity of concept and reality, this means precisely that reality itself constitutes the determinateness of the concept, and the concept in its determinateness is not to be explicated except through this very realization.

Reflection behaves differently from this.[46] It interprets determinacy as such in the form of a predicate, something at rest—not as the activity of realization and its development, [but rather] in the mode of a simple, abstract determination, ⟨i.e., only as positive characteristics [which] should be linked with the subject only pos-

43. [*Ed.*] The point here is that the idea already contains within itself the element of reality or objectivity. According to Hegel, the idea is "essentially concrete, because it is the free concept giving reality and determinacy to itself" (*Encyclopedia* [1830], § 213). It is the final category of Hegel's logic since it is "the absolute unity of the concept and objectivity" (*ibid.*).

44. [*Ed.*] See Hegel's description of the religion of sublimity (Jewish religion) in Vol. 2, *Ms.* sheets 42a–43a.

45. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Reality: (α) not natural being, not immediacy⟩

46. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(β) Manner in which the determinacy of the concept, of thought, first appears – as predicate – reflection, thought – indeed not naturally or immediately – but thus reestablished – mode of immediacy as identity with itself⟩

W_2 *reads:* The predicates are indeed not those of natural immediacy; rather they are established by reflection, and in this fashion the determinate content has become just as unshakably self-sufficient as is the natural content under which God was represented in nature religion. Natural objects such as the sun, the sea, etc., are [there]; but the categories of reflection are just as self-identical as natural immediacy.

itively and not simultaneously be distinguished from what is defined as subject.⟩ Hence various predicates result for it, inasmuch as the same basic determination, if it is one, is applied to various sides; but these various sides are themselves understood empirically, i.e., externally, to be the nature of the object. [76b]

Thus there appear diverse predicates of God as he is in the determinacy of spirit: ⟨omnipotence,⟩ righteousness, | goodness, 14
wisdom, providence, omniscience, etc.—and then, subsequent to these predicates and outside of them, as it were, the *history of God,* the activity of God and his work: the creation of the world, his Son, the Trinity, his love for humanity, redemption. In this fashion the manifestation [of God] is separated from these characteristics, ⟨but not in such a way as to reflect the fact that the simple subject [is] distinct from such diversity.⟩

Since ⟨differentiation [is] now removed from such attributes in themselves and likewise from their relation to the simple subject, it then emerges in another fashion.⟩ [Since] there are [such] attributes, (α) [they are] different from each other, ˜although (β) [they] ought to be infinite, *sensu eminentiori, excellenti,*˜[47] but (γ) [they] are determinate and therefore finite. Thus it is said that they express only our *relations* to God, not his nature, which remains unknown and unexplained since there is no way of explicating or making it available other than through these predicates.[48] (α) [It is] correct [that there is] this deficiency [in definition by predicates]. (β) But [it is] equally correct that this method of predication [can be] em-

47. W_2 *reads:* Their contradiction is not truly resolved through the abstraction of their determinacy if the understanding requires that they be taken only *sensu eminentiori.*

[*Ed.*] On the words *sensu eminentiori, excellenti,* see Wolff, *Theologia naturalis,* Pars prior, §§ 1096, 1098, 1099, 1066, 1068; Leibniz, *Monadology,* § 41, and *The Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason,* § 9 (Leibniz, *Selections,* pp. 541, 528); Leibniz, *Theodicy,* ed. Austin Farrer, trans. E. M. Huggard (New Haven, 1952), §§ 4, 192 (pp. 125–126, 247).

48. [*Ed.*] Hegel is probably alluding here to Schleiermacher's *Der christliche Glaube,* 1st ed., § 64: "All attributes that we ascribe to God can be taken as denoting not something special in God, but only something special in the manner in which we relate our feeling of absolute dependence to God." In the 2d ed., § 50, the concluding clause is revised to read: ". . . in which the feeling of utter dependence is to be related to him." See Vol. 1:163 n. 33, 279 n. 37.

ployed in a popularly correct manner. General reflections, although [they are] inwardly a rather indeterminate mode of representation, ⟨bring a grand meaning before the soul, without further development—but also without the sense of being exclusive and finite, as indeed we accept and utilize figurative, symbolic representations and poetic images often enough. It is another matter when they are taken as sharply excluding other attributes in their specific reflective meaning. Then [we say that] these contradictions [are] subjective, [the general reflections] refer only to us, they are subjective representations. We are the ones who also negate them. However, precisely this [is] external reflection, external dialectic. But [it is] not [a question of] externals but of determinacy, [one single] predicate. God is none other than the idea, which determines itself and raises its determination to infinitude, and is only infinite self-determination.⟩ | When determinacy is taken as such, precisely these contradictions arise.[49] But representation overlooks them, it elevates itself above limitation and holds the universal before its eyes. However, as we already remarked,[50] the abstract predicates contain their meaning in movement, and this realization is the true finitization of their meaning, in which their absolute content (wisdom, purpose in and for itself, which maintains itself in reality, [in] the show of an other) is contained, and whatever can appear as diverse aspects of this content consists only of moments of this movement itself.

The definition or (to put the point in a more external fashion) the configuration of God is therefore his idea, and the latter consists of *movement:* the attributes [of God] concern and proceed from the mode of differentiation. [77a]

⟨(γ) Since *we* are familiar with these determinations of the concept in advance, we shall say that [they occur] in three elements. But in themselves these distinctions develop from the concept itself and make the transition into one another. But it can and must be

49. [*Ed.*] Hegel does not mention here that the *theologia naturalis* of rationalism specifically addressed this problem, seeking to overcome the contradictions by arguing for the compossibility of the attributes (taken *sensu eminentiori*) or by asserting that apparently contradictory attributes modify each other. He alludes to these arguments in the *Science of Logic* (GW 20:100). See Wolff, *Theologia naturalis,* Pars prior, §§ 1067, 1070; and Baumgarten, *Metaphysica,* § 807.

50. [*Ed.*] See above, p. 74.

our reflection, at least, that the first [determination] is the general concept, the concept in the element of universality.⟩

God is:

(α) In the first instance, *the concept of God,* the concept as determinateness, i.e., as element; the [process of] thinking himself, God in *eternity, the idea in and for itself,* ⟨God [as] *triune.*⟩

(β) To be the concept entails a determination of subjectivity by the absolute idea both from our point of view and equally within itself. The concept [is] this *diremption,* giving its different sides the shape of immediacy, so [that they appear] as independent. The concept [must], precisely in its mediation, reflect itself back into identity with itself, whereupon the different sides first attain the character of an *immediate world* or *nature.* ⟨God is the creator of nature and its wise preserver. The appearance of God in nature [occurs as]: (α) nature, (β) the Son of Man—but the latter [appearance is] for faith, [i.e., for] the Spirit of God, [for] certainty, the knowledge of the divine.⟩ | 16

(γ) Objectivity [appears] as finite spirit. This immediacy or finitude is finite spirit, *the appearance of God in finite spirit,* as a whole *the history of redemption and reconciliation*—the eternal divine history itself. The subjective side of this history, as [it takes place] in finite spirit, in the individual, takes the form of the cultus.

These [are] the three spheres in which the divine idea is to be considered; it is wholly present in each of them, although differentiated according to the determination of the element.

a. [The Idea In and For Itself: The Triune God][51]

(α) God is spirit in the element of thought—that which rightly is called the eternal God, God as such. For here the show of finitude,

51. *Ms. reads in margin:* ⟨Absolute idea of philosophy⟩

[*Ed.*] The "absolute idea of philosophy" is the idea in and for itself, or, in the language of religion, the triune God. We have altered the heading so that it will reflect more precisely the contents of this first sphere of "Concrete Representation." Under the term "triune," Hegel ordinarily refers to the "immanent" or "preworldly" Trinity, the inner dialectic of self-differentiation and self-return that constitutes the divine life. This inner dialectic is outwardly reenacted in the "economic" or "worldly" Trinity—God's relation to the world in creation, incarnation, reconciliation, and spiritual community. Although Hegel does not use the term "Trinity"

of God's divestment and his appearance to an autonomous reality, has not [yet] taken place.

God is *spirit*—that which we call the *triune God,* a purely *speculative* content, i.e., the *mystery* of God. God is spirit, absolute activity, *actus purus,* i.e., subjectivity, infinite personality, infinite distinction of himself from himself, [as the term] "begetting" [suggests]. However, this that is distinguished—⟨divinity standing over against itself and objective to itself⟩—is contained within the eternal concept of universality as absolute subjectivity. Thus it is posited in its infinite differentiation, it has not arrived at darkness, i.e., being-for-itself, opacity, impenetrability, finitude; rather, both as remaining, in its differentiation, in this immediate unity with itself, and in its inherent differentiation, it is the entire divine concept, Son and God; ⟨this absolute unity, as of itself self-identical in its
17 differentiation, [is] *eternal love.*⟩ [77b] |

(β) Spirit, love [is] the intuition of oneself in another, this immediate identity (and therefore expressed in the form of feeling), this intuiting itself; but this intuiting, this identity, is posited only as in infinite difference (mere sensation [is only] animal love and afterwards diversity), whereas truth is posited only as differentiatedness, [as] reflection into self, subjectivity—[only in this is] posited genuine differentiation of the aspects that have been distinguished; thus its unity [is] spirit. ⟨The intuition of this unity [is found in] the poet, for example, who sings of his love, [who] not only loves but makes his love an object [of contemplation]. This [is] spirit: to know love, [to know] oneself in love.⟩

God is One, in the first instance the universal.

God is love and remains One, [subsisting] more as unity, as immediate identity, than as negative reflection into self.

God is spirit, the One as infinite subjectivity, the One in the infinite subjectivity of distinction.

[We shall add a few] *remarks.*[52]

to refer to the latter and does not employ the language of the classical distinction ("immanent" and "economic"), the "economic" Trinity is in fact coterminous with the three "elements" or "moments" in the "development of the idea of God" as described in the later lectures.

52. *Ms. margin:* ⟨The relationship of concepts [is] speculative, wholly peculiar, a different relationship – metaphysics⟩

⟨(α) [This idea of God is] the absolute content for the concept.[53] Speculative science [has] recognized and demonstrated that this idea [is] the truth, the whole truth, the sole truth. [It is] demonstrated and posited by thoughtful mediation. Every determination, every content sublates itself to this end. Faith, so called, [has] accepted [the idea] immediately, holds it to be true by its spirit; [this is] the witness of the divine Spirit.⟩

[Either] one must be content with these pure speculative determinations of thought, or [it must suffice] for faith to accept the happily naive forms of representation that are available, [such as] "Son," "begetting." That is to say, when the understanding applies [itself] to these speculative representations, introducing its forms, they are immediately inverted, and if it has the desire, there is no need for it to cease pointing out contradictions. There *are* | con- 18
tradictions, but likewise they are resolved. The understanding has the right to exhibit contradictions through making distinctions and reflecting them within itself; but it is God, spirit itself, that eternally posits and sublates this contradiction. Spirit has not waited for the understanding, which wants to remove the contradiction and the determinations that contain the contradiction. It is itself precisely what removes them, but likewise it is what posits these determinations and distinguishes them—this [is its] diremption. Against this the understanding sets an abstract universality [78a] and unity. But this is only another mode of contradiction, which the understanding does not recognize, and which therefore it does not resolve—it is a permanent separation, since such universality [stands] on one side for itself and [there is] no activity or unity in which the distinctions are sublated and precisely preserved. [We] arrive at abstract universality by negation; negation is its proper determination, its genesis.

(β)[54] At the very beginning[55] we were reminded that, in the various simpler, undeveloped religions, reminiscences and traces of

53. [*Ed.*] See *Science of Logic*, p. 824 (*GW* 12:236).

54. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(β) Traces – just as [the idea is] contaminated by understanding (number), so also by representations, [which remain] (α) abstract or (β) common, but [have] not the third [moment] as spirit. – [The second moment,] the Son, the incarnation, expends [itself] in a multiplicity [of figures]; Brahman [is] abstraction, not love. – (α) [In] the Trimurti, Siva [is] alteration, and every moment emerges

ideas and characteristics emerged, which became the major feature only in subsequent development. Thus, in [one] form or another, we find in the various religions the expression of a triad[56]—e.g., in Hindu religion. But it is another question whether a characteristic of this kind is the first, absolute determination, which lies at the basis of everything, or whether it is only one form that emerges among others, as, e.g., Brahmā is the One, without even being the object of the cultus. In the religion of beauty and in that of purposiveness, this [triadic] form can certainly make its appearance, at least; but the limiting measure that reverts to itself is not encountered in this multiplicity and particularization. However, the religion of beauty is not without traces of this unity. Aristotle, when
19 he spoke of the Pythagorean numbers, the triad, | said: "We believe that we have called upon the gods completely when we have addressed them three times."[57] [58] It was primarily, however, under the influence of Pythagoras that Plato, who borrowed from Pythagoras, defined the abstract idea in the *Timaeus* as threefold;[59] the Neoplatonists and later the Neopythagoreans did the same thing more specifically and thoroughly.[60] ⟨In philosophy [this idea has been]

fashioned wildly and multifariously, not as the eternal idea in thought—[fashioned] not as thought [but as] sensible representation.⟩

[*Ed.*] Siva is one of the gods of the Hindu triad (Trimurti), the others being Brahmā and Vishnu. Siva represents the principle of destruction, and also the reproductive or restoring power.

55. [*Ed.*] See Vol. 1, pp. 194, 196.

56. [*Ed.*] *Dreiheit,* as distinguished from the terms for "triune" and "Trinity," *dreieinig* and *Dreieinigkeit.*

57. [*Ed.*] Cf. Aristotle, *De caelo* 1.1 (268a10–15). This is not an exact quotation; Aristotle wrote: "For, as the Pythagoreans say, the world and all that is in it is determined by the number three, since beginning and middle and end give the number of an 'all,' and the number they give is the triad. And so, having taken these three from nature as (so to speak) laws of it, we make further use of the number three in the worship of the Gods" (*The Basic Works of Aristotle,* ed. Richard McKeon [New York, 1941], p. 398).

58. [*Ed.*] ⟨(β) abstract quality of thought⟩

59. [*Ed.*] See Plato, *Timaeus* 34c–35b. The three forms of the World Soul are Sameness, Difference, and Existence (Being). For a translation and exposition of this difficult passage, see F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (New York, 1957), pp. 59–66.

60. [Ed.] See, among others, Proclus, *Platonic Theology,* esp. 3.9–14 (*In Platonis theologiam libri sex,* ed. A. Portus [Hamburg, 1618; reprint, Frankfurt a.M., 1960], pp. 135–144).

wholly exhausted, in theology [it is] no longer treated seriously.⟩[61] In more recent times the form of triplicity has again been brought to mind, chiefly by Kant, [an advance] of great importance.[62]

⟨(α) But where the forms belonging to the determination of God as spirit [are found], there we have the question (as we said earlier) whether they constitute a fundamental determination. Some people have wanted to belittle the Christian religion because this determination [is] older [than it is], and because it [has] derived these forms from various places.[63] (α) This historical observation decides nothing at all with regard to the inner truth; (β) but the ancients [did] not know what they really possessed in these forms, namely, that they contained the absolute consciousness of truth—rather [they preferred] others. [They knew] these as present among other determinations.⟩

(β) In regard to the understanding we must also stress these forms, [taken] from number. Two awkward factors [emerge] in this connection: [(α)] If one attempts to count the moments of the idea—three equals one—this appears to be something entirely ingenuous, natural, and intelligible. But [by means of] the method of counting introduced here, [78b] every quality [is] fixed as one, and then to grasp that three times one is only one appears to be the harshest and, so it is said, the most irrational demand. However, only the absolute autonomy of the numerical one hovers before understanding, [signifying] absolute separation and splintering. But logical

61. [*Ed.*] The neglect of the doctrine of the Trinity criticized by Hegel here and elsewhere in the *Lectures* may be traced back to deism and neology. See, e.g., W. A. Teller, *Lehrbuch des christlichen Glaubens* (Helmstedt and Halle, 1764); and J. G. Töllner, *Theologische Untersuchungen,* 2 vols. (Riga, 1772–1774). Since this criticism is found in a marginal passage, it is conceivable that Hegel has especially in mind Schleiermacher's treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity in the concluding four propositions of the *Glaubenslehre,* where it is described as merely an "appended proposition" (1st ed., § 187). See Vol. 1:127 n. 34; see also n. 63 below.

62. [*Ed.*] See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* B 110: "In view of the fact that all a priori division of concepts must be by dichotomy, it is significant that in each class the number of categories is always the same, namely, three. Further, it may be observed that the third category in each class always arises from the combination of the second category with the first" (p. 116).

63. [*Ed.*] Since this remark is contained in a marginal passage, it may date from a later time. In the latter part of the 1820s, Hegel's criticism was directed especially against F. A. G. Tholuck, whose *Die speculative Trinitätslehre des späteren Orients* was published in 1826. See Vol. 1:157 n. 17.

consideration[64] shows the numerical one rather to be dialectical in itself and not something autonomous and genuine; ⟨it [is merely] a thing of the understanding.⟩ One needs only to be reminded of matter, which is the actual numerical one and offers resistance, but
20 | is massive; i.e., it shows the tendency not to be just one but rather to sublate its being-for-self, acknowledging this to be a nullity. Of course, although it remains only matter, the most external of externalities, it does so all the same only as an unachieved goal. Gravitational mass, which is just this sublating of the one, constitutes the underlying determination of matter, and yet matter is the poorest, most external, unspiritual mode of determinate being.[65]

(β) ⟨But another form coheres with this one, and is still more awkward.⟩ The higher definition of distinctions in the absolute idea is *personality.* [The moments of the idea] have been designated as "persons" in the Godhead, and if the determination of the numerical one already appears to be invincible to abstract understanding, so much more so is personality. ⟨Form is here defined as infinite form; each moment [is regarded] as a subject, a personality, an absolute moment, although abstractly, so as to indicate that the antithesis is to be taken absolutely. But personality [is] still the extreme in its abstraction—but as resolved, essentially not maintained in isolation. Representation [at the level of] sensibility: (α) three gods, [in which case] subjectivity would be lost; (β) evil, or [something] deeper.⟩ Personality is the infinite subjectivity of self-certainty; it is reflection into self through distinction, which as abstract form is exclusive vis-à-vis others. ⟨That this determination [is] essential [we have] already seen;[66] generally speaking, the highest idea [is] absolute reflection, the totality of the aspects in themselves.⟩ That these of themselves infinite ones, which are indeed essentially exclusive—a plurality of such ones—[are still] to be grasped only as *one,* [appears to be] the most stark contradiction.

64. [*Ed.*] See *Science of Logic,* pp. 164 ff. (*GW* 11:91 ff.).

65. [*Ed.*] For Hegel's concept of matter as the numerical one that offers resistance, and for his definition of mass, see *Encyclopedia* (1817), § 204; (1830), § 262. The hard, resistant material object because of its mass is also a center of gravitational attraction, which reaches out for the other, thereby sublating its being-for-self, its oneness.

66. [*Ed.*] See above, p. 78.

But in any case, as we [noted] earlier,[67] the divine idea is not just this contradiction but also the resolution of it—a resolution in the sense not that the contradiction is not [present] but rather that it is to be overcome. Personality or freedom is truly [present] precisely in its infinite being-for-self; its very concept is thus the determination of identity-with-self and of universality. | Speculatively 21
understood, this [is] self-emptying precisely at its highest level; this eternal movement [is] its concept.

This [is] expressed in love, in spirit. [We have] the eternal example in self-consciousness, but the pattern of nature also [offers an example]. Birth [presupposes that] the parents [are of] the same species, [but at the same time they are sexually] specific. A family [is] a natural unity of members who are persons, and its ethical unity [subsists] in love. [79a]

⟨In the Christian [religion] generally, [God is understood as] triune—Father, Son, and Spirit; in other [religious] configurations [we find] various approximations. The main category [is] purpose—the concept that maintains itself. [For example,] the life-process brings itself forth, i.e., what is, is endlessly brought forth. Distinction in the process [is] already in and for itself a show, a game, just as reassurance and enjoyment [are] only the abstract form of movement in the reciprocity of love. Reassurance [posits] the one; here [we have] identity as repetition, even for this instant. This instant is exclusive; the law of heaven [is valid] also in this instant. The law remains firm for itself. Calculations are a pleasure for children [because] the rule [is] firm in this case as well, and [they] are entirely certain in advance that the result must [follow] from these procedures. Thus the particular [is] posited only as a show.⟩

(γ) Attention [must] still be directed to the source of manifold modes of representation and definition.

For example, when we say, "God in himself according to his concept is the infinite, self-dirempting ⟨and self-returning⟩ power," he is this only as infinitely self-relating negativity, i.e., as absolute reflection into self—which is already the definition of *spirit*. [68]Since, therefore, we want to speak of God in his first determination

67. [*Ed.*] See above, p. 76.

68. *Ms. margin:* ⟨More proximate determination of the distinction that comes

according to his concept, and arrive at the other determinations from that beginning, we are already speaking about the third determination here: the last is the first. Inasmuch as [we try] to avoid
22 this, or, ⟨if we begin abstractly,⟩ | because the imperfection of the concept occasions a speaking about the first only in accord with its determination, it is the universal; and the activity of creating[69] and producing is already a principle distinct from abstract universality, which does and can appear as the second principle, as manifestation, self-externalization (Logos, Sophia; the first [is then] the Abyss). At the time of Christ's life and for several centuries after Christ's birth, we see philosophical representations emerge for which the representation of this relationship is the basis. In part these are independent philosophical systems, such as the philosophy of Philo, an Alexandrian Jew,[70] and in part they are the work of the other Alexandrines; but most notably they are mixtures of the Christian religion with philosophical representations—blended with figurative, allegorical [notions]—mixtures created in large part by heretics, especially by the Gnostics. Thus, for example, in Philo the ὄν is the first, the inconceivable, ⟨the uncommunicative, unnameable, ἀμέθεκτος⟩ God; likewise with a number of Neoplatonists. The second is the Logos, especially the νοῦς, the self-revealing, self-emerging [79b] God, the ὅρασις θεοῦ, the σοφία, λόγος, then the archetype of humanity, this man who is the impress of the heavenly and eternal revelation of the hidden Godhead—φρόνησις, *Chokma* ⟨(Neander, p. 15)⟩.[71]

about in the manifestation, in what is distinguished – the universal – the Father is presupposition⟩

69. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Transition, progression from the universal to the particular. Differentiated determination – correct, but as an abstraction; each [does] not directly [express] in itself the fulness of the whole.⟩

70. *Ms. margin:* ⟨In the middle between Orient and Occident. Oriental idealism sublimates Occidental actuality into a thought-world.⟩

W_2 *reads:* In these attempts to grasp the idea of the Trinity, we see, in general, Occidental actuality sublimated into a thought-world by Oriental idealism.

71. [*Ed.*] Hegel's information on the Neoplatonists and the Gnostics in this and the next two paragraphs derives largely from August Neander, *Genetische Entwickelung der vornehmsten gnostischen Systeme* (Berlin, 1818). See esp. pp. 8, 10, 12–15, 34, 94–95, 98. However, the predicate ἀμέθεκτος is not found in Neander's presentation and may derive instead from Hegel's study of Proclus; see Proclus, *Elements of Theology* 23–24 (ed. Portus [above, note 60], pp. 426–427).

Valentinus and the Valentinians ⟨(p. 94)⟩ called that unity βυθός, the abyss, αἰών, namely the τέλειος αἰών ἐν ἀορᾶτοις καὶ ἀκατονομάστοις | ὑψώμασι, the eternal, dwelling in invisible and 23
inexpressible heights—⟨not to mention many aeons, universal powers⟩—βυθός, which in and for itself is elevated above all contact with finite things, from whose superabundant essence nothing can be imparted directly and in and for itself, and [which] is the principle and father of all existence only through the mediation of the Sephiroth, προαρχή, προπατήρ.

The self-revelation of the hidden God must precede everything else ⟨(p. 98)⟩.[72] Through his self-contemplation (ἐνθύμησις ἑαυτοῦ) he produces the only-begotten, who is the eternal become comprehensible (καταλήψις τοῦ ἀγεννήτου), the first to be conceived, τὸ πρῶτον καταλήπτον, which is the principle of all determinate existence, the first self-determination and limitation of the infinite, inconceivable essence. The *Monogenes* [only begotten] is therefore the actual Father and basic principle of all existence, πατὴρ καὶ ἀρχή, the ὄνομα ἀόρατον. The βυθός is in and for itself ἀνονόμαστος; the *Monogenes* is the πρόσωπον τοῦ πατρός.

⟨The great controversy of the Eastern and Western Christian churches was joined over the issue of whether the Spirit proceeds from the Son or from the Father and the Son,[73] since only the Son is manifest in activity and is revelatory, and hence only from him [would] the Spirit [proceed]. But the Spirit in general does not have this defining importance; insofar as the νοῦς, λόγος, σοφία, the second principle, the revealing one, the Man, etc., is defined, it is as the Demiurge or as the immediate transition thereto.⟩

72. *Ms. adds in margin:* ⟨Cf. p. 98: "The Brahmā of the Hindus." Brahmā is not revelatory but self-enclosed.⟩

73. [*Ed.*] The controversy between the Eastern and Western church was not, as Hegel here claims in accord with his comparison of the Eastern church with Gnosticism, whether the Spirit proceeds from the Son or from the Father and the Son, but whether it proceeds from the Father alone (as the Eastern church held) or from the Father and the Son (the *filioque* clause added to the Western version of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed from the 6th century on). Hegel's next sentence suggests that this is not simply a compositional error but an error in his knowledge of the history of dogma. The error may have been prompted by the New Testament references to the sending of the Spirit by the Son upon his departure from the world (an important theme for Hegel, see John 16:7), even though it is clear enough that the Spirit is *sent* by the Son but *proceeds* from the Father (see John 15:26).

In brief, the source of many so-called heresies lies purely in the turn of speculation, which, in the transition from the One, the universal, to the process of distinction, distinguishes this activity from the universal, hypostatizes it apart from the universal, which [is supposed] to stand over against it as abstract. Considered more closely, however, this Logos has already itself the characteristic of
24 return within itself, [since it] | contains a moment that ⟨must be distinguished⟩ in order to comprehend the distinction exactly. [80a] The resolution consists in the fact that *Spirit* is the totality, and the first moment itself is grasped as first only because, to begin with, it has the determination of the third, of activity.

b. [The Idea in Diremption: Creation and Preservation of the Natural World][74]

The *second sphere* for representation is the *creation* and *preservation* of the *world as nature*—a finite world,[75] spiritual and physical nature, the inauguration of a quite different region, the world of finitude.

We know from the concept the moment of differentiation, and more precisely, the determinate differentiation.[76] One side, as the undivided and indivisible concept, [is] the pure subjectivity that keeps itself in unity. The other side is the difference as such in itself, that is to say, what has being outside itself.[77] It is the absolute judgment or primal division [*Urteil*] that grants independence to the side of other-being; it is goodness that grants the idea as a whole to this [side] in its estrangement, insofar as it can receive this idea into itself in its modality as other-being, and can represent it.

[78]The relation of this second sphere to the first may be defined by saying that it involves the same idea implicitly but in another

74. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Where – spatial determination [of] where the eternal God is⟩

75. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Objectivity – development of the same – i.e., holding fast of the determinate distinctions

Son – abstract determination of other-being – antithesis of nature and finite spirit⟩

76. [*Ed.*] See *Science of Logic,* pp. 623 ff. (*GW* 12:53 ff.).

77. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Nature and finite [spirit] – its history in it – its goals – its interests – beating itself to pieces⟩

78. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Logical connection of the first and second spheres⟩

determinate modification. The absolute act of the first judgment or division [is] *implicitly* the same as the second; but representation holds the two apart as quite different grounds and acts. And in fact they should be distinguished and held apart; if it is said that they are *implicitly* the same, then it must be exactly | determined how 25
this is to be understood. Otherwise a false interpretation may arise (one that is false in itself and is also an incorrect grasp of what has just now been expounded) to the effect that the eternal Son of the Father, of divinity having being objectively for itself, is *the same as* the physical and spiritual world—and only this is to be understood under the name "Son."[79] [80b]

It has already been suggested,[80] however, and it is in fact quite obvious, that only the idea of God, as explained previously in what [we] termed the first sphere—⟨θεὸς νοητός⟩—is the eternal, true God. Subsequently his higher realization or manifestation in the more detailed process of spirit will be considered in the third sphere.

If the world, as it is immediately, is taken as being in and for itself, as being the sensible and the temporal, then it would be understood either in that false sense just alluded to or as entailing in the first instance two eternal activities of God. God's activity is after all utterly one and the same, not a veritable manifold of various activities, some occurring now, some later on, external to one another, and so forth.

Thus this differentiating [of worldly entities] as something independent is only the explicitly negative moment of other-being, of being-external-to-self, which as such has not truth but is only a moment—temporally speaking, only an instant, yet itself no instant—and only has this mode of independence[81] in contrast with

79. [*Ed.*] Hegel here establishes an important distinction between the second moment of the divine life *ad intra* (the "eternal Son of the Father") and the physical and spiritual world. God in the moment of self-differentiation is not simply identical with the world: this would be a crude pantheism, which Hegel consistently avoids. Rather the divine differentiation *ad intra* is the *ground* for the possibility of creating a world of nature and finite spirit whose vocation is *also* to be the otherness of God. The identity of the eternal Son and the world, of the moment of divine self-objectification *ad intra* and *ad extra,* is *implicit* only, not presently actual. See Fragment 2 from Michelet.

80. [*Ed.*] See above, pp. 77 ff.

81. *Ms. margin:* ⟨This – present instant – being-for-self⟩

finite spirit insofar as it is itself in its finitude just this type and manner of independence. In God himself this is the disappearing moment of appearance. ⟨The objectification of God, as it has been portrayed in the primal idea, is the true [objectification].⟩

[82]This moment has the range, breadth, and depth of a world, including heaven and earth with their infinite organization ⟨internally and externally.⟩ This is what is expressed if we say that | other-
26 being is an immediately disappearing moment; it is only a flash of lightning that immediately vanishes, the sound of a word that is perceived and vanishes in its outward existence the instant it is spoken. Thus expressed, the instant of time floats before us momentarily with its before and after, in neither the one nor the other of which it is. [81a]

However, all temporal determinacy is to be eliminated, whether in terms of duration or of the now; and only the thought, the simple thought, of the other is to be held fast. [We say] "simple" because the "other" is an abstraction. That this abstraction is extended to the spatial and temporal world is to say that the latter is the simple moment of the idea itself and therefore receives the idea entirely in itself. However, because it is the moment of other-being, it is infinite sensible extension.

⟨(α)⟩ If we ask whether the world or matter ⟨(ὕλη)⟩ is eternal, exists from eternity, or whether on the contrary it has a beginning in time,[83] this question belongs to the empty metaphysics of the understanding. [In the phrase] "from eternity," the latter term, as an infinite time that is represented in terms of the false infinite, is itself an infinity and determination of reflection.[84] As soon as the world enters into representation, time commences, and then, by a process of reflection, infinity or eternity arises; but we must be aware of the fact that this determination does not apply to the concept itself.

82. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(α) Conceptualizing cognition of nature is spiritual reconciliation⟩

83. [*Ed.*] A reference to Kant's description of the first conflict of the antinomy of pure reason (the world is or is not limited with respect to time and space); see *Critique of Pure Reason,* B 454–461.

84. W_2 *adds:* The world is precisely the region of contradiction; in it the idea is found in a determination inappropriate to it.

⟨(β)⟩ Another question, or what is in part a further determination of the previous question, concerns the fact that the world, or matter, insofar as it is supposed to be eternal, is uncreated and is immediately there on its own account. (α) The separation made by the understanding between form and matter[85] lies at the basis of this question. (β) According to their fundamental determination, however, matter or world is much rather this other, the negative, which is itself only the moment of positedness, the opposite of something independent, and | in its very existence consists solely in sublating 27
itself and being a moment in the process. The natural world ⟨is relative,⟩ it is appearance; that is to say, it is relative and is appearance not only for us but also in itself. This is its quality, namely, precisely to pass over, moving itself forward, so as to take itself back into the final idea. The diverse metaphysical positions and diverse definitions concerning the ὕλη of the ancients, as well as that of the philosophizing Christians, and especially the Gnostics, have their basis in the determination of the independence of other-being.

⟨(γ) Because the world [is] imperfect,⟩ a third [question arises, concerning] the Demiurge[86] or the Son, the creator of the world. But this is not a particular person; [it is] God in general, the universal (therefore the Father), who [stands] ⟨over against⟩ objectivity, world, ⟨other-being.⟩ [81b]

This other-being as world is such that it is purely and simply what is created, ⟨it does not have being in and for itself;⟩ and if a distinction is made between the beginning as *creation* and the *preservation* of what is extant, precisely this distinction is prior to the representation that such a sensible world is extant and is something that is. It has therefore been held all along with justification that—since being or self-subsistent independence is not attributable to the world—preservation and creation are identical, and that preservation is a creation. But can one say that creation is also preservation? One could say this insofar as the moment of other-being is

85. [*Ed.*] On Hegel's definition of the relationship between form and matter, see *Science of Logic*, pp. 450–454 (*GW* 11:297–301).

86. [*Ed.*] The view found in many Gnostic systems that not an evil but only an unknowing Demiurge created the world may have been encountered by Hegel in the systems of Basilides and Valentinus through the information contained in Neander's *Gnostische Systeme* (see pp. 38 ff., 119 ff.).

itself a moment of the idea; or rather it would be presupposed, as in former times, that something existent precedes creation.

Now, since other-being [is] defined as the totality of an appearance, it expresses in itself the idea, and this is in general what is meant by the *wisdom* of God in nature, a definition according to which nature has in advance a concept that has being in and for itself, which is not nature [itself] as the element of other-being. ⟨(αα) The wisdom of God [is] a profound concept, which is lacking in the earlier religious standpoints because it contains the idea that
28 is determinate in and for itself.⟩ | (ββ) This wisdom is a universal expression, and it is the concern of philosophical cognition to recognize this concept in nature and to grasp nature as a system, as an organization, in which the divine idea is mirrored.[87] This idea ⟨(α) is made manifest; (β) its content is itself the manifestation⟩—the manifestation differentiating itself, revealing itself as an other and [taking] this other back into itself so that this return is just as much external as it is internal. In nature, therefore, these stages lie outside each other as a system of adjacent entities, the kingdoms of nature, the highest of which is the kingdom of the living.

But life, which is the highest exhibition of the idea in nature, means precisely the sacrifice of self—the negativity of the idea vis-à-vis this its existence [*Existenz*]—and the coming into being of spirit. Spirit is this coming forth by means of nature; that is to say, spirit finds its antithesis in nature, so that, through the sublation of this antithesis, spirit is *for* itself, i.e., is spirit. Nature, [however, is] the idea subsisting only *in* itself, i.e., posited in immediate form or in otherness. [82a]

c. [Appearance of the Idea in Finite Spirit: Estrangement, Redemption, and Reconciliation][88]

The third sphere is therefore objectivity in the form of *finite spirit*, the appearance of the idea in and to the latter, *redemption* and

87. [*Ed.*] Hegel addresses himself to this task in the second part of the *Encyclopedia*, the "Philosophy of Nature."

88. *Ms. margin:* ⟨17 August 1821⟩

[*Ed.*] This is the longest section in Part III of the *Ms.*, comprising over a third of the text. It includes the discussion of both estrangement and reconciliation,

reconciliation as the divine history itself ⟨and at the same time as the sublation of external objectivity in general—and thereby the real consummation of spirit.⟩

This [is] the moment of divine, developed objectivity, wherein divinity arrives at its most extreme [mode of] being-outside-itself no less than it finds its *turning point* there; and this moment of return itself consists in both the most extreme estrangement [*Entfremdung*] and the pinnacle of divestment [*Entäusserung*]. | 29

Since this [is] the history of the divine idea in finite spirit, this history itself directly contains two sides: it is the history *of finite consciousness itself* as isolated in immediacy; and [it is] this history as an object for consciousness, *as objective in and for itself*, i.e., as the history of God as it is in and for itself. This [is our concern] here, that [is the concern of] the community.[89]

The necessity of such a history is found, first of all, in the divine idea: God as spirit is this process, whose moments have them-

whereas these are more sharply distinguished in the later lectures. Hegel's point in joining them here is that the appearance of human being as finite spirit and its fall into estrangement represents both the pinnacle of divine self-differentiation *and* the "turning point," the beginning of the history of redemption, which becomes explicit, however, only in the story of Christ. In the later lectures, the turning point—"When the time had come"—is located differently, with the appearance of Christ (see 1824 lectures, p. 215).

If Hegel began lecturing on this material on Thursday, 17 August 1821, as the marginal notation suggests, he must have covered an astonishing amount of material during the remaining six lectures of the course, since the semester ended on Friday the 25th. (Possibly he scheduled an additional hour during the last week of the term.) As of the 17th, he had completed less than a third of the text for Part III, and still had 22 *Ms.* sheets remaining to be covered. Prior to this date he had been lecturing at a more leisurely pace, since he covered the preceding 8 sheets in the five lectures between the 8th and the 17th of August (see above, n. 17). He may have been led into a false sense of security by the belated discovery that the summer semester did not end on the 16th of August but on the 25th (see *Loose Sheets*, n. 20). The bulk of this material was probably composed between mid-July and mid-August.

89. [Ed.] *Dies hier – jenes die Gemeinde.* This sentence is difficult to construe. It could be a reference to the division of Sec. B.c into two subsections, α (estrangement) and β (redemption and reconciliation), in which case the "this" refers to the first side and the "that" to the second. Or it could mean that *our* concern is with the history of the divine idea "as objective in and for itself" (the second side), while the concern of the community is with the history "of finite consciousness itself" (the first side).

selves the shape of complete reality and thereby of finite self-consciousness; hence the divine idea actualizes itself in and to finite self-consciousness. The other aspect of the necessity of this manifestation, however, is that it takes place for self-consciousness, precisely because it is this history in finite self-consciousness. God must be for himself as the whole of his revelation; only thus is he revealed. This history of his must be an object for him, but in *its own* objectivity and truth.

This true history of finite spirit is what now must be grasped. [82b]

α. [*Estrangement: Natural Humanity*][90]

In accord with the idea of its truth, spirit is first in its character as universality (Father). But what finite spirit ⟨is means precisely not being in the element of thinking; it means that the moments⟩ of the concept of spirit ⟨[are found] not in the concept, not in an abstract universal posited in thought, [but occur rather in] immediate being,⟩ [i.e.,] as distinguished, held apart, falling indifferently asunder; it means that the first form of universality is [posited] as first only as what has being and is immediate. The positive[91] is abstract universality because of the falling asunder [of the moments]; it is not yet
30 defined as a totality. Hence the | first modality of spirit is to be as finite and natural spirit, as *natural humanity.*

This determination is to be grasped according to its concept. Immediately, it is an internally unresolved *contradiction.* Spirit is

90. [*Ed.*] Although we have employed the well-known term "estrangement" in the section heading, the term that Hegel more commonly uses is *Entzweiung* ("cleavage," "rupture") rather than *Entfremdung* ("estrangement," "alienation"). There is no substantial difference between the terms, since "cleavage" (within the self, and of the self from the infinite, from spirit) issues in "estrangement." The expression "natural humanity" (*natürlicher Mensch*) does not suggest that the natural being of humanity (the "flesh") is evil as such. Such would be a Manichaean dualism, clearly rejected by Hegel. Rather it is when human being constitutes its existence, establishes the criteria for its life, *according to* the immediacy, particularity, and externality of the physical nature it shares with all created things, that "cleavage" occurs and evil arises. The true vocation of humanity is to exist according to *the Spirit* rather than according to nature. Surely the Pauline κατὰ σάρκα and κατὰ πνεῦμα are in the background of Hegel's thought at this point.

91. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Consciousness of what it is⟩

spirit only as unending return into itself, as mediation of itself with itself, a mediation that is likewise sublated. Immediacy, on the other hand, is the nonmediated, indeed not even the living, far less the spiritual—it is something dead, as though something could be without this mediation. The natural spirit is essentially what spirit ought not to be or to remain.

This is a very important and truthful characterization, and for this reason the one according to which [finite spirit] must be represented by religion, as the knowledge of truth. We must now consider what is contained in it more closely and in more concrete ways.

Natural humanity does not exist in the form that it ought to; it is determined by the singularity of its existence. To begin with, it is the *willing* human being, for the will is the faculty of decision; it is that whereby the human being is constituted as an individual opposed to others, that which puts up resistance and establishes separation. It is not yet thinking humanity, which determines itself in thoughtful fashion according to the universal and the good, i.e. (from the viewpoint of the will), according to a purpose that is in and for itself. To think and to determine oneself according to the universal already entails an abandonment of the immediacy and sheer naturalness that adheres to humanity in an unmediated state. [83a]

Thus the natural human being[92] is not liberated[93] within itself vis-à-vis itself and external nature. It is the human being of desire,

92. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Immediate human being as negative is secondly: (α) Innocence – naive immediacy; (β) Immediacy for spiritual consciousness in the relationship corresponding to its true vocation⟩

93. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Unfree – feeling of dependence – not religious⟩

[*Ed.*] Hegel's Preface to H. W. F. Hinrichs's *Die Religion im inneren Verhältnisse zur Wissenschaft* (Heidelberg, 1822), written only a few months after the *Ms.*, suggests that the reference here to the natural human being who is unfree is an indirect criticism of Schleiermacher. For in the Preface the critique of natural humanity is found in the context of Hegel's polemic against Schleiermacher's definition of religion as the "feeling of dependence." Hegel identifies the natural human being with the ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος of 1 Cor. 2:14, so that Schleiermacher's position appears to be that of the natural or psychic human being, while Hegel, together with the Apostle, assumes the position of the πνευματικός, the spiritual person. Hegel also makes it clear that the feeling of dependence is not, properly speaking, a religious feeling but a purely natural feeling. "The human spirit on the contrary has its

of savagery and self-seeking, of dependence and fear. In its *depen-*
31 *dence* on nature, | it can be either more or less mild ⟨or savage.⟩ In a mild climate (and this is the main determining factor), where nature ⟨gives⟩ it the means to satisfy its physical needs, its natural traits are able to remain mild, benevolent, characterized by simple needs and conditions; geography and travel-accounts provide pleasing depictions of such a state of affairs. But in part these amiable customs [are] simultaneously mixed in with barbaric practices and customs (such as human sacrifice), becoming completely bestial (in the case of the tribal chiefs in the Friendly Islands,[94] the higher their rank, [the more they] have themselves fed like animals, lying as it were in the feeding trough). [There are] fascinating depictions of these customs [from] the islands and coasts of East Asia. This sort of condition does appear to depend on fortuitous circumstances—such as climate, isolation from others, an insular situation—and without such this condition is outwardly impossible; in part, however, it does not derive from empirical possibilities at all. Besides, such observations and accounts[95] concern the outer, good-natured disposition of human beings toward strangers, toward others; they do not enter into the interior aspect of relationships and conditions, ⟨and [hence] they establish an [overly] narrow standard for what human being ought to be.⟩ The question is not just what kind of state of affairs one has taken a fancy to and would like oneself—or humanity as a whole—to be in. Actuality already stands opposed

liberation and the feeling of its divine freedom in religion." See Hinrichs, p. xviii; translated by Merold Westphal as an appendix to *Beyond Epistemology: New Studies in the Philosophy of Hegel,* ed. Frederick G. Weiss (The Hague, 1974), p. 238. See also Hegel's *Berliner Schriften,* p. 74. The allusion to Schleiermacher is of course confirmed by the marginal passage. In the first edition of the *Glaubenslehre,* Schleiermacher spoke rather loosely of pious feeling as "a pure feeling of dependence" (see § 9.3); see our Vol. 1:279 n. 37.

94. [*Ed.*] Hegel's information derives from Georg Forster's account of the travels he and his father undertook with Captain Cook, *Johann Reinhold Forster's Reise um die Welt, während den Jahren 1772 bis 1775,* vol. 1 (Berlin, 1784), pp. 248–249. However, the practices to which Hegel refers were encountered not on the Friendly Islands (i.e., Tonga-Tapu) but in Tahiti; and Forster specifically emphasized the greater social equality of the Friendly Islands as compared with the social hierarchy of Tahiti (p. 344).

95. W_2 *adds:* which we have of those presumably innocent people,

to all such views—⟨insipid possibilities that proceed from abstractions divorced from such circumstances, not from concrete conditions⟩—and to the wishes of a sick philanthropy;[96] but essentially the concept, the nature of the case, is opposed to them too—and the "nature of the case" is this character of naturalness. | Spirit's 32
vocation does not lie in the direction of this naturalness and innocence, which is contrary to its concept. ⟨Necessity appears in the shape of external conditions; and the retailers of possibility believe that everything has been done when they have posited the possibility that the external circumstances [are] nothing in and for themselves and could be otherwise. But external circumstances [are] only occasions, shaped in one form or another, of a necessary development, which itself [utilizes] such external conditions.

However agreeable such a state of affairs is, it is (α) not without gruesome aspects, (β) but in general it also lacks that universal self-consciousness with its consequences and developments, which constitute the glory of spirit.⟩[97] [83b]

The other aspect to be considered here is precisely the concept of spirit itself without the character of immediacy, without this antithesis. This general concept of spirit is that which is in and for itself—the divine idea itself. Human being, because it is spirit, is implicitly this idea. Indeed, because the concept, especially in human being as finite through and through, is the vis-à-vis [of God], the objectivity of the divine idea, this idea alone is defined as the in-itself of humanity—not as human being or finite spirit actually is, but as its inner substance, its truth, which it does not immediately exist as, the truth to which [it] has first to raise itself as spirit, a truth that is itself only truly brought forth as spiritual.

The following two characteristics are found in human being existing immediately: (α) its concept or possibility—for the concept is its possibility, but only that; (β) its immediacy, its self-consciousness, [which is] not as it ought to be. (When the former [is repre-

96. W_2 *adds:* which people wish for the return of in its original state of innocence,

97. *Ms. adds in margin:* ⟨This natural and more or less [savage] state contains, furthermore . . .⟩

[*Ed.*] It seems quite probable that an inserted sheet containing the continuation of this marginal addition has been lost.

sented] as [its original] condition, existence [*Existenz*], or history, then the transition to this latter status [its immediate self-consciousness] [is] the fall into sin.) |
33

The necessary unification of these two characteristics lies in the essence of spirit, as initiating spirit, to have the immediacy by virtue of which it posits itself as an immediate object opposed to itself. [We must here] observe the distinction between representation and conception. What is thus defined conceptually becomes, in the realm of representation, [different] states of existence [*Existenz*], and a transition from one condition to another. ⟨[We must] first briefly consider this representational mode.⟩

⟨(α)⟩ [*The Original Condition.*] We need to be reminded only briefly that the portrayal of the first moment, conceptually speaking, is by means of the representation that human being was *originally created in the image of God* [Gen. 1:27], was brought forth on its own, and that this characteristic has then been represented as its *original state*—[namely that it] was the state of perfection, indeed of spiritual perfection as well as a physical state in which nothing was lacking to it. ⟨Those agreeable empirical conditions spoken of earlier, even if they appear to be touching, are scarcely to be given out as a condition of perfection, any more than the condition of childhood is in human life. Desires, self-seeking, evil, etc., are already to be found in the state of childhood, just as they are in those empirical conditions, although neither the bad nor the good is as pronounced.⟩ One can paint this condition further at will, but precisely by doing so one becomes entangled in difficulties and empty fancies as to how they can be resolved: e.g., the fact that women bear children painfully [Gen. 3:16] [84a] is based on the feminine constitution—but how is this [constitution] to be represented if it [painful childbirth] is something that ought not to be? The necessity of the death of individuals is based on the same [human] constitution—but how then [could it] be imagined that they should not grow older, should not die? More precisely, what is involved here is a confusion about time and the unending sensuous persistence
34 of the bodily state. |

⟨There are three modes of representation that can be specified with regard to this primitive condition:

(α) It is maintained on philosophical grounds that such a primitive [condition] is also the original condition, actually and temporally—but not (in accord with those empirical descriptions) as a condition of merely external well-being or bodily health, of mild, well-meaning customs, and an appropriate but still limited development of intelligence. Rather it has⟩[98] been philosophically grasped as a condition of the highest spiritual perfection,[99] of human being in unity with nature, hence as an untroubled intelligence, which does not turn away from nature and into itself by means of reflection, an intelligence that penetrates and permeates nature as its spiritual center, yet not by standing over against it or separating from it, ⟨but as an intelligence that exists as a pure and highest knowledge,⟩ comprehending the core of metals, the innermost qualities of plants and animals, and recognizing and grasping their true relation to the corresponding aspects of human existence. Thus its attitude to nature is as to a suitable garment that does not destroy its organization: ⟨nature [is one's own] body objectified and cast off, all the tones, colors, and shapes of nature corresponding to an accent of spirit. The intuition of this unity (the comprehending of nature) *is* human being. To know the characteristics of nature and one's own corresponding characteristics is the cognition of nature from oneself.⟩ But this way of thinking is empty when it is consid-

98. *Ms. adds in margin:* ⟨(β) Human being as speculative; (γ) human being as good by nature – without transition [to sin] and return [to self-identity in God].⟩ [*Ed.*] These second and third points are developed in the main text below.

99. [*Ed.*] Hegel here is criticizing the acceptance of a condition of original perfection, which was still current in his time. From his *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History* it may be assumed that he has in mind especially Schelling and Schlegel. See the reference to Schelling and to Schlegel's *Sprache und Weisheit der Inder* found in a lecture transcript (*Die Vernunft in der Geschichte,* ed. Johannes Hoffmeister, 5th ed. [Hamburg, 1955], p. 158), as well as the reference to Schlegel's *Philosophie der Geschichte* 1:44 in Hegel's lecture manuscript of 1830 (*Vernunft in der Geschichte,* p. 159 n. f; the latter reference is found in the translation by J. Sibree of the 2d German edition [1840], *The Philosophy of History,* rev. ed. [New York, 1899; reprint, 1956], p. 58). See F. W. J. Schelling, *On University Studies* (1803), trans. E. S. Morgan (Athens, Ohio, 1966), p. 83; and Friedrich Schlegel, *Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier: Ein Beitrag zur Begründung der Alterthumskunde* (Heidelberg, 1808), pp. 295, 303 (*Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe,* vol. 8 [Munich, Paderborn, Vienna, 1975], pp. 295–297, 303). We may not assume, however, that Hegel's description of the state of original perfection derives from these two works in a detailed way.

ered in a fundamental perspective, no matter how much it commends itself as an ideal of phantasy and supposedly has its roots in the idea itself, on the grounds (namely) that it is the original condition and that the actual condition conforms to this idea just as much as the ideal one.

But this first, immediate relationship [to nature] is thus a relationship of feeling, of instinct, or in consciousness, of intuition | — an immediate relation, not one that has been reconstructed by thinking ⟨or that has returned [to itself] out of the infinite antithesis,⟩[100] or that has developed by means of it. ⟨It is easy to speak of feelings and intuitions as manifold because intuition and feeling [are] unmediated and hence [are] as manifold as their objects, but both alike [are] only developed [into a manifold] through reflection. It is of no help that heaven and earth, humanity and the arts in their beauty are opened up before the eyes of the body, since what and how any of this is in [the mind of] the subject is lacking unless it [is] inwardly cultivated [by] reflection.⟩ [This] is the condition of feeling, which is one of being inwardly concentrated and nonmanifold. Nature in all its spread of wealth does not have a relation to the subject, but is rather totally dense. It is first of all the process of thinking—reflection generally [is] distinction—that develops the wealth of relations [84b] for feeling or intuition.[101] Otherwise feeling is concentrated within itself as the feeling of its singularity; and intuition is just sensible intuition instead, i.e., an external attitude to externals. It is ⟨its *own* hard-won and highly-prized internality⟩— without interest and theoretical, i.e., without interest in the inward essence [of objects], without interest in the developed, determinate inward aspect. This inward essence is the laws of nature, which are not intuited ⟨([it] is of no help to continue viewing heaven so piously, innocently, and credulously)⟩ and are not an immediate relationship, but rather are the product of thought only by means of penetrating into intuition and sublating the sensible relationship of unmediated externality.

100. *Ms. adds in margin:* ⟨(α) Concentrated within itself – feeling – not developed – lacks manifoldness⟩

101. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(β) Intuition [grasps] not the essential and true nature of things but rather their sensible nature; ⟨γ) only thought⟩

It is an entirely different matter to comprehend the idea of spirit in general as the center of nature and as the totality of its identity with it, ⟨and to recognize the way in which this idea | is actualized 36
in self-consciousness, and the path that it utilizes to achieve this end. We have still to observe this insurmountable knot, and [the way that] this exposition [of the original identity] has to work itself out laboriously in order to comprehend [it]—the fall, the becoming other [of humanity].⟩[102]

However, it is something else again[103] when this idea is brought before the imagination: here it is unavoidable that it should be represented as a primitive condition of humanity as it comes forth from the hand of God. It is a high and in essence a true faith that humanity is created in the image of God; this is its original vocation, its true being-in-itself. It is also true that the [human] condition that does not correspond to this idea is an ungodly condition, one that ought not to be, and furthermore (as we shall show later[104]) it is our fault that we should be estranged from the idea.

(β) Another form or elaboration of this definition of human nature as implicitly divine, a form that is based on the speculative idea, is that found among the philosophers, both pagan and Christian, who had the profound idea that lies at the basis of Christianity before their minds in more obscure or purer configurations. [85a] [In order] to grasp the relationship of human and divine nature in a philosophically speculative way and in pure thought, it may be indicated that they comprehended the first human being, i.e., human being as such, as the Only-begotten, the Son of God, as the moment of the objectification of God in the divine idea: Adam Kadmon ⟨(J. Boehme)⟩, the Logos, the Primal Man.[105] ⟨This holds together

102. *This marginal addition replaces the following bracketed passage in the main text:* as (α) the fact that [the idea] is made known and knows itself not merely in universality but rather in a state of determinacy; and (β) the immediacy of the latter, as it actually is, precisely the determinacy of immediate being.

103. *Ms. margin:* ⟨If it is only to be done on that account,⟩

104. [*Ed.*] See below, p. 102.

105. [*Ed.*] Hegel is here apparently drawing again on Neander's *Gnostische Systeme*, p. 102: "As the Father of all the remaining aeons, the λογος, together with ζωη, first begets the Primal Man (ἀνθρωπος), and then with him as his συζυγος the heavenly community (ἐκκλησια). This idea of the Adam Kadmon, as the recipient

[as follows]:⟩ It is precisely the idea of human being [that is depicted]: ⟨(α) in its truth (hence as a moment of God in his eternal being); and (β) [in] the moment of manifestation.⟩

(γ) That humanity [is] good "by nature" [is a doctrine of] recent
37 times.[106] In the modern | sense, human inclinations and natural tendencies [are considered to be good] in the sense that [humanity] exists not in accord with its idea but as it is empirically, by nature, in accord with its vital agency and existence. ⟨To will is good,⟩ and development, for its part, is only a positive bringing out of these tendencies, ⟨unhindered within itself and not passing through negativity,⟩ passing [out of] possibility into actuality and activity without being mediated by a negative moment, ⟨and nurturing good inclinations and tendencies. On this view,⟩ whatever is found in humanity that ought not to be [is there] only because of external contingencies or an accidental failure to satisfy those natural tendencies; it could only be the absence of a free opportunity for their development. [This is] the barren viewpoint of the pedagogy of our time,[107] which on the one hand nourishes vanity, fostering and

and disseminator of the divine vital powers, is found in many forms among the Valentinian systems." Hegel's marginal reference to Jacob Boehme is expanded in the 1824 lectures and may derive from the latter (see below, 1824 lectures, n. 106). The analogy established by Hegel between the Logos as the Only-begotten and Lucifer in Boehme is not as clear in the 1824 philosophy-of-religion lectures as in the history-of-philosophy lectures; see *Vorlesungen*, Vol. 9, original pagination 162–163.

106. [*Ed.*] In Part I of the *Lectures* Hegel ascribes this modern view that humanity is good by nature to Kant (see Vol. 1:288), although it was precisely Kant who, in opposition to the Rousseauean acceptance of the goodness of human nature, asserted the presence of radical evil in humanity. Kant held that an original kernel of goodness could be reawakened through adherence to the moral law. See Rousseau's *Émile* (1762) and *Discours sur l'origine et les fondemens de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* (1755); and Kant's *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (1793), trans. T. M. Greene and H. H. Hudson (New York, 1960), pp. 27 ff., 50 ff. (Kant, *Werke* 6:32 ff., 45 ff.).

107. [*Ed.*] Hegel attacked the pedagogy of his time in Part I (see Vol. 1:241), but there it was in connection with the question whether religion can be taught. His criticism is directed not against the neo-humanistic tendencies of his time but against philanthropinism (a system of education based on so-called natural principles), and is shaped essentially by the work of his friend, Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer, *Der Streit des Philanthropinismus und Humanismus in der Theorie des Erziehungs-Unterrichts unsrer Zeit* (Jena, 1808).

engendering all that is vain, and on the other hand does not perceive—[because it] does not investigate the depths of humanity and attains to no depths itself but moves in barren circles, complacent and self-satisfied—that truly serious and good education consists in *discipline*. It is discipline that has the effect of putting aside natural and self-seeking tendencies, especially through intellectual formation, the provision of an intellectual diet of what is rational and universal, and good, upright customs. ⟨But [this is] precisely what is not meant when we say "by nature." At all events, [if humanity is held to be good by nature,] the moment of negativity appears to recede and [does] not emerge in this glaring fashion—to spare the rod is to spoil the child.⟩ But in order to attain this condition of an ethical people, the [original] conditions must be glaringly present, and education is itself the history [of this condition]—but in softer tones—and [its] progression. ⟨(α) A good feature, the depth of modern times, is [to regard] human being [as] good by nature and its development [as] merely a positive bringing out [of the nature that is within]—the ethical condition of the Greeks. (β) But [given] a submersion in this kind of complacent self-satisfaction without negativity, [the historical condition] will break in from the outside whenever the opportunity presents itself. | [But people are] of the opinion that nothing further is lacking than 38
good educational institutions.⟩[108] [85b]

⟨(β)⟩ [*The Fall*][109] Although the idea of humanity as such [is represented] as a paradisiacal condition, this idea is actual only in the form of a natural and thus of an existent condition. Hence the connection between the first and the second is a *transition*—indeed a transition to something worse, a becoming other, a *fall* from the divine idea, from the image of God.

(α) We have attributed the fact that the connection is represented

108. *Ms. adds:* The truth [is] the first moment without such forms: ⟨(α) actual intellectual perfection; (β) altogether good by nature.⟩

109. [*Ed.*] This β marks the beginning of the second topic to be treated under the theme of natural humanity, namely, the transition from the original condition of humanity as created in the image of God to its actual condition of existing in a state of immediacy and evil—a transition represented biblically by the story of the "fall." See above, pp. 95–96.

as a transition *between two conditions* directly to representation.[110] What belongs to it as such is only [the supposition] that there are two conditions related to each other, and not that nature itself in its immediacy is a transition [into fallenness]. This [must be] considered more closely.

(αα) The first condition [is] an immediate, natural state of *desires* and tendencies generally. But this natural condition is one of *consciousness*. Life is already immediate, but only as a process: consciousness is even more so. [That the subject has] the consciousness of desire does not occur without [its] will; rather desire is the willing of consciousness, its willing in its freedom.

⟨(ββ) Willing what is natural is, more precisely defined, *evil*.⟩ [It is] the willing of separation, the setting of one's singularity against others. [There is] opposition within it—in an immediate sense, [the opposition between] one's singularity and universality. Human being [is] consciousness and also thinking: universal qualities, the good, [are] before it. Human being [exists] only as a transition, [distinguishing] good and evil. Evil, generally speaking, [is to be] in a way that one ought not to be (we must here be satisfied with this general description). Both [good and evil are] before the human being; [it has] the choice between them, and its will is evil. [Hence evil is] its *fault* [*Schuld*]. This evil is its self-seeking: [its] goals [relate] only to its singularity insofar as it is opposed to the universal, i.e., insofar as it is natural. That human being is a natural [being] is a matter of its will, its doing. No excuse to the effect that
39 human being is as it is by nature, education, | or circumstances [can] justify, excuse, or take away the guilt. [86a] In this alone, that [evil] is a matter of human responsibility, is human *freedom* recognized—its being posited by humanity itself; humanity has dignity only through [the acceptance of] guilt.

⟨Hence it is the case that the previously designated[111]⟩ immediacy of natural being itself exists only as something posited, as a willing, a transition: this [is] the accurate way of defining the matter. In a purely abstract natural condition, humanity is neither good nor

110. [*Ed.*] See above, p. 96.

111. [*Ed.*] Hegel apparently is referring not to a specific passage but to the whole of the preceding section (α) on the original condition.

evil; this means, however, that it is not yet actually human. ⟨Because human being is spirit, immediacy [is] posited within it as it truly is. Thus the world and immediate nature [are] created, the realm of immediacy and appearance in general [is created], and in itself is in the same way only the second [state].

In more precise terms, this transition is in general a consciousness of the cognitive kind; ⟨the feeling, the consciousness of the idea, of the universal, and the defining and grasping of what preexists according to the idea [as] a universal determinate in and for itself—[as] good or evil—is cognition.

(γγ) In consciousness, [there is] *cognition.*⟩ Only through cognition does human being exist—because it exists only through knowledge and consciousness. Human will is not unconscious, it is not an instinct. But cognition and volition or consciousness are, generally speaking, the willing of evil just as much as of the good. Hence the first will, the first existence [*Dasein*], [is] not necessarily evil. But will or cognition is in any case and in general (as already mentioned[112]) to be understood as that which contains its turning point within itself. Furthermore, the first will is the natural will; the will ⟨as what is first is precisely the immediate content of finitude, the first content, the first purpose,⟩ [the will] of desire. Cognition, will—[will is] precisely the form, the infinite form of cognition, its content. But the immediate content is precisely the natural, having singularity | and self-seeking as its goal; this is the 40
first, immediate content, it is still formal freedom.

Thus evil, the will of self-seeking, exists only through consciousness and cognition, and constitutes the first form of will. One must keep the concept of the thing before one's mind. [One] can say that there is indeed formal freedom, but right along with it the content [is] given—[so it is] not free will and [there is] no guilt. It does not matter here whether this first, evil will is fixed or transitory, whether it is the impulse or the life of one human being or of a people; [it is] a necessary transitional point, whether it is momentary or long-lasting. ⟨But the divine principle of turning, of return to self, is equally present in cognition; it gives the wound and heals it, [because] the principle is spirit and is true.⟩

112. [*Ed.*] See the preceding paragraph.

⟨(β)⟩[113] [We shall] call attention briefly to the chief moments in the *representation* [*of the fall*]: (α) Adam in Paradise, the Garden of Eden, ate from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; (β) the serpent said, "You will be like God" [Gen. 3:5]; ⟨(γ) they [Adam and Eve] thereby first became finite and mortal; and at the same time, (δ)⟩[114] God said, "Behold, Adam has become like one of us, knowing good and evil" [Gen. 3:22]. [86b] ([This is] a profound story. God's prohibition against eating the fruit [is] a secondary matter. To be sure, this deviation from the idea is something that ought not to be, in the sense that it should be sublated.)

In considering this story, we must first observe its contradictions. It is represented that the man [is] forbidden to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. He transgresses this command, is outwardly tempted by the promise that by eating he will be like God, foolishly believes it (bumblebees and wasps [are] gods—if apple-eating makes gods![115]), and is punished for it. Hence everything follows in a completely finite and ordinary sequence—every-
41 thing depends on such an external | inheritance of evil—entirely lacking in ideal or speculative character. ⟨It [is] all so logical.⟩ The first act of disobedience is something contingent or accidental. It is no longer a question of comprehending sin; rather it is a *story* that we have before us and of which we are externally aware. ⟨(α) [It was] God's interdict, to be sure, but [what God forbade is] not [to be understood as] eating from a tree; that [would be] *formal* obedience, and the content [of the story would then be no more than] what such a formal concept of obedience called for. (β) [Since it was just] this individual, [his] fault, freedom, and accountability oppose [his desire to be like God].⟩ However, what appears at once

113. *Ms. adds in margin:* ⟨Representation⟩

114. *Ms. reads:* (δ) . . . (ε) *instead of:* (γ) . . . (δ)

115. [*Ed.*] *Hummeln und Wespen – Götter – wenn das Äpfelfressen Götter tät' machen.* This is from Sebastian Sailer's Swabian dialect play, *Die Schöpfung,* which probably dates from 1746. At the beginning of Act 3, God chastises Eve for having not recognized that the "long worm" that offered her the forbidden fruit was the devil, and he underscores her foolishness with these words (see the edition by Martin Stern [Stuttgart, 1969], p. 39). This popular play was published in many editions, and it is not certain when Hegel first read it (or saw it performed). There is an allusion to it in a letter from Hegel to Immanuel Niethammer of 3 November 1810 (*Briefe* 1:338).

to be inconsistent in this most excellent chain of consistency is (α) that not *any* tree but the tree of the knowledge of good and evil [is prohibited]. This [is] the major point: it is not a question of just any tree and ordinary fruit; [the allusion to] good and evil leads us at once into an entirely different region. These are absolute, substantial characteristics of spirit, not something like the eating of an apple. ⟨But here [the situation is] still more difficult, for the inconsistency [is] infinite.⟩ (β) Thus it is supposedly forbidden to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil; yet this knowledge is what constitutes the nature of spirit—otherwise the man is a beast. (γ) This knowledge, so the serpent promises, will make him like God. [This is] the temptation of evil, deceit, and pride, and subsequently it is God who says ⟨(Gen. 3:22),⟩ "Behold, Adam has become like one of us, knowing good and evil." Here it is placed on the lips of God himself that precisely knowledge—the specific knowledge of good and evil in general, that is—constitutes the divine in humanity. [87a] Just as the necessity of [our gaining this] knowledge is contradicted, so our knowledge itself appears to be contradicted by the fact (δ) that punishment is incurred by this knowledge and is to take the form of physical necessity—⟨and of mortality, | [which is] a necessary consequence of finitude.⟩ ⟨(ε) And 42
[yet mortality is] also not [to be viewed] as punishment: "Lest he eat also of the tree of life . . ." [cf. Gen. 3:22].⟩[116]

It must be observed, quite generally, that a deep speculative content cannot be portrayed in its true and proper form in images and mere representations, and hence it essentially cannot be portrayed in this mode without contradiction. ⟨Each of the opposites [is] as essential as the other. But in the representation, one of them [is] the absolute idea, [it is] original.⟩ For the speculative content is precisely the comprehension of the concept of the thing—[which involves] the concept's development—and hence [the comprehension of] the inner antithesis that the concept contains and through which it moves.

Once the original divine idea has been represented as a human

116. [*Ed.*] The text continues: ". . . and live for ever—therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the garden of Eden." See the third paragraph below, "Humanity [is] also banished . . . ," and n. 118.

condition, it is consistent for representation that it should represent the knowledge of good and evil as a condition which, in contrast, ought not to have occurred, ⟨and from this everything else follows that appears as inconsistent. Reason [on the other hand] does not allow itself to be confused because of these inconsistencies.⟩ For in fact this first [form of] reflection, according to which the natural is [regarded] as evil, is a situation that ought not to be, i.e., it ought to be sublated—but it is not one that ought not to occur: it has occurred because human being is consciousness. (Moreover, the knowledge of good and evil is not evil on its own account—[this is] another inconsistency.) The story is the eternal history of humanity. The deep insight of this story is that the eternal history of humanity, to be consciousness, is contained in it: (α) the original divine idea, the image [of God]; (β) the emergence of consciousness, knowledge of good and evil, ⟨and at the same time responsibility;⟩ (γ) [the knowledge of good and evil emerges] as something that both ought not to be, i.e., it ought not to remain as knowledge, and also as the means by which humanity is divine. Knowledge
43 heals the wound that it itself is. ⟨[It | is] the category within which the finitude of spirit falls. It is not, as is the case [with] the rest of the finite world, an existing limitation; rather separation is consciousness—its severing, its positing, its distinguishing, and thus labor, toil, and mortality as consequences or punishment, the way the story tells it. On mortality: "In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread till you return to the ground, for out of it you were taken; you are dust, and to dust you shall return" [Gen. 3:19]. [Our] final destiny [is] higher only through eternal life.⟩

Humanity [is] also banished from Paradise so that it may not eat of the tree of life (the *Hom* of the Parsees[117]) and live forever.

117. [*Ed.*] Cf. W_2 11:417: "Among trees, there is one that is especially marked off—*Hom,* the tree from which flow the waters of immortality" (from Hegel's description of Parseeism). According to Iranian tradition, a tree of life and regeneration grows on earth, guarded by a serpent or lizard, and has a prototype in heaven. Earthly *haoma,* or yellow *hom,* is found in the mountains, having first been planted by Ahura Mazda. Its prototype is in heaven, and it is the heavenly *haoma* or white *hom* that gives immortality to those who drink of its sap. Among ancient religions—Indian, Iranian, Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Greek, Israelite—it was common to find a primeval man (or hero) in search of immortality, a tree of life placed

Again, [this is] inconsistent. In one place [the story has it that the ground shall] "bring forth thorns and thistles" [Gen. 3:18]—⟨this is [the meaning of] being expelled from Paradise.⟩ Finitude [thus acquires] its own characteristic knowledge, ⟨v. 17⟩: "Because you have done thus and so. . . ," [says God; hence the punishment is] altogether the consequence of knowledge. Animals are better off, their needs more easily satisfied. In another place [the expulsion is the means to ensure mortality; God says], v. 22: ". . . lest he put forth his hand ⟨and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever.⟩" [Humanity must depart from Paradise] merely in order not to eat of this tree; but mortality [is] a necessary consequence of finitude.[118]

⟨The depth of the idea [is present here] speculatively; [it is] a story concerning the nature of humanity itself, [yet it is] never again mentioned in the Old Testament, [neither in the Books of] Moses [nor in] the Prophets, but only in Sirach 25:32: "The woman is guilty."[119] [Israel has] always gone forth; the God of Abraham and Isaac led the people out of Egypt. Always [it is a matter of] their particularity, evil, stiff-neckedness—in brief, [the story for them is] wholly prosaic and particular.⟩ [87b]

Inasmuch as this representation [of the fall] was no longer contained in the Jewish worldview or in the consciousness of its con-

in some inaccessible spot, and a serpent or monster guarding the tree. See Mircea Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion,* trans. R. Sheed (New York, 1974), pp. 287–290.

118. [*Ed.*] This paragraph is an expansion and clarification of the fifth point (ε) made at the end of the third paragraph preceding. The biblical story seems to offer two conflicting accounts of human mortality: (a) It is a punishment for sin (Gen. 2:17, 3:3, 19); (b) It is a concomitant of finitude. The latter is implied by the banishment from the Garden (Gen. 3:22–23) in order to prevent Adam from eating of the tree of life. In other words, according to the first view, humanity was created immortal but lost its immortal nature because of sin; according to the second view, humanity was created mortal but had the possibility of gaining immortality by eating of the mythical tree, an opportunity that was lost. By exposing the contradictions in the story, Hegel was attempting to show that the whole "punishment" theme is mythical and to elucidate the speculative truth concerning the origin of evil that is concealed therein.

119. [*Ed.*] This is a free paraphrase based on Luther's translation. In modern editions of the Apocrypha, the verse is numbered 24; the full text reads: "From a woman sin had its beginning, and because of her we all die."

dition, the following insight was just as essentially dormant within it: "Adam has become like one of us" [Gen. 3:22]. This "has become" gives expression to the particular moment: not [that of] the first and original likeness of God, but of the likeness that is to be
44 regained. | It is represented as something that has already come to be, expressing generally this other aspect of knowledge, namely, that it is in itself the turning point. [In his] new translation of the Bible, Meyer[120] interprets this "Adam" as the new Adam, as Christ, and ˜in fact there is nothing else lying within it than the likeness of God that is to be regained. One can call this likeness the promise of the new Adam.˜[121] It is expressed figuratively as prophecy in what God says to the serpent: "I will put enmity between you and the woman, and between your seed and her seed; he shall bruise your head, and you shall bruise his heel" [Gen. 3:15]. Since in the serpent the principle of knowledge is represented as autonomous, found outside of Adam and indeed [on] the side of evil, it is wholly consistent that the other side [of knowledge], the side of turning about and reflection, is contained in humanity as concrete cognition, and that this other side will bruise the head of the serpent. This promise, the infinite side of knowledge, was likewise slumbering in the Jewish people, submerged in the limitation and particularity of this people. Only later did the drive, the need, the longing [awaken] within them, and then only in a limited fashion, of hoping especially for a worldly and religious savior—religious, [however,] only in the sense of the reestablishment of their form of worship.

⟨This entire first point[122]⟩ has the closest connection ⟨with the concept⟩ of freedom—[it is] the story of human freedom. A collision [occurs]—the problem of combining evil with God's foreknowledge, goodness, ⟨will,⟩ etc., of combining the absolute divine will with human freedom. [It] belongs to the divine life, which is divine spirit, to objectify itself in free and initially finite spirit, which [is]
45 God *implicitly.* [88a] |

120. [*Ed.*] See Johann Friedrich von Meyer, *Die heilige Schrift: Berichtigte Übersetzung mit kurzen Anmerkungen* (Frankfurt, 1819). Note 6 to Gen. 3:22: "Cf. 1:16; the eternal man, Christ, is to be understood."

121. W_2 *reads:* Involved in this is the promise and certainty of the regained likeness of God.

122. *Ms. margin:* ⟨This first [point] is the wrath of God⟩

β. [*Redemption and Reconciliation: Christ*]

(α) [*The Idea of Divine-Human Unity*]. The second [moment], however, is the elevation of spirit out of its natural will, out of evil, out of the willing of singular selfishness, out of every type of restriction whatsoever, and therefore also [out of the restriction] of religion [itself as] finite religion. This elevation consists generally in the fact that humanity comes to consciousness of the universal in and for itself, and indeed is conscious of it as *its* essence; [humanity comes to] consciousness of *its own* infinity as having being substantially in and for itself. One moment is as essential as the other, absolute objectivity as well as infinite subjectivity. Belonging to self without seeking for self is the infinite form of consciousness, and without self-seeking [it is] precisely universality. God as spirit, who is infinite subjectivity, infinite determinacy within himself, is both the absolute truth and the absolute goal of the will. That is to say, the particular subject as such recognizes this goal to be its own universal goal—infinite freedom—and makes it as such its own as this particular subject. ⟨[Here we have] absolute truth as an object: objectivity with absolute form, absolute spirit, inward process; [we have absolute truth] as a subject: infinite subjectivity, absolute form with infinite inward value, infinite inward purpose.⟩

By consciousness of the unity of divine and human nature we mean that humanity implicitly bears within itself the *divine idea,* not bearing it within itself like something from somewhere else but as its own substantial nature, ⟨as its own vocation or the unique possibility of such a vocation: this infinite possibility is its subjectivity.⟩ (α) In this consciousness humanity knows ⟨the divine idea,⟩ the universal, and [knows] itself to be determined for the universal, i.e., elevated above all locality, nationality, condition, life-situation, etc. Human beings [are] equal; slavery [is] intolerable; [there is] worth and absolute validity only in this perspective. (β) Humanity's vocation [is] in | the spiritual [realm], its goal is a universal goal, 46
it is in itself utterly fulfilled, and all that matters here is that the subject should bring itself into conformity with it, i.e., that the subject should (α) know or intuit that it has the possibility of an infinite value within itself, and that (β) it should actually give itself this value; ⟨[but it is] not its *merit* to produce the good, the divine

idea.⟩ [88b] This consciousness *consummates religion as the cognition of God as spirit,* for God is spirit in the process of differentiation ⟨and return,⟩ which we [have] seen in the eternal idea.[123] This means that the unity of divine and human nature has a significance not only for the definition of human nature but just as much for that of the divine. This is because all differentiation, all finitude, though it is a transitory moment, is a moment of the process of the divine nature, which it develops, and hence it [is] grounded within the divine nature itself.

(β) [*Appearance of the Idea in a Single Individual*]. ˜This cognition constitutes the highest stage of the spiritual being of humanity, i.e., of its religious determination. This is the vocation of humanity as human in general, to enter wholly into the consciousness of human finitude—the ray of eternal life that shines clearly for it within the finite.

This cognition must therefore˜[124] *come to* it. ⟨It comes to us as humanity in general, i.e., without our being especially conditioned by a particular locality or culture, but just as we are immediately⟩ in the mode of religious consciousness in general. This cognition must [come] to us [in such a way] that it actually can be empirically universal, universal for immediate consciousness. For the immediate consciousness this can only happen as the demonstration of the unity [of divine and human nature] to it in a wholly temporal,
47 completely ordinary worldly appearance | in a single human being—this one man who is known at the same time as the divine idea, ⟨not as a teacher,⟩ not merely as a higher being in general, but as the highest [idea], as the Son of God.

What is involved here is this intuitive certainty, not a divine teacher—not to mention a mere moral instructor, or even a teacher of the [philosophical] idea; and it is not a matter of representation or persuasion, but rather the *immediate* certainty and presence of divinity. For immediate certainty of [divine] presence is the infinite

123. [*Ed.*] See above, p. 86.

124. W_2 *reads:* If, on the contrary, the consciousness of the unity of divine and human nature, of this determinate characteristic of humanity as humanity in general, has to be *given* to humanity, or if this cognition has to penetrate fully into the consciousness of human finitude as the ray of eternal life that shines clearly for it within the finite, then it must

form, the way in which the "Is" [*das Ist*] is for natural consciousness.[125] All mediation through feelings, representation[s], or rational grounds lacks this "Is," which returns [to us] only in philosophical cognition by way of the concept, in the element of universality; ˜hence [philosophy] has something in common [with immediate certainty].˜[126]

⟨The "Is" of truth as it is for immediate consciousness [is] the infinite form; the other is the infinite content. The "Is" of feeling, of the heart, concerns the content. The "Is" [is] a moment, [there is] no form without content. [It is] not what [simply] "is" [that] is true, the absolute idea [is] for itself (ontological proof of the existence of God). Solely for the idea is this "Is" the form of truth—but not as though the "Is" gives a content, a particular truth.⟩ [89a]

This is a point of the greatest importance. ˜[The idea is present] (α) *implicitly* or *in itself,*[127] God's objectivity | realized˜[128]—realized 48
in the *whole* of humanity immediately: "from the chalice of the entire realm of spirits foams forth to him infinitude."[129] [130] ⟨In [Goethe's] *Divan,* p. 117⟩—Timur, millions of souls, roses:

125. W_2 *adds:* This "Is" eradicates all traces of mediation; it is the culminating point, the final source of illumination that was previously missing.

126. W_2 *reads:* The divine is not to be grasped merely as a universal thought or as something inward, merely subsisting in itself. The objectification of the divine is not to be grasped merely as something that is present in all human beings, for then it would be understood merely as the plurality of the spiritual in general; and the development that absolute spirit has in itself and that has to advance to the form of the "Is," of immediacy, would not be contained in it.

127. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(β) explicitly or for itself, (γ) [in its] consummate development⟩ [*Ed.*] This is an anticipation of points β and γ, which are developed below.

128. W_2 *reads:* This idea and the objectivity of God are also real implicitly in the process in which other-being sublates itself, and indeed are

129. [*Ed.*] From the concluding stanza of Friedrich Schiller's poem "Die Freundschaft" (1782):

> Freundlos war der grosse Weltenmeister
> Fühlte *Mangel*—darum schuf er Geister
> Sel'ge Spiegel *seiner* Seligkeit!—
> Fand das höchste Wesen schon kein Gleiches,
> Aus dem Kelch des ganzen Seelenreiches
> Schäumt *ihm*—die Unendlichkeit.

(Cf. Schiller, *Werke: Nationalausgabe,* vol. 1 [Weimar, 1943], p. 111.) Hegel's formulation here holds the mean between Schiller's text and Hegel's quotation of these lines at the conclusion of the *Phenomenology of Spirit,* p. 493 (*GW* 9:434): "From

⟨To possess a tiny flask,
Which forever holds the scent,
Slender as thy fingertips—
For this a world is needed,

A world of love-impulses,
Which in the fullness of their striving
Reproved already the nightingale's loves,
Its soul-stirring song.⟩

⟨Ought such torment to afflict us,
Since it enhances our desire?
Has not Timur's dominion
Consumed myriads of souls?⟩[131]

⟨The idea [is realized] (β) *for humanity;* [its] appearance and existence [occur] only in this *single individual.* (αα) [We have] al-

the chalice of this realm of spirits / Foams forth to him his own infinitude." In both cases, Hegel substitutes *Geisterreiches* (realm of spirits) for *Seelenreiches* (realm of souls).

130. W_2 *adds:* The anguish that the finite senses in being thus sublated is not anguish, since it is by this means raised to a moment in the process of the divine.

131. [*Ed.*] J. W. von Goethe, *West-Östlicher Divan,* Buch des Timur, Poem 2, "An Suleika" (*Goethes Werke* [Hamburg, 1949], 2:61):

Um ein Fläschchen zu besitzen,
Das den Ruch auf ewig hält,
Schlank wie deine Fingerspitzen,
Da bedarf es einer Welt.

Einer Welt von Lebenstrieben,
Die in ihrer Fülle Drang
Ahndeten schon Bulbuls Lieben,
Seelerregenden Gesang.

Sollte jene Qual uns quälen,
Da sie unsre Lust vermehrt?
Hat nicht Myriaden Seelen
Timurs Herrschaft aufgezehrt?

In line 3, Hegel writes *diese* (these) instead of *deine* (thy); in line 5 *Liebestrieben* (love-impulses) instead of *Lebenstrieben* (life-impulses). Bulbul (line 7) is the Persian name for "nightingale." Hegel omits the first stanza of "An Suleika," which reads as follows:

Dir mit Wohlgeruch zu kosen,	To caress thee with a fragrant scent,
Deine Freuden zu erhöhn,	To heighten thy delights,
Knospend müssen tausend Rosen	Budding, a thousand roses
Erst in Gluten untergehn.	Must first be burned to ashes.

ready seen the principle of individuality in the Greek ideal,[132] and there, of course, [it is] for the intuiting self-consciousness. [Then God reveals himself as] the One [in the religion] of the Jews, in thought, not in intuition; for this reason [the Jewish God does] not attain to the consummation of spirit. "To attain the consummation of spirit" means precisely that subjectivity should offer itself up as infinite: this absolute antithesis is the outermost extremity of spiritual appearance and negative, infinite return; [that is, it is] subjectivity, and precisely *this* subjectivity; [it is] an individual for the intuiting consciousness. [The idea is realized] (ββ) for humanity [as] an individual, unlike the Greek ideal (α) of a stone or metal, or (β) an ideal individuality. The latter lacks precisely the universal infinity that is in and for [itself]. [It is] not a question merely of a living being; the universal posited as universal is found only in the subjectivity of consciousness, [and in fact is] only this infinite inward movement in | which all determinateness of existence is simultaneously resolved and [posited] in the most finite existence. Only in 49

Goethe's *West-Östlicher Divan,* a collection of poems interweaving Oriental and Occidental themes, was published in 1819, two years before Hegel's lecture manuscript; the poem "An Suleika," the second of two poems making up the "Book of Timur," was written in 1815. Timur or Tamburlaine (1336–1405) was an infamous Oriental conqueror who subjugated parts of Persia, Russia, India, and Syria. Suleika is the Persian name by which Goethe addresses one of his lovers, Marianne von Willemer. As is the case with many of Goethe's lovers, she is an embodiment of a divine or cosmic lover. Hence in a sense the poem is addressed to God, and the meaning appears to be that just as Timur destroyed myriads of human beings to gain a kingdom, so the perfume-maker consumes thousands of roses to produce a tiny flask of fragrant scent; likewise an entire world is needed to offer up a love worthy of God. By juxtaposing this poem with the line from Schiller, and by highlighting the words "Timur," "millions of souls," and "roses," Hegel seems to be saying that from the anguish or suffering (the "chalice") of this whole human world there "foams forth to God" his own infinite love.

W_2 omits the poem except for two lines ("Ought such torment to afflict us, / Since it enhances our desires?"), which support the variant contained in n. 130. If the source of the variant is *Hn,* Hegel may have omitted quoting from the poem when lecturing (except for the two lines), thus focusing his interpretative comment on the line from Schiller. On the other hand, the variant and the omission of the poem may have been due to the editor, B. Bauer. When the poem as a whole is quoted, it conveys a somewhat different sense from that of the variant in W_2, if our reading of it is correct. The point is not so much that the anguish in being sublated is not *really* anguish (although this *also* is true) as that it is the *entire* realm of spirits which is needed to give up to God his own *infinitude.*

132. [*Ed.*] See Vol. 2, *Ms.* sheet 56b.

the latter as subjectivity [is there found] an intuition of infinite universality, i.e., of thinking that is for itself. Thus the idea [appears] directly as the same sort of nature as the rest of humanity; [it is] an ordinary finite being, and as an individual is at the same time exclusive, is on its own account something wholly different [from other individuals, just] as every subject [exists] for itself, objectively; [hence] other individuals are not already themselves this divine idea. (γγ)[133] This individual is *unique;* [there are] not several [like the Lamas]. In one, all [are encompassed]; in several, divinity becomes an abstraction. [This individual appears] utterly and exclusively other over against them all, in order that they might be reconstituted.〉

But [the idea is realized] (γ) for humanity only in the form of *this* single individual, and only *one* such individual—"this" individual—[is] the *infinite* unity ([in this] subjectivity, in a "this" [of this kind]). In [comprehending] the *singular* (as in the particular judgment[134]) [as] *several* (in the same way as with the Hindus [the deity has several] incarnations), [I have] precisely this prosaic inner rigidity of self-consciousness [such as posits more than one "this"]. It is only *then* [when I posit only one "this" that the unity is] objective, that [the idea is] in and for itself for the first time.[135] [It is] not that a few are chosen—[that is] the Calvinist view, a matter of unfortunate fate. [Likewise, it is] superfluous [to posit] several:

133. [*Ed.*] This (γγ) summarizes the theme of the next paragraph, namely, that only *one* single, unique individual is the ultimate appearance of universality. The primary theme of the present paragraph, elaborated under (αα) and (ββ), is that individual subjectivity *as such* is the true form in which universality appears. Hegel altered the arrangement of his argument by adding the whole of paragraph (β) in the margin. What was initially a two-step analysis—presence of the idea implicitly or in the whole of humanity immediately (par. α), and its realization for humanity in the form of *this one* individual (par. γ, initially β)—becomes a three-step analysis, attending, in the middle step, to the *principle* of individuality (marginal par. β.αα,ββ).

134. [*Ed.*] See *Science of Logic,* pp. 645–647 (*GW* 12:73–74).

135. [*Ed.*] This passage is unusually fragmented and complex in the original. Our construal of it depends partly on reading *sowie* rather than *so wie* (the *Ms.* can be read either way). The German text is as follows: "Aber (γ) *für sie* nur als in *diesem* Einzelnen, und NUR EIN solcher Dieser eben die unendliche Einheit – Subjektivität – in *diesem;* sowie Eins – als im particulären Urteil – Einige (wie bei den Indern Inkarnationen) – eben diese prosaische Festigkeit des Selbstbewusstseins in sich, in *diese* Einzelnen; so objektiv – gerade dann erst an und für sich."

superfluous here means counter to the concept of individual subjectivity. *Once is always.*[136] The subject must have recourse to a subject, without option. To make this one into its holy one also has a local and exclusive occasion. In the eternal idea [there is] only one Son, one only exclusive of other finite beings—not in and for himself but eternal love.

⟨The consummation of reality in immediate singular individuality [is] the most beautiful point of the Christian religion. For the first time the absolute transfiguration [of finitude is] intuitively exhibited [so that everyone can] give an account of it and have an awareness of it.⟩ [89b]

⟨(γ)⟩[137] [*The Teaching of Christ*]. The next question [is this]: By what means does this individual attest | to others that he is the 50
divine idea? This question belongs to the transition to the formation of the community;[138] ⟨similarly, [we shall speak] of miracles later on.[139]⟩ "The Spirit will guide you into all truth" [John 16:13], says Christ. The representation of some sort of spectacular verification in nature—a conversion or success—or in the Spirit as divine power, something external, would be much more apt to result in a spiritless condition. And [it would] be a spiritless plea to say that his being and faith in him would [by this means] be raised beyond all doubt.

[140]His teaching, however, belongs to his appearance [as] a free relationship of spiritual consciousness to spiritual consciousness. But since it is a question of the appearance of spirit in immediate existence and for immediate intuition, it is the divine idea as por-

136. [*Ed.*] Hegel here apparently is alluding to the Pauline christology. See 2 Cor. 5:14–15: "For the love of Christ controls us, because we are convinced that one has died for all; therefore all have died. And he died for all, that those who live might live no longer for themselves but for him who for their sake died and was raised."

137. *Ms. adds in margin:* ⟨Process of this individual – [how] the idea takes its course in him so that his temporal presence is able to be a presentation of the idea – teaching – life – suffering – and death – and resurrection – ⟩

138. [*Ed.*] See below, pp. 133–142.

139. [*Ed.*] See below, pp. 144–149.

140. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(α) Teaching: (α) The universal and divine brought [to expression] by him in thoughts, in mind; for it *is* thought, is capable of being portrayed for intuition. – But the remaining action, the remaining reversal – (β) The actual – precisely what remains belongs to the emergence, the actuality – ⟩

trayed in [the whole of] his life and destiny that is integrated by his teaching. The teaching taken by itself alone affects only one's impressions [*Vorstellung*], one's inner feeling and disposition; it does not give this content as a story [*Geschichte*] for immediate consciousness.

By itself, the teaching can contain only the universal, the universal soil, since it exists for subjective representation, ⟨for thoughts. Conversely, the universal as such can be only in inwardness, only in thought, not as an external reality;⟩ inwardness is the subjectivity of the idea. This universal soil is the element, the world, in which spirit must find its homeland; it is by virtue of this that humanity [has] its worth, its infinitude, an absolute worth in inwardness, in the spirit as such. ⟨Humanity [must] prepare this soil for itself inwardly.⟩ [This is] an elevation into a quite other and higher sphere.
51 The universal soil | is the *heavenly kingdom,* the *kingdom of God*— a substantial, intelligible world in which all values that are sought in earthly, mundane things are cast away. ⟨[It occurs] as a state of affairs; [it is] not God alone, the One, but rather a *kingdom* of God, the eternal as a homeland for spirit, the eternal as the dwelling place of subjectivity.⟩ This elevation is brought before the representation with infinite energy, summoning and stimulating the inward element of the soul. [90a]

˜Jesus appeared on the scene in the Roman world and among the Jewish people in particular. This people, more stiff-necked than ever in its religion, because of the way its form of worship was endangered and harmed under the domination of the Syrian kings and the Romans, had fallen low.˜[141] The Romans, in contrast, [enjoyed] the imperial lordship of the world. Jesus appeared when the common people were without counsel [from their leaders, and said] (Matt. 11:25): "I thank thee, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou hast hidden these things from the wise and understanding and revealed them to babes." ⟨[His words are] addressed to people

141. W_2 *reads:* Jesus appeared on the scene at a time when the Jewish people, because of the danger to which its form of worship had been and still was exposed, was more stubbornly absorbed than ever in its religion, and at the same time was compelled to despair at reality since it had come into contact with a universal dimension of human existence, which it could no longer deny, and which nevertheless was completely spiritless—in short,

who were done with the world and with whom the world was done. [Let us] Jews rid [ourselves] of all the debris [of the past], which can no longer be of help to us and cannot make itself effective. [The Jews] despair at reality, [but they are in] touch with a universal dimension of human existence, which they could not deny, but which nonetheless is a completely spiritless universality.⟩[142] [89b]

⟨Three aspects of this teaching [are to be] distinguished: (a) [In] the Sermon on the Mount⟩ (Matt. 5:3[-8]), [he says:] "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. [90a] Blessed are those who mourn, for | they shall be comforted. Blessed are the 52
meek, for they shall inherit the earth. . . . Blessed are ⟨the pure in heart, for they shall see God,"⟩ and so on.

˜In all of this there is a language of inspiration that displaces all other human interests, eradicating them completely—penetrating tones that shake the very foundations; and, as Hermes leads souls forth from their bodies, so [Christ] leads us out of the temporal sphere.˜[143] ⟨Christ speaks further of the Mosaic dispensation of the law [Matt. 5:20 ff.]. The sum and substance is that this type of service, this enslavement, this external activity has no worth. ˜Only *intention* [*Gesinnung*] imparts infinite worth to activity; however, it is not an abstract intention but the true, inward intention that issues in a true activity.˜[144]⟩ "Seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be yours as well" ⟨(Matt. 6:33)⟩.

Throughout these exaltations his sadness over the lost condition of his people and of humanity is conveyed. In brief, his teaching is a complete abstraction from what is regarded in the world as

142. [*Ed.*] This paragraph, which is found on the middle of sheet 90a, is transposed ahead of the next three paragraphs by reference marks.

143. W_2 *reads:* This is proclaimed in the language of inspiration, in such penetrating tones as to shake the soul, and, as Hermes, the Leader of Souls, did, to draw it out of the body and bear it away beyond the temporal into its eternal home.

[*Ed.*] Hegel here alludes to one of the meanings Hermes had for Homer and later poets, where he is the Leader not only of the living but of the departed souls; see, e.g., Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus* 1547; Homer, *Odyssey* 14.1–10, 11.626.

144. W_2 *reads:* And it is only intention [*Gesinnung*] that imparts value—but not an abstract intention, not this or that opinion, but rather absolute intention, which has its basis in the kingdom of God. In this connection, the infinite value of inwardness first comes into view.

great—⟨an elevation to a heaven within, access to which is open to everyone, and in comparison with which everything else counts for nothing.⟩

This universal divine heaven within, this substantial element, leads in [his] more specific reflection[s] to moral and other imperatives, which are nothing other than particular prescriptions in
53 specific | circumstances and situations. But even these imperatives have a restricted range, on the one hand, and on the other hand they are nothing exceptional ˜for this stage, which is concerned with something higher, the absolute truth. ⟨The moral imperative can be expressed as love—not what is legally right but the well-being of the other, hence a relationship to the particularity of the other, and to my sensibility.⟩ The most outstanding and at the same time comprehensive teaching of Christ is, as is well known, *love,* and indeed:˜[145] "Love your neighbor" [Matt. 22:36-40]. In its abstract, more extensive connotation, as love of humankind in general, [90b] [this commandment] prescribes the love of all humanity—and thus it becomes a lame abstraction. The human beings whom one can love are a few particular individuals. The heart that seeks to embrace the whole of humanity within itself indulges in a vain attempt to spread out its love until it becomes a mere pretense [*Vorstellung*], the very opposite of what love is.

Love in Christ's sense [is]: (α) moral love for one's neighbor in the particular circumstances in which one is related to him; ˜˜(β)
54 the love that | is the relationship, the bond among the apostles, [who are] one in love. [It is] not [the case that] each [of them has] a particular occupation, interest, or way of life and then in addition [is] loving. Rather [they are] singled out and removed [from all others], and love [constitutes] the very center of their being. ⟨Love of enemies is also contained here [Matt. 5:44]. [The disciples] are supposed to love and nothing else; they are to renounce everything else. [They are] to make only this unity, this community in and for itself their goal—not the liberation of humanity [as] a political goal—and [they are] to love one another for its sake. ⟨We do have

145. W_2 *reads:* or else they are already contained in other religions and in the Jewish religion. These imperatives are gathered together and focused in the commandment of love, which has as its goal not the legal right but the well-being of the other, and is thus a relationship to the particularity of the other.

objective goals of this kind, and we love for their sake, or are indifferent, or hate. Varying definitions of the goal itself and of the means [to it] are possible. Division immediately [arises] in regard to this objectivity; [there is] a fixation upon goals, and a parting of the ways for subjectivity, which is particularized.) But love is the abstract personality [of the community] and its identity in *one* consciousness; no possibility of particularity remains.〉 This independent love, which is made the midpoint [of all the commandments], then immediately becomes the higher, divine love itself—˜the ground, the˜[146] calling [*Bestimmung*] of the Holy Spirit.

(β) The second aspect of this teaching is this breaking away in the negative sense from everything established—(just this love as such, being without an objective goal, without any goal as such, [is a breaking away]. At first [Christ directs himself] against the established order of Judaism (see the Sermon on the Mount). [There is] the picking of corn on the Sabbath, and the healing of a withered hand,[147] which could have waited until the next morning.˜˜[148] [All such ordinances are brought to an end by his proclamation:] "The kingdom of heaven is at hand"—as an actual state of affairs (Matt. 10:7).〉 [This proclamation is,] so to speak, sansculottism,[149] or, in the Oriental perspective, revolutionary.

(αα) "Consider the lilies of the field—and the birds—they neither

146. *Ms. possibly reads:* the ground of the

147. [*Ed.*] See Matt. 12:1–13.

148. W_2 *reads:* but above all it is meant to express the relationship between his disciples and followers, the bond in which they are one. And here it is not to be understood in such a way that each of them has a particular occupation, interest, and way of life, and then in addition is loving; rather, this love, as something apart that abstracts from all else, is to be the midpoint in which they live and have their occupation. They are to love one another, nothing else, and consequently they are not to have any particular end in view, family ends, political ends, nor are they to love because of these particular ends. Love is rather the abstract personality [of the community] and its identity in *one* consciousness, where no possibility for particular ends remains. Here, therefore, there is no other objective end than this love. This independent love, which is made the midpoint [of all the commandments], finally becomes the higher, divine love itself.

At first, however, this love as such, which as yet has no objective end, is directed polemically against the established order, especially against the established order of Judaism. All those actions commanded by the law, by means of which people established their worth apart from love, are declared to be dead, and Christ himself heals on the Sabbath.

149. [*Ed.*] A reference to the radical republicans of the French Revolution.

sow nor reap, and your heavenly Father cares for them." Matt. 6:31: "Therefore, do not be anxious for the morrow, saying, 'What shall we eat?' or 'What shall we drink?' or 'What shall we wear?' The Gentiles ([for whom] such cares are appropriate) seek all these things."[150] Even beggars are anxious about the coming day, for they have their place [to worry about]. Only thieves and soldiers are capable of this lack of anxiety; thieves know that tomorrow they
55 will find [what they want]. | [He said to] the young man who came to him: "Give what you have to the poor and follow me" [cf. Matt. 19:21].

(ββ) Or [he preaches a breaking away from one's] family. Matt. 12:46[-50]: "While he was still speaking with the people, his mother and his brothers stood outside, asking to speak to him. Someone told him, 'Your mother and your brothers are standing outside, asking to speak to you.' But he replied to the man who told him, 'Who is my mother, and who are my brothers?' And stretching out his hand toward his disciples, he said, 'Here are my mother and my brothers! For whoever does the will of my Father in heaven is my brother, and sister, and mother.'" ⟨Or Matt. 8:21[-22]: "Another of his disciples said to him, 'Lord, let me first go and bury my father.' But Jesus said to him, 'Follow me, and leave the dead to bury their own dead.'"⟩

⟨[There is] no mention of the state. "Render to Caesar" [(Matt. 22:21), he says, but] the consequences [are] not dealt with.⟩

⟨[Yet there is] the well-known passage, Matt. 10:34[-37]: "Do not think that I have come to bring peace [on] earth, but a sword. For I have come to set [parents] against son, son against parents, brother against brother, a man against his father, and a daughter against her mother; and a man's foes will be those of his own household. He who loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me; and he who loves son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me."⟩[151] [91a]

150. [*Ed.*] The first quotation is a conflation of Matt. 6:28 ("lilies") and 6:26 ("birds"). The second quotation conflates the beginning of Matt. 6:34 with 6:31–32.

151. [*Ed.*] Hegel has conflated elements of Matt. 10:21 and Luke 12:53 with this passage.

In this sense, social groups and bodies will always arise among a people—among a people, a community, that [shuts] itself off, in the world too, in opposition to rational cohesion and existence—[sects that] take this distillation of the entire established order back into the simple heart, into simple love, ˜and | behave outwardly in 56
merely a forbearing, submissive manner, offering their necks [to the executioner]. ⟨[We find this] among the Muhammadans, especially in Africa.⟩ But it is impossible to remain in this withdrawn state, for the latter represents the fanatic beginning of suffering and forbearance, whose inner energy will rise after a time to an equally fanatic act of violence when it has gained sufficient strength.˜[152]

(γ) The third aspect of the teaching of Christ has to do with the more precise definition or the proper definition and determinacy of the kingdom of God, i.e., with the relationship of Christ himself to God and of humanity to God and Christ. ⟨In this exaltation of his spirit,[153] he said: "Woman, your sins are forgiven" [Luke 7:48]—this awful majesty of spirit, which can make all that has been done to be undone and declare outright that this [has] come about.⟩ His being sent from God [is thereby manifest]. He states very specifically his identity with the Father: "I and the Father are one" (John 10:30). ⟨"Then the Jews took up stones to stone him" [John 10:31].⟩ "All things have been delivered to me by my Father; and no one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and any one to whom the Son chooses to reveal him" [Matt. 11:27]. "The Father loves the Son, and has given all things into his hand. He who believes in the Son has eternal life; he who does not believe the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God rests on him" (John 3:35[-36]).[154]

˜Christ also refers to himself as the Son of Man[155]—like a son

152. W_2 *reads:* Indeed, if at the beginning this suffering appears outwardly to be only a matter of forbearance, of submission, of offering one's neck, after a time its inner energy, when it has grown stronger, will be directed outwardly in an equally fierce act of violence.

153. W_2 *adds:* and in the certainty of his identity with God

154. [*Ed.*] The biblical text reads "does not obey" instead of "does not believe."

155. [*Ed.*] Hegel's statement fails to recognize the eschatological character of this title, which stems from Jewish apocalypticism and is not at all used in the sense claimed by Hegel.

of the Ababda.[156] All [are] one stem, not this or that single indi-
57 vidual, but | a member, one of the Ababda as such; [and thus] one man [is] humanity as such.

In these and other passages, the question is not whether exegesis [can] of itself flatten out these expressions, [as for instance by] piously [explaining that Jesus was] well-pleasing to God, and that all [human beings are] God's children, just as all the stones ⟨and animals⟩ [are his] creation. Rather [the words of Christ confirm] the truth of the idea, what he [has] been for his community; [they confirm] too the higher idea ⟨of truth,⟩ which [has] been in him in his community."[157] [91b]

⟨(δ) *The Life and Death [of Christ].*⟩ "With reference to such teachings, we suppose at the outset—⟨this [is] nothing speculative⟩—that the life of this teacher is in conformity with them; not only this, but also that his life is completely devoted to them, that he does not shun the hazards and the death that he must expect because of what he has begun among his people. [It] will be found appropriate that he seals his faith by his death—which is not much [to expect] in any case and is shared [by him] with a host of others. ⟨[This is only what is] abstractly fitting: that is, the content, action, and deeds of this life are defined by that content. [Everywhere we get] an unwavering view of one and the same content.⟩"[158]

156. [*Ed.*] The Ababda are one of the Beja tribes of North African Arabs, probably the Gebadei of Pliny and the Troglodytes of classical writers. The Ababda called themselves "sons of the Jinns." *W* deciphers *Ababda* as *Araber* (see n. 157), which is either a mistake or an attempt to clarify an obscure reference. The source of Hegel's information is unknown.

157. *W reads:* Christ refers to himself as the Son of God and the Son of Man. These titles are to be taken in their strict meaning. The Arabs mutually describe one another as the son of a certain tribe. Christ belongs to the human race; this is his tribe. Christ is also the Son of God; it is possible to explain away by exegesis the true sense of this expression, [W_2 *adds:* the truth of the idea, what Christ has been for his community, and the higher idea of the truth that has been in him in his community,] and to say that all human children are children of God, or are meant to make themselves children of God, and so on.

158. W_2 *reads:* At the outset the primary point is the abstract correspondence between the action, deeds, and sufferings of this teacher and his teaching itself, namely, that his life is completely devoted to it, that he has not shunned death and by death has sealed his faith.

But here life and death have another, quite different relation to the teaching [of Christ]. Its content is the kingdom of God—not a universal essence but a living, spiritual life, a | divine community. 58
⟨(αα) The teaching as such [is] the universal form of the content—the kingdom of God, the first, eternal idea itself, but in concrete terms. (ββ) The kingdom of God—or spirit—is to move from the universal to determinacy, to pass over into actuality. This movement, the process of determining, takes place in the life of Jesus. The eternal idea is precisely what allows the category of subjectivity to appear immediately as something actual, distinct from mere thoughts. It is what makes the distinct actuality come to itself ([in its] actualization), and only as thus actualized is it the kingdom of God.⟩ ˜This kingdom of God is linked with individuals (who are supposed to attain to the kingdom) through that *one* individual. The kingdom is the universal idea still presented in representational form; it enters into actuality through this individual, and the history of spirit, the concrete content of the kingdom of God, has to portray itself in this divine actuality.˜[159] ⟨And since the kingdom of God is represented to us as the teaching of a divine individual, the divinity of Christ is at first only implicit. He is the God-man for spirit only as the process of spirit constitutes itself as such. The God-man has to manifest himself in order that he may represent the progress of the idea and be the manifestation of its absolute content, its determinate forms—in order that this absolute content may be manifest, as it were an allegorical or symbolic portrayal of the content—[such is this] teaching as such.⟩

This portrayal—this objectivity of the intuition of the history of spirit—shows that spirit in itself, which is other than itself [as] the natural will and existence [of humanity], sublates this its other-being, and that it now is for itself in all its glory—namely | issuing 59

159. W_2 *reads:* Since the teaching of Christ, taken by itself alone, concerns only representation, inner feeling and disposition, it is supplemented by the portrayal of the divine idea in his life and fate. The kingdom of God, as the content of his teaching, is at first the universal idea still presented in representational form; but it enters into actuality through this individual, so that those who are to attain this kingdom can do so only through this one individual.

[*Ed.*] Note the contrast, both in this variant and in the text of the *Ms.*, between "representation" (*Vorstellung*) and "portrayal" (*Darstellung*).

forth to be spirit through this history. What constitutes this intuition is the history of this spirit, a process transpiring in the modes of finitude, the history of spirit in this peculiar medium, namely that of external, common human existence. Since it is the divine idea that courses through this history, it occurs not as the history of a single individual alone, but rather it is implicitly the history of actual humanity as it constitutes itself as the existence of spirit. [92a]

⟨The teaching and the love with which he conducted himself belong to the previous point about fittingness.[160] Our present point concerns his ordinary life as something external and existent.⟩

⟨The life of Christ [is] a natural, ordinary life and existence; accordingly, his death is the natural negativity whose inner core is unmediated dual opposition.⟩

⟨Thus the kingdom of God has its representative (i.e., the mode of its existence) initially in this existing human being. This existence is a natural, ordinary life, which shows [itself] to be imprisoned in the needs of ordinary human life, and in these limits [consists] finitude. But the highest limit, the supreme finitization, is death, and this human being [experienced death].⟩

This invests the death of Christ with this more precise significance:[161] (αα) [As] the seal of his teaching, as what befits it, [his death] is morally, formally grand, [but it is] not a moment of the divine idea. It is the latter (ββ) under the aspect that death is the highest pinnacle of finitude. If the unity of divine and human nature is to be envisaged in one present individual, then incarnation, as immediate existence in the form of finitude, constitutes this aspect just as much as does the immediate existence, the divestment of the universal, of the divine—⟨but a divestment of itself such that it still *is* in this divestment, not like the external world over against con-
60 sciousness—this [is] nature | in the [perspective of finite] purpose.⟩ It is this immediate existence, inasmuch as it is the divine idea become subjective; it portrays the unity [of the divine and the human] to itself therein, and it is at the same time the cleavage, the other-being.

However, the pinnacle of finitude is not actual life in its temporal course, but rather death, the anguish of death; death is the pinnacle

160. [*Ed.*] See above, p. 122.

161. *Ms. margin:* ⟨becoming-other of the divine⟩

of negation, the most abstract and indeed natural negation, the limit, finitude in its highest extreme. The temporal and complete existence of the divine idea in the present is envisaged only in [Christ's] death.[162]

⟨(α) The highest divestment of the divine idea—as divestment of itself, i.e., [the idea that] is in addition this divestment—is expressed as follows: "God has died, God himself is dead."[163] [This] is a monstrous, fearful picture [*Vorstellung*], which brings before the imagination the deepest abyss of cleavage.

But (β) at the same time this death is⟩ to this extent the highest love. [It is] precisely love [that is] the consciousness [of] the identity of the divine and the human, and this finitization is carried to its extreme, to death. Thus here [we find] an envisagement of the unity [of the divine and the human] at its absolute peak, ⟨the highest intuition of love. For love [consists] in giving up one's personality, all that is one's own, etc. [It is] a self-conscious activity, the supreme surrender [of oneself] in the other, even in this most extrinsic other-being of death, the death of the absolute representative of the limits of life. The death of Christ [is] the vision of this love itself—not [love merely] for or on behalf of others, but precisely *divinity* in this universal identity with other-being, death. The monstrous unification of these absolute extremes is love itself—[this is] the speculative intuition. |

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(γ)[164] [(α)] The speculative [aspect] is that the Son[165] goes to death as the divine (the presupposition [is that there is] a reversal in death)—he who is, on his own, the absolute love. However, this speculative meaning is to be considered in its universal meaning.

162. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Death (α) in the divine idea – immediate⟩

163. [*Ed.*] From the second stanza of the passion hymn "O Traurigkeit, O Herzeleid" by Johannes Rist (1641):

O grosse Not!	O great woe!
Gott selbst liegt tot.	God himself lies dead.
Am Kreuz ist er gestorben;	On the cross he has died;
hat dadurch das Himmelreich	And thus he has gained for us
uns aus Lieb' erworben.	By love the kingdom of heaven.

164. *Ms. canceled:* ⟨(But this love is what is universal, abstract – love in itself, and its reflection – is reality)⟩

165. *Ms. reads:* death

[It is] death in respect of spirit impinging on spirit, and as, [at the same time,] a moment of spirit.⟩ ⟨(β) Death [is] a moment in connection with the more determinate concept of spirit.⟩

On the basis of this death the assertion is justified that Christ [was] given *for us,* [and that his death] may be represented as a sacrificial death, as the act of absolute satisfaction. The common objection to this way of representing it [is] that all individuals must answer for themselves and for their own deeds; others cannot atone for them, nor can they receive absolution in that way. From the standpoint of formal justice this is indeed the case, i.e., from the standpoint according to which the subject is viewed as an individual person. Here this standpoint does not apply ⟨(but at the same time [should be] considered more closely). The other standpoint appears to have a specific meaning that is distant from us.⟩ ⟨[Let us consider] now the meaning of this death.⟩ In order to explain this speculative reversal in regard to it, in order to get to this point, [we must] consider [it] more closely in the concrete sense.

In general, death is both the extreme limit of finitude and at the same time the sublation [92b] of natural finitude, of immediate existence, the overcoming of divestment, the dissolution of limitation. ˜[Death is] the moment of spirit˜[166] in which it grasps itself inwardly, the moment of perishing to the natural, of infinite abstraction from the immediacy of volition and consciousness—sub-
62 merging itself within itself and taking only its determinations | ˜and its being, all that has worth and validity for it, out of this pit. ⟨Its being, its true essence, [is] precisely absolute universality itself, which appears as love [in] religion, just as it does in sensibility.⟩˜[167]

⟨(γ) Although death appears here as natural death,⟩ this death, this suffering, the anguish of death, ⟨is⟩ the element of the reconciliation of spirit with itself, with what it is and contains implicitly. This negative moment, which pertains only to spirit as such, is its inner conversion and transformation. ⟨Death is not portrayed and

166. W_2 *reads:* This sublation of the natural is to be comprehended in the spiritual essentially as the movement of spirit

167. W_2 *reads:* and its true essence and absolute universality, out of this pit. What is valid for it, what is valuable to it, it has only in this sublation of its natural being and willing.

accomplished here in its concrete significance; at first it is⟩ represented as a natural death. In the divine idea, ⟨this negation⟩ can be portrayed in ⟨no⟩ other way: it is the external portrayal of the history of spirit in the natural state. In the process of actualization of the divine idea, evil can only have in it the modality of the natural. Hence the return [of spirit to itself can occur] only in the manner of a natural death.[168]

⟨(δ) But although [it is] a natural death, [this is] the death of God, and now its relevance for us, how we are placed in relation to it, [must be considered]:⟩ this death is one that makes satisfaction for us because it presents the absolute history of the divine idea as a history that has taken place in itself and happens eternally. That the single human being does something, achieves something, that [a certain] goal is attained, is grounded in the fact that the thing itself, in its concept, behaves in this way. Thus my eating an apple means that I destroy its organic self-identity and assimilate it to myself. That I can do this | entails that the apple in itself (already 63
in advance, before I take hold of it) has in its nature the character of being subject to destruction, and at the same time it is something that has in itself a homogeneity with my digestive organs such that I can make it homogeneous with myself. That the criminal can be punished by the judge, and that this [punishment] [93a] is the carrying out of the law, its satisfaction, is not something accomplished by the judge, nor by the criminal through his suffering ⟨the punishment⟩ as a particular, external occurrence or consequence. This is not[169] an accidental sequence of occurrences, [which] thus comes accidentally to that conclusion; rather what happens is the nature of the thing that the law expresses, ⟨the necessity of the concept.⟩ We have this process before us in a double way—on the one hand, in our thought or imagining of the law and concept; on the other hand, in the single case. In the latter, the process proceeds in such and such a way because this is the nature of the matter, without which there would be neither the judge nor his action, neither

168. W_2 *adds:* The divine idea can advance only to this determination of the natural.

169. [*Ed.*] *es ist dies nicht.* The *Ms.* reading, *es ist dies ist,* is clearly a compositional error.

suffering of punishment by the criminal nor the satisfaction of the law. The foundation and substance of all this is the nature of the matter.

This applies also in the case of the satisfaction [made] for us—that is, ˜it has occurred in and for itself.˜[170] It is not an extrinsic sacrifice that is performed, nor a matter of someone else [being] punished so that punishment might be rendered, ⟨nor of life [being] negated and other-being sublated,⟩ [as in the case of] natural death. Besides, everyone dies on his own,[171] and everyone must be and achieve on his own, out of his own subjectivity and obligation, what he ought to be. ˜For one to lay hold of the merit of Christ means that,˜[172] if one is to accomplish this merit within oneself, this conversion that abandons the natural will and natural interest, and if one is to exist in infinite love, then this is the matter in and for itself. One's subjective certainty, one's sensibility and consciousness, is | truth, is *the* truth; i.e., it is, in and for itself, the true nature 64
of spirit, in which spirit is adequate to its concept. The ground of redemption is, therefore, this history, ⟨this perishing of the natural,⟩ for this is the matter in and for itself. It is not a capricious accident, or merely a particular deed and happening, but rather is true and consummating. This verification that it is the true is the intuition given by this history.[173] It is not the history of a single individual; rather it is God who accomplishes it—i.e., it is the intuition that this is the universal history which has being in and for itself. [93b]

⟨The significance of this [death] in its relation to the dissemination of the Christian religion [has to be considered]—˜the polemical significance of the manner of this death, its character and significance for the external [world]. Natural will [is] surrendered. All distinctiveness, all traits of personality, all interests and purposes toward which the natural will might direct itself, [are] as nothing. [This is] a revolutionary element to the extent that it gives the world

170. W_2 *reads:* What lies at the basis is that this satisfaction has occurred in and for itself.

171. *Ms. canceled:* God is no longer a God of the law

172. W_2 *reads:* But what one thus is for oneself may not be something contingent, a matter of one's free choice, but must rather be something truthful.

173. W_2 *adds:* and in which the single individual takes hold of the merit of Christ.

another shape. All things great and of worldly value [are] as nothing; [all these things are] buried in the grave of spirit. This, too, [is made] visible.˜[174]⟩

We still have to consider the particular character of this death: specifically, it has been defined as the uttermost pinnacle of finitude. In addition to the fact that it is a natural death, it is the death of a criminal, the most degrading death on the *cross*. | Taken as some- 65
thing external, life is natural and immediate, but ⟨˜also *my* existence, qua existence [*Dasein*], i.e., in the representation of others—the value they attribute to me. I have value and am objective to the extent that I know how to make myself valued by others and am valued by them. My value is their representation and˜[175] their comparison of me with whatever they reverence, with what they regard as the in-itself.⟩ But immediately, in the opinion of others, my existence is one of honor or shame, a dishonoring death. In a natural death finitude as a natural condition [is] at the same time transfigured [by civil honor]; but here ⟨civil⟩ dishonor, [death on] the cross, [is] transfigured. That which is represented as the lowest and which the state uses as an instrument of dishonor is here converted into what is highest. ⟨˜Love [occurs] in immediate other-being; other-being and finitude [are] transfigured; other-being is what is ignominious.˜[176]⟩ What has counted for the lowest ⟨and most despised⟩ is now made the highest. We find here the direct expression of a complete revolution against all that is established and regarded as valuable. (Death is natural; all human beings must die; but [their

174. W_2 *reads:* A special characteristic of this death is to be emphasized first of all, namely, its polemical aspect toward the external world. In it, not only is the surrender of the natural will brought into view, but also everything distinctive, all interests and purposes toward which the natural will might direct itself, everything great and of worldly value—all these things are buried in the grave of spirit. This is the revolutionary element by means of which the world is given a totally different shape.

175. W_2 *reads:* Other-being has in fact besides its immediate natural being a more extended sphere and a further determination. It belongs essentially to the existence of the subject that it should also be for others; the subject exists not merely for itself but also in the representation of others; it exists, it has value, and is objective to the extent that it knows how to make itself valued by others and is valued by them. Its value is the representation of the others and rests on their

176. W_2 *reads:* But in surrendering the natural will, this finitude, this other-being, is at the same time transfigured.

external existence is one of honor, not that of criminals[177].) Since the dishonoring of existence has been elevated to a position of highest honor, all the bonds of human corporate life are fundamentally assaulted, shaken, and dissolved. The cross corresponds to our gallows. If this symbol of dishonor is made into a badge [of honor] and is raised up as a banner whose positive content is at
66 the same time | the kingdom of God, then ˜the inner disposition [of the citizens]˜[178] is at root withdrawn from the life of the state and from civil affairs. The substantial foundation of public life is removed, and this whole structure no longer has any actuality. Its inner reality [is now only] something external—an empty appearance, which must soon come crashing down. The fact that it is no longer anything in itself must also become manifest in [worldly] existence.

⟨Let us compare what this outward existence of Christianity simultaneously disclosed, not just immediately at the time of Christ itself, but in a web of connections that are, in their universal aspect, contemporary.⟩[179] For its part, imperial authority degraded everything esteemed and prized by humanity. All the venerable forms of justice and constitutional government remained; [nevertheless] the lot of each individual depended on the caprice of the emperor, who was subject neither to internal nor to external constraints. But, besides life, all virtue and worth, [94a] the dignity of old age, one's station in life, and one's race—all these things were thoroughly dishonored. The slave of the emperor was next to him the highest power, or had even more power than the emperor himself; the Senate debased itself in proportion as everything was debased by the emperor. The emperor did not inflict disgrace on the Senate; on the contrary the Senate courted it and freely made it its own. Thus, the majesty of world dominion, all virtue and right, every-

177. *Bracketed phrase canceled in Ms.*

178. *Ms. reads:* the opposite [of dishonor], according to the inner disposition [of the citizens], indeed according to the external sign of honor,

179. [*Ed.*] On Hegel's criticism of the political conditions of the Roman Empire, see his portrayal of the religion of expediency in Vol. 2 as well as his *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte,* ed. G. Lasson (Hamburg, 1923), esp. pp. 680 ff., 711–719. Cf. *The Philosophy of History,* trans. J. Sibree, rev. ed. (New York, 1899; reprint, 1956), pp. 314–318.

thing sacred in human institutions and affairs, the majesty of everything that has infinite value—all are cast upon the dung heap. In this way the secular authority of the earth for its part reduced the highest to what is most lowly ⟨and despised; on the | other hand 67
we saw what is most despised elevated to the highest, to a banner.⟩ In this way, the secular government for its part radically perverted the [moral] disposition [of its citizens] in accord with this [transvaluation], so that there was nothing left in the inner [life] to set against the new religion. Everything established, everything ethical, everything commonly viewed as having authority was destroyed, and there remained to the established order only an entirely bare, external, cold authority—only death—from which the ⟨degraded but existing⟩ life that was inwardly aware of itself did not recoil.

⟨(ε) *Resurrection and Ascension [of Christ].*⟩ But the conclusion of the whole course has still to be considered.

Death accomplishes the process whereby the divine idea has divested itself, divested itself unto the bitter anguish of death and the shame of a criminal, and thereby human finitude is transfigured into the highest—[this is] the highest love. That is the deepest anguish, this the highest love; in anguish love [is contained]. This transfiguration also [occurs] in the subjective [mode] of love and in the most extreme disruption—the most violent interiorization and internality alone; existence [is] simultaneously this despair. Ẇhat has still to be added is the *envisaged consummation* of the return [of the divine idea to itself] that is contained in it. [94b]

In this connection, I need only to recall the well-known modes of this envisagement: they are the *resurrection* and the *ascension.* Like everything that precedes it, this exaltation [of Christ] has appeared for immediate consciousness in the mode of actuality. "Thou wilt not abandon thy Righteous One to the grave, nor let thy Holy One see corruption"[180]—instead, this death of death, the overcoming of the grave and of Sheol,[181] the triumph over the negative, is equally present for envisagement. ⟨[This triumph is] not an abstrac-

180. [*Ed.*] See Acts 2:27: "For thou wilt not abandon my soul to Hades, nor let thy Holy One see corruption."

181. [*Ed.*] See Ps. 16:10: "For thou dost not give me up to Sheol, or let thy godly one see the Pit."

68 tion from human nature or a putting | off of it; rather it is the preservation of it, precisely in death itself and in the highest love. Spirit is spirit only as the negation of the negative, which thus contains the negative within itself. God [is envisaged] as reconciled, as love;⟩ this [involves] the exaltation ⟨of human nature⟩ to heaven, where the Son of Man sits at the right hand of the Father, and the identity and the glory of divine and human nature appear to the spiritual eye in the highest possible way.[182]

⟨This [is] the totality of the history [of redemption].⟩ Thus what this life of Christ brings to representation for us—indeed, for the empirical, immediate, and general consciousness—[is] this process of the nature of spirit—God in human shape. In its development, this [process is] the going forth of the divine idea into the uttermost cleavage, even to the opposite pole of the anguish of death, which is itself the absolute reversal, the highest love, containing the negation of the negative within itself [and being in this way] the absolute reconciliation, the sublation of the prior antithesis between humanity and God. The end is [presented] as a resolution into glory, the festive assumption of humanity in the divine idea.

That initial [cleavage], God in human shape, is God's reality in this process, which shows the separation of the divine idea and its reunification, its consummation for the first time as truth. [95a]

If we now glance back at the three spheres that [we have] considered,[183] and at their connection, [they may be summarized as follows]: the first [is] the eternal God in his pure idea in thinking spirit ⟨and all spirit is thinking⟩; the second [is] this universal realizing itself in nature [as] an entirely external existence, a veritable ⟨divestment;⟩ the third [is the universal realizing itself] in an externality that is at the same time utterly inward, [i.e.,] in finite spirit, which therefore is at the same time the consummation of externality
69 in deepest cleavage, in conscious negation, and | thereby the return

182. [*Ed.*] This paragraph is given in modified form as a footnote in W_2 12:300, with the editorial notation: "From the 1821 notebook in Hegel's own hand." This is the only such notation in W_2. See the Editorial Introduction to Vol. 1 of this edition, pp. 28, 50.

183. [*Ed.*] The three spheres of "Concrete Representation" (see above, p. 77).

to the eternal idea, which is thus actualized in self-consciousness, to eternal spirit, although in the first place abstractly.

Now this, however, is [only] *one* aspect: this return and elevation to the right hand of God is only one side of the consummation of the third sphere.[184] For this third sphere is the idea in its character as singularity but in the first instance its portrayal as only *one* singular individual—the divine singularity, universal singularity, singularity as it is in and for itself. One is all; once is always, implicitly, in accord with the concept, a simple determinacy. But singularity as being-for-self is ⟨this act of releasing the distinct moments to free immediacy and independence;⟩ [it is] immediacy, essentially and exclusively. Singularity means precisely at the same time to be empirical singularity.

Singularity exclusively is *for others;* [it is] immediacy and is the return from the other into itself. The singularity of the divine idea, the divine idea as *one* human being, is first brought to completion in actuality to the extent that initially it has *many* single individuals confronting it, whom it brings back into the unity of the Spirit, into the *community,* and therein it is [present] as actual, universal self-consciousness.

C. COMMUNITY, CULTUS

⟨Standpoint of the Community in General⟩[185]

[We need] still to speak briefly of this [community] in accord with its idea. [To consider it] in concrete form, as tied to a [specific]

184. [*Ed.*] The last two paragraphs of this section form a transition to Sec. C, "Community, Cultus." They seem to represent an acknowledgment on Hegel's part that the distinction between the third sphere of "Concrete Representation" (the appearance of the idea in "the history of redemption and reconciliation") and "Community, Cultus" is not a clear-cut one. The history of redemption includes not only the single individual in whom the divine-human unity was first accomplished, but also the community of individuals, the community of the Spirit, in which reconciliation is brought to completion and Christ is universally actualized.

185. *Ms. adds in margin (first two words canceled):* ⟨Universal antithesis – spirituality – unity [restored by resolving] the antithesis⟩

[*Ed.*] The heading is preceded by an α, which we have omitted. These initial pages serve as a general introduction to Sec. C of the *Ms.* as a whole, the first of

history and empirical existence, would lead us too far afield, tempting as this might otherwise be.

[186]The determinate transition of the idea to sensible presence[187] [has] been accomplished [in Christianity]. Precisely this [is] the
70 distinctive feature of Christianity | [as] the religion of spirit. All moments [are here] developed to their completion. ⟨This juxtaposition of the sensible presence of divinity—of this single individual who is divine—with this ordinary consciousness⟩[188] can occur only in the religion of spirit. [It is] certain of itself as the absolute truth and accordingly [is] to be afraid of nothing, not even of sensible presence. To shun the sensible in monkish fashion is to exhibit cowardice of thought. For spirit [is] at home with itself in the sensible; the sensible appearance of the divine [is now] the immediate object.

[There is] a revolting arrogance that is directed against the moment of sensible presence generally ˜[and against] its congeniality, its [supposed] spiritlessness[189] aspiring to be abstract thought. The

whose main points, "α. Origin of the Community," does not begin until the bottom of sheet 98a. In this section, which is one of the richest of the *Ms.*, Hegel argues that human subjectivity, when it is renewed, transfigured by the indwelling of the Spirit of God, becomes a *communal* subjectivity, giving up its old independence and exclusivity. The "infinite love that arises from infinite anguish" creates a unique and unsurpassable intersubjectivity, distinguished from all other forms of human love and friendship. This section is much abbreviated in 1824 and disappears completely in 1827.

186. *Ms. margin:* ⟨God – idea in sensible presence – for others. To have this idea – ⟩

187. [*Ed.*] *die sinnliche Gegenwart.* This expression, used frequently in this section, refers to the "sensible presence" of God in Christ, a presence that must be sublated in the spiritual community, since Christ is no longer immediately present in a sensible mode, although he is present "spiritually," in the mode of representation for faith.

188. *Ms. adds in margin:* ⟨I, this [manikin] – [this] *ego homuncio* – am not supposed to resist evil, like Jupiter – the *ego homuncio* ought by contrast – to be modest, to make itself humble, in order to be humble in truth, in order to be allowed to be base.⟩

[*Ed.*] Hegel refers here to Terence, *Eunuchus* 591. The contrast is between superhuman (Jupiter) and manikin (*homuncio*) strength, a distinction that is no longer appropriate in the Christian religion since it has been overcome in principle. See below, p. 141.

189. *Ms. margin:* Two aspects: ⟨(α) abstract universality of thought, (β) subjective particularity, feeling⟩

poet honors the sensible shape (just as Oriental religious life does) as having spirit within it. But [the poet] does not just honor his own sensible nature or the feeling of his own subjectivity, but rather sensible presence [as such, which is] the death of feeling. Sentimentality [is] precisely contempt for sensible presence. [This] fixation and limitation in this infinite love [is what] previously[190] [we] designated precisely as "speculative"; love in death [is] a transition. [It is] a relationship of one single sensible presence to others like it. ([Such] love [can be envisaged] by women, by people of tender disposition—[this is] easy [for] people of a loving disposition [such as] John, but infinitely hard for the independent concept, for the man.)˜[191] | The freedom of the subject rebels [against] this reconciliation and unification, [96a] the reverencing of a single living individual as God. Not so the Oriental—[but then] he is nothing, he is implicitly cast aside, without however having cast *himself* aside, i.e., without [having] the consciousness of infinite freedom within himself. ˜Yet this love [that arises from infinite freedom], this recognition, [is] the supreme miracle, the highest in the realm of spirit.˜[192] 71

Accordingly, this sphere ⟨of infinite love⟩ [is] the kingdom of the Spirit. ˜[It involves] knowing oneself as having within oneself, as this individual, infinite worth, absolute freedom, and the infinite power to maintain oneself in this other pure and simple. Love equalizes all things, [but not] in the sense [that] people nowadays want to love and live in love, [implying] that others ought to give themselves up to the same commonality—⟨[which is] the most spiritless [of conditions].⟩ Death runs counter to this love, even a sentimental ⟨death, [as when two lovers are] prepared to drown

190. [*Ed.*] See above, pp. 125–126.

191. W_2 *reads:* It is now required of individuals in the community that they should venerate the divine idea in the mode of singularity and appropriate it to themselves. For the tender, loving disposition, that of woman, this is easy; but on the other side is the fact that the subject which is thus expected to love exists in a condition of infinite freedom and has grasped the substantiality of its self-consciousness. For the independent concept, the man, this expectation is accordingly infinitely hard.

192. W_2 *reads:* But here this love, this recognition, is the direct opposite, and this is the supreme miracle, which is precisely spirit itself.

themselves together.⟩ Only spirit itself, which has grasped and envisaged the truth, absolute objectivity, provides the supreme independence.

The intuition of this religion demands the despising of all that is present and has value—power, worldly grandeur—the intensity of this disdain [is unlimited]. [This religion is] wholly polemical, ⟨recognizing ideality and yet sensible presence only in a single in-
72 dividual, and [such presence] as | infinite.⟩ [This is in] absolute antithesis to Oriental religion—⟨[which] made this Oriental feature [of disdaining sensible presence] its enemy.⟩ Infinite value thus [lies] within oneself, in one's inner being. [This religion entails] a rocklike stability and a surrendering of this stability. ⟨A particular point [concerns] the definition of subjective consciousness. How is self-consciousness, the subjective side, defined? For it, for self-consciousness, this solidity [has been] overcome; how is this overcoming portrayed?⟩

⟨Well, this singular sensible presence is that in which [everything is] gathered together—only *one,* therefore *universal,* even *ideal.*⟩

(α) The divine idea occurs in the Christian religion as a˜[193] present, immediate individual. For single individuals all worldliness has been concentrated in this individual; this is the one and only sensible presence that has value, ˜the infinite abstraction of the present. (Being in love [is] like this too; but in the present case [we live] at the same time in an infinite abstraction from all worldliness. Subjective happiness, [my] being in love with any particular individual I chance to be attracted to, [is here] sublated. Particular sensibility, strictly particular, is opposed to the universal, being exclusive with respect both to this object and to my subjectivity. It is [not then] the divine idea that I want but its opposite, my exclusive particu-
73 larity objectified.) [96b] |

193. W_2 *reads:* implying that the individual has infinite worth within itself, knows itself to be absolute freedom, possesses within itself the most solid stability, while at the same time it surrenders this stability and maintains itself in what is utterly other. Love equalizes all things, even absolute opposition.

The intuition of this religion demands the despising of all that is present, of everything that otherwise has value; it is the perfect ideality, which is directed polemically against all worldly grandeur. In this single person, in this

(β)[194] The next stage is for this singularity, this individuality, to be~[195] removed from the senses and raised to the right hand of God. So it is altogether an individual presence *only for representation*—a certainty without *immediate sensible* presence, unlike the Dalai Lama in the Orient, or [the sacred bull] Apis,[196] [who] is an immediate sensible presence. ⟨This concentration of presence into death,⟩ the shameful death [of the cross], and this withdrawal [of Christ] have the implication that humanity is [now] directed only inward, that all worldly grandeur (as well as the weakness of immediate friendship) has disappeared. The representation that has been given to single individuals as the infinite truth, [as] the divine idea, is [that of] the absolute unity of the universal and the singular, of divine and human nature, infinite love that exists only as infinite anguish, as the death of everything worldly and immediate.

(α) The retreat to inner self-consciousness that is contained in this intuition is not the Stoic retreat, which has value because it thinks by the strength of its own spirit, and seeks the reality of thought in the world, nature, natural things, and their comprehension. The Stoic retreat is without infinite anguish, and [has] at the same time a thoroughly positive relation to the world. Instead, [this Christian retreat] endlessly divests itself of its particularity and self-possession and has its infinite value only in the love that is contained in infinite anguish and comes from it. All of the immediacy in which

194. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Because [this individual is] *universal* singularity, just for that reason [his] form [is] singularity in universality. Thus (β) the definition of the subject is (αα) to have disappeared [into the grave], (ββ) the positive aspect of this subjectivity as an unending surrender of its particularity and naturalness, [of everything that] belongs to it in this world.⟩

195. W_2 *reads:* Hence this singular individuality is [there] as absolutely universal. This infinite abstraction from all worldly things is found even in ordinary love, and the loving subject centers all of its satisfaction in a particular individual; but this satisfaction still belongs altogether to particularity. It is particular contingency and sensibility that opposes itself to the universal and desires in this way to become objective to itself.

By contrast, that individuality in which I will the divine idea is utterly universal; it is for this reason directly

196. [*Ed.*] See Hegel's portrayal of the religion of the enigma (Egyptian religion) in Vol. 2 of this edition, lectures of 1824 and 1827. In the *Ms.*, Hegel does not discuss Egyptian religion and Apis in any detail.

humanity might find some value is cast away; it is only in absolute mediation that humankind gains value, but the value is infinite. This subjectivity is truly infinite in and for itself, but human being is infinite only through this mediation, not immediately. Thus it is *capable* of having an infinite value, and this capacity or possibility is its positive, absolute defining character. This character is the
74 reason why the immortality | of the soul becomes a specific doctrine of the Christian religion: the soul or singular subjectivity has an infinite, [97a] eternal vocation to be a citizen of the kingdom of God. This is a vocation, a life, that is removed from time and temporality, [existing] for itself, and since it [is] also opposed to temporality, this eternal vocation is defined as a future of immortality. The infinite demand to see God, i.e., to become conscious in the Spirit of his truth as a present reality, is not possible in this temporal present for the consciousness that intuits sensibly and is representational.

(β)[197] Subjectivity has given up all external distinctions in this infinite value, distinctions of mastery, power, position, even of sex and wealth. Before God all human beings are equal. This comes to consciousness for the first time here and now, in the speculative and negative [elements] of the infinite anguish of love; herein lies the possibility and the root of truly universal justice and of the actualization of freedom. The formal justice of Roman life proceeds from a positive standpoint and from the understanding. It has no principle within itself for the absolute verification of the standpoint of justice, but is thoroughly worldly. The sexual freedom of women[198] and monogamy—all these characteristics are connected with it.

(γ)[199] This speculative [mode] of love that arises from infinite

197. *Ms. reads:* (ββ)

[*Ed.*] Three sets of intervening Greek letters—(αα), (ββ), and (αα)—have been omitted in the preceding paragraph.

198. [*Ed.*] *Geschlechtsfreiheit der Frauen.* Hegel is probably referring here to the emancipation of women from a subservient role based on sex, especially the equality and reciprocity that should be part of the monogamous marriage relationship in the Christian community (see, e.g., 1 Cor. 7). It is conceivable, though, that he has in mind the free sharing of sexual partners in the primitive Christian community (as part of a general communalism of love) to which he refers in "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," *Early Theological Writings,* p. 280 (Nohl, p. 323).

199. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Extension of the specific concept to a community⟩

anguish, this purity of subjectivity, occur through the infinite mediation; and this infinite mediation has its objective shape [in] the life, suffering, death, and exaltation of Christ. ˜This subjectivity is implicitly universal, not exclusive, and the relation of the many, of individuals, to each other, is the˜[200] unity of faith in the representation of faith, in this third [the community of Christ].[201] [97b] It is neither human love—love of humanity, | sexual love—nor friend- 75
ship. Surprise has often been expressed that so noble a relationship as friendship is not among the duties enjoined by Christ. The relationship of the disciples [to each other] is not one of friendship, for friendship is a relationship burdened by subjective particularity. ⟨That wherein [the disciples are] objectively [one] must be a third, a syllogistic conclusion, [suitably expressed] for representational, self-subsisting subjects.⟩[202] Men are friends (not so much directly as objectively) in a substantial bond, in a third [factor], in fundamental principles, absolute purposes, studies, science. In brief, the bond [of the disciples] is an objective content; it is not attraction as such, like that felt by a man for a woman (as this particular personality or beauty), but [lies] in the intuition of this speculative [element], the infinite love that comes from infinite anguish, i.e., from the worthlessness of particularity and the mediation of love through it. Of course, the love of a man for a woman and friendship can occur, but they are essentially defined as subordinate, not as something evil but as something imperfect, not as something indifferent but essentially as [a state in which we are] not to remain; they themselves [are] to be sacrificed in order that they may do [no] injury to that absolute direction and unity.[203]

(δ) This unity in the infinite love that arises from infinite anguish

200. W_2 *reads:* On the other hand, this subjectivity likewise possesses this mode of its reality in itself, that it is a multiplicity of subjects and individuals; but since it is implicitly universal, not exclusive, this multiplicity of individuals has absolutely to be posited as only a semblance, and precisely the fact that it posits itself as this semblance is what constitutes the

201. W_2 *adds:* This is the love of the community, which seems to consist of many subjects, while this multiplicity is merely a semblance.

202. [*Ed.*] The meaning seems to be that the "third"—the community of Christ—must be represented in sensible form as the "body" of Christ for persons who think representationally.

203. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(α) The third, the objectivity that mediates; (β) as subjectivity, a self-conscious yet universal unity, a unity that subsists in and for itself⟩

is, accordingly, in no way a sensible, worldly linkage, not dependent upon the particularity and naturalness that are still left over and retain validity, but rather a unity simply *in the Spirit.* Love as [originating] in infinite anguish is precisely the concept of spirit itself. It becomes objective in Christ as the focal point of faith at an infinite distance and sublimity, but [at the same time] in an infinite nearness, and with a relevance that peculiarly belongs to
76 the individual subject. ˜⟨Humanity, death, infinite limitation | [are] taken up into the divine idea.⟩ But it is not for the [individual] (the latter is nothing particular [98a] but, in regard to the idea, itself universal), but rather for [all] individuals, and *as thus actual in their subjectivity,* that the divine idea is spirit˜[204]—the *Holy Spirit.* The Holy Spirit is in them; they are, they constitute, the universal Christian church, the communion of saints. Spirit is the infinite return into itself, infinite subjectivity, not represented but actual divinity, the *presence* of God, not the substantial in-itself of the Father or of the Son and of Christ, who is the truth in the shape of objectivity. The Spirit is rather what is subjectively present and actual; and it is only through this mediation [in the community] that it itself is subjectively present as the divestment into the objective intuition of love and its infinite anguish. This [is] the Spirit of God, or God as the present, actual Spirit, God dwelling in his community. Christ [says]: "Where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I in the midst of you" [Matt. 18:20];[205] "I [am] with you always, even unto the end of the world" [Matt. 28:20]. Christ [is] objective, but in the expressions "with you," "in you," he is the Holy Spirit. This [is] the absolute significance of the Spirit, this the highest, ⟨pure⟩ consciousness of the absolute idea, and of absolute truth, the idea as the self-consciousness of the truth.

Accordingly, in this profound sense the Christian religion is the religion of spirit, though not in the manifold, trivial sense of being a spiritual religion, ⟨venerating abstraction, regarding it as substance, essence. On the contrary, [the Christian religion is] the uni-

204. W_2 *reads:* and what thus initially embraces individuals as a third is also what constitutes their genuine self-consciousness, their most inner and distinctive character. Thus this love is spirit as such

205. [*Ed.*] The text of Matt. 18:20 reads "them," not "you."

fication of the infinite antithesis,⟩ the one and only genuinely speculative [enjoyment] of the nature of God, or of spirit. ˜This is its content and its vision, | and it is there˜[206] for the ordinary, 77
uneducated consciousness. ⟨The antithesis is: God and the world, I, this *homuncio* [manikin].⟩[207] All persons are called to blessedness. This [is] the highest calling, and alone the highest. Therefore Christ says: "All sins can be forgiven human beings, save only sin against the Spirit" ⟨(Matt. 12:31); ˜"All sins will be forgiven human beings, even the blasphemies they utter against God; but whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit never has forgiveness, but is in danger of eternal damnation" (Mark 3:28[–29]).˜[208] People have often racked their brains trying to determine what sin against the Holy Spirit is,[209] and they have trivialized this category in a variety of ways in order to get rid of it entirely.⟩ Everything can be consumed in the infinite anguish of love, but this consuming process itself is nothing else but the inwardly present spirit. What is devoid of spirit is not sinful except [when done] with a knowing and willing that is directed against the acknowledged spirit—it knows not spirit and thus is innocent. But this is the innocence that is judged and condemned precisely in itself: ⟨be it ever so vain—*nos prona natamus*;[210] not to have shared in the truth [means that] it has not had eternal life in itself. [This is the meaning that] always comes through in one way or another.⟩ [98b]

206. W_2 *reads:* This is the content of the Christian religion; it is what makes it the religion of spirit, and this content also is there

207. [*Ed.*] See above, n. 188.

208. W_2 *reads:* The injuring of absolute truth, of the idea of this unification of the infinite antithesis, is described, therefore, as the highest offense.

[*Ed.*] Hegel's quotation of the two biblical texts is an imprecise paraphrase.

209. [*Ed.*] See G. E. Lessing, *Nathan der Weise* (1779), act 4, scene 7. Sin against the Holy Spirit

. . . das ist, die Sünde,	. . . is the sin
Die aller Sünden grösste Sünd' uns gilt	That is the greatest of all our sins,
Nur dass wir, Gott sey Dank, so recht nicht wissen,	Except that, thanks be to God, we don't know
Worin sie eigentlich besteht . . .	What it actually consists in . . .

210. [*Ed.*] "We swim on our stomachs (looking downward, not seeing far ahead). Possibly an allusion to Is. 25:11, which in medieval tradition was interpreted as equating the activity of swimming with the plight of the damned.

Hence this aspect of community is the distinctive region of spirit. The Holy Spirit has been poured out upon the disciples. From then on they exist as a community—the community is their immanent life—and joyfully they went out into the world, in order to elevate it to the universal community and to spread abroad the kingdom of God.

First we considered (a) the pure concept of God in the Christian religion, then (b) its concrete representation or manifestation. This entire manifestation—which presents itself in the three spheres of thinking, representation, and actuality—is an appearance or man-
78 ifestation for an | other, the region of existence, of objectivity, [but] here of subjective immanence, of becoming immanent. Consequently, this is (c) the kingdom of the Spirit. The kingdom of God *is* the Spirit. [Thus] subjects [are] implicated in the process. The divine idea, which is there for them as infinite love in infinite anguish, is present within them precisely in this intuition: they [are] the community of the Spirit—⟨[this is their] faith, their laying hold of the merit [of Christ].⟩ At first, singularity is exclusive; in the infinite love it [is] led back [into community]. Christ [is] in the midst of them, and so [is] the Spirit; this process itself [is] the Spirit.

Following this general definition, [we proceed] in more detail.

α. The Origin of the Community

This [is] the first aspect, in accord with which we apprehend once more the standpoint of exclusive individuality: Christ as this man who was temporally present among his friends. The formation of the community comes about as his friends are filled by the Spirit. The beginning [of this is] the temporal presence of an ordinary man—so the community begins from the highest externality of appearance. The question [therefore is] how his friends came or [99a] could have been brought to recognize the divine idea in this individual, to acknowledge him as the Son of God.

[This is] the question, then, of the *verification* ⟨of the divine mission of Christ [*Christus*[211]].⟩ It seems that proofs of the truth

211. [*Ed.*] These terms demonstrate that Hegel customarily used *Christus* ("Christ") as a proper name designating Jesus of Nazareth, indeed as synonymous with the latter, while the title *der Christ* ("the Christ") designates the Messiah, the

of the Christian religion ⟨can be⟩ reduced to the point formulated in this way, ⟨[the supposition being that] these first individuals later handed the content down to others.⟩

This question immediately divides itself into two questions: (α) Is it true *in general* that God has a Son, that he sends or has sent him into the world? | (β) Was *this Jesus of Nazareth* in Galilee, a 79
carpenter's ⟨son,⟩ the Christ [*der Christ*[211]]?

The two questions are so interwoven that if Jesus were not the Son sent by God, if this could not be proved true of him, then there would be nothing at all to his mission. Either we should have to wait for another, ⟨if indeed one is to come, if there is a promise to this effect, i.e., if it is necessary in and for itself, conceptually and ideally;⟩ or rather, since the correctness of the idea is made to depend on the proof of that mission, there is in general nothing more and nothing further to think about with reference to it.

(αα) But we must first ask the essential question: Is such an appearance true in and for itself? This is what we [have] seen,[212] that it is only as what is called "triune" that God is God as spirit: he is his own manifestation, [his] self-objectification while remaining identical with [himself] in this objectification; [he is] eternal love. This objectification, developed to its consummate form in the extreme of universality ([the universality] of God and of finitude or death), is God's return into self in sublating the harshness of the antithesis; [it is] love in infinite anguish, which likewise is healed in the process. The truth in and for itself ˜[is found] in philosophy,˜[213] and only recent philosophy [has] attained this conceptual depth. The unphilosophical shallowness ⟨that wants to philosophize—thinking, reasoning, enlightenment[214]⟩—has nothing to say on this; similarly the contradiction it makes [between love and suffering] is without any value, utterly spiritless—[albeit] innocent

Son of God. The distinction is not between the earthly and the risen Christ, since the name can refer to both, but between a *name* and a *title,* with the latter designating the divine identity and role of the individual who bears the name.

212. [*Ed.*] See Sec. B.a above, pp. 77–86.

213. W_2 *reads:* that God is not an abstraction but something concrete, is explicated by philosophy,

214. [*Ed.*] Hegel here uses the term *Aufklärung,* indicating that he has in mind the Enlightenment philosophers.

according to [the views] indicated above[215]—in its sin against the Holy Spirit; [it is] prideful ⟨and self-satisfied,⟩ vulgar in its concepts, ⟨[which it regards as] complete.⟩ [99b]

But this concept must not be [thought of] as complete the way it is found in philosophy. On the contrary, the relationship of philosophy [to the truth] is *to grasp conceptually what* [*already*] *is.*
80 What is must | be *actual* on its own account, before philosophy comes—⟨[it must] not just [be] what is true implicitly, but [must be] in general empirical consciousness.⟩ Everything true begins in its appearance, i.e., in its being in the form of immediacy. The concept must ⟨therefore⟩ [be] present in the self-consciousness of humanity, in spirit as such, in the world-spirit, and the latter must have comprehended itself in this way; ⟨[this is] another mode of necessity.⟩ This self-comprehending, however, is the necessity [that occurs] as the process of spirit, a process that exhibits itself in the previous stages of religion, primarily the Jewish and ˜pagan,˜[216] and that has this result as its truth—namely, the concepts of the absolute unity of divine and human nature, the actuality of God, which is God's objectification of himself. Thus world history is the exhibition of this truth as the result [that occurs] in the immediate consciousness of spirit. ⟨In time [there is] this succession of stages.⟩

"When the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son" [Gal. 4:4]. "When the time had fully come"—this means: when spirit [had] entered so deeply into itself as to know its infinitude and to know the substantial as [present] in the subject of immediate self-consciousness, but in pure subjectivity, an infinite negativity, and for that very reason absolutely universal.

(ββ) The verification that this particular individual is the Christ is another matter and refers only to the determinate statement that this one [is the Christ] and not some other one; it does not concern the question whether the idea does not therefore exist at all. Christ said: "Do not run hither and thither, the kingdom of God is within you" [Luke 17:23, 21].[217] Many others among the Jews and pagans

215. [*Ed.*] See above, p. 141.

216. W_2 *reads:* the Greek and Roman

217. [*Ed.*] This quotation is a paraphrase and conflation of two verses. Luke 17:21 is more accurately translated: "in the midst of you" (ἐντὸς ὑμῶν).

have been venerated as divine, as gods. John the Baptist preceded Christ; among the Greeks and Romans [there was] Demetrius Poliorcetes, for example, [to whom,] when he came to Athens, statues [were erected] as to a god.[218] The Roman emperors [were] venerated as God. Apollonius of Tyana[219] and many others [were] believed | 81
to be miracle workers; ⟨it [would be] even more miraculous if it were not true [that Jesus is the Christ], for his understanding, insight, depth of thought, honesty, [are] greater miracles than those they narrate.⟩ In earlier times, Hercules [was] (among the Greeks) the only individual who was represented as human, yet because of his deeds, which were merely deeds of obedience, entered the circle of the gods and became a god, a prototype. ⟨Among the Hindus, moreover, this great multitude of incarnations [is found], this elevation of the Brāhmans to Brahmā, [this] becoming God.⟩

However, the infinite idea of humanity could attach itself only to Christ [100a] and see itself realized only in him, ⟨for the time had fully come, the idea was completely mature in its depths. In another [such as] Hercules [it was] incomplete; e.g., through his heroic deeds the nature of spirit in its history [was] not exhibited at all.⟩ The history of [Christ's] teaching, life, death, and resurrection [has] taken place; thus this history exists for the community, and it is *strictly adequate to the idea.* ˜⟨[It is] not [just] teaching, a [merely] intellectual foundation.⟩ This is the crucial point on which everything depends, this is the verification, the absolute proof.˜[220] This is what is to be understood as the witness of the Spirit, of the

218. [*Ed.*] Plutarch, in his *Lives of Illustrious Men,* tells how Demetrius and Antigonus were venerated by the Athenians and given the name "deliverer gods." Demetrius was a successful military leader who liberated the Athenians in 305 B.C.E.

219. [*Ed.*] Apollonius of Tyana was a first-century Neopythagorean concerning whom reports are found in Dio Cassius, *Histories* 77.18, 68.18; Augustine, *Letters* 102.32; Origen, *Contra Celsum* 6.41. Stories about miracle workers are found especially in biographies by Moiragenes, upon which Origen drew, and by Flavius Philostratus. The comparison between the miracles of Jesus and those of Apollonius is an ancient theme of pagan apologetics; see the writing of Hierocles of Bithynia mentioned by Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones* 5.3. Hegel's source of information about Apollonius is unknown.

220. W_2 *reads:* while it is only the effort of spirit to attain this determination of the implicit unity of the divine and the human that lies at the basis of those earlier forms and is recognizable in them.

Holy Spirit, for a single individual. It is the Spirit, the indwelling idea, that has attested Christ's mission, and this is the verification for those who believed, and for us [to know] in the developed concept.

[(α)] We have now to refer to the *miracles,* which are supposedly what constitute the immediate verification. In and for itself, miracle is only a relative verification.[221] (α) Christ says reproachfully: "Unless you see wonders, you will not believe. Many will come ⟨to me
82 saying⟩ [that] in my name [they] perform signs, cast out demons, | make the blind see, the deaf hear, the lame walk, etc. And I will declare to them, 'I have never known you, depart from me!'"[222] What sort of interest still attaches in this connection to the working of miracles? How many miracles by oracles and by men, especially for example [by] the Neopythagoreans,[223] are not narrated! (β) What is relative is in any case temporal, limited to the formation of the community. [To use miracles as a basis for] belief in this individual was of interest only for those who are outside; it was for the conversion, so to speak, of Jews and pagans. But the community that is formed needs miracles no longer; it has within itself the Spirit that leads into all truth.[224] It is the Spirit [that verifies], the power [*Macht*] of the Spirit, by its truth as spirit, ˜over spirit.˜[225] Miracle is merely a force [*Gewalt*] over natural connections and hence only a force exerted on the consciousness that is bounded within the consciousness of these limited causal connections. How could the eternal idea itself come to consciousness through the representation of such a force? (γ) But there always remains a certain curiosity or inquisitiveness: How are the miracles to be construed or [100b] explained? In other words, how can they be grasped in such a way that they are not miracles at all but rather in some sense natural effects? A curiosity of this kind presupposes

221. W_2 *adds:* or a verification of an inferior sort.

222. [*Ed.*] This quotation is a conflation of John 4:48, Matt. 7:22–23, and Matt. 11:5.

223. [*Ed.*] See above, n. 219.

224. [*Ed.*] See John 16:13.

225. W_2 *reads:* [it] is the genuine force over spirit, i.e., a power by means of which there is left to spirit all of its freedom.

doubt[226] and disbelief, and [one] would like to find a plausible support by means of which the moral virtue and integrity of the persons involved can be saved—one is so reasonable and well-meaning that Christ and his friends | are allowed to remain hon- 83
orable people. ⟨Therefore, [one makes] the assumption that a delusion is involved, but not an intentional one, i.e., no deception was perpetrated.⟩ Otherwise, the briefest way of settling the matter would be to throw out the miracles entirely. If someone does not believe in any miracles, finds them opposed to reason, [even those] of Apollonius of Tyana and others, [which are] well attested, then it helps not at all to want to prove them to him. They have to rest on sense perception, but [there is] an insurmountable resistance in human beings to allowing what is attested only in that way to count as truth. In the range of sense perception, one can find hundreds and thousands of possibilities for what happened. For possibilities and probabilities of this kind are what count in this sphere, and the proofs are themselves nothing but probabilities of the same kind, involving the subjectivity of finite grounds.

The main point [is] that curiosity of this kind proceeds already from the absence of faith. Faith, however, rests on the witness of the Spirit, not on miracles but on the absolute truth, on the eternal idea and its content, and from this standpoint the miracles have little interest. They can be cited as subjective reasons of an incidental and edifying character, or they can be left aside. ⟨[It is of] no interest [to faith] to investigate what the wedding guests at Cana really drank, and if it was wine, whose wine.⟩[227] ⟨Miracles are supposed to attest, and [yet] they have to be attested themselves [first]. What is supposed to be attested by them is the idea; [but that] has no need of them, and therefore no need to attest *to* them.⟩

226. *Ms. margin:* ⟨[One might advise:] Don't have doubts and then they are resolved! But I ***must*** have them, I cannot lay them aside unanswered; [they] press upon me and rightly should be answered. The necessity of answering them rests on the necessity of having them. The necessity of having them [is found] in reflection, [which] makes this claim, i.e., [it treats] as absolute the demand for such finite reasons. But it is precisely in piety that finite reasons, or human understanding so called, have long since been set aside.⟩

227. [*Ed.*] See John 2:1–11.

There still remains this to be said: miracles [are], in general, effects produced by the power of spirit on the natural nexus, a higher intervention in the natural process, in the eternal laws of nature. Speaking generally, spirit is this absolute intervention. Life itself is already an intervention in these so-called eternal laws of nature. Life digests, i.e., it supersedes the [101a] eternal laws of
84 physics [*Mechanismus*] and chemistry. Food, [as] material, | behaves in accord with the eternal laws of physics, and as chemical, [with those] of chemistry; life puts an end to this. Still more marked is the effect on life of the power of spirit and its weakness. [There is such a thing as] death caused by fright; [people can become] sick from grief. In the same way joy and trust also [can bring life and health]. Animal magnetism [i.e., hypnosis] has disclosed these powers to us in a more familiar form. In all ages, [there is] infinite faith, infinite trust, [the influence of] spirit upon spirit; cripples are healed, the blind see, the deaf hear, right up to the present day.[228] Unbelief in such effects is based on a superstitious belief in the so-called powers of nature and their independence vis-à-vis spirit.

(β) This first means of verification is an external mode of faith, a contingent one. Genuine faith rests on the spirit of truth, while that [first kind of verification] still involves a relation to sensible, immediate presence. Genuine faith is spiritual and exists in the spirit. It has the truth of the idea as its basis, and since this idea is at the same time [present] for representation in a temporal, finite fashion in this one individual, it can actually appear [only] as realized in this individual, can enter into play only after his death and his removal from the temporal sphere. For only then is the process of envisagement itself brought to its consummation as a spiritual totality. In other words, believing in Jesus itself means no longer having the sensible appearance as such before one, ⟨the sensible perception of which is in other cases supposed to constitute the verification. It is said: "If only [I had] seen him, if only I [had] had the sensible before me—a human being such as one sees every day of the week—[if only I had] heard [the words] of his mouth!"[229]

228. [*Ed.*] See Jesus' response to the disciples of John the Baptist, Matt. 11:5.

229. [*Ed.*] In this paragraph Hegel is arguing that the idea precisely *as it appears*

So [what we have is] not a sensible verification by seeing for oneself [but rather] through witnesses. The latter can err; they themselves are supposed to have seen it, but they themselves [are] also only witnesses; so [this is] no help at all. Thus [we have] probability and a judicial examination of the testimony; [but this too] is no help.⟩

This [witness of faith] is represented as the outpouring of the Holy Spirit upon the departure of Christ. "I will send you a Comforter, the Spirit; the Spirit will lead you into all truth."[230] And for this | Spirit sensible history exists in essence only as accomplished— 85
sublated[231] to the right hand of God; hence it exists essentially as a *past* history—past in the sense that [what is] sensible is past for representation. All eternal history, [like] the creation of the world, [is viewed] as something past. [101b]

⟨β. The Being of the Community; the Cultus⟩

(α) It is now the community that is formed and in which the Holy Spirit dwells; and from this Spirit the community explicates its faith.

(αα) It has a *faith*. "Faith" [is] an ambiguous word. Here [it means] faith in the truth, i.e., certainty of absolute truth—of what God is, God [as] spirit, and this his actualization. [This is] faith neither in authority nor [as a consequence of] what [has been] seen

in Jesus can *now* be verified only spiritually, not immediately or sensibly; faith entails spiritual envisagement (*Anschauung*) rather than sensible perception (*Wahrnehmung*). The essential reality of Jesus—the appearance of the idea of divine-human unity—can be properly apprehended only after his death, by spiritual faith. Jesus was in historical, sensible fact the "God-man," according to Hegel (a fact most concretely expressed by the *infinite love* that arises from the infinite anguish of the cross), but he can be *properly* (i.e., spiritually) envisaged as such only by faith after his death and departure. Even a direct, sensible perception of Jesus by eyewitnesses could not provide a verification of the truth claimed for him.

230. [*Ed.*] An inexact conflation of John 16:7, 13. Ironically, Hegel's defense of the proof of the Spirit is itself based on a supposed historical proof, namely, Jesus' statement in the Gospel of John to the effect that he must depart in order that the Spirit may be sent.

231. [*Ed.*] Hegel here uses *aufgehoben* ("sublated") where one might have expected *aufgestanden, erhoben,* or *aufgegangen* ("raised," "ascended"). For Hegel the resurrection of Jesus from the dead indeed entails an *Aufhebung*—an annulling of his sensible presence, yet a preservation of his real presence and its transfiguration into the modality of spirit.

and heard; rather it is the eternal, substantial nature of spirit that has come to consciousness here, exists for consciousness, [so] that what is truth in and for itself has certainty for me. This can happen [for philosophical consciousness] through the *concept*—but here it is not so; [it happens] for spiritual consciousness as a whole, and for that reason it is called faith, which does not have to rest on grounds, authority, etc. Grounds or reasons [are appropriate] for what is limited, for what appears, for the finite, not for the eternal, [because] grounds are always contingent. That I should come to have faith in the eternal can also appear to have grounds, but these [are] contingent, indifferent, external [occasions], subjective in character, depending on how an accidental incident [may have] stirred an individual's heart. ˜But the faith of the community rests solely on reason itself, on the Spirit. In other words, [what is involved is] a mediation that sublates all mediations; hence it is necessarily expressed as a faith brought about by God.˜[232] As Adam [said of the woman], "Flesh of my flesh, bone of my bones" [Gen. 2:23], so it is [with] the self-subsisting divine idea in human shape, the *imago Dei;* it is from God, and—"spirit of my spirit"—a witness
86 of God. |

(ββ) Faith as a form of *objective* truth. Initially [it is] not feeling [but rather is] an *object* of consciousness, and this represented truth is first of all the ground that determines feelings. Spirit [is] higher than [what occurs] in the form of feeling. The animal [has] feeling too. [Human beings have] consciousness, [102a] by means of whose content [feelings] are determined. If feeling were only intended to designate "immanence," then it would be ⟨a religious feeling⟩ that is indifferent [to its content]. But feeling [is] the form that locks particular subjectivity, the natural human being and natural will, within itself; ⟨[it is] what throws everything together and keeps it together,⟩ essentially impure. Spirit, by contrast, is from the first this conversion that is self-appropriating; by this appropriation [it is] what is liberated from feeling, [it is what] conquers feeling, purifies and determines it.

232. W_2 *reads:* Or this self-consciousness, expressed as a faith that rests on the Spirit, i.e., on a mediation that sublates all finite mediation, is the faith brought about by God.

The *doctrine* or *teaching* [*Lehre*] of the Christian church [is] the principal thing that serves to awaken feelings—but feelings that proceed from the teaching of truth, from representation and from objectivity, and [are], therefore, genuine feelings for the first time. Such teaching forms, creates, and explicates [these feelings] from itself. ⟨[It is] a necessity that doctrine be withdrawn from arbitrariness and contingency of insight, and that it be preserved as truth that is in and for itself, as something that is secure. Therefore [it is] deposited in [creedal] symbols, bound to fixed expressions, ˜whether [they have been] formed on the basis of written sources or on that of an [oral] tradition. In the written sources, further development appears as an interpretation of the Bible; in the tradition, as a positing, articulating, doctrinalizing of tradition. [Tradition], too, is doctrine; it, too, is something given, not [simply] created from itself. It is the Spirit of the community as a whole [that is creative]; the doctrine | of the church [is] not produced by[233] 87
the church but is cultivated by the Spirit present within it. Whether the historical origin [is] in the Bible or in tradition is not the primary issue; the community[234] is the infinite power and authority needed for its development, for the progressive determination of its doctrine.˜[235]⟩

(β) The developed community is a *church,* which as an existing community undergoes expansion, but is fixed as far as its determinate being in the actual world is concerned; it is inwardly at peace and endures through time. Thus an organization enters into play in it. The church is the kingdom of God, the achieved presence, life, preservation, and enjoyment of the Spirit.

233. *Ms. reads:* in

234. *Ms. reads:* it [*sie*]

235. W_2 *reads:* The distinction as to whether the community gives expression to its consciousness on the basis of written sources or attaches its self-determinations to the [oral] tradition is not an essential one. The main point is that, by means of the Spirit, which is present in it, the community is the infinite power and authority needed for the development and progressive determination of its doctrine. This authority makes itself felt in both of these cases. The exposition of a source lying at the basis [of a doctrine] is always in turn a form of knowledge and develops into new determinations; and even if, in the tradition, [the doctrine] is attached to something given and presupposed, the tradition itself in its historical development is essentially a form of positing.

[We need] only briefly to point out that the initial, polemical tendency of renunciation that was opposed to any external worldly presence intrinsically falls away and is no longer valid here. [A saying such as] "I have not come [to bring] peace, but a sword" [Matt. 10:34], the disruption of family bonds, the renunciation of property—[these] could only apply in special situations within the community[236] itself. ⟨"Give all that you have to the poor" [Matt. 19:21] contains within itself the insulation of this command. If everyone gave everything to the poor, then soon there would be no more poor to give anything to, or no more persons who would still have something to give. Or rather, the poor would now be rich, and those who had been rich would now be poor, so that what was previously theirs would be returned to them.⟩ [Such an injunction] is self-negating. Family, property, temporal concerns arise of themselves, [and in turn give rise to] laws and governance; and all that is needed is that out of the womb of the church there be formed a free life, ⟨a civil and⟩ political life, stemming from eternal principles, ⟨a rational, worldly kingdom in accord with the idea of freedom and the absolute character of rights. With what is legal, rational, and universal belonging in this way to the worldly sphere, there remains to the church the salvation of individual souls—[the sphere of] particular subjectivity; the worldly universal becomes its own
88 affair.⟩ |

(γ) *The cultus*

˜Doctrine [concerns] an awakening of souls, a continuous laboring for their salvation. ⟨The preservation of the community, like the creation and preservation of the world, [is] a continuous activity that creates the community, forming and bringing it forth. [It entails] an eternal repetition of the life, passion, and resurrection of Christ in the members of the church. [This] is eternally accomplished and is portrayed as mediated either externally or more inwardly. [We have here the following progression:] natural will, confession, penitence, anguish, dying [to self], partaking of the sacrament, exaltation, glory. In the mass, this [is] objectively [represented by] the sacrifice of the mass, [where] Christ is daily offered up.⟩˜[237] [102b]

236. *Ms. reads:* it [*ihrer*]

237. W_2 *reads:* If the permanent preservation of the community, which is at the

The *sacraments*—they in fact attach to the inner certainty of the truth; the immediate certainty of the kingdom, that of being received into it, of being [its] citizens, [is] a mystical union. [They attest] the implicit unity of divine and human nature. The partaking [of the sacrament] here [in this life] is the certainty of such unity. The Spirit fills its community; it [is brought] to ⟨sensible⟩ awareness that each ⟨singular subjectivity,⟩ this [particular individual], is a member of the community, i.e., that God is in it and that it is in God.[238] This [certainty is] not an assurance, attestation, or corroboration, but rather is only partaking or communion. This immense elevation and exaltation of the individual [comes] to consciousness. | 89

⟨[Involved in the cultus is] (α) the completion of this movement in the spirit. [First there is] the natural will; [then is introduced] its reconstruction; [and finally] it is adequate to the rational, universal will. (β) This [consciousness]—which subsists in and for itself and [is] therefore a divine history, mediation, appearance, activity—[is] not just the theoretical, speculative consciousness [of philosophy]. (γ) The divine history in and for itself, as accomplished upon and within Christ, not as in the pure idea of God, [is found] under the particular representation and determination [given by the cultus] as the laying hold of the history of Christ and his merit—as though another [had] accomplished [redemption for us], and satisfaction [had already] occurred through him, as though he [had] offered himself up and our conversion had an absolute value only in him. (This has been discussed earlier.[239]) Absolute value [is found

same time its unbroken creation, is itself the eternal repetition of the life, passion, and resurrection of Christ in the members of the church, then this repetition is expressly accomplished in the sacrament of the Last Supper. The eternal sacrifice here means that the absolute content, the union of the subject with the absolute object, is offered to the individual to partake of in an immediate way; and since the individual is reconciled, this completed reconciliation is the resurrection of Christ.

238. *Ms. margin:* ⟨But in order to make this present for representation and the presence [of the worshipers]—in other words, in order to create a sensible object [portraying] the union of the subjective and the objective—[something is needed in] the manner of a symbol—wine and bread, like the mystical [festivals of] Bacchus and Ceres.⟩

239. [*Ed.*] See above, p. 128.

only] through [the being] in and for itself [of the idea]. This [is what is] represented in Christ—the general consciousness of the divinity of this action. Consciousness then [becomes] pure enjoyment of its result, especially in the sacraments; confession [is] also a Catholic sacrament.⟩

It is in their cultus that the Christian confessions are distinct from one another. [We shall] mention only the Western [churches]; ⟨[there is found here] an important vantage point in general for purposes of understanding.⟩ ⟨In doctrine they are one, although of course the particular relationship of the subject in the cultus also constitutes a part of doctrine itself. Regarding the content of doctrine in general, it should be said that the deviations occur in that part of the content which is concerned with the cultus. Thus in the cultus, and more specifically in the sacrament, the unity of the subject and its absolute object, the kingdom of God, is given for purposes of immediate communion and immediate certainty. [This applies especially to] the chief sacrament [of communion]; whether several [sacraments are necessary we prefer] not to consider here. This aspect, [that of] an immediately sensuous partaking, is [expressed in] the mode of eating and drinking, and this is in fact the
90 | only possible form. For, unlike breathing and the relation of skin to air and water, eating and drinking are just this: appropriating something consciously, and indeed on an individualized basis, to oneself as this and only this sensible, singular subject; [it is] itself a mode [of relationship] of the individualized [subject] to the universal, neutral [environment]. Here [the communion] occurs in the mode of an external, sensible object such that the divine is eaten and drunk—not merely a symbol of the divine, where the meaning is found only in the [mode of] representation, but rather sensible communion as such, immediate certainty. Hence the sensible as such must [be] validated, must be transformed or transubstantiated into the divine substance itself; the two become one.⟩

Truth and spirit are [there] in doctrine in an objective form, and the sacrament is the enjoyment of God by the subject. [The only point of] difference [among the confessions concerns] whether this kind of [edible, drinkable] object is the divine as an external [thing] on its own account. The *Catholics* venerate the host as such, even

when [it is] not [being] partaken of. The same [is] true of doctrine, [where they demand] not insight but obedience, stern objectivity, ⟨subjection,⟩ and the doing of works. ⟨This form of external objectivity with respect to what subsists in and for itself is not limited to this sacrament but occurs elsewhere in accord with the same principle. Thus, the doctrine of the church stands there rigidly on its own, to be taken into the possession of the church by its members in a purely receptive fashion, as the ongoing development and tradition of the church itself. Equally [if not] more unconditional is the demand for action, for works.⟩ The laity [are] excluded from ⟨having any say in the development⟩ and self-understanding of doctrine. ⟨Thus [it functions as] law for the faithful,⟩[240] [who are expected] to conduct themselves in a receptive fashion. Grace, the dispensation of grace and of the sacraments, [falls to] a particular office. The church [is] the external proprietor and dispenser of the means of grace. Hence this grace [is] a "mass."[241] | 91

The *Lutheran, Evangelical* ⟨doctrine⟩ [regards] the host [as actual] only in faith and in the partaking. This [is] its consecration in the faith and the spirit of each individual. The minister does nothing in particular; it is not the case that he consecrates the host and the others [are] merely recipients. Every father of a household [is] equally a teacher, a baptizer, a confessor—and the host set apart as a thing is only a piece of bread, not God.

The *Reformed* view lacks this mystical element. [The communion is] a memorial, an ordinary psychological relationship; everything speculative [has] disappeared, being sublated in the relationship of the community. ⟨The Reformed Church [is] therefore the place

240. *Ms. adds in margin (canceled):* The Council of Trent was accepted only by the priesthood in France.

[*Ed.*] As a result of the conflict between Curialism and Gallicanism in France, the Tridentine decrees were rejected by Parliament and eventually by the Estates General in 1614. But at a meeting on 7 July 1615, they were accepted by the priesthood.

241. [*Ed.*] The term Hegel uses here, *Messe,* also means "market" or "fair" in German, and he undoubtedly intended the double meaning. The Roman Catholic "mass" dispenses grace and divinity in a fashion similar to the way that goods are displayed and sold at a fair, and there is a similar element of enjoyment and festivity. Although the word is the same in German, the two meanings go back to different roots.

where divinity and truth collapse into the prose of the Enlightenment and of mere understanding, into the processes of subjective particularity. Luther [was] fully justified in not yielding, however much he was assailed for it.⟩[242] [103a]

˜⟨Generally speaking, [it is a question of] the antinomy between freedom and the objectivity of God or grace.⟩ There are three representational modes to be considered with regard to the pathway of the soul, and the distinction between them is instructive:˜[243] (α) the moral portrayal, (β) the pious or religious in general, (γ)[244] the mystical and churchly.

[(α)] The first, the *moral,* ⟨has its antithesis in a relationship of self-consciousness that is wholly external—a relationship which, taken by itself, might appear either as a fourth or as the first relationship [or representational mode], a despotic, Oriental relationship, a denial of one's own volition, thinking, etc.⟩ [The moral portrayal] posits an absolute purpose; [it posits] the essence of spirit
92 in a purpose that takes the form of volition, | and indeed a volition that is only my will, so that this subjective side is the principal matter. Law, universality, rationality are in me as my rationality; and likewise the volition and actualization that make these things my own, make them into subjective purposes, are also mine. ⟨And insofar as the representation of something higher, or the highest, of God and the divine, enters into this view, [this] itself is a subjective postulate of my reason, something essentially posited by me.[245] It *ought* to be something unposited, an absolutely independent power; but in its not-being-posited, I do not forget myself, so that even this not-being-posited is itself a being-posited by me—I, my subjectivity, not absolutely self-united as absolute form but [obliged] to remain in this subjective antithetical relationship. In love I am also preserved, but in a wholly different way, namely, by surrendering my antithetical relationship, my positing; [it involves] a mea-

242. [*Ed.*] On the lower margin; reading "assailed" is uncertain.

243. W_2 *reads:* For the elucidation of the antinomy that resides in this pathway of the soul, the distinction between the three representational modes that have been formed in this regard can also be of use.

244. *Ms. reads:* (δ)

245. [*Ed.*] On the postulates of practical reason, see Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason,* pp. 126–139 (*Werke* 5:122–134).

sure of making-to-appear and of relativity. The result is the same, whether in the form of the postulate or of one's [saying] with reference to God and redemption: "My feeling of dependence,[246] my feeling of the need for redemption, are what come first." In either case, the genuine objectivity of truth is annulled.⟩

(β) *Piety* adds the insight, with regard to decision and still more with regard to universality and law, that this is the divine will, a firmly established content, and [that] power, even the power of a good decision, is a divine power. ⟨Piety is content to abide in this quite general connection.⟩

(γ) The *mystical* and *churchly* [mode of representation] defines this connection between God and subjective volition and being more precisely, and brings it to consciousness in the specific form that we [have] seen—i.e., the speculative [form] of the nature of the idea.

The moral view is that of free will as subjective; the view standing over against it is the opposite, even if its content [is] the truth. And if the content is also that of spirit, it can | be represented as the 93
grace of God or predestination—⟨which extends to the most wretched contingency, as in the Calvinistic view⟩—and as the working of grace, it can be taken as something purely external. One sees here a collision, an antinomy between the freedom of humanity and unfreedom or loss of will, a mere surrender. [103b]

The various churches and their ecclesiastical representations are attempts at a resolution of this antinomy, ⟨this implicit and explicit antithesis between the divine and the finite.⟩ But the earlier attempts to grasp this solution in thought were especially concerned with this antinomy. The Lutheran version is undoubtedly the most ingenious, ˜although it is not speculative.˜[247]

The resolution provided by Christianity is to be understood thus: that it is just the moral history of the soul that is in and for itself, that the mystical, churchly [mode of representation] contains precisely the speculative content of this resolution, and that the cultus

246. [*Ed.*] In terms of their meaning, Hegel places the postulates of the critique of practical reason on the same level with Schleiermacher's understanding of religion; on the feeling of dependence, see above, n. 93.

247. W_2 *reads:* even if it has not yet completely attained the form of the idea.

is the resolution for each self-conscious individual. Only in this way, [consequently,] does [each individual's] own action have validity because [it is] such an action in and for itself.

If now [we have spoken of] (α) the origin, and then of [(β)] the existence and preservation [of the community, it remains finally to discuss—] [104a]

γ. The Passing Away of the Community[248]

˜In a formal sense, [the following sequence applies to historical phenomena]: *origin, preservation,* and *perishing,* with the latter following upon the former. But ought we to speak here of this sequence [if] the kingdom of God [has been] established eternally? If so, then *perishing* or *going under*[249] would [in fact] be a *passing*
94 *over* to the | kingdom of heaven [and would apply] only for single subjects, not for the community; the Holy Spirit as such has eternal life in its community. ⟨Christ [says]: "The gates of hell shall not prevail against my teaching" [Matt. 16:18].⟩˜[250] To speak of a *passing away* would mean to end on a discordant note.

˜[We shall undertake] an empirical description of the so-called

248. [*Ed.*] The heading is preceded by a "c" instead of a "γ." It is found at the top of the last sheet of the *Ms.*, 104a. After making a false start in the middle of sheet 103b (see below, n. 252), Hegel skipped to the top of the next sheet for this final section, leaving empty space at the bottom of 103b, to which he returned when he ran out of marginal space on sheet 104a (see below, n. 257). The version of this concluding section offered by W_2 differs in significant respects from the *Ms.* itself. Whether these differences derive from the Henning transcript or from editorial adjustments introduced by Bruno Bauer can no longer be determined. The variant passages are given in the footnotes at the appropriate places.

249. [*Ed.*] Note the interplay in this paragraph between *Untergehen* (perishing, going under), *Übergang* (passing over), and *Vergehen* (passing away).

250. W_2 *reads:* But if now, after having considered the origin and steady subsistence of the community, we see that in attaining realization it falls into a state of inner discord in its spiritual actuality, then its realization appears to be at the same time its passing away. But ought we to speak here of a perishing when the kingdom of God is founded eternally, when the Holy Spirit as such lives eternally in its community, and when the gates of hell are not to prevail against the church?

[*Ed.*] W_2 corrects Hegel's citation of Matt. 16:18 (the reference is to the church, not the teaching of Christ). But W_2 omits Hegel's statement in the *Ms.* that the "perishing" entails a passing over to the kingdom of heaven and applies only to individual subjects, not the community.

signs of the time.[251] [Let us] compare [our age] with the age of the Roman Empire.[252]

(α) Where, in how many textbooks, one might ask, is the content of the Christian faith still taken to be true [now that] the gods, and everything else that counted as true in the Greek and Roman | 95
worlds, [have] fallen into the hands of human beings, [who themselves] create gods, and everything has been profaned? ⟨[The Roman age was one] when rationality necessarily took refuge solely in the form of private rights and private goods because the universal unity based on religion had disappeared, along with a universal political life. [Ordinary people,] helpless and inactive, with nothing to trust, left the universal alone and took care for themselves. [It was an age] when what subsists in and for itself was abandoned even in the realm of thought. Just as Pilate asked, "What is truth?" [John 18:38], similarly in our time the quest for private welfare and enjoyment [is] the order of the day; moral insight, [the basis] of personal actions, opinions, and convictions, [is] without objective truth, and truth [is] the opposite. I acknowledge only what I believe subjectively. [For some time,] the teaching of the philosophers has corresponded [to this view]: we know and cognize nothing of God, [having] at best a dead and merely historical sort of information.⟩[253]

(β) Although among the people, i.e., the lower classes, [there is still] faith ⟨in objective truth, the teaching of this truth is no longer justified in terms of faith, once the time has come when what is

251. [*Ed.*] The "signs of the time" are apocalyptic signs, contained in Jesus' prophecy of the end of the age and the coming of the Son of Man (Mark 13, Matt. 24, Luke 21). That Hegel has this allusion in mind is confirmed by his reference to "passing away." But the particular signs to which he refers are the signs of decadence of the Roman Empire, with which he intends to compare his own age. See the variant in W_2 contained in n. 256, which parallels the *Ms.* beginning with this sentence.

252. [*Ed.*] A doublet to these two sentences occurs opposite them on sheet 103b, following the end of the main text, written across the entire width of the sheet: "Empirical description of [present] conditions with a view to the Christian religion. It might occur to us to compare it with the age of the Roman Empire." After writing these words, Hegel apparently decided to start a new section at the top of sheet 104a.

253. [*Ed.*] A reference to the Kantian view, popularized by Jacobi, that theoretical knowledge of God is not possible, only the practical faith that God exists. See Vol. 1:87 n. 15. On Hegel's criticism of historical theology, see Vol. 1:108.

demanded is justification by the concept; nor is justification achieved by harshness, objective commands, and external supports, nor by the power of the state.〉 [If] the clergy, whose office [is] always to stimulate religion, [renounces] this service, [it falls into] mere argumentation, a particular [i.e., not universal] history, i.e., something past. When [religious truth is] treated as historical, that spells an end [to it]; then it no longer [lives] in immediate consciousness, i.e., in actuality, [as] the unity of the inner and the outer. [When] moralistic views and motivations, moralistic or subjective feelings and virtuosities,[254] [prevail], then [something else] is put in its place—[certainly] not the speculative truth! Where [the gospel is not preached to] the poor, who [are] the ones closest to infinite anguish; where the teaching of love in infinite anguish [is abandoned in favor of] enjoyment, love without anguish; where the gospel [is] preached in a naturalistic way—[there] the salt [has] lost its savor [Matt. 5:13]. When everything [is done] in this way, and the moral
96 man is satisfied [in] his reflection and opinion, | his conviction, in his finitude; 〈[when every] foundation, security, the substantive bonds of the world, [have been] tacitly removed; when [we are left] inwardly empty of objective truth, of its form and content—[then] one thing alone [remains] certain: finitude [turned] in upon itself, arrogant barrenness and lack of content, the extremity of self-satisfied dis-enlightenment.〉[255] [103b]

〈What is the connection of this decay with the state of religion itself? At the point where the doctrines of religion [have become] representations, mere factual data, [what is supposedly] required [is] thinking as a reflective activity. It is what causes the secure to waver, dissolves everything dialectically, and leads it back to the subjective, whether it is an empty abstraction of the universal or is reduced to feeling, which it makes the foundation. The [common] people, in which reason remains constantly under pressure, [this] class in whose cultivation the truth can exist only in the form of representation, that is helpless vis-à-vis the pressure of its interior

254. [*Ed.*] *Virtuositäten.* An apparent allusion to the first edition of Schleiermacher's *Über die Religion: Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern* (Berlin, 1799), where it is stated that the ability to see the infinite in everything finite, and to associate all sensations and actions with religious feelings and views, is "the true and highest goal of virtuosity in Christianity" (pp. 298–299).

255. [*Ed.*] "the extremity of self-satisfied dis-enlightenment" translates *Spitze*

impulses, and that experiences pain and need more concretely—indeed, infinite pain and need—[has been] abandoned by its [theological] teachers. The latter have helped themselves by means of reflection, and have found their satisfaction in finitude, subjectivity, and precisely thereby in vanity; but the [common] people, who form the substantial nucleus [of the population as a whole], cannot find its satisfaction in such things.

Instead [of allowing] reason and religion to contradict themselves, [we must] resolve the discord in the manner [appropriate] *to us*—[namely,] reconciliation in [the form of] philosophy.~[256] How

der Ausklärung befriedigt in sich. Hegel is here engaging in a wordplay between *Ausklärung* ("dis-enlightenment") and *Aufklärung* ("enlightenment"), the standard term for the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. (A more vulgar overtone may also be intended, since *Aus-klärung* means literally "clearing out," suggesting perhaps a kind of intellectual diarrhea.) This wordplay is not original with Hegel. In an appendix to the *Kritisches Journal der Philosophie* 2, no. 3 (1803), 60, Schelling alludes to Böttiger's complaint that Protestant theologians have been nicknamed *Ausklärer* ("dis-enlighteners") by representatives of the most recent idealism (namely, Schelling and Hegel). While inveighing against those who offer the "rubbish" (*Auskehricht*) of the Protestant Enlightenment as the highest wisdom, Schelling insists that this nickname has not been used in any writings by the idealists. Yet he himself does employ it in his *Vorlesungen über die Methode des academischen Studium,* published in the same year, 1803. See *On University Studies,* trans. E. S. Morgan (Athens, Ohio, 1966), p. 96: "One of the operations of the modern pseudo-enlightenment [*Aufklärerei*]—which, with respect to Christianity, might rather be called a dis-enlightenment [*Ausklärerei*]—is the attempt to 'restore' it, as the saying goes, to its 'original' meaning. . . ."

256. W_2 *reads:* Only, how can it be helped? This discordant note is present in actuality. Just as in the age of the Roman Empire, because universal unity based on religion had disappeared and the divine was profaned, and because, further, universal political life was helpless and inactive, lacking in confidence, reason took refuge only in the form of private rights; or, because what subsists in and for itself was abandoned, individual well-being was elevated to the rank of an end—so too it is now. Moralistic views, personal opinions and convictions without objective truth, have attained authority, and the quest for private rights and enjoyments is the order of the day. Once the time has come when what is demanded is justification by the concept, then the unity of the internal and the external no longer exists in immediate consciousness, in actuality, and nothing is justified by faith. The harshness of an objective command, an external support, and the power of the state can effect nothing here; the process of decay has gone too deep for that. When the gospel is no longer preached to the poor, when the salt has lost its savor, and all the foundations have been tacitly removed, then the common people, for whose reason, constantly under pressure, the truth can exist only in the form of representation, are helpless vis-à-vis the pressure of their interior impulses. They are nearest to the condition of infinite anguish, but since love has been perverted into a love and an enjoyment from which all anguish is absent, they find themselves abandoned by

the present day is to solve its problems must be left up to it. In philosophy itself [the resolution is only] partial. These lectures have attempted to offer guidance to this end.⟩[257] [104a]

˜Religion [must] take refuge in philosophy. (For [the theologians of the present day], the world [is] a passing away into [subjective reflection because it has as its] form merely the externality of con-
97 tingent occurrence.[258]⟩ | But philosophy, [as we have said, is also] partial: [it forms] an isolated order of priests—a sanctuary—[who are] untroubled about how it goes with the world, [who need] not mix with it, [and whose work is to preserve] this possession of truth. How things turn out [in the world] is not our affair.˜[259] [260]

their teachers. The latter have, to be sure, helped themselves by means of reflection, and have found their satisfaction in finitude, in subjectivity and its virtuosity, i.e., in vanity; but the [common] people, who form the substantial nucleus [of the population as a whole], cannot find its satisfaction in such things.

For us, philosophical knowledge has resolved this discord.

[*Ed.*] Note that the *Ms.* lacks the words, "Only, how can it be helped? This discordant note is present in actuality." The remainder of the W_2 passage represents an abbreviated smoothing-out of *Ms.* text, although the confidence reflected in the last sentence is very much qualified in the *Ms.*

257. [*Ed.*] Strictly speaking, this is not a marginal passage. It is written across the entire width of the bottom half of sheet 103b. It is connected to the last marginal passage on sheet 104a by reference marks for insertion at this point.

258. [*Ed.*] "Welt ihnen ein Vergehen in ihr; nur diese Form der Äusserlichkeit des zufälligen Geschehens." Any construal of this passage, which we have set off with parentheses, requires guessing what the antecedents of the pronouns *ihnen* and *ihr* are intended to be.

259. W_2 *reads:* But this reconciliation is itself only a partial one, lacking outward universality. Philosophy forms in this connection a sanctuary apart, and those who serve in it constitute an isolated order of priests, who need not mix with the world, and whose work is to preserve the possession of truth. How the empirical present day is to find its way out of its discord, and how things are to turn out for it, are questions that must be left up to it and are not the immediate practical business and affair of philosophy.

[*Ed.*] W_2 omits the problematic sentence that we have placed in parentheses and in the last sentence adds the qualifier "immediate" before "practical business and affair," suggesting that in the long run the practical affairs of the world may indeed be the concern of philosophy.

260. *Ms. adds below:* ⟨Concluded 25 August 1821
Duplicated several times [*Mehremal duppliert*]⟩

[*Ed.*] The last phrase, written in Hegel's hand but at a later date, presumably is a reference to the fact that in the subsequent lecture series a partial use of the *Ms.* was made for Parts II and III, *Determinate Religion* and *Consummate Religion.* We know, however, that the *Ms.* was not used again for Part I, *The Concept of Religion,* except at a few isolated points.

THE CONSUMMATE RELIGION[1]

99

THE LECTURES OF 1824

Introduction

1. The Consummate Religion[2]

This is the *consummate religion*, the religion that is the being of spirit for itself, the religion in which religion has become objective to itself.[3] We have called religion the consciousness of God, the

1. [*Ed.*] The title in *G* reads simply: "Part III. The Revelatory Religion," although Hegel begins the 1824 lectures by defining this religion as "the consummate religion." The titles in the other sources are as follows: *D:* "III. The Necessary, the Revelatory, the Christian Religion." *P:* "The Consummate Religion or the Revealed Religion, the Christian Religion." *Ho:* "Part Three. The Christian Religion."

2. [*Ed.*] None of the transcripts has a heading or number at this point, but one is implied by the numbers "2" and "3" that are found in *G* at the points marked by our second and third headings. In this initial section of the 1824 Introduction Hegel expands considerably his definition of the Christian religion as the religion "in which the *concept* of religion has become objective to itself," which is found at the beginning of the *Ms.*, Part III. Because the concept of religion entails the *unity* of subjective consciousness and its object, namely God as absolute essence or spirit, when the concept of religion becomes objective to itself, this unity of finite and infinite consciousness comes fully to expression. For this reason, Christianity is the "consummate" or "absolute" religion—terms Hegel tends to use synonymously in this section, although elsewhere he favors the former. In the present section Hegel develops this point by warning against the danger, present in the culture and theology of the time, of thematizing *merely* the subjective element in religion, while not attending to the fact that it is *infinite* subjectivity or *absolute* spirit that is the true content of religion. Here the polemic against Schleiermacher, characteristic of the 1824 lectures, is quite evident. Hegel also transposes the comparison between present times and the Roman age, which is made at the very end of the *Ms.*, forward into this introductory section of the 1824 lectures. Following this expanded section, he takes up the other characteristics of the Christian religion that are enumerated in the *Ms.*, namely, that it is the revelatory religion and the religion of truth and freedom (Secs. 2–3 below).

3. *Thus G, P; W (HgG/1831?) adds:* —the Christian religion. In it, universal and singular spirit, infinite and finite spirit, are inseparable; their absolute identity

consciousness of the absolute essence—and that is the concept of this religion.[4] Consciousness is inward differentiation, spirit that differentiates itself. Now, therefore, God is [present] as consciousness, or the consciousness of God means that finite consciousness has its essence, this God, as its object; and it knows the object as its essence, it objectifies it for itself. In the consciousness of God there are two sides: the one side is God, the other is that where consciousness as such stands. With the consciousness of God we arrive directly at one side, which is what we have called religion.[5] This content is now itself an object. It is the whole that is an object to itself, or religion has become objective to itself. It is *religion* that has become objective to itself—religion as the consciousness of God, or the self-consciousness of God as the return of consciousness into itself.[6]

This religion is precisely what we have called *spirituality*. "Spirit" means precisely not what immediately is, but what is objectively for itself. Spirit is *for* spirit in such a way that the two are distinct. They are defined by their contrast: the one as universal, the other as particular; the one as inner, the other as outer; the one as infinite
100 spirit, the other as finite spirit. ˜This | distinction *is* religion, and at the same time religion is˜[7] the sublation of this distinction, i.e., the self-consciousness of freedom—a spirituality which was there *for us* in all the preceding formative stages of religion, but which is now the *object*. The single self-consciousness finds the consciousness of its essence in it; hence it is free in this object, and it is just this freedom that *is* spirituality—and this, we say, is religion. In other words, spirit is now the object. Spirit ˜has been all along˜[8]

is this religion and its content. *W adds a further sentence based on Ho:* Universal power *is* substance, which, since it is likewise implicitly subject, now posits this being-in-self, and so differentiates itself from itself, imparts itself to knowledge, to finite spirit. Yet in so doing, because finite spirit is a moment of itself, it remains present to itself, and even in this division of it, it returns undivided to itself.

4. [*Ed.*] See Vol. 1:314–318.

5. [*Ed.*] See Vol. 1:327–328.

6. [*Ed.*] See Vol. 1:317–318, 146–147.

7. *Thus P; G reads:* Thus there is this distinction in religion, but at the same time there is

8. *G reads:* is previously [*ist vorher*]

an object for us that stands neither [solely] on the finite nor on the universal side; rather this *relationship* of spirit to spirit—this alone is religion. It is religion, then, that has now become what is objective in that the object of finite consciousness is known as spirit by spirit; this one substance is the absolute truth for itself, the truth of everything, inasmuch as the universal is the absolute power in which everything is negated; it is posited as organic, not only as substance but as subject. The freedom of self-consciousness is the content of religion, and this content is itself the object of the Christian religion, i.e., spirit is its own object. This absolute essence distinguishes itself at one and the same time into absolute power and subject; it communicates itself in what is distinguished from it while at the same time remaining undivided, so that the other is also the whole—all this, along with its return to itself, is the concept of religion. [It] constitutes the totality of spirituality, it is the very nature of spirituality. This concept is the absolute idea, which has previously been [an object] for us in our study of religion,[9] and [is] now itself the object [for itself]; spirit is identical with spirit.

In this religion, religion has become objective to itself; the object or content by means of which religion is fulfilled, what is objective for it, is now its *own* definition, namely that spirit is [present] only *for* spirit. Universal and singular spirit, infinite and finite spirit, are here inseparable; their absolute identity is religion, and absolute religion is the awareness of just this content. Since we have expressed it initially in this form, one can say that what is at issue here, the whole, the absolute, | *is* religion. One can say this in 101
contrast with defining what is at issue—the absolute, the essential—as the majesty of God; for the latter implies that we know God only as an object that stands over and above us for all time, that we know about this object, are cognizant of it.

˜At first sight,˜[10] what theology is about is the cognition of God as what is solely objective and absolute, what remains purely and simply separate from subjective consciousness. Therefore God is an external object—like the sun or the sky—but still a thought-object.

9. *P adds:* To the extent that this also characterizes the contemporary standpoint, [*Ed.*] The text of *P* breaks off and the remainder of the page is blank.

10. *Thus, G, D; W (HgG/Ed?) reads:* Ordinarily,

An external object of consciousness exists where the object permanently retains the character of something other and external. In contrast with this, we can designate the concept of absolute religion as follows: what is involved here, the essence of what is involved, is not this external object but religion itself, i.e., the unity of this object with the subject, the way in which it is in the subject.

We can regard the present age as concerned with religion, with religiosity, or with piety, in which no regard is had for what is objective. People have had various religions; but—[according to] the present dogmatics,[11] at least—that does not matter, as long as they are pious. We cannot know God as an object, we cannot cognize him, and it is the subjective attitude that is important. This standpoint has been recognized in our earlier discussion, and we have already spoken of its one-sidedness.[12] It is the standpoint of the age, and at the same time it is a very important advance, which has validated an infinite moment; for it involves the recognition of the consciousness of subjectivity as an absolute moment. There is the same content on both sides, and this being-in-itself of both sides is religion. The great advance of our age is that subjectivity has been recognized as an absolute moment; thus subjectivity is an essential category. But everything depends on how we define it.

In the first place, this *must* be viewed as a great advance. For as
102 we take it up first in the determination of consciousness, | religion is so constituted that its content flees into the distance, and seems at least to remain far off. Consciousness is [the awareness] that there is an object that is simply determined as an other and remains over against me, e.g., a mountain, sun, sky. In this characterization of consciousness, the [religious] content flees into the distance and remains remote. Religion may have whatever content it likes. When fixed at the standpoint of consciousness, its content is one that

11. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 8. Here, in the 1824 lectures, Hegel probably has in mind especially Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre,* which interprets the traditional content of religion as the expression of the feeling of utter dependence. See also above, *Ms.*, n. 93.

12. [*Ed.*] This standpoint is criticized in Part I of the lectures; see Vol. 1:282–283. It is found more especially in the 1827 text; see Vol. 1:162–163. Also, the evaluation of the standpoint of the time that follows finds a more appropriate expression in the 1827 lectures than in the present text.

stands over and above it, and even when the specifications of supernatural revelation are added, the content still remains simply given and external to us. Along with a representation of this sort—that the divine content is merely given, inaccessible to reason, that our role is to comport ourselves passively in faith, etc.—˜[there is another one, namely,] that all of this is not the sole standpoint of the religion of consciousness, and that there is still room for the subjectivity of sensibility, of feeling, the subjectivity that is the result of sensibility and of divine worship.˜[13] The devout submerge themselves in their object with their heart, devotion, and will; thus at the pinnacle of devotion they have sublated the separation. For their consciousness, this devotion or intensity can be considered a separation if the Spirit of God, the grace of God, is something alien to humanity, something it must allow to come upon it—an alien thing working in it, which it must allow to come upon it, in relation to which it is merely something passive and dead. Thus, as we have already noted, even in what I have called the standpoint of consciousness, there also occurs this elevation, this non-alien condition, this submersion of spirit in the depth that is no depth or the remoteness that is absolute nearness and presence instead. In contrast with this, then, there is separation, which has a different shape: the finite subject confronts the object as absolute spirit. This separation can be represented as the standpoint of the consciousness or feeling of the individual. It is against this separation that the objection is raised that what is involved here is religion as such, | i.e., the 103
subjective consciousness that wills, inwardly senses, and purposes what is divine. Thus it is in ˜the subject˜[14] that this inseparability of subjectivity and of the other, which appears as objective, exists. The validating of this subjectivity is the important thing, or [the recognition] that this subjectivity is absolutely essential for the whole sphere of the religious relationship. Thus this standpoint elevates subjectivity into the essential characteristic of the whole

13. *Thus P, which reads:* . . . room for subjectivity, sensibility, feeling, which are the result . . . *G, W_1 read:* there is also, on the other hand, subjectivity; [givenness] is not the sole standpoint. *W_2 (Var) reads:* there is also, on the other hand, the subjectivity of sensibility, which is the end, the result, of divine worship.

14. *Thus G, W; P reads:* religion

range of the religious relationship. There is a rather close bond between it and the freedom of spirit, in that spirit has reestablished its freedom, and there is no standpoint within which it is not at home but stands opposed to [something like] a rock. That is what is important in this definition. It is inherent in the concept of the absolute religion that it is the religion that is objective to itself, the one where religion *is* what is objective. But this is only the concept of religion; the consciousness is something else. Consciousness can have this concept as something otherworldly. This concept is one thing and the consciousness of it is another.

Hence in the absolute religion too, the concept may be this implicitly, and yet consciousness [as such] may be unfree; the third moment is the consciousness of what this concept is in itself. This is the aspect that has emerged and come to consciousness in the determination that it is religion which is here involved. But the concept—yes, even the concept—is itself still one-sided when taken as merely implicit; that is how it is in this one-sided form. Subjectivity itself here becomes one-sided or has the character of just one of the sides, is merely infinite form, pure self-consciousness. That is to say, subjectivity is pure knowledge of itself, but a knowledge that is, on its own account, contentless, void of content. It has no content because religion as such is grasped only in its implicit potential. It is not the religion that is objective to itself, but only a religion whose form is not yet ˜self-determining and self-regulating,˜[15] able to provide its own content. What has no objectivity has
104 no content. |

But to the extent that religion is without content, it must still *have* a content, for it is ˜the right of what is true˜[16] always to be, although it can, to be sure, have either a truthful or a disguised form. But because the content is not self-determined through subjectivity, because it is not religion itself that is objective to itself, this content has a contingent, empirical, finite character, and a similarity with Roman times arises. The period of the Roman em-

15. *P reads:* self-determining *G reads:* real and self-regulating *W (HgG/Ed?) reads:* real and self-objectifying

16. *G reads:* the right, the true *Ho reads:* the right of the truth

perors has much similarity with our own.[17] ˜Just because [the subject] is abstract, it is finite. This is the highest pinnacle we have reached, namely, that religion [is] what is empirical, arbitrary, contingent, etc.˜[18] The result is that this freedom, which has a contingent content, is only one that allows a beyond to subsist as a [goal] of yearning; it simply denies spirituality as such, or what we call the standpoint of consciousness. In this way it repudiates the essential moment of spirit and thus is spiritless subjectivity.[19] It is what is richest in spirit—but [in that] there is still the reversal into what is poorest in spirit.

We have said that religion is here its own content; inasmuch as it is the content, what is objective, this means that what it contains *is* religion. The beyond is the object, and religion as religion is only the one side, whose content stands on the side of finite subjectivity.

Thus the absolute religion has essentially the character of *subjectivity* or of *infinite form,* which is equivalent to substance. This subjectivity—we may call it knowledge, cognition, pure | intelli- 105
gence—is infinite form, the infinite elasticity of substance that enables it to dirempt itself inwardly and make itself its own object. Hence the content is ˜an organic˜[20] content because it is this *infinite,* substantial *subjectivity* that makes itself into the object and content. In this antithesis one side is termed the finite and the other the infinite. The infinite side—God as spirit—is when he remains above,

17. *[Ed.]* See Hegel's portrayal of the religion of expediency in Vol. 2. However, a comparison of the age of the Roman Empire with the present day is not found there but in the present volume, *Ms.,* nn. 252, 256.

18. *Thus P; W_2 (MiscP) reads:* The subject, as it subsists, is comprehended as infinite, but as abstract it turns immediately into the opposite and is merely finite and limited.

19. *Thus G, P; W_1 adds a passage based on Ho; Ho reads:* For religion is spirit's knowledge of itself as spirit; as *pure* knowing it does not know itself as spirit and thus is not substantial but subjective knowledge. But the fact that it is *merely* subjective—and therefore *limited* subjective—knowing does not reside for subjectivity in the shape it assumes, i.e., the shape of knowledge. Rather its shape is its immediate in-itself, which it initially finds within itself, and which is thus—in knowing itself as what is utterly infinite—a feeling of its finitude, and consequently a feeling of infinitude as an otherworldly in-itself as opposed to its own for-itself. This is the feeling of longing for the unrecognized world beyond.

20. *Thus G, P, W_1; W_2 (Var) reads:* a self-identical

when he is not [present] as the living spirit of his community, [but then] he is characterized in only a one-sided way as object. This is the first point in the definition of the concept [of this religion].

This is the concept. It is the concept of the idea, of the absolute idea. The reality is now that spirit is *for* spirit, has itself as its object.

2. The Revelatory Religion

The second point in the definition is that this religion is the *revelatory religion*. God reveals himself. As we have seen, "revealing" refers to the primal division [*Urteil*] of infinite subjectivity or infinite form; it means determining oneself to be for an other. This revealing or self-manifesting belongs to the essence of spirit itself. *A spirit that is not revelatory is not spirit.* It is said that God has created the world and has revealed himself. This is spoken of as something he did once, that will not happen again, and as being the sort of event that may either occur or not occur: God could have revealed himself, he could have created the world, or not; his doing so is one of his capricious, contingent characteristics, so to speak, and does not belong to the concept of God himself. But it is the essence of God as spirit *to be for an other,* i.e., to *reveal* himself. He does not create the world once and for all, but is the eternal creator, the eternal act of self-revelation. This *actus* is what he is; this is his concept, his definition.

[True] religion is thus revelatory inasmuch as it is spirit *for* spirit. It is the religion of spirit—not a secret that has to remain closed but rather is open or revelatory and has to be for an other, but for an other that is only momentarily so. God is this process of positing the other and then sublating it in his eternal movement. Thus the
106 essence of spirit is | to ˜appear to itself, to manifest itself.˜[21] [If we ask,] ˜"What is revealed?"˜[22] the answer is that what God reveals is this infinite form that we have called subjectivity; i.e., it is the act of determining or positing distinctions, of positing content.

21. *Thus P, D; G,* W_1 *read:* appear to itself. W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* appear to itself—this is what it does and this is what its vitality consists in; this is all that it does, and spirit itself consists solely in what it does.

22. *Thus P; G reads:* "What then does God reveal?" *W (HgG) reads:* "What indeed does God reveal other than that he is this process of self-revealing?"

What God reveals in this way is that he ˜*is* manifestation, i.e., the process˜[23] of constituting these distinctions within himself. It is his nature and his concept eternally to make these distinctions and at the same time to take them back into himself, and thereby to be present to himself. The content that becomes manifest [*offenbar*] is what is revealed [*geoffenbart*], namely, that God is for an *other* but [also] eternally for *himself*. This is what is specified by "revealing."

3. The Religion of Truth and Freedom

Thirdly, therefore, this religion is the religion of *truth* and the religion of *freedom*. For "truth" means that in what is objective we are not relating to something alien. "Freedom" expresses the very thing that truth is, but with a logical character of negation. The [consummate] religion is the religion of truth: it is precisely *spirit* that is for spirit, and it is so *for* spirit. Spirit is its presupposition; we begin with ˜spirit.˜[24] In this way spirit is identical with itself, it is the eternal intuition of itself; i.e., it is simultaneously comprehended only as a result, an end. In this way it is both what presupposes itself and the result, and it *is* only as end—as this self-differentiation, this act of presupposing itself. Truth consists in the mutual adequacy to each other of what we have characterized as subject and object. That spirit as object *to itself* constitutes the reality, the concept, the idea: this is the truth.

Likewise, it is the religion of freedom. In the abstract, freedom means relating oneself to something objective without its being something alien. This is the same definition as that of truth, except that in the case of freedom the categorial moment of the negation of difference or of otherness is emphasized, and freedom therefore appears in the | form of *reconciliation*. Reconciliation begins with 107
differentiated entities standing opposed to each other—God, who confronts a world that is estranged from him, and a world that is estranged from its essence. [They are] in conflict with one another, and [they are] external to one another. Reconciliation is the negation

23. *Thus G; W (HgG) reads:* is the power
24. *Thus G, W_1; W_2 (Var) reads:* spirit as subject.

of this separation, this division, and means that each cognizes ˜itself in the other, finds itself in its essence.˜[25] Reconciliation, consequently, is freedom and is not something quiescent;[26] rather it is activity, the movement that makes the estrangement disappear.

All of these [moments]—reconciliation, truth, freedom—constitute a universal process, and thus cannot be expressed in a simple proposition except one-sidedly. ˜One can express it in a more determinate fashion by saying that it is posited in a religion that a representation of the unity of divine and human nature occurs.˜[27] God has become human: this therefore is a revelation. This unity is to be regarded as implicitly [present], but as revealed it is *only* what is implicit. Yet it is the movement that consists in being eternally brought forth, and this bringing forth is *liberation, reconciliation,* which is only possible precisely through what is implicit. The *substance* that is identical with itself is this unity, which as such is the foundation; but as *subjectivity* it is what brings forth. We may accept this as the concept of this religion.

That ˜this idea is absolute truth˜[28]—this is the result of the whole of philosophy. In its pure form it is what is logical,[29] but is also the result of considering the concrete world. This is the truth: that nature, life, spirit are completely organic—i.e., that everything that exists on its own account is itself just the mirror image of this idea, such that the idea presents itself in each thing as singularized, as a process involving it, so that it manifests this unity in itself. But what is singularized is not a single [entity].

4. Relation to Preceding Religions[30]

The general relation [of the consummate religion] to the preceding religions has been expounded from the beginning [of these lectures]

25. *Thus P; G reads:* itself, finds itself and its essence, in the other.

26. *Thus G,* W_1; W_2 *(Var) adds:* or something that [merely] is;

27. *Thus P; G,* W_1 *read:* One specific form it takes is the assertion that in a religion the representation of the unity of divine and human nature is posited. W_2 *(Var) reads:* The principal representation is that of the unity of divine and human nature.

28. *Thus P, D; G reads:* in this alone consists the idea of absolute truth W_1 *(Ed) reads:* all there is is this idea of absolute truth W_2 *(Ed) reads:* this idea alone is absolute truth

29. [*Ed.*] See Hegel, *Science of Logic,* pp. 824–825 (*GW* 12:236–237).

30. [*Ed.*] This brief concluding section of the Introduction in the 1824 lectures is much expanded in 1827. See 1827 lectures, n. 6.

and follows from what has just been said. | First we had *nature religion,* i.e., religion from the standpoint of *consciousness* alone. In the absolute religion this standpoint is still [present], but only momentarily, as a transitory moment, whereas in nature religion it was the essential determination. In nature religion God is represented as an other, in a natural configuration—sun, light, mountain, river—so that the [divine] is defined as an other; or in other words religion has only the form of consciousness. 108

The second form was that of *spiritual religion,* but it was the religion of the spirit that remains finitely determined; to this extent it is the religion of *self-consciousness.* ˜Here we saw absolute power, or necessity: the One who is absolute power and who is wisdom only in an abstract sense is not yet spirit because he˜[31] is only abstract power—not absolute subjectivity with respect to his content but only abstract necessity, simple, abstract self-possession. Abstraction[32] constitutes finitude, and it is the particular powers and gods, defined according to their spiritual content, that first constitute the totality.[33]

The third form, which we are now considering, is the *religion of freedom,* the religion of ˜the self-consciousness (or of the consciousness) that is *self-contained,* for in it there is equally both the objectivity of spirit and the freedom of self-possession: this is [*its*] definition of consciousness.˜[34] *Freedom* is the [true] definition of self-consciousness.

I. THE METAPHYSICAL CONCEPT OF GOD[35]

We now proceed to the *abstract, metaphysical* concept. The *concrete* concept of this sphere [i.e., the consummate religion] is that

31. *Thus P, similar in D; G reads:* —i.e., of absolute power, of necessity, as we have seen. This One, this power, is defective, because it

[*Ed.*] Hegel's reference here is to Jewish religion.

32. *Thus G, D,* W_1*;* W_2 *(MiscP) adds:* in which power and necessity are still grasped at that level,

33. *Thus G,* W_1*;* W_2 *(MiscP) adds:* since they add real content to this abstraction. Finally,

[*Ed.*] Here the reference appears to be to Greek religion.

34. *Thus G (also in* W_1*), with P;* W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* self-consciousness; but at the same time it forms a consciousness of the encompassing reality, the determinacy of the eternal idea of God himself, and in this objectivity it is self-possessed.

35. [*Ed.*] In this section Hegel incorporates his discussion of the ontological

109 spirit is *for* spirit | and that it is itself spirit only in this way. The two sides into which spirit differentiates itself are both spirit, together they are the totality, and just this is its reality now. With the metaphysical concept, however, all we have before us is the pure, *abstract* concept in its determinations or moments, without these being this totality, without their having this concrete content. Therefore what now constitutes the metaphysical concept is that the content is the *concept,* the pure concept, and that we have only to discuss the pure concept—but it is also real per se. Concretely the pure concept is the concept that is for itself; in other words, the concreteness of spirit means that spirit inwardly differentiates itself into itself, inwardly opposes itself and sets itself as another spirit over against itself. The definition we have here is that we have the pure concept, which realizes itself, which is in itself real; and we here call this determination merely "reality"—in other words, [it has] also to be defined vis-à-vis the concept as either being or existence [*Existenz*]. But there is a content in it, too—and this content is God, but God as represented, not God as spirit internally developed; and we shall see that it is the pure concept. In appearance, however, we have the concept of God—the fact that it is the concept of God that *realizes* itself; but, as we shall see, what ultimately matters here is the general relationship of the concept to reality or to being.

The content seems to be a determinate concept; [it seems that] the discussion is about the concept of God, and that his being follows from his concept. And it seems, at first, that we are discussing a determinate or specific concept of God, not the concept generally. But we shall see that this content "God" dissolves itself, that it essentially has the meaning of the *unity* of the concept; i.e., it has the meaning both of the pure concept and of reality, and of the unity of the two.

The metaphysical concept is the concept of God and the unity of that concept with reality. In the form of the proof of God's being [*Sein*], of the determinate being [*Dasein*] of God, of the existence

proof of the existence of God. Cf. Sec. A of the *Ms.* Our heading is similar to that in *Ho.*

[*Existenz*] of God, what we have is a proof which is just this transition or mediation: that God's being follows from his concept. This is what is called the *ontological proof.* | 110

It should be noted that in the other proofs[36] we proceeded from finite being, which was the immediate, and from it we concluded to the infinite, the genuine being that appeared for us in the form of infinitude, necessity, absolute power, the power that is at the same time wisdom, and posits its own ends inwardly. But here our starting point is the concept, and the transition is from the concept to being. Both ways are necessary, and in order to demonstrate *this* unity it is necessary to begin both from being and from the concept, for the identity of the two is what is genuine. Both the concept and being (determinate being, the world, the finite) are one-sided ˜determinations, and only˜[37] in the idea is their truth to be found, i.e., the truth that they are both *posited.* Neither of them must be defined solely as the term that permanently has the initiative or is the origin; they must rather be portrayed as passing over into the other, i.e., each of them must be a posited term. In this way each displays itself as a transition into an other, or as a moment, so that it must be demonstrated of both of them that they are *moments.* This transition has two opposite meanings: each term is portrayed as a moment; i.e., on the one hand, as what has being, it is something that passes over—essentially it is by passing over from the immediate to the other (so that each of them is reduced to something merely *posited*); on the other hand, each term also has the significance that it is posited by something else, it is brought forth. For if a determination is shown to have been brought forth, then it has equally been shown to be merely something set up. In this transition each term sets itself down as something transient, not genuinely primitive. The other is then what has issued forth from it. Hence the one side is movement, the passing over from finite to infinite, but so too is the other.

36. [*Ed.*] The cosmological and teleological proofs, which, in the 1824 lectures as well as 1821, are treated in Part II in relation to the various determinate religions.

37. *Thus G, similar in P, D; W continues as in Ho; Ho reads:* determinations, each of which turns into the other, proving in the first place that it is not an independent moment and, secondly, that it produces the other, which it carries within itself. Only

Now we see the transition from concept to being. Here the argument begins from the concept, and more directly from the concept *of God*. The transition to being is to be demonstrated from this content, or from this concept. This is the first point; but sec-
111 ondly it must | at once be said that the category of "being" is in fact totally impoverished; it is the relation of self-identity, abstract equality with self, the ultimate abstraction—affirmation, indeed, but in its ultimate abstraction, completely indeterminate immediacy and self-reference. So if there were nothing more in the concept of God, or [in] the concept as such, then at least this utterly poor abstraction must belong to it. For the concept itself is defined only as infinitude or, in a more concrete sense, as the unity of universal and particular, as the universality that particularizes itself and so returns into itself. Thus this negation of the negative is the sublation of the difference, this relation to self *is* being, taken abstractly. This determination, this self-identity, is *ipso facto* essentially contained in the concept.

In the third place it must be said that the transition from concept to being is ˜of the utmost importance˜[38] and holds the deepest interest for reason. To grasp this relationship of concept to being is also the special concern of our time. We must now explain in more detail the reason why this transition or relationship is of such interest. The appearing of this antithesis between concept and being is a sign of *subjectivity,* a sign that subjectivity has attained ˜its being-for-self˜[39] and has arrived at totality.[40] The essential characteristic of the revelatory religion is the form through which substance is spirit.[41] This antithesis of concept and being appears so difficult and endless because reality—this one side that we have called the side of subjective spirit—because finite spirit has arrived inwardly at the comprehension of its infinitude. Only when the

38. *Thus P; D reads:* the most important point *G reads:* very weighty *W (HgG) reads:* very weighty and informative

39. *Thus G, D; W (Ed?) reads:* the culminating point of its being-for-self *Ho reads:* its culminating point, its being-for-self

40. *Thus G, P; Ho adds, similar in W:* inwardly to know itself as absolute and infinite.

41. *Thus G,* W_1*;* W_2 *(MiscP/Var?) adds:* The one side in the antithesis is the subject restored to itself, i.e., the realization of the idea in its concrete significance.

subject is the totality and has inwardly attained this freedom, this | infinitude that belongs to it, only then is it being. Then it is the 112
case that *this* subject is indifferent to *this* being, that the subject is *for itself* and being stands over against it as an indifferent other. Then, too, the other is a thing-in-itself, something that stands over against it, a reality that exists outside it. This is the specific reason why the antithesis can appear to be endless; and at the same time, therefore, the impulse to resolve the antithesis is present in the subject. The requirement that this antithesis—this other—should be resolved is directly involved in the subject's totality, but the task of sublating it has become infinitely difficult just because the antithesis itself is so endless, and the other, as something out there beyond it, is so entirely free.

This then is the grandeur of this standpoint, the standpoint of the modern world: that the subject has so sunk itself within itself that the finite knows itself as infinite and in this infinitude it is afflicted with finitude, is afflicted with this antithesis that it is driven to resolve. The question now is how it is to be resolved. This antithesis pertains to modern times. How is it to be resolved?[42] I am the subject, I am free, I am a person for myself, and outside me there is a world. Precisely because I am free, I freely let that other go from me too, the other that is "out there" and remains so. The ancients did not arrive at this antithesis, they did not come to this estrangement. To reach it is the highest capacity of spirit, and to be spirit is nothing but the grasping of this antithesis, the comprehending of oneself infinitely within it. The way the standpoint is given for us now is that we have the *concept* of God on the one side, and on the other side, set against the concept, we have *being*. What is required, therefore, is the mediation of the two, in such a way that the concept, which is self-contained infinitude, resolves itself into being, and that being is *conceived* from the concept. What this proof requires is that what is purely and simply other, the contrary of the concept, should proceed from the concept. The | 113

42. *Thus G, P; W adds a sentence based on Ho; Ho adds:* The infinite is thus confronted by an infinite, and consequently posits the infinite as finite, in such a way that the subject, owing to its infinitude, [is] compelled to sublate the antithesis, which has itself penetrated to its own infinity.

way this happens, and the form that it has for understanding, must now be briefly expounded.

As we have already said, the shape that this mediation takes is what is called the ontological proof of the existence of God, the argument that takes the concept of God as its starting point. But what is the concept of God? The concept of God is fixed as follows: God is the most real of all essences, the conceptual sum of all reality;[43] he can only be grasped affirmatively, he is inwardly determined, a content, but one that is to contain no limitation; he is the whole of reality but is only reality, without limitation; but in fact this leaves us with only a dead abstraction, as we remarked earlier.[44] ˜The second point is [to show] that this concept is possible, that it contains no contradiction, and [this] is shown˜[45] according to the canon of the understanding.[46] About this second point it is said that being is a reality, while nonbeing is a negation, a lack, ˜utterly antithetical. Being˜[47] is therefore reality, and hence it figures among the real predicates of God. God contains all reality; being is a reality; therefore he also contains this reality, being.[48]

The next point is Kant's objection to this proof, an objection that has become universal, a refutation of the proof that all the world takes for granted. Kant says, to be precise, that on the one hand we have the concept of God—but that we cannot "pluck" [*herausklauben*] being from this concept, for being is something other than the concept. The two are distinguished and opposed to each other; therefore the concept cannot contain being; "being" stands opposed to it. He goes on to say that "being" is not a "reality." ˜Being is not a reality, therefore it˜[49] is not contained in

43. [*Ed.*] On the concept of the most real essence, see above, *Ms.*, n. 34. On the designation of the *ens realissimum* or the *omnitudo realitatis* as the conceptual sum of all reality, see Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* B 601, B 610–611.

44. [*Ed.*] See Vol. 1:116 n. 8, 117 n. 9, 125–128.

45. *Thus P with G; Ho, W read:* The possibility of this concept, i.e., its identity without any contradiction, is exhibited

46. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 49.

47. *Thus G; P reads:* being utterly antithetical. That [being] *W (HgG) reads:* utterly antithetical. The third point is the conclusion. Being

48. [*Ed.*] See Descartes, *Meditations* 5 (pp. 136 ff.). See also above, *Ms.*, n. 34.

49. *Thus P; G reads:* All reality is attributed to God, therefore being

the concept of God, so that it is not a determination of content, or predicate. ˜Being is no predicate and therefore not a "reality."˜[50] Whether I imagine a hundred thalers or actually possess them makes no difference; the content is one and the same whether I possess them or imagine them.[51] Kant thus takes the content as | that which 114
constitutes the concept; it is not what is *contained* in the concept. One can say this, to be sure, if one understands by "the concept" the determination of content, and distinguishes that from the *form*, which contains thought on the one side and being on the other. All content is thus on the side of the concept, and being is the other to this content. What this amounts to is (briefly) that the concept is not being and the two are distinct; this is the basic notion, to which frequent reference has already been made. We have no cognition of God, we know nothing of him; to be sure, we can form concepts of him, but the fact that we form a representation of this kind does not mean that these concepts are so. This, then, is what the Kantian destruction of the proof reduces to.

We know quite well, of course, that one can build castles in the air, but that this does not bring them into existence. Thus the argument has a popular appeal, which is why Kant has, in the general judgment, produced a refutation [of the ontological argument].[52]

Anselm of Canterbury, a thoroughly learned philosophical theologian of the twelfth century, set forth the proof as follows. God is what is most perfect, the conceptual sum of all reality; but if God is merely a representation, merely a thought or concept, he is not what is most perfect, for we regard as perfect only that which is not merely represented but also has being.[53] This is entirely correct, and it is a presupposition that underlies all philosophy. If it is permitted to make presuppositions, this presupposition is one that all persons hold within themselves, namely, that what is only represented is only imperfect, and only what also has reality is

50. *Thus P; G reads:* Being is therefore not a "reality." *Ho reads, similar in W:* but only pure form.

51. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, nn. 35, 38.

52. *Thus G; W (HgG) adds:* and won the masses over to his side.

53. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 30.

perfect.[54] Now God is what is most perfect, therefore he must be real, he must have being, just as he is concept. Our notions include both the view that concept and representation are different, and likewise the view that what is merely imagined is very imperfect,
115 whereas God is also ˜what is most perfect.˜[55] | Kant does not demonstrate the difference between concept and being; it is merely accepted in popular fashion. We grant its validity where we can appeal to sound human sense, [i.e., where we speak] of imperfect things and representations.

To establish the case more soundly, [the following] remark must be made regarding this form, whether we mean the form of the Anselmian proof or the form of the argument adduced in the proof nowadays. The latter runs as follows: God is the conceptual sum of all forms of reality; consequently he also includes being.[56] This is entirely correct. Being is so poor a determination that it belongs immediately to the concept. The other point, however, is that being and concept are also different from one another. Being and thinking, the real and the ideal, reality and ideality, are different from and opposed to each other. True difference is also opposition in any case, and the task therefore is to sublate this antithesis. The unity of the two determinations has to be demonstrated in such a way that it results from the negation of the antithesis, and it is shown that being is contained in the concept. [To talk of] this reality as "unrestricted" is only to utter empty words, mere abstractions.[57] So the first step is that the determination of being is exhibited as affirmatively contained in the concept; this then is the unity of concept and being.

But in the second place they are also different from each other; thus their unity is the negative unity of the two, and the task now is to sublate the difference. The difference must be spoken of also, and what has to be done is to establish and demonstrate the unity *after* this differentiation. This demonstration is the task of logic.[58]

54. *Thus G, P; W adds, following Ho:* that truth is only what *is,* as well as being *thought. Ho adds:* that only what *is,* as well as being *thought,* contains truth.

55. *Thus W (HgG/Ed?); G reads:* the most perfect [representation].

56. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 49.

57. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 47.

58. [*Ed.*] See Hegel, *Science of Logic,* esp. pp. 81 ff., 705 ff. (*GW* 11:43–44, 12:127 ff.).

That the concept *is* the movement by which it determines itself to be, that it is this dialectical movement of self-determination into being, or into its own opposite—this logical dimension is a further development, which we do not find in the ontological proof—and this is where it is defective.

Let us now consider first the form of the Anselmian proof and then compare with it the view of the present time.

Concerning the form of Anselm's thought, we have remarked that his argument goes that the concept of God *presupposes* | reality 116
because God is what is most perfect. Another point to notice is this: I have said that the essential thing, the first point at issue, is the transition from concept to reality, i.e., that the concept objectifies itself and that, properly speaking, it makes no difference whether what has to realize itself is the concept of *God*—although it seems that this necessity can only hold good [for] God. The point is that the concept objectifies itself for itself.

So, then, that God is what is most perfect is presupposed. But when he is only posited in the imagination, without reality, then he is not that; and it is when measured against what is most perfect that the mere concept of God appears to be deficient. The criterion is the concept of perfection, and by that criterion God as mere concept, thought, the subjectivity of this content of God, is inadequate. God is supposedly what is most perfect; God in the form of thought does not correspond to this. God is what is most perfect; it is this then [that is here presupposed].

The second thing to note in this connection is that the "perfect" is only an indeterminate notion [*Vorstellung*].[59] What is it then to be perfect? For it to be something determinate, the perfect must be defined. The definition of what is "perfect" we can see immediately in what is counterposed to the referent of this notion. For what is imperfect is just the mere thought of God, and hence the perfect is the unity of the thought (or the concept) with reality. Thus this unity is here presupposed. The perfect, therefore, is not mere subjective being but objectivity.

The third point is that since God is posited as what is most perfect, he has no further definition [in the argument]. He is only

59. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 32.

what he is; he is only what is perfect, and what is perfect is the unity of the concept with reality. He only *is* as such, and this is his determinateness. Hence it is evident that the only thing that is properly relevant here is this unity of concept and reality. This unity is the definition of perfection and of God himself at the same time. It is also in fact the definition of the idea in general; but it is only the abstract idea, and certainly there is more than that involved in
117 the definition of God. |

The second point [regarding what has just been said] about Anselm's way of [abstracting] the concept is that its presupposition is in fact the unity of concept and reality. This is why the proof cannot afford satisfaction for reason, since the presupposition is precisely what is at issue. That this presupposition should now be proved, that the concept sublates its one-sidedness, that it determines itself implicitly, objectifies itself, realizes itself, this is a further insight which [needs] first to have emerged from the nature of the concept. This insight, which is not present—and could not occur—in Anselm or even in later times, is an insight into the extent to which the concept itself sublates its one-sidedness. This is one of the most important points.

The other thing [we said we would do] is to compare Anselm's position with the view of our own time, which derives in particular from Kant. According to this view, to say that we think is to say this: that we intuit and we will, and our willing and intuiting is accompanied by thinking. We think too, we comprehend too; a human being is a concrete [being] of sensation, and also a rational [being]. Secondly, so we are told, the concept of God—the idea as such, the infinite, the unlimited in general—is *only* a concept that we make for ourselves; we should not forget that it is only a concept and its place is in our heads. Why do we say, "It is only a concept, it is the indeterminate, and hence it is only something imperfect"? The concept is something imperfect inasmuch as thinking, conceiving, is only one quality, one human activity among others. That is to say that we measure our comprehension by the reality that we have before us, and by concrete human beings. To be sure, human beings do not just think, they are also sentient, and even in thought they can have sensible objects. In fact this is the merely

subjective aspect of conceiving, that we only find it to be imperfect on account of the criterion we have, since this criterion is the concrete human being. One might also say that the concept is declared to be only a concept and that the sensible is declared to be reality. What we can grasp with our hands, what we see, feel, or sense, this is what we call reality—a sensory datum, something sensed. So reality is also what we have sense awareness of—so far as that goes. One could assert this, and indeed many people do say it. They acknowledge as actual only what they sense; however, the fact that there are people who ascribe actuality only to the sensible, not to the spiritual, is not such a terrible tragedy. It is the concrete | human 118
nature, the total subjectivity of human beings, that hovers before their eyes as the whole and [that they] take as a yardstick. By that standard, conceiving is conceiving and nothing more.

When we now compare the two, Anselm's pattern, his thought, and the thought of the present day, what they have in common is the fact that they both make presuppositions. Anselm presupposes perfection, which in itself is still indeterminate, while the modern view ˜presupposes concrete˜[60] humanity as such in a general sense. Compared with perfection on the one hand and this empirically concrete unity on the other, the concept is seen as something one-sided and unsatisfying. In the thought of Anselm the definition of perfection also has, in fact, the sense that it is the unity of concept and reality. Later on, in Descartes and in Spinoza too,[61] God is the first reality; in God we find the absolute unity of thought with ˜space,˜[62] *cognito ergo sum,* absolute substance—it is the same in Leibniz too.[63] What we thus have on one side is the presupposition

60. *Thus P, similar in G,* W_1; W_2 *(Var) reads:* presupposes the concrete subjectivity of

61. [*Ed.*] Hegel alludes to the connection seen by Descartes between the *cogito ergo sum* and the idea of God: Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy* 1:13, 14 (pp. 189–190); and *Discourse on Method* 4 (pp. 27 ff.). With regard to Spinoza, see his *Ethics,* Part I, Definition vi; Part II, Props. i, ii (*Chief Works* 2:45, 83–84).

62. *Thus P; G reads:* the sensible *W (HgG/Ed?) reads:* being

63. [*Ed.*] An exact source for this brief allusion cannot be found in Leibniz's work. Hegel may have in mind those passages in which God is indeed understood as substance, but the difference is emphasized between God as original substance and the monads as created substances. See Leibniz, *Monadology* 48 (*Selections,* p. 542); and *Brief an Bierling vom 12. August 1711* (*Philosophische Schriften* 7:502).

of what is concrete in fact, as the unity of thought and being; and measured by this standard, the subjective concept appears defective. The modern view insists that this is as far as we can go, to say that the concept is only the concept, the concept is as it were placed on one side, and does not correspond to the concrete. Anselm, on the other hand, says we must give up wanting to let the subjective concept stand as something firm and independent; on the contrary, we must get away from this one-sidedness and [begin from] the unity of subjective and objective in general.

Both views have in common that they have presuppositions; the difference is that the modern view is based on the concrete, while the metaphysical, Anselmian view is based on absolute thought, the absolute idea, which is the unity of concept and reality. The old view is superior insofar as it takes the concrete to be not empirical human beings and empirical actuality but thoughts. It does not take
119 its stand on the claim that we must hold fast to the imperfect, | adhere to the subjective concept; [instead it takes its stand on] a concept that is at the same time reality. There is an unresolved contradiction in the modern view because both what is concrete and the one-sided subjective concept are accepted as valid. Now in recognizing the concrete, we have already passed beyond the subjective concept. But it is the subjective concept that is valid and must be accepted as something subjective; one must stand by it, one must not pass beyond it. Thus the older view is at a great advantage in that it is founded on the idea; in one respect the modern view is more advanced, in that it posits the concrete as unity of the concept and reality, whereas the former view took its stand upon an abstract form of perfection. But on the other hand [it has] lapsed into the empirical way of looking at things. Certainly Descartes and Spinoza made further progress in the defining of "the perfect." But in saying that substance is the unity of concept and being, Spinoza [and Descartes[64]] were merely presupposing it to be so, and not proving it. It is only thinking that has that unity immediately before it.

64. [*Ed.*] Hegel most likely is alluding to Descartes's *Principles of Philosophy* 1:51, 52 (pp. 206–207). Regarding Spinoza, see n. 61.

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF GOD[65]

Our next step is to proceed to concrete representation, to the development and more specific determination of the idea.

We have defined the metaphysical concept as the concept that realizes itself, the one that is itself real; the whole of finitude subsists within it. God is the absolute idea, the fact that reality matches the concept. What we have called reality in the metaphysical concept is now reality as such, being, etc. But, more precisely, it is not *natural* being. In nature religion, "being" was naturalness in general—the sky, the sun, etc. The reality we are now speaking of constitutes the determinateness of God. It is not something natural. Similarly, God's determinateness is not constituted by a predicate or a plurality of predicates. "Predicates" (characteristics such as wisdom, justice, goodness) are not, to be sure, natural and immediate; but they are stabilized by reflection—[each predicate is] a content that has attained through reflection the form of universality, of relation to self. Thus each | determinate content has become just 120
as immovable, just as rigidly *for itself*, as the natural content was to begin with. About the natural we say, "It is." These "predicates" are just as self-identical as [natural] immediacy. The predicates do

65. [*Ed.*] This is the second main section of the 1824 lectures, corresponding to Sec. B, "Concrete Representation," in the *Ms.* As we have noted above (see *Ms.*, n. 39, and the Editorial Introduction), Hegel revised the *Ms.* at this point, possibly when he made use of it in 1824, so as to indicate that the "concrete representation" of the Christian religion entails the "determination" or "development" of the idea of God (these words are almost exactly repeated at the beginning of this section in the 1824 lectures). The idea of God "develops" (for the consummate religion, at least) in terms of the three moments of the Trinity—in representational language, the "persons" of the Father, Son, and Spirit; in conceptual language, the moments of divine self-identity, self-differentiation, and self-return. These yield the three "elements" that constitute the substance of Hegel's speculative redescription of the Christian religion. Before proceeding to the "first element," Hegel offers a survey or "division of the subject," just as he did in 1821. To highlight the structural difference between the 1824 lectures and the *Ms.* at this point we prefer "The Development of the Idea of God" as a title, although "Concrete Representation" could also be used, and indeed the latter is found as a heading in *D*, *P*, and *Ho*. But in 1824, "Concrete Representation" *includes* "Community, Cultus" as the third element.

not correspond to the reality of the concept; the reality of the concept is more precisely the first [natural] reality, namely, that the concept in itself is real, wholly free totality, free totality present to itself. The one side, spirit, the subjective side, the concept, is itself the idea, while the other side, reality, is likewise the whole or spirit, posited at the same time as distinct. Reality is thus the reality of the idea itself, in such a way that each side is the idea, the free idea, present to itself, so that spirit, this idea, knows itself, is present to itself. It is real, places itself vis-à-vis [itself] as another spirit, and is then the unity of the two. And this is what the idea *is*.

The next point is to explicate the idea [of God in its self-development] as follows. Universal spirit—the totality that it is—posits itself [*setzt sich*] in its three determinations, i.e., it develops itself, realizes itself; and it is complete only at the end, which is at the same time its presupposition [*Voraussetzung*]. At first, it is in itself as the totality; [then] it sets itself forth [*setzt sich voraus*], and likewise it *is* only at the end.[66]

We thus have to consider spirit in the three forms, *the three elements,* into which it posits itself. These three forms are: (1) Eternal being, within and present to itself—the form of *universality.* (2) The form of *appearance,* that of *particularization,* of being for others. (3) The form of return from appearance into itself, the form of *absolute singularity,* of absolute presence-to-self.[67]

It is in these three forms that the divine idea explicates itself. Spirit is the divine history, the process of self-differentiation, of

66. [*Ed.*] Hegel is here engaged in a wordplay based on the verb *setzen: sich setzt* ("posits itself"), *Voraussetzung* ("presupposition"), and *setzt sich voraus* ("sets itself forth [or forward]"). Spirit must not merely posit itself "in itself" (*an sich*); it must also "set itself forth" or "appear" in the world in order to arrive at its end and thus *be* spirit in the full sense. For this reason the end is at the same time the "presupposition" (*Voraus-setzung*) of spirit. This wordplay is repeated several times below.

67. [*Ed.*] With the distinction between "universality" [*Allgemeinheit*], "particularization" [*Partikularisation*], and "singularity" [*Einzelheit*], Hegel alludes to the three determinate categories of the concept and to the three figures of the syllogism. See *Science of Logic,* pp. 600 ff., 666 ff. (*GW* 12:32 ff., 92 ff.); and *Encyclopedia* (1830), §§ 183–187. Thus this first form of the distinction can be considered the logical distinction, as compared with those that follow, based on subjective consciousness, space, and time.

diremption and return into self; it is the *divine* history and therefore is to be viewed in each of the three forms.

These three forms are also determined as follows in regard to *subjective consciousness*. The first form [is determined] as the element of *thought,* that God is in pure thought as he is in and for himself; he is manifest but not yet issued forth into appearance—God in his eternal essence, present to himself, yet manifest. The second form is that he is [present] in the element of *representation,* in the element of particularization, that consciousness is entrapped in its relation to the other; this is appearance. The third element is that of | *subjectivity* as such. Partly this subjectivity is immediate 121
subjectivity, disposition, thought, representation, sensation, but also it is partly a subjectivity that is the concept, i.e., it is thinking reason, the thinking of free spirit, which is inwardly free only through the return [into itself].

We can also explain these three forms as follows. We can say that these histories take place as it were in different *locales*. Thus the first divine history is *outside the world,* it is not in space, but outside finitude as such—God as he is in and for himself. The second locale is the *world,* the divine history as real, God having his determinate being in the world. Thirdly there is the *inner place,* the community, first of all in the world, but also the community insofar as it simultaneously raises itself to heaven, or already has heaven within itself on earth—the community which, as the church, is full of grace, and in which God is active and present.

We can then define these three elements differently in regard to *time*. Thus the first element is God outside of time, God as the eternal idea in the element of the pure thought of *eternity,* but eternity only in the sense in which it is set against time. This time that is in and for itself explicates itself by unfolding into past, present, and future. The second element is the divine history as appearance, but as a *past* time; it is [there], for appearance means something that is, that has being, but it has a mode of being that has been reduced to mere show. As appearance it is an immediately determinate being, which is simultaneously negated; this is the past—exactly what is called history, which proves itself to be mere appearance by the very fact that it is *only* history. The third element

is the *present,* but only the limited present, not the eternal present as such but the present that distinguishes past and future from itself. This is the element of heart and mind, of immediate subjectivity—the spiritual "now" as it is in this [single] individual. But this present has also to be the third element; the community raises itself to heaven as well. So it is a present that raises itself, it is essentially reconciled, brought to consummation through the negation of its immediacy, consummated in universality, but in a consummation that is not yet achieved, and which must therefore be grasped as
122 *future*—a now of the present that | has consummation before its eyes; but because the community is posited now in the order of time, the consummation is distinguished from this "now" and is posited as future. These are the three universal ideas in which we have to consider the divine history.

It should be noted that I have not made the distinctions that I made previously between *concept, figure,* and *cultus;*[68] in the subsequent treatment we shall in fact see how the relationship [among the forms of the divine idea also] enters into the cultus. In general it may be remarked that the element in which *we* exist is [that of] the Spirit. Spirit is simply self-manifestation, it *is* utterly *for* itself. So as it is grasped, it is never found alone but always has the character of being utterly manifest or of being for an other, for its *own* other, i.e., for the side that is finite spirit. And the cultus is the relationship of finite spirit to absolute spirit. Accordingly, we at once find before us the cultic aspect in each of these elements.

In this connection we have to distinguish between how the idea is for the *concept* in the various elements and how this comes to *representational* expression. Religion is universal and does not exist only for educated, conceptual thought, for philosophical conscious-

68. [*Ed.*] A reference to the categories by means of which the determinate religions were treated in Part II. These categories were carried over to the consummate religion in the *Ms.* but were dropped in 1824 and thereafter, for the reasons explained in the Editorial Introduction. Hegel here uses the term *Gestalt* ("figure") instead of the more commonly employed *Vorstellung* ("representation"). He notes here that the cultus is to be included among the three forms in which the idea of God develops (as the "third element"), rather than being added on as a separate topic.

ness; instead the truth of the idea of God is manifest for representational consciousness and ˜it has this necessary characteristic: that it *must* be universal[ly accessible] for representation.˜[69]

A. THE FIRST ELEMENT: THE IDEA OF GOD IN AND FOR ITSELF

The first element in which we have to consider the idea of God is the element of thought, the idea in its eternal present, as it is for free thought, the thought whose basic character is to be untroubled light, or identity with itself. This is an element that is not yet burdened by other-being.

In this element too a defining character is necessary because thinking *in general* is different from *conceptual* thinking as | such. 123
The eternal idea is in and for itself in thought, as the idea in its absolute truth. Therefore religion essentially has a content, and the content is an object. Religion is *human* religion, and (among its other modes) human consciousness is *thinking* consciousness, so that the idea must also be [available] for thinking consciousness. But it is not only in this way (not just among other modes) that the human being is a thinker. It is in thinking that humanity truly exists for the first time. The universal object, the essence of the object, *is* only for thinking, and since in religion God is the object, he is such essentially for thinking. He is *object* just as spirit is consciousness, and he is *for thinking,* because it is God who is the object.

It is not for sensory or reflective consciousness that God can have being *as God,* i.e., in his eternal essentiality in and for itself. His *appearance* is another matter: appearance *is* for the sentient consciousness. But if God were *merely* in sensation, human beings would stand no higher than the animals; to be sure, God also is for feeling, but only in his appearance. Nor is he ˜this or that limited

69. *Thus G, W_1; W_2 (Var) reads:* has the necessary characteristics that are inseparable from representation.

content for the argumentative consciousness (the thinking of the well-ordered understanding)."[70] God is not that kind of content either. He is therefore essentially *for thought.* This is what we have to say if we take the subjective, the human, as our starting point. But we also arrive at precisely the same point if we begin with God. Spirit only is as a self-revealing, a self-differentiation *for spirit.* This [other] spirit, for which it *is,* is the eternal idea, thinking spirit, spirit in the element of its freedom. In this field God is the act of *self-revealing* because he is spirit; but he is not yet the act of *appearing.* Thus it is of the essence that God is for spirit.

The second point to note is that spirit *thinks* spirit. In this pure thinking there is initially no difference that divides them; there is
124 nothing between them. Thinking is pure unity with itself, | where all obscurity and darkness disappears. This thinking can also be called pure *intuition,* as the simple activity of thinking, such that between the subject and object there is no [difference] and, properly speaking, subject and object are not yet present. This thinking has no limitation, it is this wholly universal activity, and the content is only the universal itself. "*Thinking* is simply *knowing.*"[71]

The third point is that the absolute diremption is also differentiation. How does this come about? "Thinking as *actus* is indeterminate."[72] The very first distinction is for the two sides we have seen to be distinguished as the two modes of the principle, according to the starting point adopted. One side, that of subjective thinking, is the movement of thinking insofar as it begins from immediate, singular being and elevates itself therein to the universal, to the infinite, as we have seen it do in the first proofs of the existence of

70. *G reads:* for the argumentative consciousness, for the thinking of the well-ordered understanding, nor for this or that limited content. W_1 *reads:* for the argumentative consciousness, for the thinking of its well-ordered understanding, in accord with this or that limited content. W_2 *(Var) reads:* for the argumentative consciousness; while reflecting is a form of thinking, it is also contingency, for which the content is any limited content. *Ho reads:* for the argumentative consciousness nor [for that] of reflective thinking, whose content is purely contingent, since such thinking, as lacking content, must itself receive its content as something given.

71. *Thus D; W_2 following Ho reads:* It [i.e., pure thinking] is pure inward pulsating. *Ho reads:* He [i.e., God] is pure inward pulsating.

72. *Thus G, W_1; W_2 (Var) reads: Actus* imposes no limitation on thinking.

God. To the extent that it has arrived at the universal, thinking is unlimited; its end is infinitely pure thinking in which all the mist of finitude has disappeared. At that point it thinks God: all particularity has disappeared, and thus religion, the thought of God, begins. The second side is that which adopts the other starting point, which proceeds from the universal, from the result of the first side—a result that is also movement—from the universal, from thinking, from the concept; ˜and hence˜[73] it consists in differentiating itself inwardly, but keeping the difference *within itself* in such a way that it does not disturb the universality. The universality is here one that has a distinction within itself, yet is in harmony with itself. This is the abstract content of thinking, i.e., it is abstract thinking, it is the result ˜that has elevated itself.˜[74]

The two sides stand opposed to each other ˜as follows. The first and simpler | mode of thinking˜[75] is also a process, an inward 125
mediation; but this process goes on outside it, it is so to speak beyond it, behind this thought. Only insofar as the thought has elevated itself does religion begin. Thus there is in religion pure, motionless, *abstract* thinking; the concrete, on the other hand, pertains to its *object,* for this is the thinking that starts from the universal, differentiates itself [from it], yet is in harmony with it. This concrete element is the object for thinking simply as such. So this thinking, as such, is abstract thinking and therefore it is *finite* thinking; for the abstract is finite. The concrete is the truth, the *infinite* object.

Regarding the content more specifically, the following remarks need to be made. We have long been familiar with them, so we can be brief. There is little to be said about them, and we need only call to mind what is essential.

In the first place, God is spirit; in his abstract character he is defined as universal spirit that particularizes itself. This is the ab-

73. *Thus G,* W_1*, similar in D;* W_2 *(Var) reads:* But the universal in turn is also movement within itself, and

74. *Thus G,* W_1*;* W_2 *(Var) reads:* that has emerged.

75. *Thus G,* W_1*; D reads:* in such a way that subjective thinking [is] simple thinking. It W_2 *(Var) reads:* as follows. Subjective thinking, the thinking of finite spirit,

solute truth, and the religion that has this content is the true religion. In the Christian religion this is what is called the *Trinity*—it is "triune" insofar as number categories are applied. It is the God who differentiates himself but remains identical with himself in the process. The Trinity is called the *mystery* of God; its content is mystical, i.e., speculative. But what is for reason is not a secret. In the Christian religion one *knows*, and this is a secret only for the finite understanding, and for the thought that is based on sense experience. There the distinctions are immediate, and natural things are accepted as valid; this is the mode of externality. But as soon as God is defined as spirit, externality is sublated, and for sense this *is* a mystery; for sense everything is external to everything else—objects change, and the senses are aware of them in different ways. The changing is itself a sensible process, occurring in time. The sun exists: once it did not exist, some day it will not exist—all these states are external to one another in time. ˜The being [of a thing] is *now*, and its˜[76] nonbeing is separated from now; for time is what
126 keeps the determinations apart from one another, | external to one another. For the understanding too [nonbeing] is other [than being]; thus the understanding, like the sensible [realm], is a holding fast to abstract characteristics in such a way that each exists on its own account. The negative is distinct from the positive; so for the understanding it is something else.

Certainly, when we say "Trinity" or "triune," the unfortunate formal pattern of a number series (1, 2, 3) comes into play. Reason can employ all the *relationships* of the understanding, but only insofar as it destroys the *forms* of the understanding. And so it is with the Trinity. Hence the very word "triune" is an extreme of misuse as far as the understanding is concerned—for it believes the mere fact of the formula being used establishes its rights; but to use it as one does here to say "three equals one" is to misuse it. Consequently it is an easy matter to point out contradictions in such ideas, distinctions that go to the point of being opposites.[77] Everything concrete, everything living contains contradiction within

76. *G reads:* Their being is *now*, and their

77. *Thus G; W (HgG) adds:* and callow understanding prides itself on amassing such contradictions.

itself; only the dead understanding is identical with itself. But the contradiction is also resolved in the idea, and the resolution is spiritual unity. The living thing is an example of what cannot be grasped by the understanding. "God is love" is an expression very much to the point: here God is present to sensation; as "love" he is a person, and the relationship is such that the consciousness of the One is to be had only in the consciousness of the other. God is conscious of himself, as Goethe says,[78] only in the other, in absolute externalization. This is spiritual unity in the form of feeling. In the relationship of friendship, of love, of the family, this identity of one with the other is also to be found. It is contrary to the understanding that I, who exist for myself and am therefore self-consciousness, should have my consciousness rather in another; but the reconciliation [of this conflict] is the abstract content—the substantial, universal *ethical* relationship as such.

The second remark is a reflection upon the foregoing. We can find traces of the Trinity in other religions. They occur, for example, in the Trimurti or in the triad of Plato, while Aristotle says: We believe we have invoked the gods completely only when we have invoked them three times.[79] But wherever else we turn, we encounter only imperfect definitions. In Plato,[80] the "one" and the | "other" 127
and the "mixture" are wholly abstract in character, while in the Trimurti the wildest mode [of fanciful imagination] has entered into play, and the third moment is not that of spiritual return, for, as Siva, it is merely alteration, not spirit.[81]

A further point is that in the Christian religion it is not merely asserted that God is triune but also that he subsists in *three persons.* This is being-for-self taken to the extreme, the extreme being not only *one* but *person,* personality. Being a person is the highest intensity of being-for-self. Here the contradiction seems to be pushed so far that no resolution, no mingling of one person with another, is possible. But just this resolution is expressed in the assertion that God is *only* one; the three persons are thus posited

78. [*Ed.*] An allusion to Goethe's *Die Braut von Corinth*, vv. 120–123.
79. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 57.
80. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 59.
81. [*Ed.*] See Hegel's portrayal of the religion of fanciful imagination in Vol. 2.

merely as ˜a transient moment or aspect.˜[82] "Personality" expresses the fact that the antithesis is to be taken as absolute,[83] that it is not a mild one, and it is only when it is pushed to this extreme that it sublates itself. Of this too we have a representation. In love and friendship it is the *person* that maintains itself and *through* its love achieves its subjectivity, which is its personality. But in religion, if one holds fast to personality in the abstract sense, then one has three gods, and ˜subjectivity is likewise lost. Infinite form, infinite power is then all there is to the moment of divinity.˜[84] Furthermore, if one holds fast to personality as an unresolved [moment], one has *evil.* For the personality that does not sacrifice itself in the divine idea is evil. It is precisely in the divine unity that personality, just as much as it is posited, is posited as resolved; only in appearance does the negativity of personality appear distinct from that whereby it is sublated.

The Trinity has also been brought under the relationship of Father, Son, and Spirit. This is a childlike relationship, a childlike[85]
128 form. The understanding has no other category, no other | relationship that would be comparable with this in respect of its appropriateness. But we must be aware that this is merely a figurative relationship; the Spirit does not[86] enter into this relationship. "Love" would be more suitable, for the spirit [of love] is assuredly what is truthful.

There is a third point that we must not overlook, because it has given rise to many so-called heresies. As we have said,[87] the abstract God, the Father, is the universal, ˜what is all-encompassing, what is One.˜[88] We are now on the level of spirit; the universal here

82. *Thus W (Ed/HgG?); G reads:* a different moment or aspect. *D reads:* transient.

83. *Thus G, W_1; W_2 (Var) adds:* not as a trivial antithesis,

84. *Thus G, W_1; W_2 (Var) reads:* infinite form, absolute negativity is forgotten, or

85. *Thus G, W_1; W_2 (Var) adds:* natural

86. *Thus G, D; W (HgG/Ed?) adds:* clearly

87. [*Ed.*] In the preceding materials Hegel has not depicted the Father as universal in this explicit form, but such a reference might not have been transmitted by the sources.

88. *Thus D; G, W read:* eternal, all-embracing, total particularity. *Ho reads:* encompasses all particularity and is without defect.

includes everything within itself. The other, the Son, is infinite particularity, the [realm of] appearance; the third, the Spirit, is singularity as such. ˜But we must be aware that all˜[89] three are spirit. In the third, we say, God is the Spirit; ˜but the Spirit is also "presupposing," the third is also˜[90] the first. It is essential to hold on to this; it is explained by the nature of the [logical] concept. We encounter it in every goal and every kind of life process. Life maintains itself; self-maintenance means entering into differentiation, into the struggle with particularity, [the organism] finding itself distinguished from an inorganic nature, and its going outwards. Thus life is only a result because it ˜has produced˜[91] itself and is a product; moreover if we are asked, "What is produced?" the answer is that what is produced is the life process itself, i.e., life is its own presupposition. This is just what the universal consists in: that it works through its process and that the process gives rise to nothing new; what is brought forth is already [there] from the beginning. It is the same with loving and being loved in return. Insofar as love is present, its ˜utterance˜[92] and all the activities to which it gives rise, whereby it is simultaneously brought forth and supported, merely confirm it. What is brought forth is already there: the confirmation of love is a confirmation whereby nothing | comes forth 129
save what is already there. Similarly, spirit sets itself forth,[93] it is the initiating.

The differentiation that the divine life goes through is not an external [process] but must ˜be defined solely as internal,˜[94] so that the first, the Father, is to be grasped just like the last [the Spirit]. Thus the process is nothing but a play of self-maintenance, a play of self-confirmation.

This definition is important in that it provides the criterion for

89. *Thus D; G, W_1 read:* But all W_2 *(Var) reads:* But the universal as totality is itself spirit, all *Ho reads:* Thus each moment is itself totality, is spirit. All

90. *Thus G; D reads:* Spirit is the result and the "presupposing" of itself, the last no more than

[*Ed.*] See above, n. 66.

91. *Thus G; D reads:* nourishes

92. *Similar in G; W (Hg/Ed?) reads:* starting point

93. [*Ed.*] See above, n. 66.

94. *Thus W (Hg/Ed?); G reads:* merely be defined as external,

evaluating many representations of the essence of divinity, and for appraising and recognizing their deficiencies. We must recognize where they are defective, and the defect arises especially from the fact that this definition is often overlooked.[95]

I have already pointed out that hints and traces of the idea of God, which essentially is the Trinity, emerged most notably shortly before and after the time when the Christian religion appeared on the scene—the church called these other views heresies. These are the Gnostic representations, which arise from the need to *cognize* God.[96] Philo, a Jewish Platonist, defines God as the ὄν, as what has being, in other words the hidden God who is unknowable, uncommunicative, inconceivable. If the first [the Father] is defined as what is only abstractly universal, and ˜[all] determinations are allowed to come only *after* what is universal, *after* the ὄν,˜[97] then this first is, to be sure, inconceivable because it is without content; anything conceivable is concrete and can *be* conceived only inasmuch as it is determined as a moment. The defect lies here, therefore, in the fact that the first is not itself grasped as entire totality. The second definition is as the Logos, Νοῦς, that which reveals itself, the [first] mover, which posits differentiation, the moment of determining generally. In respect of this second definition there is a great diversity of representations—the Son of God, Sophia, Wisdom the archetype of humanity, the First Man, the eternal one, heavenly revelation of the godhead, thinking, effective power. This is the second, and is a
130 genuine distinction that touches the quality of both; | but it is still one and the same substance, so the distinction is after all just a superficial one, though defined as a difference of persons.

According to another representation, the first is the βυθός, the abyss, the depths, the αἰών, the eternal one whose dwelling is in the inexpressible heights, and who is exalted above all contact,[98] from whom nothing can be developed, the principle, the father of all essence and all existence. The first is termed προπατήρ, Father

95. *Thus G; W(HgG) adds:* or misunderstood.

96. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 71.

97. *Thus* W_2 *(Var/Ed?); G,* W_1 *read:* actual being, the ὄν, is taken as ensuing from it,

98. *Thus G,* W_1*;* W_2 *(Var) adds:* with finite things

only mediately, προαρχή, before the beginning. The revealing of this abyss, this hidden God, is defined as self-contemplation, i.e., reflection into self, concrete determination in general. Self-contemplation begets, it is in fact the begetting of the only-begotten; this begetting is how the eternal becomes comprehensible, because it is here that it achieves determination. Thus this μονογενής, the only-begotten one, also signifies the *Father,* the principle that grounds all essentiality etc. The defect in all these representations is that what is first is not grasped in the determination of totality, as what is last [also].

As we have seen, the content is an object for pure thinking, for the finite, subjective spirit, which is here still posited in the form of infinitude, of pure intuition, of *thinking.* This relationship must be considered in greater detail. On the one side, then, we have an absolute content, the eternal idea. This is *object,* and it is object *essentially.* Self-revelation, being object for himself, is what God essentially is. God is the concrete, the idea; for pure thinking he is object, the simple directing and concentrating of thought—in other words, pure devotion. For this thinking there is only this object, the absolute truth, before which it is simply in awe—not fear but awe. In pure thinking there is nothing to be feared, all mortality and dependence are already surrendered and removed as negated and vanishing. It is a simple and pure relationship, to which the name of reverence can be applied. This concrete [relationship] is on the one hand pure thinking; on the other it is the same thought as absolute power, essentially concrete within itself, absolute plenitude; hence the relationship to what is absolutely true is one of freedom, one of blessedness, the blissful intuition of absolute truth. | 131

When we engage in reflection on this relationship, we see the inequality between the two sides, namely that subjective spirit is defined as universal thinking, not as concrete within itself; what is concrete within itself, the genuine idea, is the object. That for which the idea is, is only pure intuition, this universal thinking, and God only is for thinking. This thinking is not conceptual because it is abstract. It is not posited as activity, not posited as *concrete;* and the concrete object that it must be posited as, is the *truth.* Spirit

bears witness unto spirit, but this spirit that bears witness to what is true is not yet posited concretely; therefore finite spirit only *receives,* the content is only something *given.* Because it is not posited as concrete in itself, [spirit] relates to itself in the sentient mode, and this is the more precise definition of the finitude of spirit. Our reflection continues as follows: that spirit, because it is finite in this way, is not *active;* it does not possess itself because it is not concrete. Reverence is its object, its essence, and hence, although it is blissful in the presence of its truth, it still does not have the character of the concrete posited with respect to itself.[99]

This is the standpoint of the first element in general; we can now proceed to the second element.

B. THE SECOND ELEMENT: REPRESENTATION, APPEARANCE[100]

This is the element of representation as such or of appearance.

1. Differentiation

a. Differentiation within the Divine Life and in the World

We can say that ˜the absolute idea—the way it is determined as an object, subsisting in and for itself—is complete. On its subjective side, however, this is not so; it is neither complete in itself—[for] it is not [yet] concrete—nor is it complete as consciousness with

99. [*Ed.*] These last two paragraphs help to clarify Hegel's opposition to feeling as the basic form of the religious relationship. Feeling and sensibility (*Gefühl, Empfindung*) are basically receptive (*empfangen*), dependent, passive, whereas the true relationship to the infinite, in Hegel's view, must be active, concrete, participatory. It is a relationship of awe or reverence (*Ehrfurcht*), not fear (*Furcht*), of freedom rather than of dependence. This relationship takes place in the form of thinking—initially an intuitive thinking, not conceptual. But it must become conceptual if it is to be adequate to the object—the true object—that posits itself in the religious relationship. The thinker must become engaged in the object of thought.

100. [*Ed.*] On the organization of the "second element," which is similar in both the 1824 and 1827 lectures, see the Editorial Introduction. Materials from the *Ms.* have been reworked into a more logical arrangement, which we have sought to articulate by editorial section headings.

respect to what it has as its object. It is not reflected into self, it is not posited as *differentiated.* The subject does not view itself in the divine idea.˜[101] This is the second element; it is what is lacking in the first relationship, and it has now to be supplied. In this second element the subjective | aspect comes on the scene as such—and 132
with it comes *appearance.* In its development the subjective aspect contains the ground of [true] religion, namely, the need for truth. The Christian religion begins with truth itself; this truth is God, and God is truth; and it is from God that truth first passes over to the subject. This second aspect must now be defined more closely.

There are two sides from which the definition must be grasped. First from the side of the *idea:* from this side we have said that spirit in the categorial determination of universality posits itself in that of particularity; but this new category is still the eternal idea; God is the entire totality. Or we can say that it is the *Son* that is to be analyzed; he unites these two determinations. ˜[He is] the difference—˜˜but in love, and in the Spirit, or posited also as being identical with the idea in the form of universality.˜[102] Other-being is the first determination, while the second is that this in-itself of the other is also the divine idea. In the process of analysis the two determinations are initially to be posited as distinct—but only for an instant, as it were, since they are not truly distinct. Both in its being and in its ˜being distinguished˜[103] the concept includes the fact that what is being has negation, it is only a moment, and is sublated too. It is representation that holds these two sides apart—otherwise it would not be a real representation. [Indeed,] it is also the awareness that negation, the implicit being of the divine idea, is a true moment as well; but representation holds the two sides apart in time: now [the other is] estranged and [has] fallen away, and then [the divine idea] comes forth vis-à-vis this other-being.˜˜[104]

101. *Thus, G, D;* W_2 *(Var) reads:* as objectivity or as in itself, the absolute idea is complete, but not the subjective side, neither *in itself* as such nor as subjectivity in the divine idea, *for the idea.*

102. *Thus D; G reads:* —that of being totality *in himself* and that of being posited as other.

103. *Thus D; G reads:* immediate being

104. [*Ed.*] This passage is paralleled by Fragment 4 from Michelet.

The other side is what we have defined as *finite spirit.* Finite spirit is here pure thinking and has in view the truth, the eternal truth, to which its relationship is that of thinking. This thinking is its result, its end. Finite spirit begins from immediacy, it raises itself from the sensible to the infinite, to the element of thinking. But in fact it is not the *result* of thinking; on the contrary, thinking exists only through movement, through the process of elevation. And spirit is intrinsically the process of elevation. It is this process we
133 now have to consider. |

From the first standpoint, the relationship is that God in his eternal truth is represented as a state of affairs ˜in time, for the blessed spirits ("that the morning stars may praise me," etc.).˜[105] This relationship is thus expressed as a state of affairs in *time,* although for the object it is the *eternal* relationship of thinking. Later on, what is termed a "fall" occurred. This is the positing of the second standpoint—on the one hand it is the analysis of the Son, the keeping apart of the two moments that are contained in him. Jacob Boehme represented it as the fall of Lucifer, the firstborn, and the begetting of another son in his place.[106] This happened in heaven in the eternal idea, as it were. Thus in the analysis of this other the other is itself contained, though not posited. But then the other side is what we have termed subjective consciousness, finite spirit; the other side is that subjective consciousness as pure thinking is in itself the process, that it has begun from immediacy and has elevated itself to the truth. This is the second form.

105. *Thus D; G reads:* in time, as the mystery wherein the angels praise the children of God. *Similar in* W_1 *(Ed):* in time, as the mysteries wherein reside the angels, his children. W_2 *(Ed/Var?) reads:* conceived of prior to time, as how things were when the blessed spirits and the morning stars, the angels, the children of God praised him.

[*Ed.*] See Job 38:4–7: "Where were you when I laid the foundation of the earth? . . . On what were its bases sunk, or who laid its cornerstone, when the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy?" Both *G* and W_1 misconstrue the passage—whether on their own or as a result of its being misquoted by Hegel is not clear—whereas B. Bauer, the editor of W_2, or one of his sources must have checked it.

106. [*Ed.*] See Jacob Boehme, *Aurora, oder Morgenröhte im Aufgang,* in *Theosophia revelata* (1715), col. 149. On the context of this reference to Boehme, see above, *Ms.,* n. 105.

At this point we enter the determinacy of *space,* of the finite world and finite spirit, or—to express it more precisely—we begin upon the positing of determinations *as* determinations, the positing of a distinction that is momentarily held fast. This is a going forth—the appearing of God in [the realm of] finitude. For finitude is properly the separation ˜of what in itself is identical˜[107] but is maintained in separation. From the other side, however, from the side of subjective spirit, this is posited as pure thinking; but in itself pure thinking is result, and it is to be posited the way it is, implicitly as this movement. In other words, pure thinking has to go into itself, and for that reason it posits itself first as *finite.*

The first thing we have to consider is this movement. As a going into itself the subjective consciousness of self consists in its being *for* itself what it is *in* itself. In itself it is this process, so this process has | to be for it. But when what it is in itself is *for* it, the need for 134
its reconciliation ˜arises.˜[108] Since it is for itself in this way, and is first posited as subject, there arises the need that subjectivity too should be present for it in the divine idea, that it should know subjectivity within the idea. In the first relationship, subjectivity is not yet posited for the subjective consciousness, because it is not yet conceptual knowing. The other aspect, then, is that the need is *satisfied,* in other words that God *appears* for the subjective consciousness in the shape of subjectivity, of ˜immediate consciousness.˜[109] These are the two aspects that we now have to consider.

b. Natural Humanity

In the first place, subjective consciousness is posited as it is. As spirit it consists on the one hand in starting from immediacy and raising itself to pure thinking, to the infinite, to the knowledge of God. When one considers this in its determinate form, it contains what we know from the Christian religion. First, consciousness has to enter into itself, it has to become concrete, become what is in itself; hence it starts from immediacy, and through the sublation of this

107. *Thus* W_2 *(Var); G,* W_1 *read:* of what in itself is finite *Ho reads:* of the identical

108. *Thus D; G reads:* is thereby justified.

109. *Thus D; G reads:* what is immediately particular.

immediacy it elevates itself to thinking. This means that its true nature is to abandon its immediacy, to treat it as a state in which it ought not to be: as immediately natural human beings, we *ought* to regard ourselves as being what we *ought not* to be. This has been expressed by saying that human beings are *evil by nature*, i.e., they ought not to be the way they immediately are; hence they are as they ought not to be.

In the condition of human immediacy two characteristics are present: first, there is what humanity is implicitly, human talents and rationality, spiritual potential, the image of God, nature as what is intrinsic within us; and second, there is natural being, the fact that human rationality has not yet developed. What is lacking here is that humanity is [only] *implicitly* rational and spiritual; this is precisely the deficiency, for spirit ought not to be implicitly spirit—it is spirit only because it is so *explicitly*. Nature is only implicitly rational; this implicit potential constitutes its laws. For this reason it is *only* nature. Humans on the other hand ought to be spirit *explicitly*, not merely spirit *implicitly;* their merely implicit
135 potential, their natural being, must | be sublated. This sublation comprises two different things. All that has to be sublated is the *form* of implicit being; the absolutely primordial, that humanity *is* implicitly spirit, is what maintains itself, what abides, just as the goal or end maintains itself in the divine idea. We can therefore rightly say, on the one hand, that because human beings are implicitly spirit, they are *good* "by nature." But this is not yet "being good," for human beings are not yet what they ought to be. Immediacy is what a human being ought *not* to be, what has to be sublated.

So this first definition of the human condition is expressed by saying that "by nature" we are evil. This is a troublesome expression and can produce many false impressions. The crucial thing is that human beings are "by nature" such as they ought not to be; humanity ought to be spirit, but natural being is not spiritual being. We should notice that certain objections to this view immediately occur to us. Children are not evil, and this definition does not seem to fit many peoples and individuals. No. Children are innocent; and that is because they have no will and they are not yet account-

able. It pertains to evil to be able to decide, to have a will, to possess insight into the nature of actions. Inasmuch as the will is established through the process of growing up, it appears initially as caprice, which can will what is good just as easily as it can will evil, and by no means wills only evil according to its nature. But, of course, we cannot appeal to empirical, particular conditions at all. As regards the condition of the child, it is one of innocence, neither good nor evil. A human being, however, ought not to be like a child: adults are not innocent in this sense but must be responsible for what they do. That the condition of childhood also includes will is an empirical fact, but a child is still not what is meant by a "human being," for a human being possesses insight, his will has been trained. The adult ought not to remain in the condition of childhood.

As for the second point, that the will is caprice and can will good or evil, this caprice is in fact not the genuine will. It becomes will only insofar as it comes to a decision, for insofar as it still wills merely this or that, it is not genuine. The natural will is the will of appetite, or of inclination; it wills the *immediate* but it does not yet will *this* [particular act]. For it to be rational will, there must be a | consciousness that has some knowledge of the universal, and 136
the will itself must have insight that the law is what is rational. What is demanded of human beings is that they should not exist as natural will, that they should not be just what they are by nature. Certainly the concept of willing is also what is called "human nature." But the concept of willing is something else; as long as human beings still exist in this "nature," they are only *implicitly* will, not yet actual will, they do not yet exist as spirit. This is the general situation, the special aspects of which must be left out of consideration; it is only within a particular condition [of culture] that we can speak of what pertains to the sphere of morality—this does not concern the nature of spirit.

Now comes another objection to the view that the will is evil. There is something wrong here, in that when we view humanity concretely, and speak of will, this concrete, actual will cannot merely be something negative. The evil will, however, is posited to be merely evil volition. This is just an abstraction, and even if we

are not by nature what we ought to be, we are still implicitly rational, still implicitly spirit—this is what is affirmative in us. But we have to realize this, we have to go further, and the fact that we are not by nature what we ought to be refers therefore only to the form of our willing. The essential point is that humanity is implicitly spirit. That which is implicit persists, and in the surrender of the natural will, the *concept* is what persists, it is what produces itself. What spirit is implicitly is no longer something implicit, it is something that has been *produced.* If we contend on the other side that the will is evil by nature, then we are speaking of the will considered only negatively; thus we also have this concrete [reality] in mind, which this [negative] abstraction contradicts. ˜So much is this the case that if we set up the devil, we have to show that there must be something affirmative in him; and Milton's devil—his strength of character, energy, and consistency—appears far better, far more affirmative, than many of his angels;˜[110] in a concrete [reality] af-
137 firmative characteristics must emerge at once. |

In all of this it is forgotten that when we speak of human beings, these are human beings who have been educated and trained by customs, laws, etc. We are told, people aren't so bad after all, just look around you. But these are people with ethical and moral training, already reconstructed and put into a certain pattern of reconciliation. The main point is that such conditions, like that of childhood, are not to be looked for [empirically]. In religion, as in the portrayal of truth, what is essentially represented is rather the unfolded history ˜of what humanity is.˜[111] It is a speculative mode of treatment that dominates here; the abstract distinctions in the

110. *Thus G with D; W follows Ho; Ho reads:* This is generally personified as the devil. As the negative that wills itself, the devil is thus a self-identity, and there must therefore be something affirmative about him also, as in Milton, where in his striking energy he is better than many an angel in Paradise.

[*Ed.*] See Satan's speech to Beelzebub in Milton's *Paradise Lost,* canto 1, lines 8–10. It cannot be determined which edition of Milton Hegel used. Since he twice refers to *Paradise Lost* in his *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Kunst* (*Werke* 10/3:372, 416) (cf. *Aesthetics,* trans. T. M. Knox [Oxford, 1975], 2:1075, 1109), we may assume that he had read Milton's poem in German translation. A rather different depiction of the devil as "an extremely prosaic person" is found elsewhere in the *Aesthetics* (1:222).

111. *Thus G; D reads:* of spirit.

concept are presented one after another. If educated and cultured human beings are to be considered, then the transformation, reconstruction, the discipline through which they have passed, the transition from natural volition to true volition, must be visible in them, and their immediate, natural will must be seen to be sublated in all that. The first definition [of humanity], therefore, is that human beings in their immediacy are not what they ought to be.

c. Knowledge,[112] *Estrangement, and Evil*

The second point is that they ought to *regard* themselves in this way; the fact of being evil is then set in the relationship of being *looked at.* This can then easily be taken to mean that it is only with reference to *cognition* that human beings are posited as evil, with the implication that such consideration is a kind of external demand or condition, so that if people do not regard themselves in this way, then the other characteristic—the fact that they *are* evil—falls away as well.

Since such consideration is made into a duty, one may imagine that this alone is the essential thing, and that without it there is no content either. In the second place, the relationship involved in it is also stated in such a way as to imply that it is the consideration or the cognition that *makes* people evil, so that consideration and cognition [themselves] are what is evil, and that [therefore] such cognition is what ought not to exist [because it] is the *source* of evil. The coherence between being evil and cognition lies in this representation. This is a point of essential importance.

The more precise way of representing this evil [condition] is to say that human beings become evil by cognizing, or, as the Bible represents it, that they have eaten of the tree of knowledge of good and evil [Gen. 3:5–6]. Through this story cognition, intelligence, and theoretical capacity | come into a closer relationship with the 138
will, and the nature of evil comes to more precise expression. Against this it may be said that it is in fact cognition that is the

112. [*Ed.*] In deference to familiar biblical language, in this section and the next the term *Erkenntnis* is sometimes translated as "knowledge" rather than as "cognition." For Hegel himself, "cognition" is a particular form of "knowing" (*Wissen*), to be distinguished from other such forms.

source of all evil, for knowledge or consciousness is the only act through which separation is posited at all—negation, evil,[113] and cleavage, the more specific categories involved in being-for-self as such. Human nature is not what it ought to be: it is cognition that discloses this and brings forth the mode of being in which human beings ought not to be. Natural humanity is not as it should be; this "should" is the human concept, and that humanity does not conform to it first emerges in the separation, in the comparison with what humanity is in and for itself.

It is cognition that first posits the antithesis in which evil is to be found. Animals, stones, and plants are not evil: evil first occurs within the sphere of rupture or cleavage; it is the consciousness of being-for-myself in opposition to an external nature, but also in opposition to the objective [reality] that is inwardly universal in the sense of the concept or of the rational will. It is through this separation that I exist for myself for the first time, and that is where the evil lies. Abstractly, being evil means singularizing myself in a way that cuts me off from the universal (which is the rational, the laws, the determinations of spirit). But along with this separation there arises being-for-self and for the first time the universally spiritual, laws—what ought to be. So it is not the case that [rational] consideration has an external relationship to evil: it is itself what is evil. Inasmuch as it is spirit, humanity has to progress to this antithesis of being-for-self as such. Humans must have ˜their antithesis˜[114] as their objective—what for them is the good, the universal, their vocation. Spirit is free; freedom has the essential moment of this separation within itself. ˜In this separation being-for-self is posited and evil has its seat; here is the source of all
139 wrong, but also the | point where reconciliation has its ultimate source. It is what produces the disease and is at the same time the source of health.˜[115]

113. *Thus G, W_1; W_2 (Var) adds:* primal division

114. *Thus D; G, W read:* something confronting them

115. *Thus G; Ho reads:* This separation is the source of all ill, the poisoned chalice from which human beings drink death and decay; at the same time this point where humanity is firmly posited as evil is the point where reconciliation has its source. For to posit oneself as evil is the implicit sublation of evil.

d. The Story of the Fall

We can now compare this more specifically with the way in which it all happens in the story of the fall. In this story sin is described by saying that Adam and Eve ate of the tree of knowledge, etc. This gives rise to the cognition, cleavage, and separation through which good first comes to be for humanity, but therewith evil also. ˜According to the story, it is forbidden to eat of the tree, so evil is represented formally as the transgression of a divine command.˜[116] In this way the rise of consciousness is posited; but at the same time it is to be represented as a standpoint that ought not to be, and where we ought not to rest, a standpoint that must be sublated; for we ought not to stand fast in the cleavage involved in being-for-self.

Moreover, the serpent says that by eating the fruit of the tree Adam and Eve will become like God, and this appeals to human pride. God later communes with himself, saying, "Behold, Adam has become like one of us" [Gen. 3:22]. So the serpent did not lie, for God confirms what it said. The explication of this text has been the occasion of much labor, and some have gone so far as to explain what God says as irony.[117] The higher explanation, however, is that by this "Adam" the second Adam, or Christ, is understood.[118] Cognition is the principle of spirituality, and this—as we said—is also the principle by which the injury of the separation is healed. It is in this principle of cognition that the principle of ˜divinity˜[119] is also posited, which through a further process of adjustment must arrive at the reconciliation, the authentic state of humankind. The story says moreover that humanity has received natural punishments, natural ills [Gen. 3:16–19]; this is an uncertain content, but

116. *Thus G,* W_1; W_2 *adds:* whose content could have been anything. But here the command is essentially concerned, as content, with this cognition. *Ho reads:* Evil has here its own definite shape—it appears as the transgression of a divine interdict.

117. [*Ed.*] This remark could be directed against Herder, who offers such an interpretation. See J. G. Herder, *Aelteste Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts,* vol. 2 (Riga, 1776), pp. 108–109.

118. [*Ed.*] For support of this interpretation, Hegel refers in the *Ms.* to Johann Friedrich von Meyer (see *Ms.,* n. 120).

119. *Thus G; D reads:* spirituality

in any case Adam's labor is a consequence of his cognition. Animals do not labor; the act of laboring is at the same time the stamp of humankind's higher spiritual nature. We are also told that Adam and Eve were driven out of Paradise so that they would not also taste of the tree of life [Gen. 3:22–24]. This means that although
140 individuals | arrive at cognition, each remains a single [being] and hence a mortal one.

One more characteristic has to be added. For in this separation human beings are defined as being for themselves. As consciousness, being-for-self is self-consciousness; it is infinite self-consciousness, abstractly infinite, because [the independent being] is conscious of its freedom, its wholly abstract freedom. This is the infinite presence-to-self [*Beisichsein*][120] that did not come to consciousness in this way in the earlier religions, where the antithesis did not progress to this absoluteness, this depth. Because this has now happened, human dignity is simultaneously raised to a much higher plane. Because of it the subject acquires absolute importance and becomes an essential object of the interest of God, since it is a self-consciousness that has being on its own account. As this pure inward certainty of itself, it is formal subjectivity. To be sure, it is abstract—but it is abstract being-in-and-for-self. This comes forth in the shape that human being as spirit is *immortal,* the object of divine interest, elevated above finitude, dependence, and external conditions, [having] the freedom to abstract from everything. This implies that humanity is outside the range of mortality. Just because its antithesis is infinite, it is in religion that the immortality of the soul is such an important moment.

"Mortal" means something that can die, while whatever can reach a state into which death does not enter is "immortal." When we say "combustible" and "incombustible," combustion is only a possibility that impinges on the object externally. The determination of being is not a possibility of this kind but an affirmatively defined quality that a thing already possesses in itself. Hence the immortality of the soul must not be imagined as though it first emerges into actuality at some later time; rather it is a present quality. Spirit is

120. *Thus G, D, Ho; W (HgG/Ed²) reads:* being-for-self [*Fürsichsein*]

eternal, and for this reason it is already present; spirit in its freedom does not lie within the sphere of limitation. As pure knowing or as thinking, it has the universal for its object—this is eternity. Eternity is not mere duration[121] but *knowing*—the knowing of what | is 141
eternal. Hence the eternity of spirit is brought to consciousness at this point, in this cognition, in this very separation that has attained to the infinitude of being-for-self, which is no longer entangled in the natural, the contingent, the external. Now this inner eternity of spirit ˜is what spirit is implicitly to begin with;˜[122] but the very next standpoint, where we are at present, is that spirit ought not to be the way that it is as merely natural spirit, but rather the way it is in and for itself. Spirit should contemplate itself, and this gives rise to its rupture. But it ought not to remain at this point where its being [for itself] is not the way it is in itself; ˜it should become concordant with its concept, with absolute spirit.˜[123] At the point of rupture, this [duty] ˜is initially something other,˜[124] and spirit itself is initially natural will, inwardly ruptured. There is this rupture inasmuch as [there is] a feeling of consciousness of contradiction; and this posits the need for sublating the contradiction—i.e., it posits reconciliation. Here at this standpoint, reconciliation has its own distinctive form.

Human beings must consider themselves as [being initially the way] they ought not to be. From this separation an infinite need arises. In this cognition [of self], in this separation and rupture, the subject, as we have said, here defines itself, grasping itself as the extreme of abstract being-for-self, or abstract freedom; the soul plunges into its depths, right down into its abyss. This soul is the undeveloped monad, the naked monad,[125] the empty soul lacking

121. *Thus D; W_2 (Var) adds:* in the sense that the mountains endure,

[*Ed.*] The source of this variant is the lost transcript by Michelet; see Fragment 3.

122. *Thus D; G, W read:* means that spirit is implicit to begin with;

123. *Thus D; G, W read:* as universal spirit it should become concordant with its concept.

124. *Thus D:* initially *with G:* is something other W_1 *follows G; W_2 reads:* its being-in-self, is something other for it,

125. [*Ed.*] See Leibniz, *Monadology* 24 (*Selections,* p. 537): the dazed state is the condition of "simply bare monads."

fulfillment; but since it is implicitly the concept, what is concrete, this emptiness or abstraction contradicts its vocation, which is to be concrete. Thus the universal means that in this separation, which develops as infinite antithesis, this abstractness is to be sublated. Even the abstract ego has a will implicit in it, it is concrete, but the fulfillment that it finds there is the natural will. The soul finds nothing before it but desire, selfishness, etc., in that fulfillment; and
142 it is one of the forms of the antithesis that | I, the ˜soul in its depths,˜[126] and my real soul are so distinct from one another that the real soul is not one that [can be] made to match the concept, and therefore brought back to it, [but one] that finds in itself only natural will. The antithesis in which the real side is further developed is then the *world,* and the unity of the concept thus has the natural will as a whole opposed to it, the will whose principle is selfishness in general, and the actualization of which takes the form of depravity, brutishness, etc. The objectivity that this pure ego has, and that is for it as what is appropriate to it, is not its natural will, nor is it the world. Instead, this appropriate objectivity is just the universal essence, this One who is not fulfilled in the ego and to whom *all* fulfillment [in] the world stands equally opposed.[127]

Now the consciousness of this antithesis, of this separation of the ego and the natural will, is the consciousness of an infinite contradiction. This ego exists in immediate relation with the natural will and with the world, yet at the same time it is repelled from them. This is the infinite anguish, the suffering of the world. ˜A reconciliation can take place at this standpoint, but it is unsatisfactory and one-sided.˜[128] It consists in an inner equilibrium of the ego, in the way that this ego exists for itself in Stoic philosophy. It knows itself as a thinker, and its object is what is thought, the universal; this is for it absolutely everything, it is the genuine essence for it, so that this universal is valid for it. Something that is thought belongs to the subject, because it is posited by it. But a reconciliation

126. *Thus G, W; D reads:* abstract soul,

127. [*Ed.*] This entire discussion reflects the Pauline theology of the divided will; see esp. Romans 7.

128. *Thus G, W_1; W_2 (Var) reads:* The reconciliation we have thus far encountered at this standpoint is only partial and therefore unsatisfactory.

of this kind is itself only abstract; all determination lies outside this thought, which is merely formal identity with itself. An abstract reconciliation such as this cannot and should not take place at the absolute standpoint where we now are. Even the natural will cannot be inwardly satisfied [with it], for those who have comprehended their infinitude cannot be contented either with the natural will or with the state of the world. The abstract depth of this absolute antithesis demands an infinite suffering of the soul and, with it, a reunification that is equally complete. | 143

2. Reconciliation[129]

a. The Idea of Reconciliation and Its Appearance in a Single Individual

Such is the nature of the need. The question now is: "How can it be satisfied?" "What is it that effects reconciliation for it?" This reconciliation can come about only by the separation being sublated for it. Both for the need and for the representation, it must turn out that what *seems* incompatible—the infinite and the inner ego, ˜and˜[130] [on the other hand] pure essence or God, and fulfillment—is *not* so, that this antithesis is null and void, and that the truth, or what is affirmative and absolute, is the *unity* of the finite and infinite, the unity of subjectivity, in its various determinations, and objectivity. This is expressed in the determinate form that the resolved contradiction comes into being for the need itself; divine and human nature enter into a unity wherein both have set aside their abstractness vis-à-vis each other. These extremes, divine and human nature, are not in themselves extremes, but the truth is their identity instead—the unity of abstract, rigid being-for-self and its fulfillment, so that what is concrete is the truth. And to the extent that this stands opposed to concrete divinity, this weak antithesis too is done away with, and there remains the [unitary] determination of divine and human nature. The subject is in *need* of this truth, and this truth must come into being for it. "Divine and human nature" is a puzzling and difficult expression, and the kind of rep-

129. [*Ed.*] On the organization of this section, see below, n. 156.
130. *G reads:* or

resentation we associate with it should be forgotten. What it means is spiritual essentiality [*die geistige Wesenheit*]; in the unity of divine and human nature everything that belongs to external particularization has disappeared—the finite [itself] has disappeared.

The second question is this: "Cannot the subject bring about this reconciliation by itself, through its own efforts, its own activity—so that through its piety and devotion it makes its inner [life] conform with the divine idea, and expresses this conformity through its deeds?" "And further, is this not within the capability [not merely] of a single subject but of all people who genuinely wish to take up the divine law within themselves, so that heaven would exist on earth and the Spirit would be present in reality and dwell in its community?"[131] The question is whether the subject
144 cannot bring this about on its own, as subject. It is commonly | believed that it can. It is to be noted here that we must bear carefully in mind that the subject we are dealing with is the extreme case—it is the subject that is *for itself.* Subjectivity has the characteristic of *positing*—something is so through *my agency.* This positing and activity happens through my agency, let the content be what it may; so bringing it forth is itself a one-sided determination, and the product is only something posited. It abides as such only in abstract freedom. In other words, the question is whether or not the subject can produce this result through its own positing activity. And this is always one-sided.

This positing must essentially be a *presupposing,* in such a way that what is posited is also something implicit. The unity of subjectivity and objectivity—this divine unity—must be a presupposition for my positing. For only then does the latter have a content;[132] otherwise it remains subjective and formal. This is the way in which it gains for the first time true, substantive content. By taking on the character of a presupposition, it loses its one-sidedness; with the signification of a presupposition of this kind it enters into possession of this one-sidedness, takes it into itself, and thereby gets rid of it. Kant and Fichte maintain that we can sow,

131. [*Ed.*] Reading *Gemeinde* ("community") instead of *Gnade* ("grace"), as in *G.*

132. *Thus G; W (HgG) adds:* namely, spirit, substance;

do good only on the presupposition of a moral world order.[133] We do not know whether what we do will prosper and succeed, and we can act only on the assumption that the good bears fruit in and of itself, that this is not simply something posited but is an objective fact in virtue of the very nature of the good. This presupposition therefore constitutes an essential condition [of human action].

The harmony, the resolution of this contradiction, must be represented as something that is in and of itself, it must be a presupposition for the subject. Since the concept cognizes divine unity, it recognizes that God is in and of himself. ˜The one-sidedness that appears as the activity and so forth of the subject is merely a moment [that] simply subsists; it is nothing on its own account but exists only by virtue of this˜[134] presupposition. | The truth must therefore 145
appear to the subject as a presupposition, and the question is how and in what guise the truth can appear at the standpoint at which we now find ourselves, i.e., the standpoint of infinite flight and abstractness. This is the infinite anguish, the pure depth of soul, and it is for this anguish that the contradiction is to be resolved. To begin with, the resolution necessarily has the form of a presupposition because the subject is, as we have seen, a one-sided extreme. More precisely, the subject is now defined as this profound being-within-itself, this flight from reality, this complete withdrawal from immediate existence, from fulfillment. But at the same time this

133. [*Ed.*] Kant advances this argument in connection with his theory of the existence of God as a postulate of practical reason. See *Critique of Practical Reason,* p. 130 (*Werke* 5:126); and *Critique of Judgment,* p. 118 (*Werke* 5:450): "We must assume a moral world-cause, that is, an author of the world, if we are to set before ourselves a final end in conformity with the requirements of the moral law." With regard to Fichte, see especially "On the Foundation of Our Belief in a Divine Government of the Universe" (1798), in *Nineteenth-Century Philosophy,* ed. P. L. Gardiner (New York, 1969), p. 25 (Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe* 5:354–355): "The moral world order is the absolute beginning of all objective knowledge (just as your freedom and your moral vocation are the absolute beginning of all subjective knowledge)." See also Fichte, *Appellation an das Publikum* (1799) (*Gesamtausgabe* 5:429).

134. *D reads:* The one-sidedness that appears as the activity and so forth of the subject is merely a moment and is nothing without this. *G, W_1 read:* and consequently only insight, activity, the subject simply subsists; it is nothing on its own account but exists only by virtue of this *W_2 (Var/Ed?) reads:* and consequently the insight and activity of the subject is nothing on its own account but exists and subsists only by virtue of this

abstraction of the ego is defined, in its reality, as an immediate being. So this subjective [element], this ego, is itself something presupposed too. It does have the aspect of a reality as well, for the idea is the unity of concept and reality, and its reality is determined according to the definition of the concept; here it is subjective reality. The subjective [element] is ˜this profundity involved in the fact that the ego and its fulfillment (the world) is an other. But what is as idea is also actual, and hence it has the determinate character of reality. Empty, naked reality is, as sensible, defined in a strictly exclusive way. Thus there is˜[135] consciousness, subjectivity and objectivity, objectivity being defined as abstractly as consciousness itself. Consciousness exists in the mode of sensible being; it is simple, abstract being-within-self and does not yet reflect, for reflecting is an inner relating, thinking; reflection is not abstract being-within-self—just as the thinking of Stoicism is not.

This infinite suffering that is wholly unfulfilled is without reflection. Hence for consciousness its sensible content is one that ought not to be, and it still lacks any extended world within itself; so in its infinite depth it relates to itself as sensible consciousness. Therefore, since the truth now has to be *for it,* there is on the one hand the *presupposition* of the unity of divine and human nature, and on the other hand, because it is *sensible* self-consciousness, this unity *appears.* God appears as the concrete God. For this reason the idea appears in sensible immediacy, in sensible presence too, for the form of being for others is the immediate and sensible
146 form. |

Consequently God appears in sensible presence; he has no other figure or shape [*Gestalt*] than that of the sensible mode of the spirit that is spirit in itself—the shape of the *singular human being.* This is the one and only sensible shape of spirit—it is *the appearance of God in the flesh.* This is the monstrous reality whose necessity we have seen. What it posits is that[136] divine and human nature are not intrinsically different—God [is] in human shape. The truth is that there is only one reason, only one spirit; we have seen that spirit as finite does not have genuine existence.

135. *Thus G; D reads:* a sensible existence as a strictly exclusive
136. *Thus W (HgG/Ed?); G adds:* the unity of

The essential aspect of the shape of appearance is thus explicated. Because it is the appearance *of God,* it occurs essentially for the community; it must not and cannot be taken in isolation. Appearing is being for an other; this other is the *community.*

The verification of this appearance has two aspects. The first concerns the *content* of the appearance, which is the unity of the finite and the infinite, the fact that God is not an abstraction but what is utterly concrete. Inasmuch as God is *for consciousness,* the verification of this is from our present standpoint a purely *inner* verification, a witness of the Spirit. Philosophy has to make explicit that the witness is not merely this mute inner one; it has to bring it to light in the element of thinking. This is the one side, the *imago*-aspect of human nature; human beings are the image of God [Gen. 1:26–27].

The second aspect [of the verification] is the one that we have observed earlier,[137] that God, considered in terms of his eternal idea, *has* to generate the Son, has to distinguish himself from himself, in such a way that what is distinguished is wholly he himself; and their union is love and the Spirit. The suffering of the soul, this infinite anguish, is the witness of the Spirit, inasmuch as spirit is the negativity of finite and infinite, of subjectivity and objectivity being conjoined but still as conflicting elements; if there were no longer any conflict, there would be no anguish. Spirit is the absolute power to endure this anguish, i.e., to unite the two and to be in this way, in this oneness. Thus the anguish itself | verifies the ap- 147
pearance of God.

As for the other mode of verification,[138] namely, that God appeared in *this* human being, at *this* time and in *this* place—this is quite a different matter, and can be recognized only from the point of view of world history. It is written: "When the time had come, God sent forth his Son" [Gal. 4:4]; and *that* the time had come can only be discerned from history.

137. [*Ed.*] See Sec. A, The First Element.

138. [*Ed.*] Hegel here actually introduces a *third* consideration, distinct from the second. These three paragraphs taken together summarize what might be described as a threefold argument for the *possibility, necessity,* and *actuality* of the appearance of God in a single human individual. The final point serves as a transition to the next section, since it requires attending to concrete historical matters.

b. The Historical, Sensible Presence of Christ

The question is now more precisely this: "What content must present itself in this appearance?" The content can be nothing else than the history of spirit, the history of God (which is God himself), the divine history as that of a single self-consciousness which has united divine and human nature within itself—the divine nature in this [human] element.

The first [aspect] of this history is the *single, immediate human being* in all his contingency, in the whole range of temporal relationships and conditions. To this extent this is a divestment of the divine. What is to be seen here is that this aspect is for the community. There is in it the unity of the finite and the infinite, but there is at the same time in this sensible mode a divestment of the idea, and this has to be sublated.

The second point relates to the *teaching*. What must the teaching of this individual be? It cannot be what later became the doctrine of the church or community. The teaching of Christ is not Christian dogmatics, not the doctrine of the church; Christ did not expound what the church later produced as its doctrine. For his teaching evokes sensations through representation, and it has a content. It is this content, which at the highest level is an explication of the nature of God, that has to be initially directed specifically at the sentient consciousness, coming to it as an *intuition*. Hence it is not present as a doctrine, which begins with assertions.

The main content of this teaching can only be universal and abstract, it can only contain abstract and universal [images]. If something new, a new world, a new religion, a new concept of God is to be given to the world of representational awareness, then two aspects are involved. First there [is] the universal soil, and second there is what is particular, determinate, and concrete. The world of representational awareness, insofar as it thinks, can achieve only abstract thinking, it thinks only the universal. It is reserved solely for conceptualizing spirit to cognize the particular from the universal, to let the particular emerge from the concept by its own
148 power. | For the world of representational awareness, ˜determinate [reality] and the soil of universal thought are mutually exclusive.˜[139]

139. *Thus G; W_1 (Ed?) reads:* The two are mutually exclusive, and this is the

So what can initially be produced here by teaching is the universal soil for the concept of God. This can be expressed briefly as the *kingdom of God.*[140] This has been taught: it is the real divinity, God in his *determinate being* [*Dasein*], in his *spiritual actuality,* the kingdom of heaven. This divine reality contains already within itself God and his kingdom, the community—a concrete content. This is the main content.

This teaching, insofar as it cannot initially advance beyond the universal, has in this universal (as an abstract universal) the character of negation vis-à-vis everything in the present world. Insofar as it affirms the universal in this way, it is a *revolutionary* doctrine that partly leaves all standing institutions aside and partly destroys and overthrows them. All earthly, worldly things fall away as valueless, and they are expressly declared to be so. What is brought before the imagination is an elevation to an infinite energy in which the universal demands to be firmly maintained on its own account. This is how we interpret the following sayings. When Christ is among his disciples and his mother and brothers come to speak to him, he asks: "Who are my mother and my brothers? Behold my mother and my brothers! For whoever does the will of God is my brother, and sister, and ˜mother˜[141]" (Mark 3:31–35). "To another he said, 'Follow me.' But he said, 'Lord, let me first go and bury my father.' But Jesus said to him, 'Leave the dead to bury their own dead; but as for you, go and proclaim the kingdom of God.' Another said, 'I will follow you, Lord; but let me first say farewell to those at my home.' Jesus said to him, 'No one who puts his hand to the plow and looks back is fit for the kingdom of God'" (Luke 9:59–62). All of the relationships that refer to property disappear, | but 149
at the same time they inwardly sublate themselves—for if everything is given to the poor, there are no poor any more. Christ says: "Do not be anxious about another day, for each day is anxious for itself."[142] Such concerns, however, are proper for human beings.

soil of universal thought. W_2 *(Var) reads:* the soil of universal thought and particularization and development are separate.

140. [*Ed.*] See Mark 1:15 and parallels.

141. *G reads:* brother

142. [*Ed.*] Cf. Matt. 6:34: "Do not be anxious about tomorrow, for tomorrow will be anxious for itself. Let the day's own trouble be sufficient for the day."

Family relationships, property, etc., recede in the face of something higher, namely, following Christ. This perfect independence is the abstract, primal soil of spirituality. On the one hand, morality as such has its place at a subordinate level here, and it is nothing peculiar; for the commands of Christ are for the most part already to be found in the Old Testament. On the other hand, *love* is made the principal commandment—not an impotent love of humanity in general but the mutual love of the community,[143] such that no one has ˜any˜[144] particular purpose [of his or her own]; for this community the universal can consist in the spiritual tie that binds them together.

As for the particular [duties of life], all that is supplied from elsewhere, so to speak, for the representational consciousness. We find quite concrete examples of this in other spheres. In the Islamic doctrine there is merely the fear of God: God is to be venerated as the One, and one cannot advance beyond this abstraction. Islam is therefore a religion of formalism, a perfect formalism that allows nothing to take shape in opposition to it. Or again in the French Revolution, liberty and equality were affirmed in such a way that all spirituality, all laws, all talents, all living relations had to disappear before this abstraction, and the public order and constitution had to come from elsewhere and be forcibly asserted against this abstraction. For those who hold fast to the abstraction cannot allow anything determinate to emerge, since this would be the emergence of something particular and distinct in contrast with this abstraction. (I am bringing in all of this to illustrate how far the representational consciousness can go by itself, and how it can be self-possessed with its own freedom and knowledge in this abstraction; but the particular must come into play in some other way.)

And the particular *is* the determinate aspect that comes into play here in equally distinctive fashion. Although to be sure the soil for it is the universalism of [Christ's] teaching, and some individual
150 traits point to that, | still the main point is that this [particular] content does not impinge on our representation through teaching

143. [*Ed.*] Hegel seems to refer here not to the love of God but only to the love of neighbor (cf. Matt. 22:36–39).

144. *G reads:* no

but through sense-intuition. This content is nothing other than the life,[145] passion, and death of Christ.

c. The Death of Christ and the Transition to Spiritual Presence

For it is *this* suffering and death, this sacrificial death of the individual for all, ˜that˜[146] is the nature of God, the divine history, ˜the being that is utterly universal and affirmative. This˜[147] is, however, at the same time to posit God's negation; in death the moment of negation is envisaged. This is an essential moment in the nature of spirit, and it is this death itself that must come into view in this individual. It must not then be represented merely as the death of *this individual,* the death of this empirically existing individual. Heretics have interpreted it like that,[148] but what it means is rather that *God* has died, that *God himself is dead.*[149] God has died: this is negation, which is accordingly a moment of the divine nature, of God himself.

In this death, therefore, God is satisfied. God cannot be satisfied by something else, only by himself. The satisfaction consists in the fact that the first moment, that of immediacy, is negated; only then does God come to be at peace with himself, only then is spirituality posited. God is the true God, spirit, because he is not merely Father, and hence closed up within himself, but because he is Son, because he becomes the other and sublates this other. This ˜negation˜[150] is intuited as a moment of the divine nature in which all are reconciled. Set against God there are finite human beings; humanity, the finite,

145. [*Ed.*] Although Hegel mentions the "life" of Christ, he does not in fact discuss it further in the 1824 lectures—as he did at the beginning of Sec. δ of the lecture *Ms.*, headed "The Life and Death [of Christ]," where he showed the "conformity" between the life of Christ and his teaching. Rather the 1824 lectures turn directly to the passion and death of Christ, and the discussion of his "life" has focused entirely on his teaching. The same is true of the 1827 lectures.

146. *G reads:* for this

147. *Thus D; G reads:* the subjectivity that is absolutely and utterly affirmative, universal. [To affirm] this kind of subjectivity

148. [*Ed.*] Hegel is apparently thinking especially of Gnostic teachings, with which he was familiar through Neander's descriptions; cf. the latter's *Gnostische Systeme,* pp. 43–44, 49–50.

149. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 163.

150. *Thus G; D reads:* incarnation

is posited in death itself as a moment of God, and death is what reconciles. Death is love itself; in it absolute love is envisaged. The identity of the divine and the human means that God is at home with himself in humanity, in the finite, and in [its] death this finitude is itself a determination of God. Through death God has reconciled the world and reconciles ˜himself˜[151] eternally with himself. This coming back again is his return to himself, and through it he is
151 *spirit*. So this third moment is that | Christ has risen. Negation is thereby overcome, and the negation of negation is thus a moment of the divine nature.

The Son is raised up to the right hand of God. Thus in this history the nature of God, namely, spirit, is accomplished, interpreted, explicated for the community. This is the crucial point, and the meaning of the story is that it is the story of God. God is the absolute, self-contained movement that spirit is, and this movement is here represented in the individual. There are quite a number of ways in which the matter can be represented, which refer to finite, external relationships. In particular a number of false relationships have been introduced: for example, the sacrificial death offers occasion for representing God as a tyrant who demands sacrifice; this is untrue. On the contrary, the nature of God is spirit, and that being so, negation is an essential moment.

As for the *verification* of this individual, this involves essentially the witness of the Spirit, of the indwelling idea, of spirit in itself. Spirit is here brought to intuition; what is given is an immediate *witness of the Spirit to spirit,* which only conceptualizing spirit recognizes in its true necessity. Outward attestations are of a subordinate character and do not belong here.

Essentially the Son is recognized by the community as the one who has been raised to the right hand of God (i.e., that he is essentially a determination for the nature of God itself), not as he who was here in sense experience. So all sensory verification falls away, including miracles in the way in which they fall within the empirically external consciousness of faith. This is another field, another soil, but we readily imagine that the individual [Jesus] must

151. *Thus G,* W_1, *similar in D;* W_2 *(Var) reads:* it

have attested himself through the marvelous phenomenon of miracles and through absolute power over nature, since we humans ordinarily picture God as the power in nature. We have already discussed that. But it may be recalled that Christ himself renounces miracles. He says, "You wish to see signs and wonders."[152] It is not a matter of signs and wonders; Christ renounced them. In any event, this is by its very nature an external, spiritless mode of attestation. We are rightly aware that God and his power are present in nature in and according to eternal laws; | ˜the true miracle is spirit itself. 152
Even the animal is already a miracle vis-à-vis plant life, and still more spirit vis-à-vis life, vis-à-vis merely sentient nature.˜[153] However, the genuine mode of verification is quite different—it is through power over minds. We must insist that this is the genuine [proof]. ˜But even this power over minds is not an external power like that of the church against heretics; rather it is power of a spiritual type, which leaves˜[154] spirit's freedom completely intact. This power has subsequently been manifested through the great community of the Christian church. One can say that this again is only an effect and [thus] an external mode [of verification]. But to say this is to fall into self-contradiction, for what is demanded is proof of the *power,* and this consists merely in its effect; the proof ˜of˜[155] the *concept* requires no verification.

This, then, is what this history is. The first moment is the concept of this standpoint for consciousness; the second is what is given to this standpoint, what actually exists for the community; the third is the transition to the community.[156]

This appearance of God in the flesh occurs in a specific time and

152. [*Ed.*] Cf. John 4:48: "Unless you see signs and wonders you will not believe." The renunciation of "signs and wonders" is found at various places in the Synoptic tradition, e.g., Luke 17:20–21; Mark 13:21–23; Matt. 7:22–23.

153. *Thus G; D reads:* Life is already spirit itself, it is already a miracle vis-à-vis inorganic nature, and spirit vis-à-vis merely animal nature.

154. *Thus G with D; W_2 (Var/Ed?) reads:* The same is true of confirmatory proof, which is a power in spiritual fashion and not an external power like that of the church against heretics, but such as to leave

155. *Thus G; W_1 (HgG?) reads:* that consists in

156. [*Ed.*] This is a summary of the three main points taken up under the theme of the history of reconciliation (Sec. B.2)—the idea of reconciliation, the historical presence of Christ, and the transition to spiritual presence, i.e., to the community.

in this single individual. Since it is an appearance of this kind, of itself it passes by and becomes past history. This sensible mode must disappear and rise again in the sphere of representation. The formation of the community has just this content—that the sensible form passes over into a spiritual element. The manner of this purification of immediate being ˜preserves the sensible element precisely by˜[157] letting it pass away; this is negation in the way that it is posited and appears in the sensible individual as such. Only in regard to that single individual is this intuition given; it is not
153 capable of being inherited or renewed.[158] | This cannot happen because as "this" event, a sensible appearance is by its very nature momentary, and its destiny is to be spiritualized. It is therefore essentially something that *has been,* and it will be raised up into the sphere of representation in general.

For the spirit that has need of it, sensible presence *can* be brought forth again in various ways, in pictures, ˜relics, holy images.˜[159] There is no lack of such mediations when they are needed. But for the spiritual community, immediate presence (the now) has passed away. At first, then, sensible representation reintegrates the past, which is a one-sided moment for representation; the present includes the past and the future as moments within itself. Hence sensible representation includes the coming again of Christ, ˜which is essentially an absolute return, but then takes [the shape of] a turning from externality to the inner realm˜[160]—a Comforter, who can come only when sensible history in its immediacy has passed by.[161]

157. *Thus G, W; D reads:* contains immediate being in the very fact of

158. *Thus G, W_1; W_2 adds:* like the appearance of the substance in the Lama. *Ho adds:* as in India or as in the case of the Lama.

159. *Thus G; D reads:* relics. W_1 *reads:* relics, etc. W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* not viewed of course as works of art but as wonder-working pictures (wonder-working in their sensible existence). And then it is not just the corporeality and body of Christ alone that can satisfy the need for something sensible but the sensible aspect of his corporeal presence in general, the cross, the places where he walked. Thus there are relics and holy images.

160. *Thus G, similar in W_1; W_2 (Var) reads:* as its completion, but a return that is essentially absolute consists in a turning from externality to the inner realm; it is *Ho reads:* whereas an absolute return consists in a turning from representation to spiritual subjectivity

161. [*Ed.*] Cf. John 16:7: "It is to your advantage that I go away, for if I do

This then is the point relating to the formation of the community, in other words the third point—namely, the Spirit.

C. THE THIRD ELEMENT: COMMUNITY, SPIRIT

This is the transition from externality, from appearance, to inwardness. What it is concerned with is subjectivity, the certainty felt by the subject of its own infinite, nonsensible essentiality, | the 154
certainty with which it knows itself to be infinite, to be eternal, immortal. Beyond that there is the subject's being filled with the truth, and the fact that this truth is in self-consciousness *as* self-consciousness, that it is not external but is there as the inward truth of thought, as the representation of inwardness as such. At first, subjectivity and the knowledge of its essence is the knowledge of a sensibly present content. This is obviously nonspiritual, transitory; yet it is not merely transitory, but essentially *transitional*—it is a door where one cannot tarry, a form that is destined to be sublated, a form that is defined not merely as past but as belonging eternally to the spiritual nature of God. This is the turning to the inward path, and in this third realm we find ourselves on the soil of spirit as such—this is the *community,* the *cultus, faith.*

We have defined the manifestation of God first as revelatory and second as appearance. The third [moment of manifestation] is knowledge or faith, for faith is also knowledge, but in a distinctive form. This third [moment] we now have to consider.

It consists, then, in the divine content being posited as *self-conscious* knowledge of this content, posited in the element of self-consciousness, of inwardness. On the one hand it is the knowledge that the content is the truth, and [on the other hand] that it is the truth of ˜finite˜[162] spirit as such—that is to say, the knowledge of it belongs to finite spirit so that finite spirit has its freedom in this knowledge, and is itself the process of casting off its particular individuality and of liberating itself in this content.

not go away, the Counselor will not come to you; but if I go, I will send him to you." See also John 15:26.

162. *Thus G, D; W (Ed?) reads:* infinite

Regarding this cultus and community, etc., we have once more three aspects to be considered: (1) the *origin* of the community and the coming to be of faith; (2) the *existence* [*Dasein*] or *subsistence* [*Bestehen*] of the community; (3) the *realization of faith,* which is at the same time the process by which faith passes over [into worldly
155 actuality], the transformation and transfiguration of faith itself. |

1. The Origin of the Community

The first [aspect] concerns the origin of faith and the community. This lies in the generation and discovery of the doctrine of the Spirit (or better, of the content of this doctrine). Thus it is more precisely the explication of what we have already indicated in general in the process of making the transition to the community.[163]

If we begin by comparing the community with what we have already seen, we first considered the eternal idea in the element of thinking, and second in the element of divestment, in the sensuously external, immediate mode of presentation. It was *we* who considered it in this way, it was *for us.* But if we ask, "Who are 'we'?" we are nothing other than the community itself, subjective consciousness. It is therefore manifest to us, we know about it; hence we are the presupposition, [that] for which it is. But at this point we have ourselves proceeded to the realization of the idea, so that spirit is *for* spirit, and what spirit is for spirit, it is as sense-consciousness. Thus there are two that are for one another. The side that we directly constitute stands now over against us. Just as in a drama the spectators have themselves in the form of the chorus standing objectively over against them, so here the standpoint is that the content is for spirit, and this relationship must be considered in its essence.

Initially this spirit has been defined as sense-consciousness. However, it ought no longer to be for us as it is for consciousness, in this one-sided way. Or, to the extent that we have defined it as sensible, this part of the whole relationship must—if we are at the true standpoint—raise itself to our standpoint, which is that of considering the truth. Such a consideration presupposes the com-

163. [*Ed.*] See above, pp. 221–223.

munity in actual fact. The origin of the community is the production of the content for the community, for subjective self-consciousness. We have considered the idea first in the element of thinking, and second how it realizes itself outwardly, posits itself in differentiation. In the community, the stages are at first in the opposite order: the community begins with the sensible appearance, and the next step is the discovery of its content, the promulgation of its teaching. In other words, as has been said, the origin of the community lies in the generation of doctrine. Initially the community is immediate self-consciousness, and truth | comes to it in this sensible mode as 156
a determination of sense; and it is in moving on from this sensible mode to the attainment of eternal truth that it first raises itself into a community.

Initially, then, the content is ˜for immediate˜[164] consciousness, where it was possible for the truth to appear in a diversely sensible fashion. For the idea is one in all, universal necessity; actuality can only be a mirror of the idea. The idea, therefore, can issue forth for consciousness from everything; for it is always just the idea that is in these infinitely numerous drops that reflect it back again. The idea is represented, recognized, foreshadowed in the seed, which is the fruit, the ultimate determination of the tree; the seed first dies out in the earth, and only through this negation does the plant spring forth. A story—an intuition, a portrayal, an appearance of this kind—can also be raised by spirit to the level of the universal, and thus the history of the seed or of the sun becomes a symbol of the idea, but only a symbol; these are configurations that, in terms of their peculiar content or specific quality, are not adequate to the idea. What is known in them lies outside of them; their meaning does not exist in them as meaning.

The object that does exist in itself as the concept is spiritual subjectivity, human being. As thinking being it is in itself meaningful; meaning does not lie outside of it. It is all-interpreting, all-knowing, it is not a symbol. ˜Human consciousness, what is specific to humanity,˜[165] *is* essentially history itself, and the history of the

164. *Thus* W_2 *(Var/Ed?); G,* W_1 *read:* that of immediate

165. *Thus D; G,* W_1 *read:* Human consciousness W_2 *(Var) reads:* Rather human subjectivity, its inner shape, the self,

spiritual does not take place in an existence that is not adequate to the idea.[166] Thus what is necessary ˜in regard to humanity is that the thought, the idea, should become objective in the community.˜[167] Initially, however, the idea is present in the single individual in sense-intuition; this must be stripped away and the meaning, the eternal, truthful essence, must be made to emerge. This is the faith of the nascent community. It began from[168] the individual [founder]; that
157 single | human being is transformed by the community, he is known as God—characterized as the Son of God, but entangled in everything finite that pertains to subjectivity as such. ˜Subjectivity itself, the form that is finite, then disappears in the face of substantiality. This is the transformation of the sensible appearance into something spiritual and the knowledge of what is spiritual.˜[169] It is the community as it begins from faith; but on the other hand, it is the faith that is brought forth as spirit, so faith is at the same time the result. We have now to bring out the different meanings of faith and verification.

Since faith begins from the sensible mode, it has a temporal history before it. What it holds to be true is an outward, ordinary occurrence, and its verification is [by means of] the historical [*historisch*], juridical method of attesting a fact, [which gives] sensible certainty. Or again, the representation of the foundation [of truth] is based on the sensible certainty of other persons regarding certain sensible facts, and it brings other evidence in support of this.

The content in this kind of attestation is of a wholly sensible nature—for instance, that Christ lived in Palestine. But faith changes its significance; in other words, it is not merely a question of faith

166. *Thus G, W; W_2 (Var) adds:* but in its own element.

167. *Thus D; G, W_1 read:* in regard to humanity is that the thought, the idea, should become objective. W_2 *(Var) reads:* for the community is that the thought, the idea, should become objective.

168. *Thus G, W_1; W_2 (Var) adds:* faith in

169. *Thus G with D; W_1 follows G:* The form, which is finite, disappears then in the face of substantiality. [*Ed:* The representation of sensible *G:* Sensible] appearance is transformed into the knowledge of God. W_2 *(Var) reads:* in its development, but as subjectivity it is separate from substantiality. Sensible appearance is now transformed into knowledge of what is spiritual. *Ho reads:* subjectivity as separate from substantiality.

as belief in [what happened at this] time and in this external history, but rather of faith that this man was the Son of God. Thereby the sensible content becomes something quite different; it is transformed into something else, and the demand then is that this latter should be attested. The object has been completely transformed from something that exists sensibly and empirically into something divine, into what is essentially the highest moment of God himself. This content is no longer something sensible, for the transition consists precisely in sublating the sensible. Thus if the demand is made to attest the content as a fact in the same sensory way as before, this way at once proves to be inadequate, because the object is of an entirely different nature. | 158

If one defines the content in such a way that Christ's miracles are themselves sensible phenomena that can be attested in historical fashion, and likewise regards his resurrection and ascension as sensible events, then with regard to the sensible it is no longer a question of the relationship of historical verification to these phenomena,[170] but of the relationship of verification by the senses per se and of sensible events (of both together) to spirit, to the spiritual content. Verification of the sensible, whatever its content, ˜occurs through [sense-]intuition etc. It˜[171] remains subject to an infinite number of objections because sensible externality lies at its basis; and that is something entirely different from spirit, from consciousness. In such verification, consciousness and object are separated, and this fundamental separation brings with it the possibility of error, deception, and lack of the culture needed to comprehend a fact correctly, so that one can have doubts.[172] A sensible content is in fact one that *cannot* be certain in itself because it is not certain by virtue of spirit as such, because it stands on a different soil and is not posited by the concept. One might suppose that we must get to the root

170. *Thus G, W_1, similar in D; W_2 (MiscP) adds:* —the matter is not presented as if there were not sufficient evidence for Christ's miracles, his resurrection and ascension, as themselves outward phenomena and sensible events—

171. *Thus D; W_2 (Var) reads:* and whether it occurs through the testimony [of others] or [one's own] intuition,

172. *Thus G, W_1; W_2 (MiscP) adds:* and can regard the Holy Scriptures, so far as their merely external, historical aspects are concerned, as profane writings, without necessarily mistrusting the good will of those who bear witness.

of things by comparing all the evidence and circumstances, or that there must be grounds for deciding in favor of one possibility or the other; but this entire mode of attestation, and the sensible content as such, has to be ˜replaced by˜[173] spirit. What is to have truth for spirit as spirit, what spirit is to believe, must not be a sensory
159 belief; what is true for spirit | is something for which in fact sensible appearance becomes subordinate. Since spirit begins from the sensible and advances [from that] to what is worthy of itself, its relationship to the sensible is at the same time a negative attitude, even though the sensible is its point of departure.

This is a basic characteristic, and it is basic to all cognition insofar as it is directed in any way toward something universal. [For example,] it is well known that Kepler discovered the laws of the heavens.[174] They are valid for us in a twofold fashion; they are the universal. The discovery began from [the observation of] single cases; certain movements were referred back to laws, but these were still only single cases. One might think that millions of other cases were possible, and that there were bodies which do *not* fall[175] in this way; thus even [as applied] to the heavenly bodies this is no universal law. This is, to be sure, how we have ˜initially become aware of the matter;˜[176] it has come ˜within the ken of˜[177] our representative capacity. But the interest of spirit is that such a law be true in and for itself; [the concern is] whether [it] is in conformity with reason, i.e., that reason finds its counterpart in the law. Where it does so, it recognizes it to be true in and for itself. By contrast with this cognition on the basis of the concept, cognition through the senses takes on a subordinate place. It is indeed the starting point, the point of departure, and should be gratefully acknowledged as such, but a law of this kind stands on its own feet, and

173. *Thus D; G, W_1 read:* led back to the requirement of W_2 *(Var) reads:* replaced by the requirement of

174. [*Ed.*] See Johannes Kepler, *Harmonice mundi,* book 5, chap. 3 (*Gesammelte Werke,* vol. 6, ed. Max Caspar [Munich, 1941], p. 302).

175. [*Ed.*] Hegel apparently spoke of both moving bodies (Kepler) and falling bodies (Galileo), but Griesheim has confused or conflated them in this passage.

176. *D reads:* awareness initially of the matter; *G, W_1 read:* become aware of the matter; W_2 *(Var) reads:* become aware of these laws through induction;

177. *D reads:* about for

therefore its verification is of another sort. It is the *concept,* and sensible existence is reduced to the level of a dream image,[178] above which there is a higher region with its own enduring content.

The relationship is the same as we have seen in connection with those proofs for the existence of God that begin from the finite.[179] The defect in them is that the finite is grasped only in affirmative fashion; but at the same time the transition from the finite to the infinite is such that the realm of the finite is abandoned, and the sensible is reduced to a subordinate status, to a distant image that now subsists only in the past and in recollection—not in spirit, which is strictly present to itself. Having left that starting | point 160
behind, spirit now stands on a soil of quite a different worth. This is the relationship involved in the transition, which should in essence be attended to. Piety can build on whatever opportunity comes to hand; this furnishes its point of departure, but it leaves that behind as it passes over to a spiritual [interpretation]. It has been demonstrated that several of Christ's quotations from the Old Testament are incorrect, so that [the meaning that] derives from them is not grounded in the immediate sense of the words, or the fathers of the church have made something else out of the words. The word was presumably something hard-and-fast, yet spirit makes of it what has truth. In the same way, sensible history constitutes the point of departure for spirit.[180] These two categories [sense and spirit] must be distinguished: the chief thing that matters is spiritual consciousness, the return of spirit into itself.

The church has been right to condemn the attack upon the miracles, the resurrection, etc., because such attacks entail the assumption that these things are what establish that Christ is the Son

178. *Thus G,* W_1; W_2 *(Var) adds:* of earthly life

179. [*Ed.*] A reference to the cosmological and physicotheological proofs of the existence of God. See Hegel's portrayal of nature religion and his treatment of the metaphysical concept of God in the religion of spiritual individuality in Part II of the 1824 lectures (Vol. 2). The physicotheological proof, according to Kant, is based on natural or physical teleology, whereas the ethicotheological proof is based on moral teleology and practical (rather than theoretical) reason. See Kant, *Critique of Judgment,* pp. 100–101 (*Werke* 5:436). The physicotheological proof is akin to those forms of the cosmological proof that focus on the matter of design.

180. *Thus G; W (HgG) adds:* and for belief.

of God. But this claim stands secure on its own account, even though the miracles etc. were its point of departure, to be sure.

This transition is what is termed the *outpouring of the Spirit.* It could occur only after ˜the Christ who had become flesh had withdrawn,˜[181] after his sensible, immediate presence had ceased; then for the first time the Spirit issued forth.[182] What the Spirit alone produces is something else, has another form.

We have arrived, then, at the issuing forth of the Spirit in the community. About this emergence of the spiritual being of the community in this self-conscious spirit, there are two things worthy of note. The first question is, "What does spirit know?" It is itself the object [of its own knowing] because it is spirit. [The second question is,] "What then is its content, what is its teaching?" [Its content is that] this objective spirit, while standing over against the community, also posits itself, realizes itself therein; even as it was first
161 posited objectively, | it now posits itself, is posited, subjectively. What objective spirit knows is first of all God, his essence. But God does not merely have being in general; he is now a living, active God, the God who possesses activity, who produces himself; he himself *is* his activity, he makes himself objective. This objectivity has initially the character of the otherness, the distinctness, the finitude that is termed the Son of God. This is the witness of spirit, that God has a Son, the absolute decree of spirit, which it has not yet conceptually comprehended, but which it testifies immediately from its own nature, in an instinctive manner so to speak. This is the second [moment]; the third is that the Spirit defines itself as the unity of the first two. Only in thought does history first achieve the form by which it has absolute interest for spirit. This third [moment] consists in what was already there in the Son—namely, that spirit is objective for itself, that it objectifies itself as the unity of the first and the second [moments], so that the second [moment], otherness, is sublated in eternal love. But this love expresses initially [i.e., in God made flesh] a relationship, a knowing, a seeing of the one in

181. *Thus D; G reads:* Christ in the flesh had withdrawn, *W (HgG/Ed?) reads:* Christ had withdrawn from the flesh,

182. *Thus G, D, W_1; W_2 (Var) adds:* for here the whole story is ended and the image of the Spirit stands completely before the intuition.

the other, such that the two extremes remain independent; it expresses an identity in which the two extremes are not absorbed. Now, on the contrary, it is love [itself] that is defined as what is objective; this is the Spirit.

~It is possible, in the form of a [particular] religion, to advance basically no further than the representation of the Son and those about him. This is perhaps the case principally in Catholicism, with the result that Mary, the Mother of God, and the saints are exalted, the Spirit being also recognized as spirit, but only entering into the picture, as it were, rather than dwelling in the church and abiding in its decrees. As a result the second [moment] is brought to the fore in its sensible form for sensible imagination, rather than being spiritualized, and spirit does not essentially | become an object.~[183] 162

The other side is the converse of this, namely, that now—just as, in the emerging community, doctrine took shape in such a way that the eternal truth is also something known, something posited in and through the community—so also the reverse is true, and finite spirit abides in itself not in an objective way but rather brings forth spirit in itself, begetting itself in its self-consciousness. This exaltation happens by means of the content that we have seen. This content is the mediator, for it is a one-sided view to characterize faith in the form of subjectivity, meaning that the community raises *itself* into the form of self-consciousness, that it has its being in the activity of bringing forth. All activity is mediated: what is to be brought forth must already exist in and for itself. Activity is merely positing, it imparts only the character of being-for-self; spiritual activity is possible only if what is to be posited is presupposed. "Is it possible that this can be done?" means, "Is it already so in and for itself?"

183. *Thus G with D; W_2 (MiscP) reads:* Another possible standpoint is to advance no further than the Son and his appearance, as in Catholicism, where Mary and the saints are added to the reconciling power of the Son, and the place of the Spirit is rather solely in the church as hierarchy, and not in the community. But then the second moment in the definition of the idea remains in the sphere of representation rather than being spiritualized. In other words, the Spirit is known less as objective than merely as this subjective form in which it is, in the sensible present, the church and lives in the tradition. In this shape of actuality, the Spirit is, as it were, the "third person."

We have seen finite subjectivity taken up into the content. Reconciliation is already implicitly accomplished. This is the representational image of the Spirit, and only by means of this image can reconciliation be brought forth. Thus the activity of the community is already determined by the fact that reconciliation is implicitly accomplished, i.e., that God is spirit. This is the spiritual element of religion, and this content is what the community *brings forth*. ˜It˜[184] is evident that the community brings forth ˜this doctrine, this relationship within itself,˜[185] that it cannot be brought forth, so to speak, ˜from the words, from the mouth of Christ,˜[186] but is produced through the community, through the church.[187] The em-
163 pirical way in which | [this] has happened does not concern us here. The story may be full of the passionate disputes of bishops at church councils and so on—this is of no account. What is the content in and for itself?[188] Only by philosophy can ˜this simply present content˜[189] be justified, not by history [*Geschichte*]. What spirit does is no history [*Historie*].[190] Spirit is concerned only with what

184. [*Ed.*] Reading *Es* with *W (Ed)* rather than *Er* with *G*.

185. *Thus G; W (HgG/Ed?) reads:* this content of belief implicitly,

186. *Thus D with G; W (HgG/Ed?) reads:* through the words of the Bible,

187. *Thus G, similar in D and* W_1*;* W_2 *(MiscP) adds:* Nor is it sensible presence but the Spirit that teaches the community that Christ is the Son of God and sits eternally at the right hand of the Father in heaven. That is the interpretation, the testimony and decree of the Spirit. When grateful peoples placed their benefactors only among the stars, that was how spirit recognized subjectivity as an absolute moment of the divine nature. The person of Christ is made the Son of God by the decree of the church.

188. *Thus G; W (HgG/Ed?) adds:* —that is the question.

189. *Thus D; G reads:* this content *W (HgG/Ed?) reads:* the genuine, Christian content of faith

190. [*Ed.*] This is one of Hegel's most famous (or notorious) statements. It is significant that he uses the term *Historie* here (though not in the preceding sentence). He does not, of course, intend to deny that in the more fundamental sense spirit *is* historical (*geschichtlich*) in its process of self-distinguishing and self-reintegrating. Especially in the 1827 and 1831 lectures, he refers to "the divine history" or "the eternal history, the eternal movement, which God himself is." But this historicity of God as spirit is not subject to the external, empirical mode of investigation suitable for past, factual data; in this sense it is no *Historie*. There remains in Hegel's thought an unresolved tension between the two senses of history—the intrinsically historical (*geschichtlich*) and "simply present" process that spirit is, and the now-past historical (*historisch*) events in which this process "appears." (Unfortunately Hegel does not consistently maintain the terminological distinction in order to convey the conceptual one, as is evident from the present passage.)

is in and for itself, not something past, but simply what is present. This is the origin of the community.

2. The Subsistence of the Community

The second aspect is its continuation, the subsistence of the community, its self-maintenance. ˜Within itself the community is an eternal becoming that presupposes itself. Spirit is an eternal process of self-cognition in self-consciousness, streaming out to the finite focus of finite consciousness, and then returning to what spirit actually is, a return in which *divine* self-consciousness breaks forth.˜[191] The community is a process of eternal becoming.

More precisely, in the subsistence of the community, doctrine is already complete, and the individual is merely attracted to a doctrine that is already there in a finished state. It is evident that a doctrine is necessary. The content must be made representationally visible, and it is a content in which what is to be accomplished in the individual as such is accomplished, exhibited in and for itself.

[(1)] The sacrament of *baptism* is the first thing to play a part in this connection. The individual, that is, is already born within the community of the church; | he or she is not born in misery and 164
will not be confronted by a hostile world but by a world that is a church, so that each one simply has to be grafted as subject upon a community that already exists as the individual's current environment.

Doctrine comes to the individual through the *authority* of the church. The beginning of all our knowing is and must be authority. Even in the case of sense-knowledge we begin with the authority of being: it is the way it is, immediately, and it is valid for us as such—this is the authority of the sensible. Representational images with which we are familiar are the authorities from which we begin our philosophizing. They are given us as true; they are not our own

191. *Thus G with D; W_2 (MiscP) reads:* The subsistence of the community is its continuous, eternal becoming, which is grounded in the fact that spirit is an eternal process of self-cognition, dividing itself into the finite flashes of light of individual consciousness, and then re-collecting and gathering itself up out of this finitude—inasmuch as it is in the finite consciousness that the process of knowing spirit's essence takes place and that the divine self-consciousness thus arises. Out of the foaming ferment of finitude, spirit rises up fragrantly.

insight. Our own insight comes only later on through the reworking, assimilation, appropriation, and taking back of this material.

[(2)] This second moment is therefore the assimilation involved in *rebirth* by means of doctrine or teaching. Human beings must be born twice, first naturally, then spiritually, like the Brāhmans. Spirit is not immediate; it is only insofar as it engenders itself from itself.[192] That is why there is a grief belonging to the natural state. This rebirth is no longer the infinite melancholy arising from the pangs of birth;[193] but there is also present the antithesis arising from the purely private preoccupations of human beings, their further interests, passions, self-seeking, etc. Only so can they have a natural heart, being other than they should be. The natural heart in which they are imprisoned is the enemy that is to be combated, but in the community this enemy is so determined as to be implicitly overcome.

The representation of a perennial struggle is not here the last word, as it is in the Kantian philosophy, where the strife is unending and the resolution is put off to infinity, so that we must take our stand upon the "ought."[194] Here the contradiction is resolved; hence the nature of spirit also is represented to the individual in such a way that evil is implicitly overcome. It does not have an absolutely independent subsistence, as it does in the eternal struggle between light and darkness of the Persian religion; [nor] is there a mechan-
165 ically external relationship between | the sensible and the rational, as in the Kantian philosophy, where the two realms remain independent.[195] Here the power belongs to spirit; but spirit is the ab-

192. *Thus G, similar in D; W (HgG) adds:* it only is as what is reborn.

193. *Thus G,* W_1; W_2 *(Var) adds:* of the community in general;

194. [*Ed.*] In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 3:461, 498 (*Werke* 15:593, 633), Hegel criticizes the Kantian-Fichtean view that the good on the one hand remains bound to the moral activity of the individual subject, but on the other hand can be realized only in infinite progress. See Vol. 1 of this edition, p. 349 n. 170.

195. [*Ed.*] Hegel discusses Persian dualism in Part II of the 1824 lectures (Vol. 2). As for Kant, he has in mind the Kantian distinction between the sensible world and the rational or intelligible world. Because the connection between these worlds is not comprehensible, it is impossible to understand how moral freedom might exercise a causality in the sensible world. See, e.g., Kant, *The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics* (1785), trans. Otto Manthey-Zorn (New York, 1938), pp. 71–72, 79 (*Werke* 4:452, 458–459).

solute and is what is here known—the awareness that what has happened as such, what has been found to be the case, the natural being of humanity, can be undone. Here there is the awareness that, just as the natural will can be given up, so there is no sin that cannot be forgiven, except for the sin against the Holy Spirit,[196] the denial of spirit itself; for spirit alone is the power that can itself sublate everything. Spirit has only to deal with itself in the element of the soul, of freedom, of spirituality; it does not continue to stand over against natural being or action and deed. Only spirit is free; its energy is not restricted. There is no power that is equal to it ˜or that can come against it;˜[197] no mechanistic or spiritless relationship is possible.

It is true that there are very many difficulties about this topic, difficulties that arise from the concept of spirit and of freedom. On the one hand there is spirit as universal spirit, and on the other hand human being-for-self, the being-for-self of the single individual. It must be said that it is the divine Spirit that effects rebirth; this is the free grace of God, for everything divine is free. It is not fate or destiny. On the other hand, however, the self-consciousness of the soul stands fast, too, and the question now is to ascertain how much is due to human agency. A *velleitas,* a *nisus* remains to it, but stubborn persistence in [its own contribution to] this relationship is itself what is unspiritual. ˜The first being [of a human, its] self-being, is the concept in itself, implicit spirit; and what has to be sublated is the form of its immediacy, of its singularized, private being-for-itself.˜[198] This self-sublating and coming to self on the part of the concept is universal nature, in the same way that in the element of thought, spirit that comes to itself is free spirit; but free spirit is unlimited, universal spirit. | 166

(3) The third [moment] in regard to this rebirth is that of *partaking* [*Genuss*]—the consciousness of this divine grace, the consciousness of being a ˜citizen˜[199] of God's kingdom—what is called mystical union, the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, where human

196. [*Ed.*] See Matt. 12:31; Mark 3:28.

197. *Thus G; D reads:* there is nothing that can limit its energy;

198. *Thus G; D reads:* The essence of this self, this singular point or atom, is to sublate itself according to its immediate selfhood—the process that is spirit itself.

199. *Ms. reads:* citizen (*Bürger*) *G reads:* henceforth (*fürder*) *D reads:* member

beings are vouchsafed the consciousness of their reconciliation with God in a sensible, intuitable form, the indwelling and lodging of the Spirit within them.

The content of the sacramental actions is also the development of spirit. There are three ways of representing the content of this sacrament. For the content begins from the representation, which is based on the sensible; but the sublation of this sense-element is the certain knowledge, in worship, of the grace of the divine Spirit. What is represented in the sacrament is that Christ is eternally sacrificed and rises again in the heart; this is correct. The eternal sacrifice is the process through which single individuals make themselves their own, the process by which their implicit being passes away. But since they belong to grace and are reconciled, the resurrection of Christ also takes place within them. The differences within the Christian religion are essentially involved in this point.

The first representational image is that Christ is present in the host in a sensible, bodily, unspiritual fashion. He is in this *thing* through the consecration of the priest: the divine is to be found in this externality. This is the view of the Catholics; the divine is literally eaten by the worshipers.

The second view is that God is present only in spirit, in faith, or in a spiritual way: this is the great image of the Lutheran confession. It too begins from eating and drinking, as in the Eleusinian mysteries;[200] the starting point is the consumption of God objectively present. The advance is that the individual worshiper takes up this consumption inwardly, and the sensible is first spiritualized in the subject. The Father is what exists only insofar as it surrenders itself; but it first exists as real spirit, spirit realized, in self-consciousness. The crucial point in this interpretation is that transubstantiation takes place only in the partaking of communion, in faith, and only in a spiritual fashion.

The third view is that the deity is not present here at all, but is
167 only remembered as an image. This is | the Reformed view: [the sacrament] is merely a lively recollection of the past, devoid of spirit. It is not divine presence, there is no actual spirituality.

200. [*Ed.*] The religious mysteries at Eleusis, in ancient Attica, in worship of Demeter and Persephone.

Such are the main considerations regarding the subsistence of the community.

3. The Realization of Faith

The third aspect to be considered is the realization of faith; but this also involves the transformation of the community, its recasting and modification.

The fact is that religion, as we have seen it, is spiritual religion, and the community exists primarily in what is inward, in spirit as such. This inwardness, this subjectivity that is inwardly present to itself, but not inwardly developed, is feeling or sensibility. The community also essentially possesses consciousness and its ˜representations in the form of doctrine etc.,˜[201] but this brings with it separation and differentiation. The divine objective idea confronts consciousness as something other, which is in part given by authority, in part appropriated in worship. Or again, the moment of communion is just one single moment; or yet again, the divine idea, the divine content, is not intuited, it is only represented. The "now" of communion dissolves in its representation, partly into a beyond, an otherworldly heaven, partly into the past, and partly into the future.[202] But spirit is *simply present to itself;* it demands a fulfilled present, it requires more than merely[203] confused images. It requires that the content should itself be present, or that feeling, sensibility, should be developed and expanded.

Thus over against the community, and the kingdom of God in the community, there stands an *objective reality.* As the external, *immediate* world, this objective reality is the *heart* and the concerns of the heart. Another form of objectivity is that of *reflection,* of abstract thought or understanding; and the third form, the true one, is that of the *concept.* Accordingly, we must consider the manner in which faith *realizes* itself in these three elements. | 168

The realization of faith or of religion in general is simply the *reconciliation* of spirit. Initially, this reconciliation still has an an-

201. *Thus G; D reads:* representations, *W (Var) reads:* representations [W_1: in the form of doctrine], needs, drives, worldly existence in general,

202. [*Ed.*] Probably an allusion to the Catholic, the Reformed, and the Lutheran forms of communion.

203. *Thus G; W (HgG/Ed?) adds:* love or

tithesis, and we must consider its relationship to it, the way in which the antithesis is sublated, how the idea takes shape in it and seems in so doing to run the risk of losing itself.

[(1)] The first thing that opposes reconciliation is the natural *heart*. Religious reconciliation proceeds within the heart as that which is most inward and deep. On the other hand, the heart is also something private: it is the *natural* heart, with passions, inclinations, self-seeking, and egoism; hence in its one-sidedness it is forsaken by the universal, removed from faith. The direct reconciliation of the community with this worldliness, a reconciliation that is only immediate, is through the community's taking all these passions, inclinations, etc. up into itself, so that the *church*, which has its existence in its subjects, lets them do as they like, takes them up into itself as they are immediately, and thereby receives into itself all the coarseness and passions etc. [of human life]. The church is, on the one hand, the struggle with what is worldly; but on the other hand, standing as it does in the existence of a crude world, it falls into worldliness and corruption. So this initial reconciliation has rather the character of the church's corruption.

[(2)] The second [realm] to which the church is related is *reflection*.[204] It is indeed through the contact between the inward and

204. [*Ed.*] "Reflection" (*Reflexion*) is Hegel's term for the philosophy of the Enlightenment, i.e., the "reflective philosophy of subjectivity," as expressed in the subtitle to *Faith and Knowledge*. Reflective philosophy is critical philosophy because it interprets objective reality in terms of the critical categories of the mind. What is "reflected," then, is the cognitive faculty of finite consciousness, not the rational structure of objective reality or of the "concept," as is the case with truly "speculative" philosophy. Reflective philosophy represents an indispensable advance beyond the immediacy and dogmatism of everyday experience (empiricism) and precritical metaphysics and theology. Thus the clash between the church (or church dogmatics) and reflection was inevitable. But because reflection is locked into the finite categories of the "understanding" (*Verstand*), it is unable to grasp the dialectical identity that underlies its abstract and partial images. It thus remains a finite, "alienated" mode of thought, oscillating between an abstract, empty unity on the one hand and a capricious, arbitrary individualism on the other. The decay and fragmentation of the bourgeois world to which Hegel alludes in the concluding section of the *Ms.*—in whose stead the present section stands in the 1824 and 1827 lectures—is attributable in part to the role of "reflection" in modern philosophy, science, and technology. For a helpful discussion of "reflection," see the *Encyclopedia* (1830), §§ 21–22, 24, 81, 112, 174–175.

the worldly or finite that reflection, indeed thinking in general, is first awakened, as the mediation of the real, worldly side with the ideal. This proximate and initial reconciliation can only be an abstract one; it is a self-disclosure of the understanding, of reflection, a self-disclosure of the reflection of a universality that is at first the abstract universality of the understanding.

Inasmuch as reflection thus sets [itself] up as a standard, there arises a hostile relationship to the church. Since the church seeks to imprint its image on the understanding, while the understanding imagines itself to be the content of religion, there emerges the sharpest possible apparent conflict. The community has the peculiarity of containing within itself the infinite antithesis between absolute spirit, having being in and for itself, and subjective, single spirit. The latter, in its character as singular self-consciousness, represents the extreme of formal freedom. As such, this extreme is what we have previously called the innermost realm. Over against this innermost realm stands "natural humanity" with | all of its private 169
concerns, so that the subject itself is this infinite contradiction. This antithesis is reconciled in and for itself, and the reconciliation is portrayed in religion. Implicitly it is reconciled in the concept too, and this is the subjectivity, the infinitude of the ego within itself, what was previously pointed out as the principle of immortality.[205] Here the realization of faith consists in the fact that this inward element does not remain simply the inward heart, simply the depths of the heart, but develops itself within itself. So if we say that faith grows in the soil of what is most inward, the natural human self is quite distinct from this; and because the innermost element is not [yet] developed within itself, this truth [about faith] is for it a sensible history, a representation of God; it is spiritual truth as merely objective, as a datum.

The requirement is that the inmost element shall develop inwardly itself, that it shall exist for itself as the idea, albeit only as the subjective idea. This is what is meant by saying that faith realizes itself in reflection. What is awakened initially is thinking in general, the demand for the unity of what is inmost with one's own particular

205. [*Ed.*] See above, pp. 208–209.

worldly life. This is a demand for universality, in the first place for abstract universality. What it produces or manifests by itself is that this infinite inwardness, or pure thinking within itself, turns against authority and demands the form of selfhood with regard to every content that is to be accepted by it as true. Faith is indeed the testimony of the Spirit to the truth. The sensibility of devotion receives and has within itself the fulfillment afforded by the Spirit, but the individual worshipers do not exist for themselves therein; the truth has the form of authority, and the self lacks the determination of its own being-for-self in it.

The second [moment] is that thinking itself then produces hard-and-fast characteristics within itself and by itself. It discovers in the self a content, namely, that it is natural humanity; and since it is the universal, and its activity is that of universality, it extracts the affirmative element from the content and gives it the form of universality. Thus it arrives at hard-and-fast characteristics. For instance, the family relationship [is] a content of this kind—family life or family love, justice in general, contractual provisions, the relation of individuals to official authority, the relations of sovereigns and states. There is the testimony of spirit for these also that
170 they are essential relationships. | In human life they become fixed characteristics—the family against celibacy, [property] rights against the poverty enjoined by the church, obedience to civil authority against the blind obedience of the church ([i.e.,] against the demand that one surrender all one's will and know nothing of determinations fixed within oneself and by oneself). Thus, in the second place, reflection also arrives at a hard-and-fast content; the content becomes fixed by obtaining the form of universality and, therewith, the form of identity with itself. Thinking thus enters into an antithesis to the church; it bases itself on fixed determinations; it brooks no contradiction. Whatever contradicts these fixed determinations is invalid; pretensions and ordinances of the church that run counter to them have no validity for it.

Abstract thinking, with its principle of identity, assails the inner content of the church even more violently. This content is concrete; it is the unity of the two [the universal and the particular]—the divine Trinity. This concrete content stands in contradiction to the

abstract law of identity. In the same way the relationship of God to humanity, ˜the process of grace, the unity of divine and human nature, the mystical union—[all of these] represent an absolute˜[206] coupling of opposite determinations. This content is annulled in thought; and reflection then has as its final result the objectivity of identity itself, namely, that God is nothing but the supreme being [*das höchste Wesen*]—which (for the very reason that it is not concrete, without definition, and empty) is simultaneously defined for cognition as what is beyond it. For every determination makes [what is determined] concrete, and cognition is only the knowledge of concrete content. This consummation of reflection is the antithesis of the Christian church.

There are two forms of this abstract unity. [For the first,[207]] what counts as the true is empty unity, something other opposed to cognition. Vis-à-vis the subject, this empty unity is a negation, for the subject knows itself as concrete. Finitude stands on this side of the empty essence. It has become free for itself, and it is of absolute value within itself, it is independent. In this way, finitude is its own criterion of value in various forms, as, for example, | the personal 171
uprightness of individuals. The further consequence of this is not only that the objective reality of God is thus removed into the beyond and negated, but also that all other objective determinations, all of the determinations that are valid implicitly and explicitly (and are posited in the world as rights, customs, etc.), explicitly disappear. Since the subject withdraws to the pinnacle of its own infinitude, what is good, just, etc. is contained only within it; it makes good and justice into its subjective decisions, they constitute *its* thoughts. What bodies out this good is then derived from natural caprice, contingency, passion, etc. The [single] subject is simply the consciousness that objectivity is shut up within itself; it is conscious that objective reality has no subsistence; only the principle of iden-

206. *Thus G with D; W (Ed/HgG?) reads:* the unity of the two, divine grace and human freedom—this is all a

207. [*Ed.*] Hegel here describes the ideology of Enlightenment rationalism. It accepts the reflective critique of traditional religious dogma but substitutes for it merely subjective ethical and cognitive criteria, ending with abstract and empty self-identity over against the equally empty beyond.

tity is valid for this subject. It is an abstract subject, it can be bodied out with any sort of content; it has the capability (so deeply implanted in the human heart) of subsuming each and every content. Thus subjectivity is caprice and the knowledge of its power over everything—its power to produce objectivity, the good, and imbue it with content.

"The second form [of abstract unity] is that, vis-à-vis the unity toward which it has stretched out, subjectivity has no being on its own account, and therefore it does not allot to itself an affirmative private sphere; instead its vocation is"[208] to submerge itself in the unity of God, of the infinite. Thus the subject has no private purpose, and no absolute purpose other than that of willing itself to exist for this One, and it alone, of making its sole purpose the glory of the one God. This other form is religion: it contains an affirmative relationship to one's essence, which is this One, wherein the subject yields itself up. This religion has in general the same content as the Jewish religion, but the relationship in which human beings stand
172 is broadened. No particularity remains to it; | here there is no "defining characteristic like the Jewish sense of national value."[209] Here there is no limitation to a particular people; humanity relates itself to the One as purely abstract self-consciousness. This is the characteristic of the *Islamic religion.*[210] In it Christianity finds its

208. *Thus G with D, similar in* W_1; W_2 *(Var) reads:* The other development of this standpoint is that the subject does not have being on its own account vis-à-vis the unity into which it has emptied itself. It does not retain its private domain; instead it takes it as a vocation simply *Ho reads:* Hence subjectivity veers around in its caprice, no longer aspiring to maintain itself vis-à-vis the abstract unity into which it has emptied itself but merely to subsist therein, aspiring with the totality of its private interests

209. *Thus G,* W_1; W_2 *(Var) reads:* Jewish sense of national value, which posits this relationship to the One. *Ho reads:* Jewish sense of national value, which posits this relationship.

210. [*Ed.*] This is the only significant discussion of Islamic religion (*mohammedanische Religion*) in the lectures (there are brief references to it in this volume, *Ms.*, p. 121, 1824 lectures, p. 218, 1827 lectures, p. 316, and in Volume 2, where it is compared with Judaism [*Ms.* sheet 47b–48a]). Islam lacks a place in Hegel's schema of determinate religions. The reason appears to be that, unlike the other religions, Islam does not represent an earlier phase of religious consciousness that has been or can be sublated in the consummate religion. Rather it stands in antithesis to Christianity as a contemporary rival. Thus the proper place for its treatment, in Hegel's scheme, is in the context of various challenges to the Christian religion in the modern world.

antithesis because it occupies a sphere equivalent to that of the Christian religion. It is a spiritual religion like the Jewish, but its God is [available] for self-consciousness only within the *abstract* knowing spirit. Its God is on a par with the Christian God to the extent that no particularity is retained. Anyone, from any people, who fears God is pleasing to him, and human beings have value only to the extent that they take as their truth the knowledge that this is the One, the essence. ˜The differentiation of˜[211] subjects according to their station in life or class is sublated; there may be classes, there may even be slaves, but this is merely accidental.

The antithesis consists in the fact that in Christianity spirituality is developed *concretely* within itself and is known as Trinity, as spirit; and that human history, the relationship to the One, is likewise a *concrete* history that begins with the natural will, which is as it ought not to be. The surrender of the natural will and the coming to be of the [spiritual] self takes place through the negation of our [natural] self for the sake of our [spiritual] essence. The religion of Islam, by contrast, hates and proscribes everything concrete; its God is the absolute One, in relation to whom human beings retain for themselves no purpose, no private domain, nothing peculiar to themselves. Inasmuch as they exist, humans do in any case create a private domain for themselves in their inclinations and interests, and these are all the more savage and unrestrained in this case because they lack reflection. But coupled with this is also the complete opposite, namely, the tendency to let everything take its own course, indifference with respect to every purpose, absolute fatalism, indifference to life; no practical purpose has any essential value. But since human beings are in fact practical and active, their purpose can only be to bring about the veneration of the One in all humanity. | Thus the religion of Islam is essentially 173
fanatical.

The [stance of] "reflection" that we have been considering is on a par with Islam in that God has no content and is not concrete. In this way the concrete historical content of the life of Christ also disappears; ˜his exaltation to be the Son of God, the transfiguration

211. *Thus G, W_1; W_2 (MiscP) reads:* No dividing wall of any kind between believers or between them and God is recognized. Before God the determinacy of

of self-consciousness, etc.˜[212] have no place here. ˜˜The distinction[213] consists in the fact that ˜this independence of Islam [from everything concrete and worldly] is not preserved [by reflection]; here, on the contrary,˜[214] subjective reflection retains for itself the power to fill out its own contingent free will. This is the religion of the Enlightenment, of reflection, of abstract thinking, which means in fact that the truth cannot be cognized, cannot be known—that it is not there for subjective self-consciousness [proper] but only for its opinion, its contingency, and its pleasure.˜˜[215]

212. *Thus G, similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* consequently the appearance of God in the flesh, the exaltation of Christ to be the Son of God, the transfiguration of the finitude of the world and self-consciousness to reveal the infinite self-determining of God,

213. [*Ed.*] Presumably between the "reflective" thinking of the Enlightenment and Islam. This reading is supported (and clarified) by the variant from *MiscP in* W_2 given in n. 215. It requires reading "not preserved" in this sentence rather than "not abandoned" as in *G*. The editor of W_1, following *G*, construed the distinction as one between Christianity and Islam/Enlightenment religion (see n. 214), which makes little sense in the context. We assume that *MiscP* lay behind Hegel's oral presentation in 1824; we accordingly construe the meaning in conformity with W_2.

214. *Thus G;* W_1 *(Ed) reads:* in Islam

215. *Thus G with D;* W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* Christianity [according to reflection] is valid only as doctrine, and Christ counts as the emissary of God, as a divine teacher, in other words as a teacher like Socrates, only even more excellent than Socrates, since he was without sin. But that is only a half-truth. Either Christ was only a man or he was the "Son of Man." Nothing remains of the divine history, and Christ is spoken of in exactly the same way as in the Koran. The difference between this [reflective] stage and Islam is that the latter, whose intuition bathes in the aether of limitlessness, being itself this infinite independence, simply surrenders everything particular—enjoyment, status, personal knowledge, every form of vanity. From the standpoint of the Enlightenment, on the other hand, based as it is on the understanding, God is otherworldly and has no affirmative relationship to the subject; human beings, therefore, are regarded abstractly as being on their own account. They recognize the affirmative universal only to the extent that it is within them, but also they possess it only *abstractly,* and consequently they derive the fulfillment of it only from contingency and caprice.

[*Ed.*] Hegel's critical remark concerning the comparison of Socrates and Christ is directed against a common theme that assumes many different forms in the Enlightenment. See Benno Böhm, *Sokrates im achtzehnten Jahrhundert: Studien zum Werdegange des modernen Persönlichkeitsbewusstseins* (Leipzig, 1929; reprint, Neumünster, 1966), esp. pp. 134–154. It is not clear whether Hegel's criticism is directed generally against the comparison between Jesus as the exponent of revealed religion and Socrates as the exponent of natural religion, or against more specific themes in this literature. Despite Hegel's implication here, sinlessness was often attributed to Socrates as well. Hegel is likely to have been familiar with J. A. Eberhard's *Neue Apologie des Sokrates* (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1772) and F. V. Reinhard's *Versuch*

The final point is that a reconciliation can also be recognized in this last-mentioned form; thus this last mode of appearing is also a realization of faith. For since all content and all truth perish | in 174
this subjectivity that inwardly knows itself as infinite yet remains private, the principle of subjective freedom thereby comes to consciousness in it. What is called inwardness in the community is now developed within itself. It is not only inwardness and conscience, but is the subjectivity that divides, differentiates itself, that is concrete; it knows within itself the universal that it produces from itself. This is the subjectivity that is for itself and inwardly determines itself, the consummation of the subjective extreme to the point of being the self-contained idea. But the deficiency here is that this is only formal and lacks true objectivity; it represents the ultimate pinnacle of formal development without inner necessity. For the true consummation of the idea, what has been differentiated must be set free, must in itself constitute a totality of objective reality.

(3) The third relationship of faith is to the *concept*, to the *idea*. Once reflection has invaded the sphere of religion, thinking or reflection assumes a hostile attitude toward the representational form in religion and toward the concrete content. And once thinking has begun in this way, it does not stop; it carries through, it ˜empties heart and heaven; cognitive spirit and the religious content then take refuge in the concept. Here they must find their˜[216] justification; thinking must grasp itself as concrete and free, not maintaining the distinctions as merely posited, but letting them go free and in that way recognizing the content as objective.

über den Plan, den der Stifter der christlichen Religion zum Besten der Menschen entwarf (Wittenberg, 1781).

The Koran describes Jesus as the son of Mary, as one sent by Allah, enlightened by the Holy Spirit, as a servant of Allah and one near to Allah, etc. In contrast with the more radical wing of Enlightenment criticism of religion, it allows for the supernatural conception of Jesus, but it contests the idea of Jesus' divine sonship and rejects the Trinity as tritheism. It cannot be shown, and in fact is unlikely, that Hegel had direct knowledge of the Koran.

216. *Thus G*, W_1; *D reads:* empties spirit and heaven, and the religious content then takes refuge in the concept. Here it must find its W_2 *(Var) reads:* empties heart, heaven, and cognitive spirit; and the religious content then takes refuge in heaven. Here it must find its

[*Ed.*] See 1827 lectures, n. 262.

Philosophy therefore has the task of ˜mediating these two relationships.˜[217] Religion and the need for ˜religion˜[218] can take refuge in the form of feeling or sensibility as well as in the concept. It can limit itself to giving up the truth and renouncing all hope of knowing a content, with the result that the holy church no longer has any commonality and splits into atoms, each with its own
175 worldview. For commonality is based on | doctrine, but individuals have each their own feeling, their own sensations. It is just this form that does not correspond to spirit, which is resolved to *know.*[219]

Thus philosophy stands between two opposing views. On the one hand it seems to be opposed to the church; because it conceptualizes, it shares with the development of culture and with reflection the refusal to remain bound to the form of representation. Instead, it [advances to the point] of comprehending [the truth] in thoughts; and in the process it also recognizes the necessity of the form of representation. But the concept is the higher form because, even while encompassing the various [representational] forms and acknowledging their legitimacy, it has its own content. So this opposition [to the church] is only a formal one. The other opposition is between philosophy and the Enlightenment. Philosophy is opposed to the [attitude of] indifference toward the content, it is opposed to mere opinion, to the despair involved in its renunciation of the truth, and to the view that it does not matter what content is intended. The goal of philosophy is the cognition of the truth—the cognition of God because he is the absolute truth. In that context nothing else is worth troubling about compared with God and his explication. Philosophy knows God essentially as concrete, as the spiritual, realized universality that is not jealous but communicates itself. Even light communicates itself. Whoever says that God cannot be cognized is saying that God is jealous, and is not making a serious effort to ˜achieve cognition when˜[220] he speaks of God.[221] The Enlightenment—that vanity of understanding—is the most vehement

217. *Thus D; G, W read:* establishing the relationship to the two preceding stages.

218. *Thus G, D; W (HgG/Ed?) reads:* piety

219. *Thus G; W (HgG/Ed?) adds:* how it stands in that respect.

220. *Thus G; W (HgG) reads:* believe in God, however much

opponent of philosophy. It takes it very ill when philosophy demonstrates the rational content in the Christian religion, when it shows that the witness of the Spirit, the truth in the most all-embracing sense of the term, is deposited in religion. ˜Thus the task of philosophy˜[222] is to show forth the rational content of religion.

That was the purpose of these lectures, to reconcile reason with religion in its manifold forms, and to recognize them as at least necessary.[223] | 176

This conceptual cognition of religion is by its nature not universal, but is rather only the cognition of a community.[224] For that reason three stages take shape in regard to the kingdom of the Spirit: the first estate is that of immediate, naive religion and of faith; the second is that of the understanding, the estate of the so-called cultured, of reflection and the Enlightenment; and finally the third estate is ˜the community of philosophy.˜[225]

221. [*Ed.*] In Part I of the lectures, Hegel appeals to Plato and Aristotle for a refutation of the view that God is "jealous" of any knowledge of himself. See Vol. 1:382 n. 45.

222. *Thus G; W (HgG) reads:* In the [branch of] philosophy that is theology, the one and only task

223. *Thus G; W_2 (Var) adds:* and to rediscover truth and the idea in the revelatory religion.

224. [*Ed.*] That is, the community of philosophy. The *conceptual* cognition of religion is not universally available to the whole of humanity in the same way that the representational forms of religion are. Cf. the discussion of the "partiality" of philosophy in the *Ms.*, p. 162. Thus although philosophy is the highest or final stage, it is not as universal as religion, and the latter is a permanent "estate" (*Stand*) in the kingdom of the Spirit. In Hegel's view, the theology of the time belongs to the second estate, although "true" theology is a citizen of the third. The "community" (*Gemeinde*)—the community of faith, of the Spirit, the Christian community—seems now to have passed over into the philosophical community, and along with it its cognitive (i.e., its theological) activity.

225. *Thus G; D reads:* that of the community, of philosophy. *W (HgG/Ed?) reads:* the stage of philosophy. *Ho reads:* that of the philosophizing community.

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THE CONSUMMATE RELIGION[1]

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THE LECTURES OF 1827

Introduction

1. Definition of This Religion[2]

˜The first [division] was the *concept of religion* in general; the second, religion in its particularity or *determinate religion,* the last of these being the religion of expediency. The third is the *consummate religion,* the religion that is for itself, that is objective to itself.

This is always the pattern in scientific knowledge: first the concept; then the particularity of the concept—reality, objectivity; and finally the stage in which the original concept is an object to itself, is for itself, becomes objective to itself, is related to itself. So this is the pattern in philosophy: first the concept of the conceptualizing science—the concept that *we* have. But at the end science itself grasps its concept, so that this concept is for itself.˜[3]

1. [*Ed.*] The title found in the Königsberg Anonymous, used by Lasson, is: "Part III. The Revelatory Religion." Erdmann offers as a title the words used by Hegel in the second sentence: "Part III. The Consummate Religion, the Religion That Is For Itself, or the Religion That Is Objective to Itself." The titles in the extant transcripts are as follows: *An:* "III. The Revealed Religion"; *Hu:* "Part III. The Christian Religion"; *B:* "III. The Revelatory Religion, or the Religion That Is Objective to Itself."

2. [*Ed.*] In this section, Hegel briefly summarizes the substance of the introductory remarks found in the *Ms.* and (in considerably expanded form) in the 1824 lectures. The agenda of the 1827 introduction is different, as we shall see below in Secs. 2–3. The polemic against the subjectivism of present-day theology is past, and Hegel now faces a different challenge.

3. *W (1831) reads:* We have now arrived at the realized concept of religion, the *consummate religion,* in which it is the concept itself that is its own object. We have defined religion more precisely as the *self-consciousness of God.* Self-consciousness

And therefore the sphere into which we are now entering is the concept of religion that is for itself, i.e., the *revelatory religion.* Religion is for the first time what is revelatory, is manifested, when the concept of religion is for itself, i.e., when religion or its concept has become objective to itself—not in limited, finite objectivity, but
178 such that it is objective to itself in accord with its concept. |

This can be defined more precisely as follows. Religion, in accord with its general concept, is the consciousness of God as such, consciousness of absolute essence. Consciousness, however, is a differentiating, a division within itself. Thus we have already two moments: consciousness and absolute essence. These two are, first of all, externalized forms in a finite nexus and relationship—empirical consciousness on the one hand, and essence in the abstract sense on the other. They stand in a finite relationship to each other, and to this extent they are both finite; in consciousness we accord-

in its character as consciousness has an object, and it is conscious of itself in this object; this object is also consciousness, but it is consciousness as an object, and consequently it is finite consciousness, a consciousness that is distinct from God, from the absolute. Determinateness and consequently finitude are present in this form of consciousness. God is self-consciousness; he knows himself in a consciousness that is distinct from him, which is implicitly the consciousness of God, but is also the divine consciousness explicitly since it knows its identity with God, an identity that is mediated, however, by the negation of finitude. It is this concept that constitutes the content of religion. We define God when we say that he distinguishes himself from himself and is an object for himself but that in this distinction he is purely identical with himself—that he is *spirit.* This concept is now realized; consciousness knows this content and knows that it is utterly interwoven with this content: in the concept that is the process of God, consciousness is itself a moment. Finite consciousness knows God only to the extent that God knows himself in it; thus God is spirit, indeed the Spirit of his community, i.e., of those who worship him. This is the consummate religion, the concept that has become objective to itself. Here it is manifest what God is: he is no longer a "beyond," an unknown, for he has made known to human beings what he is, and has done so not merely in an external history but in consciousness. We have here, therefore, the religion of the manifestation of God, since God knows himself in finite spirit. God is utterly revelatory: this is the [essential] circumstance here. The transition was our having seen that the knowledge of God as free spirit is still burdened with finitude and immediacy so far as its content is concerned. This finitude had yet to be done away with by the labor of spirit; it is nothingness, and we have seen how this nothingness has been made manifest to consciousness. The unhappiness, the anguish of the world was the condition, the preparation on the subjective side for the consciousness of free spirit as absolutely free and consequently infinite spirit.

We dwell initially on (A) the universal features of this sphere.

ingly have two elements that are related to each other in a finite, external way. Thus consciousness knows even the absolute essence only as something finite, not as what is true. God, however, is himself consciousness, differentiating himself within himself. Since God, as this differentiating of himself within himself, is consciousness, so is he, as consciousness, such that he gives himself as object for what we call the side of consciousness.

But when religion grasps itself,[4] its content and | object is this 179
whole—*consciousness relating itself to its essence,* knowing itself as its essence and knowing its essence as its own—and that is spiritual religion.

This means that *spirit* is the object of religion,[5] and the object of the latter—essence knowing itself—is spirit. Here for the first time, spirit is as such the object, the content of religion, and spirit *is* only *for* spirit. Since it is content or object, it is, as spirit, this self-knowing or self-differentiating, and it itself furnishes the other side, that of subjective consciousness, which appears as finite. It is the religion whose fulfillment is itself.

2. The Positivity and Spirituality of This Religion[6]

This is the abstract determination of this idea or the sphere where religion is in fact idea. This is because an idea in the philosophical

4. *Thus also W; L (1827?) adds:* the other determination in it emerges. The consciousness of God means that finite consciousness has this God, who is its essence, as an object—it knows him as its essence, sets him over against itself. Thus

5. *Thus L, similar in B, Hu, An; W (1831) adds:* Thus we have two elements, consciousness and object; but in the religion that has itself as its fulfillment, that is revelatory, that has comprehended itself, religion or the content itself is the object.

6. [*Ed.*] This section is new in the 1827 lectures, although it incorporates some materials used elsewhere in the earlier lectures. Against the charges of his critics, Hegel insists that Christianity is a *positive* religion, whose truth is mediated to consciousness in sensible historical fashion, and which has a necessary element of external authority. Yet the essential, rational truth revealed by this religion, while mediated positively, derives solely from its *spirituality* and can be verified only by the witness of spirit (see n. 16), not by historical proofs. Here materials from the *Ms.*'s treatment of the cultus in Part III (see above, *Ms.,* Sec. C) and from the 1824 lectures' treatment of the cultus in Part I (see Vol. 1, 1824 *Concept,* Sec. B.3.b) are incorporated into the 1827 introduction to the revelatory religion. In contrast with the whole debate in late Enlightenment thought over reason versus revelation, Hegel claimed that the *revealed* (positive) religion is also one in which reason and truth are made open, manifest (*offenbar*). The term "revelatory" gathers up both the positivity and the spirituality of this religion.

sense[7] is the concept that has an object, has determinate being, reality, objectivity; it objectifies itself, and is no longer merely inner and subjective, but its objectivity is at the same time a return to itself.[8]

The consummate religion is the idea and has as its object what it [actually] is, namely, the consciousness of essence; thereby it is objectified.[9] This absolute religion is the *revelatory* [*offenbar*] religion, the religion that has itself as its content and fulfillment. But it is also called the *revealed* [*geoffenbart*] religion—which means, on the one hand, that it is revealed by God, that God has given himself for human beings to know what he is; and on the other hand, that it is a revealed, *positive* religion in the sense that it has come to humanity from without, has been given to it. In view of the peculiar meaning that attaches to the positive, it is interesting to see what positivity is.

In the first place, the absolute religion is, of course, a positive
180 religion in the | sense that everything that is *for* consciousness is *objective* to consciousness. *Everything must come to us from outside.* The sensible is thus something positive. Initially there is nothing positive other than what we have before us in immediate intuition. Everything spiritual also comes to us in this fashion, whether it be the spiritual in general or the spiritual in finite or historical form. This mode of external spirituality, and spirit expressing itself outwardly, are likewise positive. The ethical realm, the laws of freedom, entail a higher, purer spirituality; the ethical by nature has nothing *externally* spiritual about it; it is not something external and contingent but is the nature of rational spirit itself. But even the ethical comes to us in an external mode, chiefly in the form of education, instruction, doctrine: it is simply given to us as something valid as it stands. Laws—e.g., civil laws, laws of the state—are likewise something positive: they come to us and are there for us as valid. They are not merely something external

7. [*Ed.*] See esp. *Science of Logic,* pp. 755 ff. (*GW* 12:173 ff.).

8. *Thus B, Hu, An; L, W (1827?) add:* or—to the extent that we speak of the concept as a goal—is the fulfilled, accomplished goal, which precisely as such is objective.

9. *Thus B; L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* [now] exists in a fashion similar to how at first it was the concept—or *our* concept—and the concept alone.

for us, as are sensible objects, so that we can leave them behind or pass them by; rather, in their externality, they also ought to have, for us subjectively, an essential, subjectively binding power. When we grasp or recognize the law, when we find it rational that crime should be punished, this is not because law is positive but rather because it has an essential status for us. It is not simply valid for us externally because it *is* so; rather it is also valid for us internally, it is rationally valid as something essential, because it also is itself internal and rational. Positivity does not in any way detract from its character as rational and therefore as something that is our own. The laws of freedom always have a positive aspect, an aspect marked by reality, externality, contingency in their appearance. Laws must be determinate. Externality already enters into the determination or the quality of punishment, and even more into its quantity. Positivity simply cannot be removed from punishment but is wholly necessary to it. ˜This final determination of the immediate, this immediate [factor],˜[10] is something positive, i.e., not at all rational in and for itself. For example, in the case of punishment, round numbers determine the amount of the penalty; | it is not 181
possible to determine by reason what the absolutely just penalty is. Whatever is positive *according to its nature* is also irrational. It must be determinate, and is so in such a way that it has or contains ˜nothing rational˜[11] in it.

This aspect is also necessary in the case of the revelatory religion. Since historical, externally appearing elements are found in it, there is also present a positive and contingent [feature], which can just as well take one form as another.[12] Because of the externality and appearance that are posited along with it [i.e., revelation], this positive [feature] is always present. However, we must distinguish between the positive as such, the abstract positive, and ˜[the positive in the form of] rational law.˜[13] The law of freedom is not valid simply because it is there, but rather because it is the determination

10. *L reads:* —this final determination of the immediate. This immediate [factor] *W (Var) reads:* This final determinacy of the immediate

11. *Thus Hu, W; L reads:* a rational element

12. *Thus L, Hu, An; W (Var) adds:* This occurs also in the case of religion.

13. *Thus L; W_1 (Var) reads:* law, the rational law. *W_2 (Var) reads:* the positive in the form of and as the law of freedom.

of our rationality itself. When it is known in this way, then it is not something that is merely positive or externally valid. Religion also appears as positive in the entire content of its doctrines. But it should not remain in this form; it should not be a matter of mere representation or of bare remembrance.

The second aspect of positivity is connected with the verification of religion, namely, that this external [feature] should bear witness to the truth of a religion, and should be regarded as the ground of its truth. Verification may sometimes take the form of the positive as such—namely, *miracles* and *testimonies,* ˜which are supposed to verify the fact that this individual has done this or that,˜[14] has given this or that doctrine. Miracles are positive occurrences, sensible givens, perceptible alterations in the sensible world, and this perception itself is sensible because it consists in a sensible alteration. In regard to this form of positivity, it has already been remarked[15]
182 that it certainly | can bring about a kind of verification for human beings as sentient beings. But that is only the beginning of verification, it is the sensible or as it were unspiritual verification, by which precisely what is spiritual cannot be verified. The spiritual as such cannot be directly verified by the unspiritual, the sensible. The chief thing about this aspect of miracles is that in this way they are actually put aside. For, on the one hand, the understanding can attempt to explain the miracles naturally, it can advance many probabilities against them; but this involves confining one's attention to the external, eventlike character of miracles and directing one's arguments against this aspect. What matters most to reason with respect to miracles, on the other hand, is that what is spiritual cannot be verified externally. For the spiritual is higher than the external; it can be verified only from within and through itself; it is confirmed only in and through itself. This is what can be called "the witness of spirit."[16]

14. *L reads:* which are supposed to verify the fact that this individual *Hu reads:* that this individual has done this or that, *An reads:* that this individual W_1 *(Var) reads:* the verification that this individual W_2 *(Var) reads:* which are supposed to prove the divinity of the revealing individual, and that this individual

15. [*Ed.*] See Vol. 1:411–413.

16. [*Ed.*] The expression *Zeugnis des Geistes* contains an ambivalence or double meaning for Hegel. On the one hand, it can refer to the witness of the Holy Spirit or the Spirit of God, by which authentic faith is awakened in human subjects; on

This very point has found expression in religious narratives. Moses performs miracles before Pharaoh, and the Egyptian magicians imitate him;[17] which is to say that no great value is placed on miracles. The main point, however, is that Christ indeed says, "You demand signs and wonders," and so reviles the Pharisees, who demand from him attestations of this sort;[18] he himself also says, "After ˜my death˜[19] many will come who perform miracles in my name, but I have not recognized them."[20] Here Christ himself rejects miracles as a genuine criterion of truth. This is the essential point, and we must hold fast to it. Verification by miracles, as well as the attack upon miracles, belong to a lower sphere that concerns us not at all.

The witness of spirit is the authentic witness. It can be of diverse sorts. ˜In an indeterminate, more general way,˜[21] it can be whatever accords with spirit, whatever awakens in it, or produces in its inwardness, a deeper resonance. In history, all that is noble, lofty, and divine speaks to us internally; to it our spirit bears witness. This witness may remain nothing more than this general resonance, this inner agreement, | this empathy and sympathy. But beyond this, 183
the witness of spirit may also be connected with insight and thought. Insofar as this insight is not sensible in character, it belongs directly to thought; it appears in the form of reasons, distinctions, etc., in the form of mental activity, exercised along with and according to the specific forms of thought, the categories. This thinking may

the other hand, it can refer to the witness of *our* spirit to spiritual truth. (See Vol. 1:337 n. 149.) The two meanings are in fact two aspects of a single truth, since the Spirit of God witnesses only in and through our spirits: there is no divine witness apart from the activity of human spirit; however, the latter is not an autonomous, singular activity but the inner working of the one holy and universal Spirit. In some contexts, especially those concerned with the formation of the community of the Spirit, Hegel intends the former meaning, while in others (such as the paragraphs immediately following) the stress falls on the latter. In accord with our principle of capitalizing "spirit" when it has the representational-religious function of referring to the Holy Spirit, we translate as either "the witness of the Spirit" or "the witness of spirit," depending on how we construe the primary intention of specific passages.

17. [*Ed.*] See Exod. 7:9–12, 22; 8:3.

18. [*Ed.*] A conflation of John 4:48 and Matt. 12:38–39.

19. *Thus An; L reads:* my resurrection

20. [*Ed.*] A paraphrase of Matt. 7:22–23.

21. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* indeterminately and generally,

appear in more or less mature forms; it may serve as the presupposition of one's heart or of one's spiritual life in general—the presupposition of universal principles, which are acknowledged to be valid and which direct the life of a human being, serving as one's maxims. These need not be conscious maxims, but they are the means by which the character of a human being is formed, the universal that has obtained a firm foothold in one's spirit. This is a permanent, governing element in one's spirit. It is upon firm foundations of this kind, on presuppositions like this, on ethical principles of this type, that the powers of reasoning and defining can begin. In this respect the levels of development and ways of life of human beings vary considerably, just as do their needs. The highest need of the human spirit, however, is so to think that the witness of spirit is present [for it] not merely in that first resonating mode of sympathy, nor in the second way of providing firm foundations[22] upon which views may be established and firm presuppositions from which conclusions can be drawn and deductions made. The witness of spirit in its highest form is that of philosophy, according to which the concept develops the truth purely as such from itself without presuppositions. As it develops, it cognizes—in and through its development it has insight into—the necessity of the truth.

Faith and thought have often been opposed in such a way that we say: one can ˜be convinced˜[23] of God, of the truths of religion, in no other way than by thinking.[24] But the witness of spirit can be present in manifold and various ways; it is not required that for
184 all of | humanity the truth be brought forth in a philosophical way. The needs of human beings are different in accord with their cultivation and their free spiritual development; and this diversity in accord with the stage of development also encompasses that standpoint [we call] trust or belief on the basis of *authority*. Miracles

22. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* and principles

23. *Thus B; L, W_1 (Var) read:* have an awareness W_2 *(Var) reads:* have a genuine conviction

24. *Thus B, An, similar in Hu; L, W (Var) add:* Hence the proofs of the existence of God have been declared the sole means of knowing the truth and of being convinced.

also have their place here, but it is interesting to note that miracles have been reduced to a minimum—namely, to those recounted in the Bible.

[25]That sympathy of which we have spoken earlier, where the spirit or the soul cries out, "Yes, that is the truth"—that sympathy is so immediate a form of certainty that it can be as secure for one person as thinking is for another. [It is] something so immediate that just for this reason it is something posited, given, or positive; [it is so immediate] that precisely this immediacy has the form of positivity and is not brought forth by means of the concept.[26] We ought to bear in mind, however, that only human beings have religion. Religion has its seat and soil in the activity of thinking. The heart and feeling that directly sense the truth of religion are not the heart and feeling of an animal but of a thinking human being; they are a thinking heart and a thinking feeling, and whatever [measure] of religion is in this heart and feeling is a thought of this heart and feeling. [27]But to be sure, insofar as we begin to draw conclusions, to reason, to give grounds, to advance to the categories of thought, this is invariably thinking.

Since the doctrines of the Christian religion are present in the Bible, they are thereby given in a positive fashion; and if they are subjectively | appropriated, if spirit gives witness to them, this can 185
happen in an entirely immediate fashion, with one's innermost being, one's spirit, one's thought, one's reason, being touched by them and assenting to them. Thus the Bible is for Christians the basis, the fundamental basis, which has this effect on them, which strikes a chord within them, and gives firmness to their convictions.

25. *Precedes in L (1827?), similar in* W_2*:* In general, however, there is still something positive in these different forms of the witness of spirit.

26. *Thus L with Hu, An;* W_2 *(Var) reads:* Because of its immediacy, sympathy—this immediate certainty—is itself something positive, and the reasoning that proceeds from something posited or given has just such a foundation.

[*Ed.*] Cf. the following footnote.

27. *Precedes in L (1827?):* Likewise, as we have noted in the second instance, in any process of reasoning that has a firm foundation and presupposition, the foundation is something positive, posited, given. Reasoning has a foundation that has not investigated itself, that has not been produced by the concept.

[*Ed.*] Cf. the preceding footnote.

Beyond this, however, human beings, because they are able to think, do not remain in the immediacy of assent and testimony, but also indulge in thoughts, in deliberation, in considerations concerning this immediate witness. These thoughts and considerations result in ˜a developed˜[28] religion; in its most highly developed form it is *theology* or scientific religion, whose content, as the witness of spirit, is [also] known in scientific fashion.

But here the opposing thesis perhaps comes in, for the theologians say that we ought to hold exclusively to the Bible. In one respect, this is an entirely valid principle. For there are in fact many people who are very religious and hold exclusively to the Bible, who do nothing but read the Bible, cite passages from it, and in this way lead a very pious, religious life. Theologians, however, they are not; such an attitude has nothing of a scientific, theological character.[29] But just as soon as religion is no longer simply the reading and repetition of passages, as soon as what is called explanation or interpretation begins, as soon as an attempt is made by inference and exegesis to find out the *meaning* of the words in the Bible, then we embark upon the process of reasoning, reflection, thinking; and the question then becomes how we should exercise this process of thinking, and whether our thinking is correct or not. It helps not at all to say that one's thoughts are based on the Bible. As soon as these thoughts are no longer simply the words of the Bible, their content is given a form, more specifically, a logical form. Or certain presuppositions are made with regard to this content, and with these one enters into the process of interpretation. These

28. *Thus L, B, An; W (Var) reads:* still further development in

29. *Thus L, An, W_1, similar in Hu; W_2 (MiscP) adds:* Goeze, the Lutheran zealot, had a celebrated collection of Bibles; the Devil quotes the Bible too, but that by no means makes the theologian.

[*Ed.*] The Hamburg Hauptpastor Johann Melchior Goeze was Lessing's chief opponent in the controversy surrounding Reimarus's *Fragments*. It began with the publication of Goeze's book, *Versuch einer Historie der gedruckten niedersächsischen Bibeln vom Jahr 1470 bis 1621* (Halle, 1775), with which it is unlikely that Hegel was familiar. But Lessing alluded many times to Goeze's Bible collection; see his *Anti-Goeze, d.i. Notgedrungene Beiträge zu den freiwilligen Beiträgen des Herrn Pastor Goeze* (Braunschweig, 1778), nos. 1, 9, in Lessing, *Vermischte Schriften*, vol. 6 (Leipzig, 1791), pp. 159, 275 (Lessing, *Sämtliche Schriften* 13:142, 195).

presuppositions are the permanent element in interpretation; one brings along representations and principles, which guide the interpretation. | 186

The interpretation of the Bible exhibits its content, however, in the form of a particular age; ˜the interpretation of a thousand years ago˜[30] was wholly different from that of today. Among the presuppositions that one brings to the Bible today belong, for example, the views that humanity is good by nature, or that we cannot cognize God.[31] Thus here the positive can enter again in another form: we bring with us certain propositions such as that human beings have these feelings, are constituted in this or that particular way. So everything then depends on whether this content, these views and propositions, are true; and this is no longer the Bible, but instead words that spirit comprehends internally. If spirit expresses in a different way what is expressed in the Bible, then this is already a form that spirit gives [the content], the form of thinking. The form that one gives to this content has to be investigated. Here again the positive enters, in the sense that, for example, the formal logic of inference has been presupposed, namely, finite relations of thought. In terms of the ordinary relations of inference, only the finite can be grasped and cognized, only the understandable, but not the divine. This way of thinking is not adequate to the divine content; the latter is ruined by it. Insofar as theology is not a mere rehearsal of the Bible but goes beyond the words of the Bible and concerns itself with what kinds of feelings exist internally, it utilizes forms of thinking, it engages in thinking. If it uses these forms haphazardly, ˜because one˜[32] has presuppositions and prejudices, the result is something contingent and arbitrary. [What is pertinent here] can only be forms that are genuine and logically developed in terms of

30. *Thus Hu; An reads:* indeed a thousand years ago [it] *L reads:* the first interpretation in the early period of the church *W (Var) reads:* the first interpretation

31. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* Imagine how someone with these prejudices in mind must distort the Bible! People bring these prejudices to the Bible, although the meaning of the Christian religion is precisely the cognition of God; it is indeed the religion in which God has revealed himself, has said what he is.

[*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, nn. 106, 253.

32. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* because it

necessity. But the investigation of these forms of thought falls to philosophy alone. Thus theology itself does not know what it wants when it turns against philosophy. Either it carries on unaware of
187 the fact that it needs these forms, that it itself | thinks, and that it is a question of proceeding in accord with thought; or ˜it fosters˜[33] a deception, by reserving for itself the option to think as it chooses, in contingent fashion, when it knows that the cognition of the true nature of spirit is damaging to this arbitrary sort of cognition. This contingent, arbitrary way of thinking is the positive element that enters in here. Only the *concept* on its own account liberates itself truly and thoroughly from the positive. For in philosophy and in religion there is found this highest freedom, which is thinking itself as such.

Doctrine itself, the content, also takes on the form of the positive, as noted above; it is valid, it is firmly established, it is ˜an entity that has to be reckoned with in actual society.˜[34] Everything rational, every law, has this form.[35] But only its *form* is positive; its *content* must be that of spirit. The Bible has this form of positivity, yet according to one of its own sayings,[36] "The letter kills, but the Spirit gives life" [2 Cor. 3:6]. It is a question, then, as to which spirit we bring in, which spirit gives life to the positive. We must know that we bring with us a concrete spirit, a thinking, reflecting, sensing spirit; we must be aware of this spirit, which is at work, comprehending the content. This comprehension is not a passive acceptance, but since it is spirit that comprehends, it is at the same time its activity. Only in the mechanical sphere does one of the sides remain passive in the process of reception. Spirit, therefore, reaches out to, attains the positive realm; it has its representations

33. *Thus L; W_1 (Var) reads:* it is *W_2 (Var) reads:* it is not serious about it but rather is

34. *L (Var) reads:* an entity reckoned with by everyone. *Hu reads:* a thing to be reckoned with in actual society. *W (Var) reads:* something binding, to be reckoned with in society.

[*Ed.*] Cf. the following footnote.

35. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* namely, that it is an entity and, as such, is what is essential and binding for everyone.

[*Ed.*] Cf. the preceding footnote.

36. *In B's margin:* 26 July 1827

and concepts, it is logical in essence, it is a thinking activity. This, its [own] activity, spirit must know.

This thinking can proceed in one or another of the categories of finitude. It is, however, spirit that begins in this way from the positive but is itself there essentially alongside it. It is to become the true and proper Spirit, the Holy Spirit, which comprehends the divine and knows its content to be divine. This is the witness of spirit, | which, as we have shown above,[37] may be more or less 188
developed. In regard to positivity, the main point is that spirit conducts itself in a thinking fashion and its activity occurs within the categories or determinations of thought; here ˜spirit is purely active, sentient, or rational.˜[38] But most people are not conscious of the fact that they are active in this reception. Theologians are like the Englishman who didn't know that he was speaking prose;[39] because they work exegetically and (so they believe) in a passively receptive way, [they] have no inkling of the fact that they are thereby active and reflective. But if thinking is merely contingent, it abandons itself to the categories of finite content, of finitude, of finite thinking, and is incapable of comprehending the divine in the content; it is not the divine but the finite spirit that moves in such categories. As a result of such a finite thinking and comprehending of the divine, or of what is in and for itself, as a result of this finite thinking of the absolute content, the fundamental doctrines of

37. [*Ed.*] See above, pp. 255–257.

38. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* spirit is active, whether it be in sentient or rational fashion, etc.

39. [*Ed.*] Hegel is alluding here to the dialogue between M. Jourdain and the teacher of philosophy in Molière's *Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme,* act 2, scene 4, where the philosopher assures M. Jourdain that he is indeed speaking prose (and that one must really speak either prose or verse). Hegel erroneously ascribes M. Jourdain's lack of culture to an Englishman. That this is actually an error of Hegel and not of Hube's transcription (our only source for this passage) is confirmed by the following comment about Newton's lack of awareness of the conceptual presuppositions of the physical sciences, found in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 3:323 (*Werke* 15:447): "Newton is so complete a barbarian as regards his conceptions that his case is like that of another of his countrymen who was surprised and rejoiced to learn that he had talked prose all his life, not having had any idea that he was so accomplished." It was probably because of this association with Newton that the erroneous ascription of M. Jourdain's naïveté to an Englishman came about. Cf. Hegel, *Briefe* 2:251.

Christianity have for the most part disappeared from dogmatics. Philosophy ˜is preeminently, though not exclusively,˜[40] what is at present essentially orthodox; the propositions that have always been valid, the basic truths of Christianity, are maintained and preserved by it.

In our present consideration of this religion, we shall not set to work in *merely historical* fashion, which would entail starting with external matters, but rather we shall proceed *conceptually.*[41] The form of activity that begins with externals appears to be [capable of] comprehension only on one side, while on the other it is ˜independent.˜[42] Our attitude here essentially takes the form of an activity such that thinking is conscious of itself, of the process involved in the categories of thought—a thinking that has tested and recognized itself, that knows how it thinks and which are the finite and which the true categories of thought. The fact that we began from the other side, from the positive side, ˜from the indi-
189 vidual | development of the subject, from education in faith—[this has]˜[43] to be put aside insofar as we proceed *scientifically.*

3. Survey of Previous Developments[44]

This is the point at which to survey our previous course and to discuss the relation of this course to the final stage of religion; here

40. *Thus L, similar in W; An (Var) reads:* alone is

41. [*Ed.*] In the *Philosophy of Religion* as a whole, Hegel offers a speculative transfiguration of religion, not a merely historical (*historisch*) description of it. This is true also of the Christian religion, to which he now turns; it is already being viewed and interpreted from the standpoint of the absolute philosophy. Hegel does not intend to deny the positive, historical (*geschichtlich*) character of religion, and of the Christian religion especially; but since his intention is to proceed *scientifically* in this work, as he says in the last sentence of the paragraph, and since scientific cognition entails the speculative grasp of what is true, actual, rational, and spiritual, merely historical details are deemphasized.

42. *Thus Hu; L, W (Var) read:* [merely] activity.

43. *Thus An with Hu; L (Var) reads:* occurs in education etc., and has *W (Var) reads:* occurs in education and is necessary there, but here it has

44. [*Ed.*] This section expands considerably the brief concluding section to the 1824 introduction (Sec. 4), where Hegel discussed the relation of the consummate religion to the preceding religions. The present survey is developed in rather strictly logical categories and describes the process by which finite spirit "rises" to the absolute through the various forms of religious consciousness, which, when taken together, constitute the history of religion. The survey reflects Hegel's penchant for

for the first time we are able to comprehend the course as a whole and its meaning. We refer back to what has already been said.[45] Religion is spirit as consciousness of its essence. On the one hand, there is a spirit that is the spirit of distinction; the other spirit is spirit as essence, as true, nonfinite spirit. This separation or diremption, this distinguishing, which resides in the concept of spirit, is what we have called the elevation of spirit from finite to infinite.[46] This elevation appears metaphysically in the proofs for the existence of God. Finite spirit makes infinite spirit its object, knows it as its own essence. If we allow ourselves to speak this way, the word "finite" becomes an indefinite, abstract word, in turn making the word "infinite" also indefinite; and spirit, defined as infinite, is designated only in an indeterminate way—indeed, not only indeterminately but also one-sidedly.

One must be clear about these logical definitions of "finite" and "infinite."[47] When we keep them apart, we are in the realm of finite thinking. When we say "infinite spirit," the word "infinite" is itself understood in a one-sided way because it has the finite over against it. In order not to be one-sided, spirit must encompass finitude within itself, and finitude in general means nothing more than a process of self-distinguishing. Consciousness is precisely the mode of finitude of spirit: distinction is present here. One thing is on one side, another on the other side; something has its limit or end in something else, and in this way they are limited. Finitude is this distinguishing, which in spirit takes the form of consciousness. Spirit must have consciousness, distinction, otherwise it is not spirit; accordingly, this is the moment of finitude in it. It must have this character of finitude within itself—that may seem blasphemous. But if it did not have it within itself, and thus if it confronted finitude

summing up previous stages of the discussion, but it may also reflect the closer association with the *Logic* that is characteristic of the 1827 lectures as a whole. Hegel is at pains to show in these lectures that the concept of religion and the various historical forms that it assumes correspond strictly to logical moments of the concept itself.

45. [*Ed.*] See above, p. 249, as well as Vol 1:380 ff.

46. *L (1827?) adds:* Just as spirit defines itself as finite, it [also] defines itself vis-à-vis spirit as infinite.

47. [*Ed.*] For this and what follows, see *Science of Logic,* pp. 137–156 (cf. *GW* 11:78–85).

190 from the other | side, then its infinitude would be a spurious infinitude. When we view the characteristic of finitude as something contradictory to God, then we take the finite as something fixed, independent—not as something transitional, but rather as something essentially independent, a limitation that remains utterly such—and then we have not properly recognized the nature of the finite and the infinite. The finite is not, however, the absolute. Neither are finite things absolute, nor is the absolute the definition of finitude logically or in thought; rather the definition of the latter is precisely to be not true in itself. If God has the finite only over against himself, then he himself is finite and limited. Finitude must be posited in God himself, not as something insurmountable, absolute, independent, but above all as this process of distinguishing that we have seen in spirit and in consciousness—a distinguishing that, because it is a transitory moment and because finitude is no truth, is also eternally self-sublating. Infinite spirit is posited in a one-sided abstraction when we say that the finite elevates itself to the infinite. The finite is here taken just as indefinitely as infinitude. This is the deficiency; this abstraction of the infinite has to be sublated, and likewise the abstraction of the finite, in which we initially perceive the finitude. The *consideration* of finitude is what gives us development and progressive determination.

We began with the *concept of religion.*[48] Religion is the spirit that relates itself to itself and thus to its essence, to true spirit; it is reconciled with true spirit and finds itself in it. Because this concept of religion is *only* a concept, it is finite; it is not yet the *idea,* the realization, the actualization of the concept. It is *in* itself the true, but it is not yet *for* itself; but the essence of spirit is to be for itself what it is in itself or what its concept is. Since, therefore, finitude is so defined that this being-in-itself is only spirit in its concept or religion in its concept, any advance appears to sublate the concept, i.e., the one-sidedness, deficiency, or mere abstraction of the concept, whether it be grasped now as finitude or as abstract infinitude. Our advance had, therefore, the signification or character of sublating this abstraction. The second point is this: whatever is

48. [*Ed.*] As treated in Part I of the lectures.

conceptual to begin with | —i.e., merely conceptual or subjective 191
in the sense that it has the content only in itself—is at the same time the first or immediate. Whatever is only in itself or in accord with its concept—such as the human being as a child—is, in its existence as a determinate being, at first only something immediate; and immediacy, therefore, is the finitude that we have to deal with first.

So this is the course we have taken. First we have considered the concept of spirit or of religion. But this in-itself, or the concept merely as such, is nothing but the immediate modality of the concept, immediate being, and this we have in *the natural.*[49] The natural is whatever is *immediately;* finitude is immediate being. In its immediate being, spirit is empirical consciousness, immediate self-consciousness, which views itself as essence, knows itself as the power of nature. This immediate spirit is indeed fulfilled, determinate in itself, concrete, but it is only empirically concrete. For the content by which it is filled is the content of inclinations and desires, instincts and passions; and this first fulfillment is the fulfillment of spirit's merely natural state. This constitutes the finitude of spirit, its natural, empirical self-consciousness. Spirit is fulfilled, but empirically, not by its concept; but what is needful is that it must become *for* itself what it is *in* itself, it must arrive at its concept. This progression is logical: it lies in the nature of the determining process itself to determine itself further in this way—this is logical necessity.

The further form of this finitude we have also seen. This finitude, which is unmediated being, can also be defined as the unitary being of immediate, finite spirit with itself, or as spirit that has not yet arrived at the separation through which it distinguishes this natural state and desire from itself, and therefore it is not yet self-contained, it has not yet attained the determination of freedom. In order to be free, spirit must remove this immediate, natural, empirical state, withdrawing from it. The next step, therefore, is the withdrawal-

49. [*Ed.*] "Nature Religion" constitutes the first of the three main divisions of Part II, *Determinate Religion,* in the 1827 lectures. The religion of natural immediacy, or magic, represents the first and most primitive form of nature religion.

into-self of spirit from its submersion in the natural. We have seen various forms of this.[50] The outstanding example is the religion of India—this being-within-self, Brahman, pure self-consciousness, the severance by means of which the being-within-self of pure self-consciousness is posited in abstraction from everything concrete
192 and natural | and from all worldly delight and imagery. But this separation is at the same time abstract: this way of thinking is on the one hand still empty; on the other hand it is an immediate self-consciousness that has not yet distinguished itself from itself, has no object, and is nothing other than subjective, abstract knowledge. From this sort of cognition, then, there emerges a first form of unity or reconciliation,[51] namely, that this inwardness fills itself with externality, that it shows itself no longer as an abstraction but as something concrete, that it takes this externality into itself, showing itself above all as *power*. This is the unrefined condition in which the inward has only the signification of something external, an external that still remains only in its natural state.

The second stage was the beginning of *spiritual religion*,[52] namely, a religion of being-withdrawn-into-self,[53] a religion of the freedom of spirit, for which the natural (which was the previous fulfillment) is not an independent content, constituting a fulfillment in an immediate way, but is only the appearance of something inward instead, the appearance of the ethical, which has rational inwardness as its defining character. This inwardness is so concrete

50. [*Ed.*] Hegel here turns to the second form of nature religion, the religion of being-within-self (*Insichsein*), which in this summary he identifies with Buddhism and Hinduism, but which in his actual treatment he distinguishes, regarding Buddhism (the religion of being-within-self in the strict sense) as the earlier form, and Hinduism (the religion of phantasy) as the higher form.

51. [*Ed.*] This is an apparent reference to what are described in the 1827 lectures as "the religions of transition" from nature religion to spiritual religion, namely, the religion of light (Persian religion) and Egyptian religion, and in particular to the connection in these religions between the pure (spiritual) inwardness of the good and the pure (natural) externality of light.

52. [*Ed.*] "Spiritual religion" (or the religion of spiritual individuality, in which "spirit" is still construed as *finite*) is the second main division of *Determinate Religion*. In this paragraph Hegel describes Greek religion as the religion of ethical inwardness.

53. [*Ed.*] *Insichgegangensein*, literally, "being-gone-within-self."

within itself, therefore, that concreteness belongs to it and constitutes the definition or nature of inwardness: the concrete is the ethical as such. But it does indeed have the natural as its manifestation, its appearance; this concrete inwardness—the ethical—is, however, not yet posited within itself as subjectivity. Thus a condition of finitude comes about in which the ethical distinguishes itself into particular ethical powers; it is only a collection of these powers with a particular content—an encompassing totality, to be sure, though only a wholeness and not subjectivity—"for the appearance still occurs in sensible fashion."[54]

The other mode of finitude is that the external still is [has the character of] sensible being. In this second sphere of withdrawal-into-self, over against the *religion of beauty* we have seen the *religion of sublimity*[55]—that is, spirituality fulfilled within itself in such a way that these particularities, these ethical powers, are brought together in a single purpose by means of which the One, the spirit, is defined as having being within itself, | as wise. Here, 193
therefore, we have spirit in its freedom, at once inwardly concrete and inwardly determinate, which is to say that it exists as the Wise One. This spirit first merits for us the name of God, while the previous one did not. It is no longer substance but subject. Thus spirit has a purpose within itself; it is inwardly determinate. But the content of its subjectivity, its infinite determination, its inner content that we call purpose, is still abstract.

The third stage is the one where *purpose*[56] receives a comprehensive, universal content, although chiefly within the world in external fashion—[specifically] among the Romans. Wisdom is a

54. *L (1827?) reads:* One can make light of the fact that particularity has not been taken up into absolute harmony or unity.

55. [*Ed.*] The religion of beauty (Greek religion) and the religion of sublimity (Jewish religion) together constitute spiritual religion (the religion of spiritual individuality). In the 1827 lectures, Hegel treats Greek religion first, followed by Jewish religion—just the reverse of the order in which he discusses these religions in the other lecture series. In Jewish religion, what is "external" over against the ethical inwardness of the Greeks—namely, the one good, wise, all-powerful God—is still construed as a finite, sensible being.

56. [*Ed.*] The "religion of purposiveness" (*Zweckmässigkeit*) or Roman religion constitutes the third and final division of *Determinate Religion.*

purpose [of this kind], but in the form of an abstraction. Once this purpose is developed, its mode is externality. It is a worldly purpose, a unity, but still an abstract unity, which even in this reality is only abstract and consequently [mere] domination as such. The purpose, therefore, takes the form of subjectivity possessing comprehensive reality, but in such fashion that the subject, while comprehensive, comprehends only what is finite.

The transition [to the consummate religion] is the spirit that has entered into itself: it is the concept that has only *itself* as its purpose—this inwardly subsisting mode [of being] whose purpose is only itself, is God himself. The idea has only itself as purpose; and now this concept is purified in order to have a more comprehensive purpose, but one that is also taken back into subjectivity. Spirit now has as its final purpose its concept, its concrete essence itself; it eternally realizes and objectifies its purpose, and is free in it—indeed it is freedom itself because this purpose is its own nature. Thereby finitude is sublated. This progression has the more specific character of containing that which is inwardly self-determining, the determinateness of spirit. It involves the fact that spirit shows itself in this sphere as inwardly posited. Spirit is precisely that which determines itself infinitely. To be sure, the series of forms that we have passed through is a succession of stages that follow upon one another; but these forms are encompassed within the infinite, absolute form, in absolute subjectivity, and only the spirit so defined as absolute subjectivity *is* spirit.

On the one hand we have seen a stripping away of these determinacies, these modes of finitude and of finite forms. On the other hand it is the nature of spirit, of the concept itself, to determine
194 itself in this way; | in order to be spirit, the concept must first traverse these forms. Only when this content has traversed these determinations is it spirit. Spirit is essence—but only insofar as it has returned to itself from out of itself, only insofar as it is that actual being which returns and is at home with itself, that being which posits itself from itself as at home with itself. This positing produces the distinctive determinations of its activity, and these distinctive determinations are the forms through which spirit has to move.

We have said that spirit is immediate. This is a mode of finitude. All the same, it is spirit, the concept, that determines itself. The first of its determinate forms is that of inward self-diremption and of being immediately, in accordance with this form of finitude. The concept determines itself, posits itself as immediate; that concept for which spirit so determines itself, posits itself as immediate, we ourselves still are. The last stage, however, is that this concept, this subjectivity for which spirit is, is not to remain something external to spirit, but rather is itself to be absolute and infinite subjectivity, infinite form. The infinite form is the circuit of this determining process; the concept is spirit only because it has achieved determinacy through this circuit, has moved through it. This is how it first becomes concrete. [57]This means on the one hand a stripping away of the mode of finitude, and on the other hand a self-diremption and a return to self from diremption; only so is it posited as spirit. At first, spirit is only a presupposition; that it *is* as spirit and comes to be comprehended as spirit is nothing immediate, and cannot happen in an immediate fashion. It is spirit only as that which dirempts itself and returns into itself again—i.e., only after traversing this circuit. What we have traversed in our treatment is the becoming, the bringing forth of spirit by itself, and ˜only as such, or as eternally bringing itself forth, is it spirit.˜[58] This course is, therefore, the grasping or comprehension of spirit. It is the concept that determines itself, and takes these determinations back into itself, as the concept; in this way the concept is | infinite subjectivity. 195
[59]What results is the concept that posits itself, and has itself as its content. This, then, is the absolute idea. The idea is the unity of concept and reality; it is concept *and* objectivity. Truth consists in objectivity being adequate to the concept; but what is adequate to the concept is only the concept itself insofar as it has itself as its counterpart or object. The content as idea is the truth.

57. *In B's margin:* 27 July 1827

58. *Hu reads:* that which it now traverses, it is as such, namely, spirit.

59. *Precedes in L (1827?):* In this way, the absolute objectification of spirit consists precisely in the fact that the concept determines itself, fulfills itself with its own concept, with itself. The circuit of these forms is the process of self-positing by the concept. These forms, comprehended together in their unity, are the concept.

Freedom is the following aspect of the idea: the concept, because it is conceptually at home with itself, is free. The idea alone is what is true, but equally so it is freedom. The idea is what is true, and the true is thus absolute spirit. This is the true definition of spirit. The concept that has determined itself, that has made itself into its own object, has thereby posited finitude in itself, but posited *itself* as the content of this finitude and in so doing sublated it—that is spirit.

[60]We are accustomed to say of God that he is the creator of the world, that God is wholly just, all-knowing, totally wise. But this is not the authentic way of cognizing what the truth is, what God is; it is the way of representation, of understanding. It is necessary, of course, to define the concept by predicates too, but this is an incomplete, reflective way of thinking; it is not thinking by means of the concept, thinking the concept of God, the idea. Predicates signify particular determinations; attributes, as particular determinations of this kind, are distinguished from one another. If one thinks of these differences determinately, they fall into contradiction with each other, and this contradiction is not resolved, or is resolved only in an abstract, superficial manner. We resolve it merely in an
196 abstraction, by allowing the | attributes to temper each other mutually or by abstracting from their particularity.[61] The outcome is that in this way God, because he is thus defined by predicates, is not grasped as living. This amounts to the same thing we have just stated, namely, that the contradictions are not resolved, or they are only abstractly resolved. The vitality of God or of spirit is nothing other than a self-determining (which can also appear as a predicate), a self-positing in finitude, [which involves] distinction and contradiction, but [is] at the same time an eternal sublating of this con-

60. *Precedes in L (1827?):* The task of philosophy is to cognize what God, the absolute truth, is. The customary, usual procedure (apart from proofs for the existence of God) is to assert this or that about God and to define him by means of predicates. His attributes tell us what he is, render him determinate.

[*Ed.*] Hegel is criticizing here the procedure of the *theologia naturalis,* which appends to the proofs a derivation of the divine attributes. See, e.g., Christian Wolff, *Theologia naturalis,* Part I, chaps. 1–4; Baumgarten's *Metaphysica,* chaps. 1–2, has a similar structure.

61. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.,* n. 49.

tradiction. This is the life, the deed, the activity of God; he is absolute activity, creative energy [*Aktuosität*], and his activity is to posit himself in contradiction, but eternally to resolve and reconcile this contradiction: God himself is the resolving of these contradictions. From this point of view, definition by predicates is incomplete, since they are only particular determinations whose contradiction is not resolved. They represent God as though he were not himself the resolution of these contradictions, as though he were not himself the one who resolves them. It would seem, then, that it is only our human particularity that comprehends specific, distinguishable aspects in God, and that these characteristics are rather just our own. But the particularity does not merely belong to our reflection; rather it is the nature of God, of spirit, it is his concept itself. In the same way, however, God is the one who resolves the contradiction—not by abstraction but in concrete fashion. This, then, is the living God.[62]

4. Division of the Subject[63]

Since we have now indicated the position of our earlier discussion in relation to the idea of God itself—namely, that it is the concept itself that sets up these distinctions and attains to itself through them, becoming for the first time idea in this way—we are now able to view the idea in its development and completion. We turn first to the division of the subject. In its outward aspect, | we can 197
say that this idea is for us. We now have the following distinctions regarding God as the absolute idea.

(1) First, God is the absolute idea for [us in the mode of] *thought* or *thinking*. Insofar as the content is [present] for thought, for the

62. *L (1827?) adds:* That God is living, the vitality of God, signifies that the particularities in him and their resolution are not merely an external aspect and are not grasped merely from our side.

63. [*Ed.*] In the *Ms.* and in the 1824 lectures, the "division of the subject" is found at the beginning of the second main section ("Concrete Representation" in the *Ms.*, "The Development of the Idea of God" in the 1824 lectures). Since the 1827 lectures lack a first section, containing the ontological proof of the existence of God—which in 1827 has been moved to *The Concept of Religion*—the "division" falls logically into the introduction, followed by the three main sections in which the three "elements" of the consummate religion are explicated.

soil of thinking, it can and must be grasped also in the mode of representation. Since indeed the eternal idea is for the thinking of humanity as a whole, and the thinking of humanity as a whole is extraneous to philosophical thinking, which transposes itself into the form of thinking itself, this thinking must also occur in the mode of representation. The idea of God is first to be considered as it is for thinking or in itself. This is *the eternal idea of God for itself*, what God is for himself, i.e., the eternal idea in the soil of thinking as such.

(2) Second, God is the eternal idea, not for us in the mode of thinking, but rather for finite, external, empirical spirit, for *sensible intuition*, for *representation*. The determinate being that God gives himself for the sake of representation is, in the first instance, *nature;* and therefore one of the ways God is there for representation is that finite, empirical spirit recognizes God from [the evidence of] nature. The other way, however, is that God is [present] for finite spirit *as finite spirit*. Thus, finite, concrete spirit is itself necessarily involved in the way that God is for it, the way God is manifest for it. To be more precise, God as such cannot properly *be* for spirit as finite; rather the basis of his being for finite spirit lies in the fact that the latter does not hold fast to its finitude as a subsisting being or something fixed, but is instead precisely the process of reconciling itself with God. As finite spirit, it is placed in a condition of separation; it has fallen away from God, it is apart from God. Since it is still related to God in this state of being apart from God, the contradiction consists in its cleavage and separation from God. The concrete spirit, the finite spirit defined as finite, is therefore in contradiction to its object or content, and this gives rise above all to the need to sublate this contradiction and separation that appear in finite spirit as such—in other words, the need for *reconciliation*. This need is the starting point; the next step is that God comes into being for finite spirit, that the latter should arrive at a knowledge and certainty of the divine content, and that the divine content should represent *itself* to that finite spirit which is at the same time
198 the *representing* spirit, spirit in finite, | empirical form. This can happen only insofar as spirit does indeed appear to it, but in an external fashion, and insofar as it is able to bring to consciousness (in this external fashion) what God is.

(3) [64]Third, God comes to be, one may say, for *sensibility,* for *subjectivity* and in the subjectivity of spirit, in the innermost being of subjective spirit. Here reconciliation, the sublation of that separation, is made actual; here *God as spirit is [present] in his community,* and the community is liberated from that antithesis and has the consciousness or certainty of its freedom in God.

These are the three ways by which the subject is related to God, the three modes of God's determinate being for subjective spirit. Since it is *we* who have made this distinction, this trichotomy, we have arrived at it more or less empirically, from our own standpoint. We know, in terms of our own spirit, that first of all we are able to think without this antithesis or cleavage within us, that secondly we are finite spirit, spirit in its cleavage and separation, and that thirdly we are spirit in the state of sensibility and subjectivity, of return to self—[which is] reconciliation, innermost feeling. Of these three, the first is the realm of *universality;* the second, the realm of *particularity;* the third, that of *singularity.*[65] These three realms are a presupposition that we have taken up as our definition. They are not to be regarded, however, as realms that are externally distinct, or as externally subsisting modes vis-à-vis God; rather it is the idea itself that makes these distinctions. The absolute, eternal idea is:

(1) First, in and for itself, God in his eternity before the creation of the world and outside the world.

(2) Second, God creates the world and posits the separation. He creates both nature and finite spirit. [66]What is thus created is at first an other, posited outside of God. But God is | essentially the 199
reconciling to himself of what is alien, what is particular, what is posited in separation from him. He must restore to freedom and

64. *Precedes in L (1827?):* Thus we have God in the first sphere of thinking in general; second, we have him in the form of representation.

65. [*Ed.*] The moments of universality (*Allgemeinheit*), particularity (*Besonderheit*), and singularity (*Einzelheit*) are the constitutive moments in the dialectic of the concept. See *Science of Logic,* pp. 600–621 (*GW* 12:32–52); *Encyclopedia,* §§ 183–187. The logical idea is the principle of universality; nature, the principle of particularity; and finite spirit, the principle of singularity. Each of these, in turn, mediates between the other two; together they constitute the structure of Hegel's entire philosophical system. The unity of all three is the infinite subjectivity of absolute spirit.

66. *Precedes in L (1827?), similar in W:* This creation [*W:* What is created], this other-being, divides of itself into two sides—physical nature and finite spirit.

to his truth what is alien, what has fallen away in the idea's self-diremption, in its falling away from itself. This is the path and the process of reconciliation.

(3) In the third place, through this process of reconciliation, spirit has reconciled with itself what it distinguished from itself in its act of diremption, of primal division, and thus it is the Holy Spirit, the Spirit [present] in its community.

These are not external distinctions, which *we* have made merely in accord with what we are; rather they are the activity, the developed vitality, of absolute spirit itself. It is itself its eternal life, which is a development and a return of this development into itself; this vitality in development, this actualization of the concept, is what we have now to consider.[67]

67. *W adds the "Division of the Subject" contained in the 1831 lectures; the fuller version of* W_2 *reads:* We have, speaking generally, to consider the idea as divine self-revelation, and this revelation is to be taken in the sense indicated by the three determinations just mentioned.

According to the first of these, God is [present] for finite spirit purely and solely as thinking. This is the theoretical consciousness in which the thinking subject has an attitude of full composure and is not yet posited in this relationship itself, is not yet posited in the process [of reconciliation], but remains in the wholly undisturbed calm of thinking spirit. Here God is thought for thinking spirit, the latter's thought consisting in the simple conclusion that God brings himself into harmony with himself, is immediately present to himself, by means of his differentiation—which, however, is still [found] here in the form of pure ideality and has not yet reached the form of externality. This is the first relationship, which is only for the thinking subject, and is occupied only with the pure content. This is *the kingdom of the Father.*

The second determination is *the kingdom of the Son,* in which God is [present] for representation in the element of representing as such. This is the moment of particularization as such. In this second standpoint, that which was God's "other" in the first moment, though without being defined as such, now obtains the *determination* of the other. Considered from the first standpoint, God as the Son is not distinguished from the Father, but is merely expressed in the mode of sensibility. In the second element, however, the Son obtains the determination as other, and thus we pass out of the pure ideality of thinking and into representation. If, according to the first determination, God begets only a son, here he brings forth nature. Here the other is nature, and distinction comes into its own. What is distinguished is nature, the world as a whole, and the spirit that is related to it, the natural spirit. What we have earlier designated as "subject" comes into play as itself the content; human being is involved in this content. Since human beings are here related to nature and are themselves natural, they have the character of subjects only within the sphere of religion, and consequently we have here to consider nature and humanity from the point of view of religion. The Son comes into the world, and this

A. THE FIRST ELEMENT: THE IDEA OF GOD IN AND FOR ITSELF[68]

In accord with the first element, then, we consider God in his eternal idea, as he is in and for himself, prior to or apart from the creation | of the world, so to speak.[69] Insofar as he is thus within 200
himself, it is a matter of the eternal idea, which is not yet posited in its reality but is itself still only the abstract idea. But God is the creator of the world; it belongs to his being, his essence, to be the creator; insofar as he is not the creator, he is grasped inadequately. His creative role is not an *actus* that ˜happened˜[70] once; [rather,] what takes place in the idea is an *eternal* moment, an eternal determination of the idea. | 201

Thus God in his eternal idea is still within the abstract element of thinking in general—the abstract idea of thinking, not of conceiving. We already know this pure idea, and therefore we need only dwell on it briefly.

Specifically, the eternal idea is expressed in terms of the holy

is the beginning of faith. When we speak of the coming of the Son into the world, we are already using the language of faith. God cannot properly *be* for finite spirit as such because, to the extent that God is for it, it follows immediately that finite spirit does not hold fast to its finitude as a subsisting being, but rather is in a relation to spirit, reconciles itself with God. As finite spirit its stance is one of falling away, of separation from God; thus it is in contradiction to its object, its content, and this contradiction constitutes, in the first instance, the need for the sublation of the contradiction. This need is the first step, and the next one is that God should come to be for spirit, that the divine content should represent itself to spirit—though at the same time this spirit exists in an empirical, finite fashion. Hence what God is appears to it in empirical fashion. But since in this history the divine steps into view for spirit, the history loses the character of external history. It becomes divine history, the history of the manifestation of God himself.

This constitutes the transition to *the kingdom of the Spirit,* which comprises the awareness that human beings are implicitly reconciled with God and that reconciliation exists for humanity. The process of reconciliation itself is comprised in the cultus.

68. [*Ed.*] "The First Element," like that of the 1824 lectures, and like Sec. B.a of the *Ms.*, "The Idea In and For Itself," concerns the immanent or logical Trinity. It is given an especially full treatment in the 1827 lectures, perhaps in response to recent attacks on the doctrine of the Trinity by F. A. G. Tholuck and others (see Vol. 1, 1827 *Intro.*, nn. 17, 18).

69. [*Ed.*] See *Science of Logic,* p. 50 (*GW* 11:21).

70. *Thus L; W_1 (Var) reads:* was undertaken

Trinity: it is God himself, eternally triune. Spirit is this process, movement, life. This life is self-differentiation, self-determination, and the first differentiation is that spirit *is* as this universal idea itself. The universal contains the entire idea, although it only contains it, it is only implicitly the idea. In this primal division is found the other, the particular, what stands over against the universal—that which stands over against God as distinguished from him, but in such a way that this distinguished aspect is God's entire idea in and for itself, so that these two determinations are also one and the same for each other, an identity, the One. Not only is this distinction implicitly sublated, and not only do we know that, but also it is established that the two distinguished moments are the same, that this distinction is sublated insofar as it is precisely what posits itself as no distinction at all; hence the one remains present to itself in the other.

That this is so is the Holy Spirit itself, or, expressed in the mode of sensibility, it is eternal love: *the Holy Spirit is eternal love.*

When we say, "God is love," we are saying something very great and true. But it would be senseless to grasp this saying in a simple-minded way as a simple definition, without analyzing what love is. For love is a distinguishing of two, who nevertheless are absolutely not distinguished for each other. The consciousness or feeling of the identity of the two—to be outside of myself and in the other—this is love. I have my self-consciousness not in myself but in the other. I am satisfied and have peace with myself only in this other—and I *am* only because I have peace with myself; if I did not have it, then I would be a contradiction that falls to pieces. This other, because it likewise exists outside itself, has its self-consciousness only in me, and both the other and I are only this consciousness of being-outside-ourselves and of our identity; we are only this intuition, feeling, and knowledge of our unity. This is love, and
202 without knowing that love is both a | distinguishing and the sublation of the distinction, one speaks emptily of it. ˜This is the simple, eternal idea.˜[71]

71. *Thus Hu; L (1827?) reads, similar in* W_1*, first and last sentence similar in* W_2*:* God is love: he is this distinguishing and the nullity of the distinction, a play of distinctions in which there is nothing serious, distinction precisely as sublated, i.e., the simple, eternal idea. We deal with the simple idea of God—the fact that

[72]When we speak of God in order to say what he is, it is customary to make use of attributes: God is thus and so; he is defined by predicates. This is the method of representation and understanding. Predicates are determinate, particular qualities: justice, goodness, omnipotence, etc. Because they have the feeling that this is not the authentic way to express the nature of God, the Orientals say that God is πολυώνυμος [worshiped under many names] and does not admit of exhaustion by predicates[73]—for names are in this sense the same as predicates. The real deficiency in this way of defining by predicates consists in the very fact that gives rise to this endless number of predicates, namely, that they designate only particular characteristics, of which there are many, and all of them are borne by the subject.[74] Because there are particular characteristics, and because one views these particularities in their determinateness, one thinks and develops them, they fall into opposition and contradiction with each other as a result, since they are not only distinct but opposed, and these contradictions remain unresolved.

This is also evident when these predicates are taken as expressing God's relation to the world.[75] The world is something other than God. Predicates as particular characteristics are not appropriate to the nature of God. Here, then, is the occasion for the other method, which regards them as relations of God to the world: e.g., the omnipresence and omniscience of God in the world. Accordingly, the predicates do not comprise the true relation of God to himself, but rather his relation | to an other, the world. So they are limited 203
and thereby come into contradiction with each other.

We are conscious of the fact that God is not represented in living fashion when so many particular characteristics are enumerated alongside one another. Put in another way, this is the same point

[W_1 *reads:* as] it is in the simple element of thinking and is the idea in its universality; this is the essential determination of the idea, the determination by which it has truth. We make the following remarks about this idea, its content and form.

72. *In B's margin:* 30 July 1827

73. [*Ed.*] Hegel may be referring here to Philo, to whom Neander attributes just this expression (*Gnostische Systeme*, p. 12).

74. *Thus L, B, Hu,* W_1*;* W_2 *(Var) adds:* which is inwardly without distinction.

75. [*Ed.*] Most likely an allusion to Schleiermacher's derivation of the divine attributes, namely, as modifications of the feeling of absolute dependence, or of God's relation to self and world. See above, *Ms.* n. 48.

that was stated earlier: the contradictions among the different predicates are not resolved. The resolution of the contradiction is contained in the idea, i.e., in God's determining of himself to distinguish himself from himself while [remaining] at the same time the eternal sublation of the distinction. The distinction left as is would be a contradiction.[76]

If we assign predicates to God in such a way as to make them particular, then we are immediately at pains to resolve their contradiction. This is an external action, a product of our reflection, and the fact that it is external and falls to us, and is not the content of the divine idea, implies that the contradictions cannot in fact be resolved. But the idea is itself the resolution of the contradictions posited by it. Its proper content, its determination, is to posit this distinction and then absolutely to sublate it; this is the vitality of the idea itself.

At the point where we now stand, our interest is in passing over from concept to being. We should also recall our characterization of the metaphysical proofs of God,[77] which serve as the route for going from the concept to being.[78] The divine idea is the pure concept, without any limitation. The idea includes the fact that the concept determines itself and thereby posits itself as what is self-differentiated. This is a moment of the divine idea itself, and because the thinking, reflecting spirit has this content before it, the need
204 arises for this transition and progression. |

We observed the logical aspect of this transition earlier.[79] It is contained in those so-called proofs by means of which the transition ought to be made, in, from, and through the concept, into objectivity

76. *Hu adds:* This resolution is forever and always sublated, not left standing on its own account. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* If the distinction were permanent, then finitude would persist. The two sides confront each other independently, yet remain in relation; hence an unresolvable contradiction emerges. The idea does not involve leaving the difference alone, but rather resolving it. God posits himself in this distinction and likewise sublates it.

77. [*Ed.*] In the 1827 lectures, all the proofs for the existence of God are treated in Part I, *The Concept of Religion,* Sec. B.4.c. In this paragraph and the next, Hegel provides a brief summary of the ontological proof.

78. *Thus B; W_2 (Var) adds, similar in W_1:* so that the concept is not merely concept but also *is,* has reality.

79. [*Ed.*] See Vol. 1:432–441.

and being (all within the element of thought). What appears as a subjective need and demand is the content, is one moment of the divine idea itself. When we say, "God has created the world," this also entails a transition from concept to reality; but the world is there defined as the essentially other of God, as the negation of God, it is what has being outside God, without God, godlessly. Insofar as the world is defined as the other, we do not have the distinction as a distinction within the concept itself; it is not contained in the concept before us. But now being and objectivity are to be exhibited *in* the concept as its activity and consequence, as a determination of the concept. This shows, therefore, that what we have here, within the idea, is the same content and exigency that is found in the form of those proofs of the existence of God. In the absolute idea, in the element of thinking, God is this utterly concrete universal, the positing of self as other, but in such a way that the other is immediately defined to be himself, and the distinction is only ideal, it is immediately sublated, and does not take on the shape of externality. This means precisely that what is distinguished ought to be exhibited in and within the concept.[80] It is the logical aspect in which it becomes clear that every determinate concept is self-sublating, it occurs as the contradiction of itself, and ˜is a positing of what is distinguished from it.˜[81] Thus the concept itself is still burdened with one-sidedness and finitude, as indicated by the fact that it is something subjective, posited as subjective; the characteristics of the concept and its distinctions are posited only as ideal and not as distinctions in fact. This is the concept that objectifies itself.[82]

When we say "God," we speak of him merely as abstract; or if we say, "God the Father," we speak of him as the universal, | only 205
abstractly, in accord with his finitude. His infinitude means precisely that he sublates this form of abstract universality and immediacy, and in this way distinction is posited; but he is precisely the sublating

80. *Thus also W; L (1827?) adds:* What this transition itself concerns we have considered at the appropriate time.

81. *Thus L, An; W (Var) reads:* is thus a coming to be of what is distinguished from it and a positing of itself as such.

82. *Thus also W; L (1827?) adds:* This is the logical aspect, which is presupposed.

of the distinction. Thereby he is for the first time true actuality, the truth, infinitude.

This is the speculative idea, i.e., the rational element, insofar as it is thought, the thinking of what is rational. For the nonspeculative thinking of the understanding, distinction remains as distinction, e.g., the antithesis of finite and infinite. Absoluteness is ascribed to both terms, yet each also has a relation to the other, and in this respect they are in unity; in this way contradiction is posited.

The speculative idea is opposed not merely to the sensible but also to what is understandable; for both, therefore, it is a secret or mystery. It is a μυστήριον for the sensible mode of consideration as well as for the understanding. ˜In other words, μυστήριον is what the rational is; among the Neoplatonists, this expression already means simply speculative philosophy.˜[83] The nature of God is not a secret in the ordinary sense, least of all in the Christian religion. In it God has made known what he is; there he is manifest. But he is a secret or mystery for external sense perception and representation, for the sensible mode of consideration and likewise for the understanding.

The sensible in general has as its fundamental characteristic externality, the being of things outside each other. Space-time is the externality in which objects are side by side, mutually external, and successive. The sensible mode of consideration is thus accustomed to have before it distinct things that are outside one another. Its basis is that distinctions remain explicit and external. In reason this is not the case. Therefore, what is in the idea is a mystery for sensible consideration. For in [the region of] the idea, the way [things are looked at], the relations [ascribed to things], and the categories [employed] are entirely different from those found in sense expe-
206 rience. The idea is just this distinguishing which | at the same time is no distinction, and does not persist in its distinction. God intuits

83. *Thus L; Hu reads:* The speculative is accordingly [*canceled:* reason] the mysteries, and nothing else—simply reason. In the pagan religions God is no secret. *W (Var) reads:* For both it is a μυστήριον, with respect, that is, to what is rational in it.

[*Ed.*] Hegel attributes the connection between mystery and speculation to Proclus in particular; see Vol. 1:382 n. 44.

himself in what is distinguished, he is united with himself only in his other, and is only present to himself in it; only there does God close with himself and behold himself in the other. This is wholly repugnant to sense experience, since for it one thing is here and another there. Everything counts as independent; what counts for it is not to be the sort of thing that subsists because it possesses itself in another. For sense experience, two things cannot be in one and the same place; they exclude each other. But in the idea, distinctions are not posited as exclusive of each other; rather they are found only in this mutual inclusion of the one with the other. This is the *truly supersensible* [realm], not ˜that of the understanding,˜[84] which is supposed to be above and beyond; for the latter is just as much a sensible [realm] where things are outside one another and indifferently self-contained.[85]

In the same way this idea is a mystery for the understanding and beyond its ken. For the understanding holds fast to the categories of thought, persisting with them as utterly independent of each other, remaining distinct, external to each other, and fixed. The positive is not the same as the negative, the cause is not the effect, etc. But for the concept it is equally true that these distinctions are sublated. Precisely because they are distinctions, they remain finite, and the understanding persists in finitude. Indeed, even in the case of the infinite, it has the infinite on one side and finitude on the other. But the truth of the matter is that neither the finite nor the infinite standing over against it has any truth; rather both are merely transitional. To that extent this is a mystery for sensible representation and for the understanding, and both resist the rationality of the idea.[86]

[87]What has life *is,* and it has drives and needs; accordingly, it

84. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* the ordinary supersensible,

85. *Thus L; W (Var) omits:* self-contained *and adds:* To the extent that God is defined as spirit, externality is sublated; accordingly, this is a mystery to the senses.

86. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* The opponents of the doctrine of the Trinity are merely the partisans of sensibility and understanding.

87. *Precedes in L (1827?), similar in W:* Moreover, the understanding is equally powerless to grasp anything else whatever, to grasp the truth of anything at all. Animal life, for example, also exists as idea, as the unity of the concept, as the unity

207 has | distinction within itself, the latter arises within it. Thus life itself is a contradiction, and the way the understanding comprehends such distinctions is that the contradiction remains unresolved; when the distinctions are brought into relation with each other, only the contradiction remains, which is not to be resolved.[88] Life has certain needs and thus is in contradiction, but the satisfaction of the need annuls the contradiction. I myself am distinguished ˜for myself˜[89] from myself in my drives and needs. But life is the resolving of the contradiction, the satisfying of the need, giving it peace, though in such a way that the contradiction emerges once more. The distinction, the contradiction, and its annulment alternate back and forth.[90] When considering drive and satisfaction on their own account, the understanding does not grasp the fact that even in the act of affirmation and self-feeling, the negation of self-feeling, limitation, and lack are simultaneously found, yet at the same time, as self-feeling, I reach beyond this lack. This is the determinate representation of the μυστήριον; a mystery is called inconceivable, but what appears inconceivable is precisely the concept itself, the speculative element or the fact that the rational is thought. It is precisely through thinking that the distinction comes out specifically.[91] Now when the understanding comes to this point, it says, "This is a contradiction," and it stands still at this point; it stands by the contradiction in the face of the experience that it
208 is life itself which sublates the contradiction. | When [for example] drive is analyzed, the contradiction appears, and then the understanding can say, "This is inconceivable."

of soul and body. For the understanding, by contrast, each is on its own. To be sure, they are distinct, but equally it is their nature to sublate the distinction. Life or vitality is simply this perennial process.

88. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* This is the case; the contradiction cannot cease when the distinctions are maintained to be perennial in character, just because the fact of this distinction is insisted upon.

89. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* in myself

90. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* They do not occur simultaneously but succeed each other in temporal progression, and accordingly the entire process is finite.

91. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* The thinking of the drive is only the analysis of what the drive is; as soon as I think "drive," I have the affirmation and therein the negation, the self-feeling, the satisfaction, and the drive. Thinking it means recognizing what is distinguished, what is within it.

Thus the nature of God is inconceivable; but, as we already said, this is just the concept itself, which contains the act of distinguishing within itself. The understanding does not get beyond the fact of the distinction, so it says, "This can't be grasped." For the principle of understanding is abstract identity with itself, not concrete identity, in accord with which these distinctions are [present] within a single [concept or reality]. According to the abstract identity, the one and the other are independent, each for itself, yet at the same time are related to each other.[92] This is what is called inconceivable. The resolution of the contradiction is the concept, a resolution which the understanding does not attain because it starts from the presupposition that the two [distinguished moments] both are and remain utterly independent of each other.

˜One of the circumstances contributing to the assertion that the divine idea is inconceivable is the fact that, | in religion, the content 209
of the idea appears in forms accessible to sense experience or understanding, because religion is the truth for everyone. Hence we have the expressions "Father" and "Son"—a designation taken from a sentient aspect of life, from a relationship that has its place in life. In religion the truth has been revealed as far as its *content* is concerned; but it is another matter for this content to be present in the *form* of the concept, of thinking, of the concept in speculative form.˜[93]

92. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* therefore the contradiction is present.

93. *Cf. the amplification of this theme by the 1831 lectures, inserted by* W_1 *in the context of the 1824 lectures at p. 192, and by* W_2 *in the context of the 1827 lectures at p. 276;* W_2 *reads, similar in* W_1*:* This eternal idea, accordingly, finds expression in the Christian religion under the name of the Holy Trinity, which is God himself, the eternally triune God.

Here God is present only for the person who thinks, who remains silently within himself. The ancients called this "enthusiasm";[a] it is a purely theoretical contemplation, the supreme repose of thought, but at the same time its highest activity, namely, to grasp the pure idea of God and to become conscious of that idea. The mystery of the dogma of what God is, is imparted to human beings; they believe in it, and already have the highest truth vouchsafed to them, although they apprehend it only in the form of representation, without being conscious of the necessity of this truth, without conceiving it. Truth is the disclosure of what spirit is in and for itself; human beings are themselves spirit, and therefore the truth is for them. Initially, however, the truth that comes to them does not yet possess for them the form of freedom; it is for them merely something given and received, though they can receive it only because they are spirit. This truth, this idea, has been called the *dogma of*

Yet another form of understandability is the following: When we say, "God in his eternal universality is the one who distinguishes himself, determines himself, posits an other to himself, and likewise

the Trinity—God is spirit, the activity of pure knowing, the activity that is present to itself. It was chiefly Aristotle who comprehended God under the abstract determination of activity.[b] Pure activity is knowing (in the Scholastic age, *actus purus*), but in order to be posited as activity, it must be posited in its moments: knowing requires an other, which is known, and since it is knowing that knows it, it is appropriated to it. This explains why God, the actual being that is eternally in and for itself, eternally begets himself as his Son, distinguishes himself from himself—the absolute primal division. What God thus distinguishes from himself does not take on the shape of an other-being, but rather what is thus distinguished is immediately only that from which it has been distinguished. God is spirit, and no darkness, no coloring or mixture enters into this pure light. The relationship of father and son is drawn from organic life and is used in representational fashion. This natural relationship is only figurative and accordingly never wholly corresponds to what should be expressed. We say that God eternally begets his Son, that God distinguishes himself from himself, and thus we begin to speak of God in this way: God does this, and is utterly present to himself in the other whom he has posited (the form of love); but at the same time we must know very well that God is himself this entire activity. God is the beginning, he acts in this way; but he is likewise simply the end, the totality, and it is as totality that God is the Spirit. Merely as the Father, God is not yet the truth (he is known in this way, without the Son, in the Jewish religion). Rather he is both beginning and end; he is his own presupposition, he constitutes himself as presupposition (this is simply another form of differentiation); he is the eternal process. The fact that this is the truth, and the absolute truth, may have the form of something given. But that this should be *known* as the truth in and for itself is the task of philosophy and the entire content of philosophy. In it is seen how all the content of nature and spirit presses forward dialectically to this central point as its absolute truth. Here we are not concerned to prove that this dogma, this tranquil mystery, is the eternal truth; this comes to pass, as has been said, in the whole of philosophy.

In W_1 *there follows a further passage from the 1831 lectures, which in* W_2 *is transmitted at a later point (p. 283, 1st par.), in part more fully, in part abridged;* W_1 *reads:* Against this truth the understanding adduces its categories of finitude. But there is no reference at all here to the notion of three as a number; it would be the most thoughtless and unconceptual procedure to introduce this form here. Principally, the understanding sets up its notion of identity against it [the truth of divine self-differentiation]: God is the One, the essence of essences, it says. But this is only an untrue abstraction, a product of the understanding without truth, empty identity as an absolute moment. God is spirit, making himself objective and knowing himself in this objectivity: this is concrete identity [W_2 *continues:* and thus the idea is also an essential moment], whereas identity without distinction is the false product of the understanding and of modern theology; identity by itself is a false, one-sided characteristic. The understanding, however, believes that it has done everything when it detects a contradiction; it believes that it has prevailed over everything since

sublates the distinction, thereby remaining present to himself, and is spirit only through this process of being brought forth," then the understanding enters in | ˜and counts one, two, three.˜[94] Oneness 210
is to begin with wholly abstract. But the three ones are expressed more profoundly when they are defined as persons. Personality is what is based upon freedom—the first, deepest, innermost ˜mode,˜[95] but it is also the most abstract mode in which freedom announces its presence in the subject. "I am a person, I stand on my own"—this is an utterly unyielding position. So when these distinctions are defined in such a way that each of us [is taken] as one or indeed as a person, then through ˜this definition of the person˜[96] what the idea demands appears to be made even more unattainable, namely, to regard these distinctions as distinctions which are not distinct but remain absolutely one, [and so to attain] the sublating of this distinction. Two cannot be one; each is a rigid, unyielding, independent being-for-self. Logic shows that the category of "the one" is a poor category, the wholly abstract unit.[97] If I say "one" [of God], I [must also] say this of everything else. | But 211
as far as personality is concerned, it is the character of the person, the subject, to surrender its isolation and separateness. Ethical life,

identity is supposed to be the foundation [of everything]. But [even] if there were a contradiction, it is the nature of spirit to sublate it eternally. Here, however, opposition and contradiction are not yet found in the first element, but only in the second.

[*Ed.*] [a]In referring to "enthusiasm" as a "purely theoretical contemplation," Hegel apparently has in mind Plato: "The love for ideas is what Plato calls enthusiasm" (*Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 2:30 [*Werke* 14:199]). He is thinking especially of the description of the contemplation of the ideas in *The Republic* 475e–477b, although Plato does not speak there of "enthusiasm." In any case, both Hegel and Plato distinguish enthusiasm in this sense from any sort of suprarational ecstasy, which would be the opposite of presence of mind; cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 71e–72a. [b]See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1072b18–30.

94. *Thus L, similar in B, Hu, An; W (1831) reads:* and brings its categories of finitude to bear, counts one, two, three, mixing in the unfortunate form of number. But there is no reference to number here; counting betokens a complete lack of thought. Thus by introducing this form, one introduces a complete absence of concept.

95. *Thus B; L, W (Var) read:* freedom

96. *Thus L, similar in* W_1; W_2 *(Var) reads:* this infinite form, namely, that each moment should be as a subject,

97. [*Ed.*] See *Science of Logic,* pp. 164–170 (cf. *GW* 11:91–97).

love, means precisely the giving up of particularity, of particular personality, and its extension to universality—so, too, with ˜friendship.˜[98] In friendship and love I give up my abstract personality and thereby win it back as concrete. The truth of personality is found precisely in winning it back through this immersion, this being immersed in the other.[99]

[100]But, even though representation grasps the content in its own forms, the content still belongs to thinking. We are considering the idea in its universality, as it is defined in and through pure thinking. This idea is the one truth and the whole truth; therefore everything particular that is comprehended as true must be comprehended according to the form of this idea. Nature and finite spirit are products of God; therefore rationality is found within them. That something is made by God involves its having the truth within it, the divine truth as a whole, i.e., the determinateness of this idea in general. The form of this idea is only in God as spirit; if the divine idea is grasped in the forms of finitude, then it is not posited as it is in and for itself—only in spirit is it so posited. In the finite forms it exists in a finite way; but, as we have stated, the world is something produced by God, and therefore the divine idea always forms the foundation of what the world as a whole is. To cognize the truth of something means to know and define it according to the truth, in the form of this idea in general.

In the earlier religions, particularly in Hinduism, we ˜have
212 had˜[101] anticipations of the triad as the true category.[102] | This idea of threefoldness indeed came to expression with the recognition that the One cannot remain as one, that it is what it ought to be not as one[103] but rather as movement and distinction in general, and as the relation of these distinctions to each other. Nevertheless,

98. *L (1827?) adds:* Inasmuch as I act rightly toward another, I consider the other as identical with myself. *W (Var) reads:* family, friendship; here this identity of one with another is present. Inasmuch . . . [*continues with L*]

99. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* Such forms of the understanding show themselves immediately in experience as the sort that annul themselves.

100. *In B's margin:* 31 July 1827

101. *Thus B, similar in Hu, An; L,* W_2 *read:* have

102. W_1 *(Var) adds:* and we see that the category of the triad is the true category.

103. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* —the One is not what is true—

the third element here—˜in the Trimurti˜[104]—is not the Spirit, not genuine reconciliation, but rather origin and passing away, or the category of change, which is indeed the unity of the distinctions, but a very inferior union—a reconciliation that is still abstract. Even in the Christian religion the Holy Trinity does not appear in the immediate appearance [itself]; rather the idea is first completed only when the Spirit has entered into the community and when the immediate, believing spirit has raised itself to the level of thinking.[105]

It is also well known that the Trinity played an essential role for the Pythagoreans[106] and Plato, but its determinate characteristics are left entirely in a state of abstraction: partly in the abstraction of numerical units (one, two, three); partly (and specifically for Plato) in somewhat more concrete fashion, the nature of the one, then the nature of the other (that which is distinct within itself, θάτερον); and finally the third, which is the unity of the two.[107] Here the triad is found not in the Hindu mode of fanciful imagination but in mere abstraction. These are categories of thought that are better than numbers, better than the category of number, but they are still wholly abstract categories of thought. They are found, most surprisingly, in Philo, who carefully studied Pythagorean and Platonic philosophy, among the Alexandrian Jews and in Syria. Consciousness of this truth, this triune idea, arose especially among the heretics, indeed primarily among the Gnostics,[108] although they brought this content to expression in obscure and fanciful notions.[109] | 213

104. *Thus Hu; W (Var), preceding this sentence, reads:* The Trimurti is the most uncontrolled form of this [triadic] category.

[*Ed.*] The Trimurti is later Hinduism's divine triad: Brahmā, Vishnu, Siva.

105. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* It is of interest to consider these fermentations of an idea and to learn to recognize their ground in the marvelous appearances that manifest themselves.

106. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 60.

107. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 59.

108. [*Ed.*] Hegel's information on Philo and the Gnostics in this paragraph and the next derives primarily from Neander's *Gnostische Systeme*. See above, *Ms.*, n. 71.

109. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* We see here, however, at least the struggle of spirit for the truth, and that merits recognition.

Apart from those already mentioned above, one can point to a countless number of forms in which the content of the Trinity appeared distinctly and in various religions. But this properly belongs to church history. The main features are as follows: First, the Father, the One, the ὄν, is the abstract element that is expressed as the abyss, the depth (i.e., precisely what is still empty), the inexpressible, the inconceivable, that which is beyond all concepts. For in any case what is empty and indeterminate is inconceivable; it is the negative of the concept, and its conceptual character is to be this negative, since it is only a one-sided abstraction which makes up only one moment of the concept.[110] The second moment, other being, the action of determining, self-determining activity as a whole, is, according to the broadest designation, λόγος—rationally determinative activity, or precisely the word. The word is this simple act of letting itself be heard that neither makes nor becomes a hard-and-fast distinction, but rather is immediately heard, and that, because it is so immediate, is likewise taken up into interiority and is returned to its origin. This second moment is also defined as σοφία, wisdom, the original and wholly pure human being, "an existing other"[111] or as that initial universality, something particular and determinate.[112] For this reason it has been defined as the archetype of humanity, Adam Kadmon, the only-begotten. This is not something contingent but rather an eternal activity, which does not happen merely at one time. In God there is only one birth, the act as eternal activity, a determination that itself belongs essentially to the universal.[113] The essential point is that this σοφία, the only-begotten, remains likewise in the bosom of God; so that the dis-
214 tinction is no distinction. |

These are the forms in which this truth, this idea, has fermented. The main point is to know that these appearances, wild as they are,

110. *L, W (1827?) add:* The One for itself is not yet the concept, the true.

111. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* something existing, something other,

112. *Thus L; W (1831) adds:* God is the creator, and is such indeed in the specification of the Logos as the self-externalizing, self-expressing word, as the ὅρασις, God's vision.

113. *Thus L; W (1831) adds:* This is a genuine differentiation, which affects the quality of both; however, it is only one and the same substance, and thus the distinction here is still constituted only superficially, indeed as a person.

are rational—to know that they have their ground in reason, and to know what sort of reason is in them. But at the same time one must know how to distinguish the form of rationality that is present and not yet adequate to the content. For this idea has ˜in fact˜[114] been placed beyond human beings, beyond the world, beyond thought and reason; indeed, it has been placed over against them, so that this determinate quality, though it is the sole truth and the whole truth, has been regarded as something peculiar to God, something that remains permanently above and beyond, and does not reflect itself in the other (in what appears as the world, nature, humanity). But to this extent, this fundamental idea has not been treated as the universal idea.

Jacob Boehme was the first to recognize the Trinity in another manner, as universal. His way of representing and thinking is rather wild and fanciful; he has not yet risen to the pure forms of thinking. But the ruling foundation of the ferment [in his mind], and of his struggles [to reach the truth], was the recognition of the presence of the Trinity in everything and everywhere. He said, for example, that it must be born in the hearts of human beings.[115] The Trinity is the universal foundation of everything considered from the point of view of truth, albeit as finite, but in its finitude as the truth that lies in it. Thus Jacob Boehme sought to make nature and the heart or spirit of humanity representable—in his own way, to be sure, but according to the [logical] determinations of the Trinity.

In more recent times, especially through the influence of the Kantian philosophy, the triad has been put to use again as a type or a schema for thought, so to speak—not in any extensive way, certainly, though indeed in quite specific categorial forms.[116] But this is the one aspect, namely, that when this idea is known as the essential and sole nature of God, it must not be regarded as something above and beyond, as it was formerly; rather it is the goal of cognition to know the truth in particular things as well. If it is thus cognized, then whatever in such particular things is the true

114. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* frequently

115. [*Ed.*] See Jacob Boehme, *Aurora, oder Morgenröhte im Aufgang,* in *Theosophia revelata* (1715), 10.116.

116. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 62.

contains the form of this idea. For cognition in fact means knowing
215 something in its | determinateness; but its nature is that of determinateness itself, and the nature of determinateness is what has been expounded in the idea. ˜[To show] that this idea is what is true as such, and that all categories of thought are this movement of determining, is the [task of] logical exposition.˜[117]

B. THE SECOND ELEMENT: REPRESENTATION, APPEARANCE[118]

1. Differentiation

a. Differentiation within the Divine Life and in the World

We now consider, therefore, the eternal idea in the second element, in the form of *consciousness* or of *representation* in general; in other words, we consider this idea insofar as it emerges out of universality and infinitude into the determinacy of finitude.

Once again, the first aspect or form is that of the universality of the idea with respect to content—but precisely in this sense: that God is everywhere. He is everywhere present; the presence of God is just the element of truth that is in everything. We can comment further here: [119]what is universal or abstract must precede everything else in scientific knowledge; scientifically, one must start with it. But in existence it is in fact what comes later. It is the in-itself, which nevertheless appears subsequently, specifically in knowledge—the in-itself that comes to consciousness and knowledge later.

117. *Thus L, similar in* W_1; *Hu reads:* To show that the Trinity is what is true is the task of logic. *W (Var) adds:* and is logical necessity.

[*Ed.*] Cf. Hegel's formulation of the result of this logical exposition at the beginning of the section on the absolute idea in *Science of Logic,* pp. 824–825 (*GW* 12:236–237).

118. [*Ed.*] The structure of "The Second Element" in the 1827 lectures is almost identical with that of 1824, and we have adopted the same section headings. The only structural variation in 1827 is that the treatment of the story of the fall precedes the discussion of the knowledge of evil and estrangement. There are, however, differences of content and emphasis between 1827 and 1824.

119. *Precedes in L (1827?), similar in W:* At first the idea was found in the element of thinking; this is the foundation, and we began with it.

The form of the idea comes to appearance as a result, even though this result is essentially the in-itself, the beginning. Just as the content of the idea is such that the last is first and the first last, so it is that what appears as a result is at the same time the presupposition, the in-itself, the foundation. And now we have to consider this idea in the second element, the element of *appearance* in general.

We can comprehend this progression from two sides.

First of all, the subject for which this idea is [present] is the thinking subject. Even the forms of representation take | nothing 216
away from the nature of the fundamental form, namely, that this latter is [available] for human being only as a thinking being. The subject behaves in general as a thinking subject, thinking this idea; yet the subject is also concrete consciousness. The idea must therefore be [present] for this subject as concrete self-consciousness, as an actual subject.

Or one might say that this idea is the absolute truth. Absolute truth is for thinking. But the idea must not only be the truth for the subject; the subject must also have the [sort of] certainty about the idea that belongs to the subject as such, as a finite, empirically concrete, sentient subject. The idea possesses certainty for the subject only insofar as it is a perceptible idea, insofar as it exists for the subject. If I can say of anything, "it is so" [*das ist*], then it possesses certainty for me; this is immediate knowledge, this is certainty. To prove that "what is so" is also *necessary*, that it is what is true that is certain for me—that is the further process of mediation and is no longer something immediately apprehended; so this mediation is the transition into the universal.[120]

The other side of this progression starts from the idea. Eternal being-in-and-for-itself is what discloses itself, determines itself, divides itself, posits itself as what is differentiated from itself, but the difference is at the same time constantly sublated. Thereby actual being in and for itself constantly returns into itself—only in this way is it spirit. What is distinguished is defined in such a way that

120. *L adds (1827?), similar in W:* Having started with the form of truth, we now proceed to the fact that the truth obtains the form of certainty, that it exists for me.

the distinction immediately disappears, and we have a relationship of God, of the idea, merely to himself. The act of differentiation is only a movement, a play of love with itself, which does not arrive at the seriousness of other-being, of separation and rupture. The other is to this extent defined as "Son"; in terms of sensibility, what-has-being-in-and-for-itself is defined as love, while in a higher mode of determinacy, it is defined as spirit that is present to itself and free. In the idea as thus specified, the determination of the distinction is not yet complete, since it is only abstract distinction in general. We have not yet arrived at distinction in its own proper
217 form; [here] it is just one | determinate characteristic. [121]The distinguished elements are posited as the same; they have not yet come to be defined so that they are distinctly determined.

From this side the primal division of the idea is to be conceived in such a way that the other, which we have also called "Son," obtains the determination of the other as such—that this other exists as a free being for itself, and that it appears as something actual, as something that exists outside of and apart from God. Its ideality, its eternal return into actual being in and for itself, is posited in the first form of identity, the idea, in an immediate and identical way. Otherness is requisite in order that there may be difference;[122] it is necessary that what is distinguished should be the otherness as an entity. Only the absolute idea determines itself and is certain of itself as absolutely free within itself because of this self-determination. For this reason its self-determination involves letting this determinate [entity] exist as something free, something independent, or as an independent object. It is only for the being that is free that freedom *is;* it is only for the free human being that an other has freedom too.[123] It belongs to the absolute freedom of the idea that, in its act of determining and dividing, it releases the other to exist as a free and independent being. This other, released as something free and independent, is *the world* as such.

121. *Thus L, W_1; precedes in W_2 (Var):* To that extent we can say that we have not yet arrived at distinction.

122. *Thus L, W_1; W_2 (Var) adds:* and that it may come into its own,

123. *Thus L, W; Hu adds:* As free, human beings do not comport themselves according to desires; they leave them aside.

The truth of the world is only its *ideality*—for it is not true that it possesses genuine actuality. Its nature is to *be,* but only in an *ideal* sense; it is not something eternal in itself but rather something created, whose being is only posited. For the world, to be means to have ˜being only for an instant,˜[124] so to speak, but also to sublate this its separation or estrangement from God. It means to return to its origin, to enter into the relationship of spirit, of love—to *be* this relationship of spirit, of love, which is the third element. The second element is, therefore, the process of the world in love by which it passes over from fall and separation into reconciliation. | 218

This is the second element—the creation of the world. The first element, within the idea, is only the relationship of the Father to the Son in eternal reconciliation, or, alternatively, nonreconciledness, because no fall is present yet. But the *other* also obtains the determinacy of other-*being,* of an actual entity. It is in the Son, in the determination of distinction, that the advance to further distinction occurs, that distinction comes into its own as [true] diversity.

As we have already said,[125] Jacob Boehme expressed this transition inherent in the moment of the Son as follows: the first only-begotten one was Lucifer, the light-bearer, brilliance and clarity, but he inwardly fancied himself, i.e., he posited himself for himself, he strove to be, and thereby he fell. But the eternal only-begotten One appeared immediately in his place. Looked at from this standpoint, that [first] other is not the Son but rather the external world, the finite world, which is outside the truth—the world of finitude, where the other has the form of being, and yet by its nature is only the ἕτερον,[126] the determinate, what is distinct, limited, negative. The finite world is the side of distinction as opposed to the side that remains in unity; hence it divides into the *natural world* and

124. *Thus B, An; L, W (Var) read:* only an instant of being,

125. [*Ed.*] This cross-reference was probably introduced into the text by Lasson in order to camouflage the repetition relating to the 1824 lectures (see 1824, n. 106), but possibly Hegel is referring to p. 289 above.

126. [*Ed.*] From Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 2:64 (*Werke* 14:233), we may assume that he is here alluding to Plato (see *Sophist* 254e–259d and *Parmenides* 143a–c).

the world of *finite spirit.* On its own account, nature ˜enters into relationship˜[127] only with humanity, not with God, for nature is not knowledge. God is spirit; nature knows nothing of spirit. It is created by God, but of itself it does not enter into relationship with him—in the sense that it is not possessed of knowledge. It stands in relation only to humanity, and in this relationship it provides what is called the dependent side of humanity. But to the extent that thinking recognizes that nature is created by God, that understanding and reason are within it, nature is known by thinking human beings. To that extent it is posited in relation to the divine,
219 because its truth is recognized.[128] |

127. *Thus L, Hu,* W_1, *similar in An; B,* W_2 *(Var) read:* appears in relationship

128. W_2 *(1831) adds, located elsewhere in* W_1: The manifold forms of relationship of finite spirit to nature do not belong here [in the philosophy of religion]. Their scientific treatment forms part of the phenomenology of spirit or the doctrine of spirit.[a] Here this relationship has to be considered within the sphere of religion, so as to show that nature is for human beings not only the immediate, external world but rather a world in which humanity knows God; in this way nature is for humanity a revelation of God. We have already seen[b] how this relationship of spirit to nature is present in the ethnic religions where we encountered those forms that belong to the advance of spirit from immediacy, in which nature is taken as contingent, to necessity and to a wise and purposeful mode of activity. Thus the consciousness of God on the part of finite spirit is mediated by nature. Humanity sees God by means of nature; thus far nature is only the veil and the untrue configuration [of God].

What is distinguished from God now is actually an other, and has the form of an other: it is nature, which is for spirit and for humanity. Through it unity is to be accomplished and the consciousness attained that the goal and destination of religion is reconciliation. The first step is the abstract consciousness of God, the fact that humanity raises itself in nature to God: this we have seen in the proofs for the existence of God; and here too belong those pious reflections as to how gloriously God has made everything and how wisely he has arranged all things. These elevated thoughts go straight to God and may start from any set of facts. Piety makes edifying observations of this kind, it starts with the most particular and insignificant things, recognizing in them something that is higher in principle. Mixed in with these observations there is often the distorted notion that what goes on in the world of nature is to be regarded as something higher than what is found in the human sphere. This way of looking at things, however, is inappropriate because it starts from singulars. Another form of observation can be opposed to it, namely, that the cause should be appropriate to the appearance and should itself contain the element of limitation that belongs to the appearance; we require a particular ground on which this particular effect is based. The observation of a particular appearance always has this inappropriate aspect. Further, these particular appearances belong to the realm of the natural. God, however, must be conceived as spirit, and the

b. Natural Humanity

[129]~The truth is [now to be] considered as posited in the second element, in the finite element.~[130] The first thing we have now to consider is the *need* for truth; the second is the *mode* and *manner* of its appearance. | 220

Regarding the first point, the need for truth, it is presupposed that there is present within subjective spirit the demand to know the absolute truth. This need directly implies that the subject exists in a state of untruth. As spirit, however, the subject implicitly surmounts its untruth at the same time, and consequently the latter is for it something that *ought* to be overcome. More strictly defined, untruth means that the subject exists in a state of cleavage from itself; hence the need [for truth] expresses itself in this way: that the cleavage within the subject and its attendant cleavage from the truth should be annulled, that the subject should be reconciled, and that this reconciliation can in itself be only a reconciliation with the truth. This is the more precise form of the need. The way it is defined is that the cleavage is all within the subject, that the subject is evil, that it *is* the split and the contradiction—yet not a contra-

element in which we cognize him must likewise be spiritual [cf. John 4:24]. "God thunders with his thundering voice," it is said, "and yet is not recognized" [cf. Job 37:5]; the spiritual person, however, demands something loftier than what is merely natural. In order to be recognized as spirit, God must do more than thunder [W_1 *reads:* God is more than a mere thunderer].

Follows additionally in W_2 *(MiscP):* The higher mode of viewing nature, and the deeper relation in which it is to be placed to God, is that in which nature itself is conceived as something spiritual, i.e., as the natural aspect of humanity. It is only when the subject ceases to be classed as belonging to the immediate being of the natural and is posited as what it intrinsically is, namely, as *movement,* and when it has gone into itself, that finitude as such is posited, and indeed as finitude in the process of the relationship in which the need for the absolute idea and its appearance come to exist for it.

[*Ed.*] [a]It is not clear from this reference whether Hegel has in mind the *Phenomenology of Spirit* of 1807 or the chapter by the same title in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830), §§ 413–439. It is probably the latter since the "doctrine of spirit" could refer to the "Psychology" of the *Encyclopedia,* §§ 440–482. [b]This is a reference to the cosmological and physicotheological proofs of the existence of God found in Part II; see the physicotheological proof according to the lectures of 1831 in the Appendix to Vol. 2.

129. *In B's margin:* 2 August 1827

130. *Thus Hu; L (1827?) reads, similar in* W_1: The absolute idea must come to be *for* consciousness and *in* it; it must become the *truth* for the subject and in it.

diction that simply falls apart, but rather one that simultaneously holds itself together. It is only through its holding together that it is split and has the contradiction within itself.

Consequently, it is requisite that we recall to mind and define the nature or character of humanity on its own account—how it is to be regarded, how human beings should regard "themselves,"[131] what they should know about themselves. At this point we encounter two opposed definitions, both at once. The first is that *humanity is by nature good.* Its universal, substantial essence is good; far from being split within itself, its essence or concept is that it is by nature what is harmonious and at peace with itself. Opposed to this is the second characterization: *humanity is by nature evil*—that is, its natural, substantial aspect is evil. These are
221 the antitheses that are present for us at the outset for | external consideration: sometimes one view has been in vogue, and sometimes the other. It should be added, moreover, that this is not just the way that *we* view the situation; it is human beings [generally] who have this knowledge of themselves, of how they are constituted and what their definition is.

Humanity is by nature good:[132] This is the more or less predominant notion of our time.[133] If only this proposition is valid, that humanity by nature is good, is not cloven, then it has no need of reconciliation; and if reconciliation is unnecessary, then the entire process we are here considering is superfluous.

It is [indeed] essential to say that humanity is good: human beings are implicitly spirit and rationality, created in and after the image of God [Gen. 1:26–27]. God is the good, and human beings as spirit are the mirror of God; they, too, are *implicitly* good. This is a correct statement. Precisely on this proposition, and on it alone, the possibility of their reconciliation rests. The difficulty and ambiguity of the proposition, however, reside in the definition of the "implicitly" [*an sich*]. Humanity is "implicitly" good: this seems

131. *Thus L, Hu; B, W read:* it *An reads:* it (themselves)

132. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 106.

133. *L adds (Var/Ed?):* In treating the community, a topic for consideration will be how religious intuition and the religious relationship are developed and determined within it.

to say it all, but the "implicitly" designates precisely a one-sidedness which implies that everything has *not* been said. Humanity is "implicitly" good: this means that human beings are good only in an inner way, or according to the concept, and not according to their actuality. But insofar as they are spirit, they must be in actuality, i.e., *explicitly,* what they are in truth. Physical nature remains in the condition of implicitness [*Ansich*]; it is "implicitly" the concept.[134] Precisely this word "implicitly"—the notion that humanity is "implicitly" good—contains the deficiency. The implicitness of nature consists in the laws of nature; it remains true to its laws and does not go beyond them. It is this that constitutes its substantiality, and hence it is within the sphere of necessity. The other side, however, is that human beings ought to be explicitly what they are implicitly—they ought to become this explicitly. "Good by nature" means "immediately good," and spirit is precisely something that is not natural and immediate. On the contrary, humanity as spirit is what steps forth out of natural life | and passes over 222
into a separation between its concept and its immediate existence. But in the case of nature the concept of nature does not arrive at its being-for-self; this separation of an individual from its law, from its substantial essence, does not occur in nature just because [in it] the individual is not free. But human being is what sets its implicit being, its universal nature, over against itself and enters into this separation.

The other characterization derives immediately from what has just been said, namely, that human being ought not to remain as it is immediately, but should pass beyond its immediacy: this is the concept of spirit. It is correct that human beings are good by nature; but with that, one has only said something one-sided. It is this passing beyond the natural state of humanity, beyond its implicit being, that for the first time constitutes the cleavage within humanity; it is what posits the cleavage. Thus the cleavage is a stepping forth out of natural life and immediacy. But this is not to be construed to mean that there would be no evil until the stepping forth;

134. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* But in it the concept does not arrive at its being-for-itself [*Fürsichsein*].

rather this stepping forth is already contained in the natural state itself. ˜The implicit constitutes˜[135] the immediate; but because the implicit being of human being is spirit, humanity in its immediacy is already involved in stepping forth from immediacy, in falling away from it, from its implicit being. Here lies the basis for the second proposition: *humanity is by nature evil;* its implicit being, its natural being, is what is evil. In the natural being of humanity, the deficiency is directly present. Because human being is spirit, it is distinguished from its implicit being and *is* the cleavage.[136] When humanity exists only according to nature [*nur nach der Natur ist*], it is evil. The way humanity is implicitly, or according to its concept, is of course what we refer to abstractly as humanity "according to nature"; but concretely the person who follows passions and instincts, and remains within the sphere of desire, the one whose law is that of natural immediacy, is the natural human being. At the same time, a human being in the natural state is one who wills, and since the content of the natural will is only instinct and inclination, this person is evil. From the formal point of view, since the
223 natural human being has volition and will, | it is not an animal any more; but the content and purposes of its volition are still natural. It is from this standpoint—obviously the higher standpoint—that humanity is evil by nature; and it is evil just because it is a natural thing.

What we vacuously represent to ourselves, in taking the original condition of the human being to have been the state of innocence, is the state of nature, the animal state. Humanity ought not to be innocent [in this sense], it ought not to be brutish; insofar as human being is good, it ought not to be so in the sense that a natural thing is good. Rather it is up to its responsibility [*Schuld*], its will, to be good—it ought to be *imputable.* Responsibility means, in a general sense, the possibility of imputation. The good person is good by and through his will, and hence in virtue of his responsibility. Innocence [*Unschuld*] means to be without a will—without indeed being evil, but also at the same time without being good. Natural

135. *Thus L, W_1; W_2 reads:* The implicit and the natural state constitute

136. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* In the natural state, one-sidedness is directly present.

things and animals are all good, but this kind of goodness cannot be attributed to humanity.[137]

What is absolutely required is that human being should not persist as a natural will, a natural essence. It is simultaneously possessed of consciousness, to be sure, but as human being it can still be essentially natural inasmuch as the natural constitutes the purpose, content, and definition of its volition. We must look at this definition more closely: the human being is human as a subject, and as a natural subject it is *this* single individual; the will involved is this singular will, and it is fulfilled with the content of its singularity. This means that natural humanity is selfish. But we demand of one who is called good that he should at least be guided by general principles and laws. Strictly speaking, the naturalness of the will is the selfishness of the will; in its naturalness, the will is private, distinguished from the universality of willing and opposed to the rationality of the will that has been cultivated into universality.

So whenever we consider what humanity is implicitly, the deficiency of implicit being is directly involved. But the fact that, insofar as its will is natural, humanity is evil, does not annul the other side, the fact that it is implicitly good, which always remains part of its concept. Humanity, however, is reflection and consciousness, | and 224
therefore it engages in the process of distinguishing; for this reason it is something actual, a "this," a subject, distinct from its concept. And since this subject exists to begin with *only* in a state of distinction and has not yet returned to unity, to the identity of subjectivity and the concept, to rationality, the actuality that it has is the natural actuality that is selfishness. The condition of evil directly presupposes the relation of actuality to the concept; this simply posits the contradiction between implicit being or the concept and singularity, the contradiction between good and evil. This is the antithesis that is our first topic of inquiry. It is false to ask whether humanity is only good by nature or only evil. That is a false way of posing the question. In the same way, it is superficial to say that

137. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* Insofar as one is good, one should be so by means of one's will.

humanity is both good and evil equally. Implicitly, according to its concept, human being is good; but this implicitness is a one-sidedness, and the one-sidedness is marked by the fact that the actual subject, the "this," is only a natural will. Thus both of them, both good and evil, are posited, but essentially in contradiction, in such a way that each of them presupposes the other. It is not that only one of them is [there], but instead we have both of them in this relation of being opposed to each other.

This is the first fundamental definition, the essential determination of the concept [of natural humanity].

c. The Story of the Fall[138]

This accordingly is the mode and manner of the shape in which this conceptual determination appears representationally as a story and is represented for consciousness in an intuitable or sensible mode, so that it is regarded as something that *happened.* It is the familiar story in Genesis. The gist of it is that God created human beings in his own image: this is the concept of the human being.[139] Humankind lived in Paradise; we can call it a zoological garden. This life is called the state of innocence. The story says, too, that

138. [*Ed.*] In the 1827 lectures, the discussion of the story of the fall (Gen. 3) is not simply appended at the end of the treatment of differentiation and natural humanity, as in the *Ms.* and the 1824 lectures. Rather it is integrated as the representational, storylike version of what has just been treated conceptually. This then enables Hegel to conclude the entire discussion of differentiation with the conceptual insight that it is humanity's cognitive capacity—specifically the knowledge of good and evil—that gives rise to estrangement (or cleavage) and hence to evil (Sec. d). A smooth transition is then provided from the fact of estrangement to the need for reconciliation, which is taken up in Sec. B.2.

In this section and the next, the term *Erkenntnis* is translated as "knowledge" rather than as "cognition" when the reference is to such familiar expressions as "the tree of knowledge" or "the knowledge of good and evil." Also in these sections Hegel customarily uses the term *Entzweiung* ("cleavage," "rupture," etc.) instead of *Entfremdung* ("estrangement," "alienation"). The terms are virtually synonymous since to be "split" or "cloven" within oneself is to exist in a state of estrangement or self-alienation. We have maintained the terminological distinction, although in the present context "estrangement" could be a more idiomatic rendering of *Entzweiung.*

139. *L (1827?) adds:* This concept is now represented as something that also has being.

the tree of the knowledge of good and evil stood in Paradise, and that human beings disobeyed God's command by eating of it. On the one hand, it is formally set down that this eating was the transgression of a commandment. The content, however, is the essential thing, namely, that the sin consisted in having eaten of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and | in this connection there 225
comes about the pretense of the serpent that humanity will be like God when it has the knowledge of good and evil.

It is said, then, that human beings have eaten of this tree. It is clear, as far as the content is concerned, that the fruit is an outward image—it belongs only to the sensible portrayal. What it really means is that humanity has elevated itself to the knowledge of good and evil; and this cognition, this distinction, is the source of evil, is evil itself. Being evil is located in the act of cognition, in consciousness. And certainly, as we already said earlier,[140] being evil resides in cognitive knowledge; cognition is the source of evil. For cognition or consciousness means in general a judging or dividing, a self-distinguishing within oneself. Animals have no consciousness, they are unable to make distinctions within themselves, they have no free being-for-self in the face of objectivity generally. The cleavage,[141] however, is what is evil; it is the contradiction. It contains the two sides: good and evil. Only in this cleavage is evil contained, and hence it is itself evil. Therefore it is entirely correct to say that good and evil are first to be found in consciousness.

The first human being is represented as having brought about this fall. Here again we have this sensible mode of expression. From the point of view of thought, the expression "the first human being" signifies "humanity in itself" or "humanity as such"—not some single, contingent individual, not one among many, but the absolutely first one, humanity according to its concept. Human being

140. [*Ed.*] This cross-reference has probably been inserted into the text by Lasson in order to camouflage the repetition of the corresponding passage in the *Ms.*

141. [*Ed.*] Hegel here draws upon the etymological similarity between the terms *Entzweiung* ("cleavage," "division into two" [*Ent-zwei-ung*]) and *Urteil* ("judgment," "primal division" [*Ur-teil*]). Because knowledge or cognition (*Erkenntnis*) entails an act of judgment, it issues in division, cleavage, and estrangement; and because evil is "contained" in the cleavage, knowledge is the source of evil.

as such is conscious being; it is precisely for that reason that humanity enters into this cleavage, into the consciousness that, when it is further specified, is cognition. But inasmuch as universal humanity is represented as a first man, he is represented as distinguished from others. Hence the question arises: if there is only one who has done this, how is that deed transmitted to others? Here the notion of an inheritance of sin that is passed on to all others comes into play. By this means the deficiency involved in viewing humanity as such representationally as a first man is corrected. The one-sidedness involved in representing the cleavage belonging to the concept of human being generally as the act of a single individual is absorbed by this notion of a communicated or inherited sin.
226 Neither the original representation | nor the correction are really necessary; for it is humanity as a whole that, as consciousness, enters into this cleavage.

But in the same way as this cleavage is the source of evil, it is also the midpoint of the conversion that consciousness contains within itself whereby this cleavage is also sublated.[142] The story reports that an alien creature, the serpent, seduced humanity by the pretense that, if one knows how to distinguish good and evil, one will become like God. In this way the story represents the fact that humanity's deed springs from the evil principle. However, the confirmation of the fact that the knowledge of good and evil belongs to the divinity of humanity is placed on the lips of God himself. [143]God himself says: "Behold, Adam has become like one of us" [Gen. 3:22]. So the words of the serpent were no deception. This is customarily overlooked along the lines of the ingrained prejudice to the effect that this is an irony of God,[144] that God has made a joke.[145]

142. *L (1827?) adds:* The highest cleavage, the distinction between good and evil (good as such by definition exists only in contrast with evil, and evil only in contrast with good), is certainly cognitive knowledge; and human being as such, as spirit, eats of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.

143. *In B's margin:* 6 August 1827

144. [*Ed.*] See above, 1824 lectures, n. 117.

145. *L (1827?) adds:* However, what distinguishes human being as human, as spirit, is precisely cognition and cleavage.

Labor and the childbearing of woman are then declared to be the punishment for sin [Gen. 3:16–19]. In general, this is a necessary consequence. The animal does not labor, or it does so only when compelled, and not by nature; it does not eat its bread in the sweat of its brow or produce its own bread, but rather finds the satisfaction of all its needs directly in nature. Human beings, too, find the material for their satisfaction in nature, but this material is, so to speak, the least important element for them; the infinite provision for the satisfaction of their needs occurs only through labor. Labor done in the sweat of one's brow, or bodily work, and the labor of the spirit, which is the harder of the two, are immediately connected with the knowledge of good and evil. That | humanity must make 227
itself what it is, that it must produce and eat bread in the sweat of its brow, belongs to what is most essential and distinctive about it and coheres necessarily with the knowledge of good and evil.

The story further depicts a second tree, a tree of life, that stood in Paradise. God wanted to drive Adam out [of Paradise (Gen. 3:22–23)], so that he would not be immortal. This, too, is expressed in a simple, childlike image. For the wishes of human beings, there are two ˜directions.˜[146] One line is directed toward living in undisturbed happiness, in harmony with oneself and external nature; it is the animals that remain in this unity, while humanity has to pass beyond it. The other line answers rather to the wish to live eternally. And the representation of the tree of life is formed in accord with ˜this latter wish.˜[147] When we consider it more closely, it is directly evident that this is only a childlike representation. Human being as a single living thing, its singular life, its natural life, must die.[148] So on the one hand, it is said that human beings in Paradise and without sin would be immortal; they would be able to live forever.[149] For, if outward death were only a consequence

146. *Thus L; W_1 (Var) reads:* branches. *W_2 (Var) reads:* types of good.

147. *Thus An; B reads:* the wish. *L reads:* these two wishes. *W reads:* these wishes.

148. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* But when the story is viewed more closely, this is seen to be the wondrous aspect of it, the self-contradictory aspect.

149. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* (In this story, immortality on earth and immortality of the soul are not separate.)

of sin, then humanity in Paradise would be implicitly immortal. On the other hand, however, it is also said that human beings will become immortal for the first time when they have eaten of the tree of life—but it cannot be assumed that they would have eaten of the tree of life without sin, for this was forbidden them.

The fact of the matter is that humanity is immortal only through cognitive knowledge,[150] for only in the activity of thinking is its soul pure and free rather than mortal and animallike. Cognition and thought are the root of human life, of human immortality as
228 a totality within | itself. The animal soul is submerged in corporeality, while spirit is a totality within itself. This is the first point that is represented.

d. Knowledge, Estrangement, and Evil

The second point is that the view we have grasped as essential in [the realm of] thought should become actual in humanity as such—i.e., that human beings should realize the infinity of this antithesis between good and evil within themselves, and that as natural beings they should *know* themselves to be evil in their naturalness. They should become conscious of this antithesis[151] within themselves and know that they are the ones who are evil. But it also pertains to this that evil at the same time refers to the good, that there is present [along with evil] the demand of the good, of being good, and that one becomes aware of this contradiction, undergoing anguish because of it, because of this cleavage. We have encountered the form of this antithesis in all religions. But the antithesis to the power of nature, to the ethical law, the ethical will, and ethical life, or to fate—these are all subordinate antitheses that contain only ˜something˜[152] particular. The person who violates a commandment is evil, but only in this particular case; he stands in opposition to this particular commandment. In the Parsee religion,[153] we saw that

150. [*Ed.*] See Fragment 3 from Michelet.
151. *Thus L; W_2 adds:* not only in general but of it
152. *Thus L, W_1; W_2 (Var) reads:* the antithesis to something
153. [*Ed.*] The religion of Persia, or Zoroastrianism.

good and evil, light and darkness, stand in universal antithesis to each other. There, however, the antithesis is *external* to human beings, and they themselves are outside it. This abstract antithesis is not present within them.

It is therefore required that ˜humanity should comprehend this abstract antithesis *within* itself.˜[154] It is not that one has transgressed this or that commandment, but rather that one is intrinsically evil—universally evil, purely and simply evil in one's innermost being.[155] This evil character is the essential definition of one's concept: this is what one must bring to consciousness. It is with this depth that we are concerned. Depth means abstraction | —the pure univer- 229
salization of the antithesis so that its two sides attain this wholly universal specification vis-à-vis each other.

Speaking generally, this antithesis has now two forms. On the one hand, it is the antithesis of evil as such, the fact that it is humanity itself that is evil: this is the *antithesis vis-à-vis God.* On the other hand, it is the *antithesis vis-à-vis the world,* the fact that humanity exists in a state of rupture from the world: this is unhapppiness or misery, the cleavage viewed from the other side.

We have first to consider the relation of the cleavage to one of the extremes, namely, to God. It is an aspect of there being the need for universal reconciliation in humanity—and this means divine, absolute reconciliation—that the antithesis has attained this infinite degree, that this universality [of evil] encompasses the innermost being, that nothing remains outside this antithesis, and that therefore the antithesis is not something particular. This is the deepest depth. Human beings are inwardly conscious that in their innermost being they are a contradiction, and have therefore an infinite *anguish* concerning themselves. Anguish is present only where there is opposition to what ought to be, to an affirmative. What is no longer in itself an affirmative also has no contradiction, no anguish.

154. *Thus L; W_1 (Var) reads:* humanity should overcome this abstract antithesis. *W_2 (Var) reads:* humanity should have this abstract antithesis within itself and should overcome it.

155. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* evil in one's core.

Anguish is precisely the element of negativity in the affirmative, meaning that within itself the affirmative is self-contradictory and wounded. This anguish is thus one moment of evil. Evil merely on its own account is an abstraction; it *is* only in antithesis to the good, and since it is present in the unity of the subject, the latter is split, and this cleavage is infinite anguish. If the consciousness of the good, the infinite demand of the good, is not likewise present in the subject itself, in its innermost being, then no anguish is present and evil itself is only an empty nothingness, for it *is* only in this antithesis.

Evil and anguish can be infinite only when the good or God is known as *one* God, as a pure, spiritual God. It is only when the good is this pure unity, only when we have faith in *one* God, and only in connection with such a faith, that the negative can and must advance to this determination of evil and negation can advance to this universality. One side of this cleavage becomes apparent in this way, through the elevation of humanity to the pure, spiritual unity of God. This anguish and this consciousness are the condition of
230 the absorption [*Vertiefung*] of humanity into itself, | and likewise into the negative moment of cleavage, of evil. This is ˜an objective,˜[156] inward absorption into evil; inward absorption of an affirmative kind is absorption into the pure unity of God.

At this point it is evident that humanity, I as a natural human being, ˜do not correspond to˜[157] what the truth is, but likewise the truth of the one good remains firmly fixed within me. This lack of correspondence is characterized as what ought not to be. The task and demand are infinite. One can say: Since I am a natural human being, I have, on the one hand, consciousness of myself, but on the other hand my natural being [*Natürlichkeit*] consists rather in a lack of consciousness with regard to myself, in being without a will. I am the sort of being that acts according to nature, and in this respect I am innocent, it is often said, having no consciousness

156. *Thus L,* W_1; W_2 *reads:* a negative,

157. *L,* W_1 *read:* does not correspond to *Hu reads:* am unsuitable to W_2 *reads:* do not correspond to, and am caught in the many natural particularities [vis-à-vis]

of what I do, being without a will of my own, acting without inclination, allowing myself to be surprised by instinct. But *here*, in the antithesis that we have observed, the innocence disappears, for precisely the natural being of humanity, lacking in consciousness and will, is what ought not to be. In the face of the pure unity and perfect purity that I know as absolute truth, this natural being is declared to be evil. What has been said implies that[158] the absence of consciousness and will is to be considered as itself essentially evil. And thus the contradiction remains, no matter how one twists ˜oneself˜[159] about. Since this so-called innocence is defined as evil, my lack of correspondence to my essence and to the absolute remains; and from one side or the other I know myself always as what ought not to be.

This is the relation to the one extreme, and the result, the more determinate mode of this anguish, is my humiliation, my remorse; I experience anguish because I as a natural being do not correspond to what at the same time I *know* to be my own essence, to what I should be in my own knowing and willing. | 231

Concerning the relation to the other extreme, the world, the separation appears as *unhappiness* [*Unglück*]—the fact that humanity is not satisfied in the world.[160] As natural beings, human beings are related to other natural beings, and others are related to them as powers [*Mächte*], and to this extent each is as contingent as the other. However, the higher requirements of humanity, those having to do with ethical life, are requirements and determinations of freedom. Insofar as these requirements, which are implicitly justified in the concept of humanity—for human beings know what is good, and the good is in them—do not find satisfaction in existence, in the external world, humanity is in a state of unhappiness.

It is this unhappiness that drives and presses human beings back into themselves; and since the fixed demand that the world should be rational is present within them but does not find fulfillment, they

158. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* when we arrive at this point

159. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* it

160. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* Its natural needs have no further right or claim to satisfaction.

renounce the world, seeking happiness and satisfaction in the harmony of the self with itself. [The demand becomes] that they renounce the world and achieve the satisfaction of their happiness [in this inner harmony]. In order to achieve the harmony of their affimative side with their determinate being, they give up the external world, transfer their happiness into themselves, and seek satisfaction within themselves.

˜This element˜[161]—the anguish that comes from universality, from above—we saw in the Jewish people; it does not release me in my natural existence, in my empirical willing and knowing, from the infinite demands of absolute purity. The other form [of cleavage or estrangement], the being driven back into oneself by unhappiness, is the standpoint at which the Roman world arrived—the universal unhappiness of the world. We saw the formal inwardness that satisfies itself in the world ˜as the dominion of God's purpose,˜[162] which is represented, intended, and known as a worldly dominion.

Each of these sides has its one-sidedness. The first may be
232 described as the sensation | of ˜humiliation;˜[163] the other is the abstract elevation of human being inwardly—the human being who is concentrated within himself—and hence it is Stoicism and Skepticism. The Stoic or Skeptic sage was directed back to himself and was supposed to be satisfied within himself. Through independence and rigid self-containment, he was supposed to find happiness and be in harmony with himself; in this abstract self-absorption, in the presence of [his own] self-conscious interiority, he was supposed to be at rest.

These are the highest, most abstract moments of all; here the antithesis is at its height, and both sides embrace the antithesis in its most complete universality—in the universal itself—and in its innermost essence, its greatest depth. But, as we have said, both

161. *Thus Hu, similar in An; L reads:* We already found these two forms of cleavage in the particular religions. W_1 *(Var) reads:* We found these two forms: W_2 *(Var) reads:* With respect to this demand and this unhappiness, we found these two forms:

162. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* [we saw] this dominion, the purpose of God,

163. *Thus Hu, W; L (Var) reads:* humility;

forms are one-sided. The first contains that anguish and abstract humiliation the crowning feature of which is the utter lack of correspondence between the subject and the universal, the cleavage or rupture that is not bridged, is not healed. This is the standpoint of the most abstract antithesis between the infinite on the one side and a fixed finitude on the other—and this finitude is abstract finitude. Here everything that is reckoned as belonging to me is simply evil. This abstraction finds its complement on the other side, namely in the process of internal thought; here we have the correspondence of self with self, [the claim] that I am satisfied, and can be satisfied within myself. This second form, however, is just as one-sided on its own account, because it comprises only the affirmative side, and indeed the one-sided affirmation of myself within myself. The contrition of the first side is only negative, lacking in self-affirmation; the second side is now supposed to be this pure affirmation, this self-satisfaction. But this satisfaction of myself within myself is only an abstract satisfaction; it occurs only by means of flight from the world and from actuality—by means of this inactivity. Since this is a flight from actuality, it is also a flight from *my* actuality—and indeed not from my external actuality, but from that of my own volition. The *actuality* of my volition—I as a specific subject, as a will filled with content—is no longer mine, but what remains for me is the *immediacy* of my self-consciousness. To be sure, the latter is completely | abstract, but the final extremity 233
of depth is contained therein, and ˜I have preserved it therein.˜[164] It is not an abstraction from the abstract actuality within me or from my immediate self-consciousness, from the immediacy of my self-consciousness. On this side, therefore, affirmation is the predominant factor, but it does not include the negation of the one-sidedness of immediate being found on the other side; while on that side the negation is [itself] the one-sided factor. These two moments contain within themselves the need for a transition.

The concept of the preceding religions has refined itself into this

164. *Thus L; B reads:* and that which I have preserved for myself therein. *W (Var) reads:* I have preserved myself therein.

antithesis; and the fact that the antithesis has disclosed and presented itself as an actually existing need is expressed by the words, "When the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son" [Gal. 4:4]. This means: the Spirit is at hand, the need for the Spirit that points the way to reconciliation.

2. Reconciliation

a. The Idea of Reconciliation and Its Appearance in a Single Individual

[165]The deepest need of spirit is that the antithesis within the subject itself should be intensified to its universal, i.e., its most abstract, extreme. This is the cleavage, the anguish that we have considered. That these two sides do not fall completely apart, but rather constitute a contradiction within the unity of the subject, demonstrates at the same time that the subject is the infinite power of unity: it can bear this contradiction. This is the formal, abstract, yet infinite energy of unity that it possesses. What satisfies this need is the consciousness of atonement, of the sublation, the nullification of the antithesis, so that the latter is not the truth. Rather, the truth is the attainment of unity through the negation of the antithesis; this is the peace, the reconciliation, that the need demands. Reconciliation is what is demanded by the need of the subject, and this exigency resides in the subject as infinite unity or as self-identity.

The sublation of the antithesis has two sides. First, the subject must become conscious of the fact that the antithetic opposites are not [things] in themselves, but that instead the truth, the inner nature [of spirit], consists in the sublatedness of the antithesis. Second, because the antithesis is implicitly and truthfully sublated,
234 | the subject as such, in its being-for-itself, can reach and attain peace and reconciliation through the sublation of the antithesis.

That the antithesis is *implicitly* sublated constitutes the condition, the presupposition, the possibility that the subject should also sublate this antithesis *explicitly*. In this respect it may be said that the subject does not attain reconciliation on its own account, i.e., as this [single] subject and in virtue of its [own] activity or conduct;

165. *In B's margin:* 7 August 1827

reconciliation is not brought about, nor can it be brought about, by the subject in its way of conducting itself. The subject's activity consists only in positing, in doing, the one side. The other side is what is substantial and foundational, that without which there is no possibility of resolving the antithesis—namely, that implicitly this antithesis is not present. Put more precisely, the antithesis arises eternally and just as eternally sublates itself; there is at the same time eternal reconciliation. That this is the truth may be seen in the eternal, divine idea: God is the one who as living spirit distinguishes himself from himself, posits an other and in this other remains identical with himself, has in this other his identity with himself. This is the truth.

It is this truth that constitutes one side of what must come to consciousness in humanity, namely, the side that has substantial being in itself. This can be expressed more precisely as follows: the antithesis is incongruous in principle. The antithesis (or evil) is the natural state of human being and willing; it is human immediacy, which is precisely the modality of natural life. Along with immediacy, finitude is likewise posited, and this finitude or naturalness is incongruous with the universality of God, with the infinite, eternal idea, which is utterly free within itself and present to itself. This incongruity is the point of departure that constitutes the need [for reconciliation]. But the more precise determinacy [of it] is not that this incongruity of the two sides disappears for consciousness. The incongruity is [there], it resides in spirituality. Spirit is the process of self-differentiating, the positing of distinctions. If the distinctions are made, then in the respect that they are distinct they are not equal; they are distinct, not congruous with one another. *This* incongruity cannot disappear, for otherwise the judgment of spirit, its | vitality, would disappear, and it would cease to be spirit. It is 235
rather the case that the two sides are not merely incongruous and that the identity of the two persists in spite of their incongruity. The other-being, the finitude, the weakness, the frailty of human nature is not to do any harm to that divine unity which forms the substance of reconciliation. That no harm is done has been seen in the divine idea. For the Son is other than the Father, and this otherness is difference—otherwise it would not be spirit. But the

other is [also] God and has the entire fullness of the divine nature within itself. The character of otherness in no way detracts from the fact that this other is the Son of God and therefore God.[166] This otherness is what eternally posits and eternally sublates itself; the self-positing and sublating of otherness is love or spirit.

Evil, the one side, has been abstractly defined as only the other, the finite, the negative, and God is placed on the other side as the good, the positive, the true. But this is not a true representation. For that which is negative and other also contains affirmation within itself. It must be brought to consciousness[167] that the principle of affirmation is contained within that negative, and that in the affirmative principle there lies the principle of identity with the other side—even as God, as truth, is not just abstract identity with himself, but on the contrary the other, negation, the positing of oneself otherwise, is God's own essential determination, and the proper determination of spirit. ˜˜Hence this need could come to consciousness. This implicit being, this implicitly subsisting unity | of divine and human nature, must come to consciousness in infinite anguish—but only in accord with implicit being, with substantiality, so that finitude, weakness, and otherness can do no harm to the substantial unity of the two. Or expressed differently, the substantiality of the unity of divine | and human nature comes to consciousness for humanity in such a way that a human being[168] appears to consciousness as God, and God appears to it as a human being. This is ˜the necessity and need˜[169] for such an appearance.

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Furthermore, the consciousness of the absolute idea that we have in philosophy in the form of thinking[170] is to be brought forth not for the standpoint of philosophical speculation or speculative thinking but in the form of *certainty.* The necessity [that the divine-human unity shall appear] is not first apprehended by means of thinking; rather it is a certainty for humanity. In other words, this content—the unity of divine and human nature—achieves certainty,

166. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* nor does it detract from this other in human nature.
167. *Thus L,* W_1; W_2 *(Var) adds:* within finite being
168. *Thus L, Hu; An adds:* (but not every human being)
169. *Thus L;* W_1 *(Var) reads:* the necessity of this need
170. [*Ed.*] See *Science of Logic,* pp. 824–844 (GW 12:236–253).

obtaining the form of immediate sensible intuition and external existence for humankind, so that it appears as something that has been seen in the world, something that has been | experienced. It 238
is essential to this form of nonspeculative consciousness that it must be *before* us; it must essentially be *before* me—it must become a certainty for humanity. For it is only what exists in an immediate way, in inner or outer intuition, that is certain. In order for it [this divine-human unity] to become a certainty for humanity, *God had to appear in the world in the flesh* [cf. John 1:14]. The necessity that God [has] appeared in the world in the flesh is an essential characteristic—a necessary deduction from what has been said previously, demonstrated by it—for only in this way can it become a certainty for humanity; only in this way is it the truth in the form of certainty.

˜At the same time there is this more precise specification to be added, namely, that the unity of divine and human nature must appear in *just one human being*. Humanity in itself as such is the universal, or the thought of humanity.˜[171] From the present standpoint, however, it is not a question of the thought of humanity but of sensible certainty; thus it is just one human being in whom this unity is envisaged—humanity as singular, or in the determinacy of singularity and particularity. Moreover, it is not just a matter of singularity *in general,* for singularity in general is something universal once more. But from the present standpoint, singularity is not something universal; universal singularity is found in abstract thinking as such. Here, however, it is a question of the certainty of intuiting and sensing. The substantial unity [of God and humanity] is what humanity implicitly is; hence it is something that lies beyond immediate consciousness, beyond ordinary consciousness and knowledge. Hence it must stand over against subjective consciousness, which relates to itself as ordinary consciousness and is defined as such. That is exactly why the unity in question must appear for others as a singular human being set apart; it is not present in the others, but only in one from whom all the others are excluded.

171. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* The unity of divine and human nature, humanity in its universality, is the thought of humanity. W_2 *(Var) adds:* and the idea of absolute spirit, which has being in and for itself.

~Thus this one stands over against the others as what humanity implicitly is—a single individual [who is there] as the soil of
239 certainty.~[172] |

Thus there are two conditions for this appearance. The first is that consciousness can achieve this content, this substantial unity, the consciousness of which is given and which is its reconciliation. The second condition is the consciousness of the determinate form of this exclusive singularity.~~[173]

172. *Thus L, which reads in German: So ist er ihnen drüben als das Ansich und ein Einzelner als Boden der Gewissheit.* W_1 *(Var) reads:* Thus it [*es* (the unity?)] stands over against the others as what humanity implicitly is—singularity on the soil of certainty. *Hu reads:* For only in this way does this one become what stands over there [*das Drüben*] for the intuition of human beings. W_2 *(Var) reads:* —but no longer as what implicitly is [*das Ansich*], which is over there [*das drüben ist*], but as singularity on the soil of certainty.

173. W_1, *and in part also* W_2, *transmit a parallel to this passage from the 1831 lectures. The text below follows* W_1, *but the passages contained in* W_2 *in somewhat fuller form are also given.* W_1 *(1831) reads:* The one mode of revelation that leads as a whole to the elevation [of spirit], whose general characteristics we have considered earlier, is revelation by way of nature and the world. The other mode is the higher one and occurs through finite spirit. This is what first displays the interest of the standpoint at which we now find ourselves. Divinity is recognized by finite human beings in what is objectively available to intuition, sensibility, and immediate consciousness.

This is the appearance of God in the flesh. God should be known as being for other, for humanity, and the human is an intuiting and sensing being—this singular human being. The possibility of reconciliation is present only when the implicitly subsisting unity of divine and human nature is known. Human beings can know themselves to be taken up into God only when God is not something alien to them, only when they are not merely an extrinsic accident upon God's nature, but rather when they are taken up into God in accordance with their essence and freedom. The implicitly subsisting unity of divine and human nature must be revealed to humanity in an objective way; this is what happened through the incarnation of God.

W_2 *reads:* The possibility of reconciliation resides only in the fact that the implicitly subsisting unity of divine and human nature is known; this is the necessary foundation. Human beings can know themselves to be taken up into God inasmuch as God is not something alien to them and they are not related to him as an extrinsic accident [W_1 *reads:* as something extrinsic]—[i.e.,] when they are taken up into God in accordance with their essence, their freedom and subjectivity [W_1 *reads:* when they are subjects in God in accordance with their essence and freedom]. But this is possible only in virtue of the fact that this subjectivity of human nature is [present] within God himself. W_1 *continues:* and the implicitly subsisting unity of divine and human nature is [there] for them when God appears as human. Similarly, in a quite inferior form we have seen the incarnations of the Hindu deities, the Dalai Lama, and Buddha—[these are] human beings revered as deities. Among the Greeks there

In the church Christ has been called the "God-man." This is a monstrous compound, which directly contradicts both representation and understanding. But what has thereby been brought into human consciousness and made a certainty for it is the unity of divine and human nature, implying that the otherness, or, as we also say, the finitude, weakness, and frailty of human nature, does not damage this unity, just as otherness does not impair the unity

is even a human being, Heracles, who swings himself up into heaven through his bravery and his deeds, and is received among the gods. All this is quite different from what we have before us at this point; but all the same the impulsion toward this way of determining the implicitly subsisting unity is unmistakable. The form is still quite inferior, to be sure: in Hindu pantheism, substance dons only the mask of subjectivity, for it does not attain to actual, free subjectivity.

W_2 *reads:* This determination, namely, that God becomes human [*dass Gott Mensch wird*], and consequently that finite spirit has the consciousness of God within the finite itself, is the most difficult moment of religion. According to a common representation, which we find among the ancients especially,[a] the spirit or soul has been relegated to this world as something alien; this indwelling [of the soul] in the body, and this singularization to [the limit of] individuality, are held to be a degradation of spirit. This is what characterizes the purely material side, or immediate existence, as untrue. But on the other hand immediate existence is at the same time an essential determination; it is where spirit is sharpened to a final point in its subjectivity. Human beings have spiritual interests and are spiritually active; they can feel that they are hindered in exercising these interests and activities because they feel that they are physically dependent and must make provision for their sustenance etc. Thus they fall away from their spiritual interests because of their bondage to nature. But the moment of immediate existence is contained within spirit itself; it is [logically] characteristic of spirit to advance to this moment. Natural life is not merely an external necessity; on the contrary, spirit as subject, in its infinite relatedness to itself, has the [logical] character of immediacy in it. Now, inasmuch as it is to be revealed to humanity what the nature of spirit is, and the nature of God is to become manifest in the entire development of the idea, this form [of immediacy] must also be present here, and this is precisely the form of finitude. The divine must appear in the form of immediacy. This immediate presence is only the presence of the spiritual in its spiritual shape, i.e., in the human shape. In no other way is this appearance genuine—not, for instance, the appearance of God in the burning bush [Exod. 3:2 ff.], and the like. God appears as a single person to whose immediacy all [the usual] physical needs are attached. In Hindu pantheism a countless number of incarnations occur; but there subjectivity, the human being, is only an accidental form in God; it is only a mask that substance adopts and exchanges in contingent fashion. As spirit, on the other hand, God contains the moment of subjectivity and uniqueness in himself; his appearance, therefore, can only be a single one, it can take place only once.

[*Ed.*] [a]Hegel is referring to Gnostic representations of the imprisonment of the spirit and soul in matter, with which he was familiar through Neander's *Gnostische Systeme* (on Basilides, see pp. 36–37; on Valentinus, pp. 106–107).

that God is in the eternal idea. It is the appearance of a human being in sensible presence; God in sensible presence can take no other shape than that of human being. In the sensible and mundane order, only the human is spiritual; so if the spiritual is to have a sensible shape, it must be a human shape.

b. The Historical, Sensible Presence of Christ

This ˜appearance of the God-man˜[174] has to be viewed from two different perspectives at once. First, he is a human being in accord with his external circumstances. This is the nonreligious perspective [*die irreligiöse Betrachtung*] in which he appears as an ordinary human being. Second, there is the perspective that occurs in the Spirit or with the Spirit. Spirit presses toward its truth because it has an infinite cleavage and anguish within itself. It wills the truth; the need of the truth and the certainty thereof it will have, and must have. Here for the first time we have ˜the religious view [*das*
240 *Religiöse*].˜[175] |

When Christ is viewed in the same light as Socrates, then he is regarded as an ordinary human being, just as in Islam he is regarded as a messenger of God in the general sense that all great men are messengers of God.[176] If one says no more of Christ than that he is a teacher of humanity, a martyr to the truth, one is not adopting ˜the religious standpoint;˜[177] one ˜says˜[178] no more of him than of Socrates. But there is this human side of Christ too—his appearance as a living human being—and we shall mention briefly its moments.

The first moment is that he is *immediately a human being* in all the external contingencies, in all the temporal exigencies and conditions, that this entails. He is born like every other human being,

174. *Thus L; Hu, An reads:* appearance *W (Var) reads:* historical appearance

175. *Thus L, Hu; An reads:* the religious perspective [*religiöse Betrachtung*]. *W (1831) reads:* the genuine perspective in religion. These two sides are to be distinguished here—the immediate perspective and that of faith. Through faith we know that this individual has a divine nature, and in that way the "beyondness" of God is superseded [*Durch den Glauben wird dieses Individuum als von göttlicher Natur gewusst, wodurch das Jenseits Gottes aufgehoben werde*].

176. [*Ed.*] See above, 1824 lectures, n. 215.

177. *Thus L, Hu; W (Var) reads:* the Christian standpoint, that of the true religion;

178. *Hu reads:* speaks

and as a human he has the needs of other human beings; only he does not share the corruption, the passions, and the evil inclinations of the others, nor is he involved in particular worldly interests, along with which integrity and teaching may also find a place. Rather he lives only for the truth, only for its proclamation; his activity consists solely in completing the higher consciousness of humanity.[179]

~Thus the second moment is that of his teaching office.~[180] The question now is this: "How can, how must this teaching be constituted?" This original teaching cannot be constituted in a manner similar to the later doctrine of the church; it must have its own distinctive aspects, which in the church[181] partly take on another character and are partly set aside.[182] Once the community is established, once the kingdom of God has attained its determinate being and its actuality, these teachings are either interpreted in other ways or else they fall by the wayside.[183] | 241

Since what is at issue is the consciousness of absolute reconciliation, we are here in the presence of a new consciousness of humanity, or a new religion. Through it a new world is constituted, a new actuality, a different world-condition, because [humanity's] outward determinate being, [its] natural existence, now has religion as its substantiality. This is the aspect that is negative and polemical, being opposed to the subsistence of externality in the consciousness[184] of humanity. The new religion expresses itself precisely as a new consciousness, the consciousness of a reconciliation of

179. *Thus L, similar in An; W_1 (1831) adds:* This affords an intuition of what is available for the community. It is available at the same time in a sensuous way, and to this extent it is an emptying out [*Entäusserung*] of the divine, of the idea, which has to annul itself.

180. *Thus L, similar in An; W (1831) reads:* The teaching of Christ also belongs on this human side.

181. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* in necessary fashion

182. *Thus L; W (1831) adds:* As this immediate teaching, Christ's teaching cannot be Christian dogmatics, cannot be the doctrine of the church.

183. *Thus L; W_1 (1831) adds:* The primitive [*unmittelbare*] Christian teaching arouses sensibilities by means of representation. Its content, which at the highest level is explication of the nature of God, is [directed] precisely at sensible consciousness and comes to the latter as intuition, not doctrine, which has the concept as its form—this only became necessary in the church later on when science began.

184. *Thus Hu; W (Var) adds:* and faith

humanity with God. This reconciliation, expressed as a state of affairs, is the kingdom of God, an actuality.[185] The souls and hearts [of individuals] are reconciled with God, and thus it is God who rules in the heart and has attained dominion.

This kingdom of God, the new religion, thus contains implicitly the characteristic of negating the present world. This is its polemical aspect, its revolutionary attitude toward all the determinate aspects of that outer world, [all the settled attitudes] of human consciousness and belief. [186]So what is at issue is the drawing of those who are to achieve the consciousness of reconciliation away from present actuality, requiring of them an abstraction from it. The new religion is itself still concentrated and does not actually exist as a community, but has its vitality rather in that energy which constitutes the sole, eternal interest of its adherents who have to fight and struggle in order to achieve this for themselves, because it is not yet coherent with the world consciousness and is not yet in harmony with the condition of the world.

Hence the first emergence of this religion directly contains this polemical aspect. It poses the demand that one should remove one-
242 self ˜from finite things˜[187] | and elevate oneself to an infinite energy for which all other bonds are to become matters of indifference, for which all other bonds—indeed, all things hitherto regarded as ethical and right—are to be set aside. Thus Christ says: "Who is my mother, who are my brothers? Whoever does the will of God is my mother, [my] sister, and [my] brother." Or: "Follow me! Leave the dead to bury the dead. Go forth and proclaim the kingdom of God." "I have not come to bring peace on earth, but rather children will leave their parents and follow me."[188]

185. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* in which God rules.

186. *Precedes in L (1827?), similar in W:* The previous [state of things] is now altered; the way things used to be, the previous condition of religion and the world, cannot continue as before.

187. *Thus L, W; An reads:* from worldliness *Hu reads:* from the world *B reads:* from worldly, earthly thought

188. [*Ed.*] Here Hegel conflates and quotes loosely from Matt. 12:48, 50; Mark 3:33–34; Luke 9:59–60; Matt. 8:21–22; and Matt. 10:34–38. The last clause ("but rather children will leave . . .") is not found in any of the Gospels but may be inferred from Matt. 10:35–38. These quotations are found in the extant sources rather than *L*, which at this point interpolates 1824 text in place of 1827.

We see here a polemical attitude expressed against the ethical relationships that have hitherto prevailed. These are all teachings and characteristics that belong to its first appearance, when the new religion constitutes the sole interest [of its adherents], which they were bound to believe they were still in danger of losing. This is the one side.

This renunciation, surrender, and setting aside of all vital interests and moral bonds is an essential characteristic of the concentrated manifestation of the truth, a characteristic that subsequently loses its importance when the truth has achieved a secure existence. ˜Beyond that˜[189] is the proclamation of the kingdom of God. Humanity must transpose itself into this kingdom[190] in such a way as to cast itself immediately upon this truth. This is expressed with the purest, most colossal boldness, as, for example, at the beginning of the Sermon on the Mount: "Blessed are the [poor] in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of God. Blessed are the pure in heart, [for] they shall see God" [Matt. 5:3, 8].[191] | 243

[192]Nothing is said about any mediation through which this elevation [of soul] may come to pass for humanity; rather what is spoken of is this immediate being, this immediate self-transposition into the truth, into the kingdom of God. It is to this kingdom, to this intellectual, spiritual world, that humanity ought to belong.

With respect to details, there are more specific teachings, among which the teaching about love constitutes a focal point: ˜"Love your neighbor as yourself" [Matt. 22:39].˜[193] But these teachings are already found in the Old Testament [cf. Deut. 6:5; Lev. 19:18].[194]

189. *Thus Hu; L,* W_1 *read:* It W_2 *(Var) reads:* Beyond that, in the affirmative sphere,

190. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* as the kingdom of love for God

191. *W (1831) adds:* Words like these are among the greatest that have ever been uttered; they are an ultimate focus that annuls every superstition, every bondage on the part of human beings. It is of the highest importance that, by means of Luther's translation of the Bible, a folk-book has been placed in the hands of the people, a book in which the heart, the spirit, can find itself at home in the highest, infinite fashion; in Catholic lands there is in this respect a great lack. There [in Protestant regions?] the Bible is the means of deliverance from all servitude of spirit.

192. *In B's margin:* 8 August 1827

193. *Thus Hu;* W_1 *(Var) reads:* "Love God above all and your neighbor as yourself" [cf. Matt. 22:37–39].

194. *Thus Hu, similar in B;* W_1 *(1831/Var?) adds:* What can be regarded as

Thus the following [distinctive] moment or determinate aspect enters into these teachings. Because the demand, "Seek first . . . "[195]—[i.e.,] cast yourself upon the truth—is expressed so directly, it emerges almost as a subjective declaration, and to this extent the person of the teacher comes into view. Christ speaks not merely as a teacher, who expounds on the basis of his own subjective insight and who is aware of what he is saying and doing, but rather as a prophet. He is the one who, because his demand is immediate, expresses it immediately from God, and God speaks it through him. His having this life of the Spirit in the truth, so that it is simply there without mediation, expresses itself prophetically in such a way that it is God who says it. It is a matter of the absolute, divine truth that has being in and for itself, and of its expression and intention; and the confirmation of this expression is envisaged as God's doing. It is the consciousness of the real unity of the divine will and of his harmony with it. In the form of this expression, however, the accent is laid upon the fact that the one who says this is at the same time essentially human. It is the Son of Man who speaks thus, in whom this expression, this activity of what subsists in and for itself, is essentially the work of God—not as something suprahuman that appears in the shape of an external revelation, but rather as [God's] working in a human being, so that the divine
244 presence is essentially identical with this human being. |

We still have to consider the fate of this individual, namely, that he became, humanly speaking, a martyr to the truth in a way that coheres closely with his earlier role, because the establishment of the kingdom of God stands in stark contradiction to the worldly

moral commandments are [found] partly in other religions and partly in the Jewish religion.

195. [*Ed.*] See Matt. 6:33: "Seek first his kingdom and his righteousness, and all these things shall be yours as well." The phrase that follows ("Cast yourself upon the truth"), while appearing to be a saying of Jesus, is in fact found nowhere in the Gospels. Hegel may have had in mind a saying such as that found in Luke 16:16 ("The law and the prophets were until John; since then the good news of the kingdom of God is preached, and everyone enters it violently"), or John 16:13 ("When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth"); but more likely it is intended as Hegel's interpretation of what it *means* to seek and to enter the kingdom of God (see the preceding two paragraphs).

authority [*vorhandenen Staate*], which is grounded upon another mode, a different determinate form, of religion.

These are the principal moments in the ˜appearance of this man, upon the human view of it. But this is only one side, and it is not a religious view.˜[196] | 245

196. *Thus L; W (1831) reads:* human appearance [W_1 *reads:* teaching] of Christ. This teacher gathered friends about him. Inasmuch as his teachings were revolutionary, Christ was accused and executed, and thus he sealed the truth of his teaching by his death. Even unbelief can go this far in [the view it takes of] this story: it is quite similar to that of Socrates, only on a different soil. Socrates, too, brought inwardness to consciousness; his δαιμόνιον is nothing other than this. He also taught that humanity must not stop short at obedience to ordinary authority but must form convictions for itself and act according to them. Here we have two similar individualities with similar fates. The inwardness of Socrates was contrary to the religious beliefs of his people as well as to their form of government, and hence he was put to death: he, too, died for the truth.

Christ happened to live among another people, and to this extent his teaching has a different hue. But the kingdom of heaven and the purity of heart contain, nonetheless, an infinitely greater depth than the inwardness of Socrates. This is the outward history of Christ, which is for unbelief just what the history of Socrates is for us.

With the death of Christ, however, the reversal of consciousness begins. The death of Christ is the midpoint upon which consciousness turns; and in the comprehension of it lies the difference between outward comprehension and that of faith, which entails contemplation with the Spirit, from the Spirit of truth, the Holy Spirit. According to the comparison made earlier, Christ is a human being like Socrates, a teacher who lived his life virtuously, and who brought humanity to the awareness of what the truth really is and of what must constitute the basis of human consciousness. But the higher view is that the divine nature has been revealed in Christ. This consciousness is reflected in those often-quoted passages which state that the Son knows the Father, etc.—sayings which of themselves have at the outset a certain generality about them and which exegesis can draw out into the arena of universal views, but which faith comprehends in their truth through an interpretation of the death of Christ. For faith is essentially the consciousness of absolute truth, of what God is in and for himself. But we have already seen what God is in and for himself: he is this life-process, the Trinity, in which the universal places itself over against itself and therein remains identical with itself. God, in this element of eternity, is the conjoining of himself with himself, the closure of himself with himself. Only faith comprehends and is conscious of the fact that in Christ this truth, which has being in and for itself, is envisaged in its process, and that through him this truth has been revealed for the first time.

[*Ed.*] On the *daimonion* ("genius" or "demon") of Socrates, see esp. Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.1.7–9; Plato, *Apology* 10–14; also Hegel, *History of Philosophy,* pp. 421–425 (cf. *Werke* 14:94–101). On the comparison of Socrates and Christ, see above, 1824 lectures, n. 215. On the conclusion to the note, see Fragment 1 from Michelet.

c. The Death of Christ and the Transition to Spiritual Presence

It is this second view that leads us for the first time into the religious sphere as such, where the divine itself is an essential moment. Among those friends and acquaintances who were taught by Christ, there was present this presentiment, this representation, this desire for a new kingdom, a new heaven and a new earth, a new world. This hope and certainty penetrated the actuality of their hearts and became entrenched there. But the suffering and death of Christ superseded his human relationships, and it is precisely in his death that the transition into the religious sphere occurs.[197] On the one hand it is a natural death, brought about by injustice, hatred, and violence.

But in the hearts and souls [of believers] is the firm [belief] that the issue is not a moral teaching, nor in general the thinking and willing of the subject within itself and from itself; rather what is of interest is an infinite relationship to God, to the present God, the certainty of the kingdom of God—finding satisfaction not in morality, ethics, or conscience, but rather in that than which nothing is higher, ˜the relationship˜[198] to God himself. All other modes of satisfaction involve the fact that they are still qualities of a subordinate kind, and thus the relationship to God remains a relationship to something above and beyond, which in no sense lies present at hand.

The defining characteristic of this kingdom of God is the *presence of God,* which means that the members of this kingdom are expected to have not only a love for humanity but also the consciousness that God | is love. This is precisely to say that God is present, that his presence must exist as one's own feeling, as self-feeling. The kingdom of God, God's presentness, *is* this determination [of one's feeling]; so the certainty of God's presentness belongs to it. But since the kingdom is on the one hand [present] in need or feeling [on the part of the subject], the latter must, on the other hand, distinguish itself from it, must establish a distinction between this

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197. *L adds:* it is the meaning of or the way of comprehending this death. *W (Var) adds:* It is a question of the meaning of, of the way of comprehending, this death.

198. *Thus L; W_1 (Var) reads:* relationship *W_2 (Var) reads:* absolute relationship

presence of God and itself, but in such a way that this presence remains certain to it, and this certainty can here occur only in the mode of sensible appearance. [199~~]Because this is how the content

199. W_1 *here contains a lengthy passage from the 1831 lectures, which is also found in* W_2*, although dispersed into several disconnected segments. Our text follows the order of* W_1*, which is also confirmed by S, but the wording is that of* W_2*. The parallel in the main text follows, ending with the penultimate paragraph of this section.* W_2 *(1831) reads:*

We have seen God as the God of free humanity, though still at first in the subjective, limited forms of the folk-spirits and in the contingent shapes of phantasy; next we saw the anguish of the world following upon the suppression of the folk-spirits. This anguish was the birthplace for the impulse of spirit [W_1 *reads:* the birthplace of a new spirit, the impulse] to know God as spiritual, in universal form and stripped of finitude. This need was engendered by the progress of history and the progressive formation of the world-spirit. This immediate impulse, this longing, which wants and desires something determinate—this instinct, as it were, of spirit, which is impelled to seek for this [W_1 *reads:* —this is the witness of the Spirit and the subjective side of faith. This need and this longing]—demanded such an appearance, the manifestation of God as infinite spirit in the shape of an actual human being. [W_1 *reads:* The faith that rests upon the witness of the Spirit then makes the life of Christ explicit for itself. *Instead of this sentence,* W_2 *gives as a transition:* The eternal idea itself means that the characteristic of subjectivity as actual, as distinguished from mere thought, is allowed to appear immediately. On the other hand, it is faith, begotten by the anguish of the world and resting on the testimony of the Spirit, which explicates the life of Christ.] The teaching and the miracles of Christ are grasped and understood in this witness of faith. [W_1 *reads:* The words of Christ are truly grasped and understood only by faith.] The history of Christ is also narrated by those upon whom the Spirit has already been poured out. The miracles are grasped and narrated in this Spirit, and the death of Christ has been truly understood through the Spirit to mean that in Christ God is revealed together with the unity of divine and human nature. Thus the death of Christ is the touchstone, so to speak, by which faith is verified, since it is here, essentially, that its understanding of the appearance of Christ is set forth. This death means principally that Christ was the God-man, the God who at the same time had human nature, even unto death. It is the lot of human finitude to die. Death is the most complete proof of humanity, of absolute finitude; and indeed Christ has died the aggravated death of the evildoer: not merely a natural death, but rather a death of shame and humiliation on the cross. In him, humanity was carried to its furthest point.

Now, however, a further determination comes into play. *God has died, God is dead*—this is the most frightful of all thoughts, that everything eternal and true *is not,* that negation itself is found in God. The deepest anguish, the feeling of complete irretrievability, the annulling of everything that is elevated, are bound up with this thought. However, the process does not come to a halt at this point; rather, a reversal takes place: God, that is to say, maintains himself in this process, and the latter is only the death of death. God rises again to life, and thus things are reversed. The resurrection is something that belongs just as essentially to faith [as the crucifixion].

247 behaves, | we have here the religious aspect, and the formation of the community begins here. This content is the same as what is called the outpouring of the Holy Spirit: it is the Spirit that has

After his resurrection, Christ appeared only to his friends.[a] This is not an external history for unbelievers; on the contrary, this appearance occurs only for faith. The resurrection is followed by the glorification of Christ, and the triumph of his ascension to the right hand of God concludes this history, which, as understood by [believing] consciousness, is the explication of the divine nature itself. [W_1 *reads:* of God. This history is the explication of the divine nature itself.] If in the first sphere we grasped God in pure thought, then in this second sphere we start from the immediacy appropriate to intuition and sensible representation. The process is now such that immediate singularity is sublated: just as in the first sphere the seclusion of God came to an end, and his original immediacy as abstract universality, according to which he is the essence of essences, has been sublated, so here the abstraction of humanity, the immediacy of subsisting singularity, is sublated, and this is brought about by death. But the death of Christ is the death of this death itself, the negation of negation. We have had the same course and process of the explication of God in the kingdom of the Father, but this is where it occurs insofar as it is an object of consciousness. For at this point the urge to *see* the divine nature was present.

Concerning Christ's death, we have still finally [W_1 *reads:* particularly] to emphasize the aspect that it is God who has put death to death, since he comes out of the state of death. In this way, finitude, human nature, and humiliation are posited of Christ—as of him who is strictly God—as something alien. It is evident that finitude is alien to him and has been taken over from an other; this other is the human beings who stand over against the divine process. It is their finitude that Christ has taken [upon himself], this finitude in all its forms, which at its furthest extreme is evil. This humanity, which is itself a moment in the divine life, is now characterized as something alien, not belonging to God. This finitude, however, on its own account (as against God), is evil, it is something alien to God. But he has taken it [upon himself] in order to put it to death by his death. As the monstrous unification of these absolute extremes, this shameful death is at the same time infinite love.

It is out of infinite love that God has made himself identical with what is alien to him in order to put it to death. This is the meaning of the death of Christ. It means that Christ has borne the sins of the world and has reconciled God [with the world (2 Cor. 5:18–19)].

Suffering and death interpreted in this way are opposed to the doctrine of moral imputation, according to which all individuals are accountable only for themselves, and all are agents of their own actions. The fate of Christ seems to contradict this imputation, but the latter only applies in the region of finitude, where the subject stands as a single person, not in the region of free spirit. It is characteristic of the region of finitude that all individuals remain what they are. If they have done evil, then they *are* evil: evil is in them as their quality. But already in the sphere of morality, and still more in that of religion, spirit is known to be free, to be affirmative within itself, so that its limitation, which extends to evil, is a nullity for the infinitude

revealed this. The relationship [of believers] to a mere human being is changed into a relationship | that is completely altered and trans- 248
figured by the Spirit, so that the nature of God discloses itself therein, and so that this truth obtains immediate certainty in its manner of appearance.

In this experience, then, Christ, who at first was regarded as a teacher, friend, and martyr to the truth, assumes quite a different posture.[200] | On the one hand, the death of Christ is still the death 249
of a human being, a friend, who has been killed by violent means; but when it is comprehended spiritually, this very death becomes the means of salvation, the focal point of reconciliation. To have before oneself the intuition of the nature of spirit and of the satisfaction of its needs in a sensible fashion is, therefore, what ˜has been˜[201] disclosed to the friends of Christ only after his death.[202] [203]The authentic disclosure was given to them by the Spirit, of whom Christ had said, "He will guide you into all truth" [John 16:13]. By this he means: only that into which the Spirit will lead you will be the truth. Regarded in this respect, Christ's death assumes the character of a death that constitutes the transition to glory, but to a glorification that is only a restoration of the original glory. Death,

of spirit. Spirit can undo what has been done. The action certainly remains in the memory, but spirit strips it away. Imputation, therefore, does not attain to this sphere.

For the true consciousness of spirit, the finitude of humanity has been put to death in the death of Christ. This death of the natural has in this way a universal significance: finitude and evil are altogether destroyed. Thus the world has been reconciled; by this death it has been implicitly delivered from its evil. In the true understanding [*Verstehen*] of death, the relation of the subject as such [to death] comes into view in this way. Here any merely historical view comes to an end; the subject itself is drawn into the process. The subject feels the anguish of evil and of its own estrangement, which Christ has taken upon himself by putting on humanity, while at the same time destroying it by his death.

[*Ed.*] [a]See Matt. 28:9–10, 17–20; Mark 16:9 ff.; Luke 24:13 ff.; John 20–21.

200. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* Up to this point only the beginning has been posited, which is now carried forward by the Spirit to an end, a result, the truth.

201. *Thus B, Hu; L reads:* was

202. *W (Var) adds:* Thus the conviction that they were able to derive from his life was not yet the proper truth; rather first the Spirit [had to be sent].

203. *Precedes in L (1827?), similar in W:* Prior to his death he was to them an outwardly sensible individual.

the negative, is the mediating term through which the original majesty is posited as now achieved. The history of the resurrection and ascension of Christ to the right hand of God begins at the point where this history receives a spiritual interpretation.[204] That is when it came about that the little community achieved the certainty that God has appeared as a human being.

But this humanity in God—and indeed the most abstract form of humanity, the greatest dependence, the ultimate weakness, the utmost fragility—is natural death. "God himself is dead," it says in a Lutheran hymn,[205] expressing an awareness that the human, the finite, the fragile, the weak, the negative are themselves a moment of the divine, that they are within God himself, that finitude, negativity, otherness are not outside of God and do not, as oth-
250 erness, hinder unity with God. | Otherness, the negative, is known to be a moment of the divine nature itself. This involves the highest ˜idea˜[206] of spirit. In this way what is external and negative is converted into the internal. On the one hand, the meaning attached to death is that through death the human element is stripped away and the divine glory comes into view once more—death is a stripping away of the human, the negative. But at the same time death itself is this negative, the furthest extreme to which humanity as natural existence ˜is exposed; God himself is [involved in] this.˜[207]

The truth to which human beings have attained by means of this history, what they have become conscious of in this entire history, is the following: that the idea of God has certainty for them, that humanity has attained the certainty of unity with God, that the human is the immediately present God. Indeed, within this history as spirit comprehends it, there is the very presentation of the process of what humanity, what spirit is—implicitly both God and dead.

204. *Thus also W; L (1827?) adds:* Religious history is [found] where a spiritual interpretation of the history of Christ before his death prevails; for, of course, even the Gospels were written only after the outpouring of the Spirit. *In An's margin:* The overstepping of sensible verification: the church cannot undertake an investigation of it [the history of Christ] in a sensible manner.

205. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 163.

206. *Thus L,* W_1; W_2 *(Var) reads:* cognition of the nature of the idea

207. *Thus L with Hu; W (Var) reads:* and just for that reason, God himself, is exposed.

This [is] the mediation whereby the human is stripped away and, on the other hand, what-subsists-in-itself returns to itself, first coming to be spirit thereby.

It is with the *consciousness* of the community—which thus makes the transition from mere humanity to the God-man, to the intuition, consciousness, and certainty of the union and unity of divine and human nature—that the community begins; this consciousness constitutes the truth upon which the community is founded. This is the explication of reconciliation: that God is reconciled with the world, or rather that God has shown himself to be reconciled with the world, that even the human is not something alien to him, but rather that this otherness, this self-distinguishing, finitude as it is expressed, is a moment in God himself, although, to be sure, it is a disappearing moment.[208]

For the community, this is the history of the appearance of God. | This history is a divine history, whereby the community has come 251
to the certainty of truth. From it develops the consciousness that knows that God is triune. The reconciliation in Christ, in which one believes, makes no sense if God is not known as the triune God, [if it is not recognized] that God *is*, but also is as the other, as self-distinguishing, so that this other is God himself, having implicitly the divine nature in it, and that the sublation of this difference, this otherness, and the return of love, are the Spirit.[209]

These are the moments with which we are here concerned and which establish that humanity has become conscious of the eternal history, the eternal movement, which God himself is. Other forms such as that of sacrificial death reduce automatically to what has been said here. "To sacrifice" means to sublate the natural, to sublate otherness. It is said: "Christ has died for all."[210] This is not

208. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* But in this moment he has shown himself to the community.

209. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* This consciousness involves the fact that faith is not a relationship to something subordinate but to God himself.

210. *[Ed.]* See 2 Cor. 5:14–15: "For the love of Christ controls us, because we are convinced that one has died for all; therefore all have died. And he died for all, that those who live might live no longer for themselves but for him who for their sake died and was raised."

a single act but the eternal divine history: it is a moment in the nature of God himself; it has taken place in God himself.[211~~]

This is the presentation of the second [element of] the idea, the idea in appearance, the eternal idea as it has become [present] for the immediate certainty of humanity, i.e., as it has appeared. In order that it should become a certainty for humanity, it had to be a sensible certainty, which, however, at the same time passes over into spiritual consciousness, and likewise is converted into the immediately sensible—in such a way that the movement and history of God is seen in it, the life that God himself is.

C. *THE THIRD ELEMENT: COMMUNITY, SPIRIT*[212]

The third element is the element of the community. The first [moment of this element] is, then, the immediate origin of the com-
252 munity—this we have | already observed. It is the outpouring of the Holy Spirit [Acts 2]. [It is] spirit that comprehends this history

211. *L (1827?) adds, first sentence similar in W:* It is also said that in Christ all have died [cf. 2 Cor. 5:14]. In Christ this reconciliation has been represented [as being] for all, just as the Apostle compares faith in the crucified with viewing the bronze serpent.

[*Ed.*] From the context it must be assumed that Hegel is referring to the Apostle Paul, in which case it is likely that he has conflated two texts: 1 Cor. 10:9 and John 3:14. Paul alludes to the first part of the story concerning the setting up of a bronze serpent on a pole (Num. 21:5–9), but the comparison with faith in Christ is not found in Paul, as claimed by Hegel; see 1 Cor. 10:9: "We must not put the Lord to the test, as some of them did and were destroyed by serpents." Therefore it is probable that Hegel has in mind not the words of the Apostle but rather those of Jesus in conversation with Nicodemus in John 3:14–15: "And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, so must the Son of Man be lifted up, that whoever believes in him may have eternal life." (According to the story in Numbers, anyone bitten by a serpent would save him- or herself from death, by viewing the bronze serpent set up on a pole.)

212. [*Ed.*] The treatment of the "third element" is relatively brief in the 1827 lectures as compared with 1824 and 1821. The semester ended on Friday, 10 August, in 1827, and Hegel had already nearly completed the lecture on Wednesday, 8 August, before reaching the "third element" (see n. 192). The Wednesday lecture was an addition to the regular schedule, and during the last week of the course Hegel lectured five straight days, Monday through Friday. Fortunately, several of the themes treated in the final section of the lectures in 1824 and 1821 had already

spiritually as it is enacted in [the sphere of] appearance, and recognizes the idea of God in it, his life, his movement. The community is made up of those single, empirical subjects who are in the Spirit of God. But at the same time this content, the history and truth of the community, is distinguished from them and stands over against them. On the one hand, faith in this history, in reconciliation, is an immediate knowledge, an act of faith; on the other hand, the nature of spirit in itself is this process, which has been viewed both in the universal idea and in the idea as [it occurs] in appearance; and this means that the subject itself becomes spirit, and thus a citizen of the kingdom of God, by virtue of the fact that the subject traverses this process in itself. ˜It has been set forth above[213] that the human subject—the one in whom is revealed what is through the Spirit the certainty of reconciliation for humanity—has been marked out as singular, exclusive, and distinct from others.˜[214] Thus for the other subjects the presentation of the divine history is something that is objective for them, and they must now traverse this history, this process, in themselves. In order to do this, however, they must first presuppose that reconciliation is possible, or more precisely, that this reconciliation has happened in and for itself, that it is the truth in and for itself, and that reconciliation is certain.[215] In and for itself, this is the universal idea of God; but the other side of the presupposition is that this is certain for humanity, and that this truth is not [valid] for it [simply] through speculative thinking. This presupposition implies the certainty that reconciliation has been accomplished, i.e., it must be represented as some-

been discussed in 1827, such as the transition from sensible to spiritual presence, and the question of the verification of faith (whether by miracles or the witness of the Spirit). Thus Hegel could cover "the origin of the community" rather briefly.

213. [*Ed.*] See above, pp. 313–314.

214. *Thus L (the cross-reference is not found in B, Hu, or An); W_2 (MiscP) reads:* Thus in this divine drama the other that is for [human] subjects is objective to them in the same way that in the [Greek] chorus the audience finds itself objectified. *W (Var) continues:* Initially, of course, the subject, the human subject—the one in whom is revealed what becomes through the Spirit the certainty of reconciliation for humanity—has been defined as singular, exclusive, and distinct from others.

215. *Thus also W; L (1827?) adds:* The perishing of sin and the negation of immediacy are indicated by the bodily, sensible death [of Christ].

thing historical, as something that has been accomplished on earth,
253 in [the sphere of] appearance.[216] | This is the presupposition in which we must first of all believe.

1. The Origin of the Community

˜For the origin of faith there is necessary˜[217] first a human being, a sensible human appearance, and second, spiritual comprehension, consciousness of the spiritual. The content is spiritual, involving the transformation of immediacy into what has spiritual character. Verification is spiritual, it does not lie in the sensible, and cannot be accomplished in an immediate, sensible fashion.[218] The transformation of something immediate into a spiritual content is a transition that we have seen in the form of the proofs for the existence of God[219]—namely, that there is also a sensible world, although the truth is not the sensible, not the immediate world of finitude, but is rather the infinite.

[220]As to the empirical mode of the appearance, and investigations concerning the conditions surrounding the appearance of Christ after his death, the church is right insofar as it refuses to acknowledge such investigations; for the latter proceed from a point of view implying that the real question concerns the sensible and historical elements in the appearance [of Christ], as though the confirmation of the Spirit[221] depended on narratives of this kind about something

216. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* For there is no other mode of what is called certainty.

217. *Thus L; W (Var/1831?) reads:* 1. The origin of the community is what occurs as the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. The origin of faith is

218. *L (1827?) adds:* Accordingly, objections can always be raised against the sensible facts.

219. [*Ed.*] See Vol. 1:414–441.

220. *Precedes in L (1827?), similar in* W_1: This conversion, which already begins with the resurrection and ascension, is what we call the origin of the community.

[*Ed.*] This sentence, if authentic, indicates that the resurrection belongs as much to the history of the community as it does to the history of Christ. It constitutes the point of transition from the Son to the Spirit, from the second to the third element. In nonrepresentational language, the resurrection means for Hegel the spiritual presence of Christ in the community, Christ's presence *as* spirit. However, he uses resurrection language with reference to this actuality only infrequently.

221. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* and its truth

represented as [merely] historical [*historisch*], in historical [*geschichtlich*] fashion. It is said that the Holy Scriptures should be treated like the writings of profane authors. One can do this with regard to what concerns the merely historical, the finite and external. But for the rest, | it is a matter of comprehension by the Spirit; 254
the profane [aspect] is not the attestation of the Spirit.

[222]Thus the community itself is the existing Spirit, the Spirit in its existence [*Existenz*], God existing as community.

The first moment is the idea in its simple universality for itself, self-enclosed, having not yet progressed to the primal division, to otherness—the Father. The second is the particular, the idea in appearance—the Son.[223] It is the idea in its externality, such that the external appearance is converted back to the first [moment] and is known as the divine idea, the identity of the divine and the human. The third element, then, is ˜this consciousness—God as the Spirit.˜[224] This Spirit as existing and realizing itself is the community.

The community begins with the fact that the truth is at hand; it is known, extant truth. And this truth is what God is: he is the triune God; he is life, this process of himself within himself, the determining of himself within himself. The second aspect of this truth, then, is that it has also appeared, it has a relation to the subject, and is [present] for the subject; moreover, the subject is essentially related to it, and is meant to be a citizen of the kingdom of God. That the human subject ought to be a child of God implies that reconciliation is accomplished in and for itself within the divine idea, and secondly that it has appeared too, and hence the truth is certain for humankind. The appearing is precisely this certainty, the idea as it comes to consciousness in the modality of appearance. The third aspect is the relationship of the subject to this truth, the fact that the subject, to the extent that it is related to this truth,

222. *In B's margin:* 9 August 1827

223. *L (1827?) adds, similar in* W_1*:* Insofar as the first element is concrete, otherness is indeed already contained in it; the idea is eternal life, eternal bringing forth.

224. *Thus B, Hu,* W_1*; An reads:* God as the Spirit within consciousness. *L (Var) reads:* this consciousness of God as the Spirit.

arrives precisely at this conscious unity, deems itself worthy of this known unity, brings this unity forth within itself, and is fulfilled by the divine Spirit.

The fact that the single subject is now filled by the divine Spirit is brought about by mediation in the subject itself, and the mediating
255 factor is | that the subject has this faith. For faith is the truth, the presupposition, that reconciliation is accomplished with certainty in and for itself. Only by means of this faith that reconciliation is accomplished with certainty and in and for itself is the subject able and indeed in a position to posit itself in this unity. This mediation is absolutely necessary.

In this blessedness mediated through the laying hold of the truth, the difficulty that is immediately involved in the grasping of the truth is overcome. This difficulty is that the relationship of the community to this idea is a relationship of the single, particular subject; it is removed in the truth itself. It consists in the fact that the subject is different from absolute spirit.[225] This difference is removed, and its removal happens because God looks into the human heart, he regards the substantial will, the innermost, all-encompassing subjectivity of the human being, one's inner, true, and earnest willing. But apart from this inner will, and distinct from this inner, substantial actuality, there is still the external and deficient side of humanity: we commit errors; we can exist in a way that is not appropriate to this inward, substantial essentiality, this substantial, essential inwardness. ˜The difficulty is removed by the fact that God looks into the heart and sees what is substantial, so that externality—otherness, finitude, and imperfection in general, or however else it may be defined—does no damage to the absolute unity; finitude is˜[226] reduced to an inessential status, and is known as inessential. For in the idea, the otherness of the Son is a transitory, disappearing moment, not a true, essentially enduring, absolute moment.

This is the concept of the community in general, the idea which, to this extent, is the process of the subject within and upon itself,

225. *Thus L,* W_1; W_2 *(Var) adds:* it is what appears as its finitude.

226. *Thus L, similar in An; W (Var) reads:* But externality—otherness in general, finitude, imperfection, or however else it may be defined—is

the process of the subject that is taken up into the Spirit, is spiritual, so that the Spirit of God dwells within it. This process, which is its pure self-consciousness, is at the same time the consciousness of | truth, and the pure self-consciousness that knows and wills the 256
truth is precisely the divine Spirit within it.

2. The Subsistence of the Community

The community, whose concept we have just seen, also *realizes* itself. The real community is what we generally call the *church*. This is no longer the *emerging* [*entstehende*] but rather the *subsisting* [*bestehende*] community, which maintains itself. In the subsisting community the church is, by and large, the institution whereby [its] subjects come to the truth, appropriate the truth to themselves, so that the Holy Spirit becomes real, actual, and present within them and has its abode in them, whereby the truth can be within them and they can enjoy and give active expression to the ˜truth of˜[227] the Spirit; it is the means whereby they as subjects *are* the active expression of the Spirit.

The first thing that is present in the church is its universality, which consists in the fact that the truth is here presupposed, that it exists as truth already present—not, as in the case of the emerging church, that the Holy Spirit is poured out and engendered for the first time. This is a changed relationship to the beginning [of their religion] for [its] subjects, and for the subjects in their beginnings. The presupposed, extant truth is the *doctrine* of the church, its doctrine of faith. We know the content of this doctrine: it is[228] the doctrine of reconciliation. It is no longer the case that a person is elevated to [the sphere of] absolute meaning by the outpouring and ordaining of the Spirit, but rather that this meaning is something that is known and acknowledged. It is the absolute capability of the subject, both within itself and objectively, to share in the truth, to come to the truth, to abide in the truth, to attain to the consciousness of truth. This consciousness of doctrine is here present and presupposed.

227. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* truth, of
228. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* in one word

Thus it is that doctrine is elaborated within the community itself only as something presupposed and finished. The Spirit that was shed abroad is the beginning, that which makes the beginning, which raises up. The community is the consciousness of this Spirit,
257 the expression of what | spirit has discovered and what it has been touched by, namely, that Christ is for spirit. Hence doctrine has been essentially brought forth and developed in the church. First it is [present] as intuition, faith, feeling—as the felt witness of the Spirit like a flame of fire. ˜But it is supposed to be present and presupposed; thus it must be developed from the concentration and interiority of feeling into representation as something immediately present.˜[229] Accordingly, the doctrine of faith is essentially constituted in the church first of all, and then later it is thinking, developed consciousness, which also asserts its rights in the matter, adducing the other [forms of truth] to which it has attained by way of the cultivation of thought, by way of philosophy. For these thoughts, on behalf of these thoughts, and on behalf of this otherwise known truth, thinking first develops a consciousness that is only intermixed with other, impure thoughts. Thus doctrine is developed out of other concrete contents that are intermixed with impurities. This doctrine is present to hand and must then be preserved too. This happens in the church. There, that which is doctrine must also be taught. It *is,* it exists, it is valid, it is acknowledged and immediately presupposed. But it is not present in a sensible manner, such that the comprehension of the doctrine can take place through the senses—in the way that the world, for example, is of course presupposed as a sensible entity, to which we are related externally and sensibly. Instead, spiritual truth exists only as known, and the fact that it also appears, and the mode of its appearance, is precisely this, that it is taught. The church is essentially a teaching church, by virtue of which there is a teaching office whose function is to expound doctrine.

Human beings are already born into this doctrine; they have their beginnings in this context of valid truth, already present, and

229. *Thus L with B and Hu, similar in* W_1; W_2 *(MiscP) reads:* But this characteristic of bringing forth is itself merely a one-sided one because the truth is at the same time implicitly present and presupposed; the subject is already taken up into the content.

in the consciousness of it. The relationship of single members to this presupposed truth that subsists in and for itself has yet a second aspect. Since individuals are born into the church, they are destined ˜straightaway, while they are still unconscious,˜[230] to participate in this truth, | to become partakers of it; their vocation is for the truth. 258
The church expresses this too, in the sacrament of *baptism,* which says that the human being, the individual, is in the fellowship of the church, where evil has been overcome, implicitly and explicitly, and God is reconciled, implicitly and explicitly. [231]Initially, doctrine is related to this individual as something external. The child is at first spirit only implicitly, it is not yet realized spirit, is not yet actual as spirit; it has only the capability, the potentiality, to be spirit, to become actual as spirit. Thus the truth is something external to it, and comes to the subject initially as something presupposed, acknowledged, and valid. This means that the truth necessarily comes to humanity at first as *authority.*

All truth, even sensible truth—although it is not truth in the proper sense—comes to people initially in the form of authority; i.e., it is something present that possesses validity and exists on its own account. That is how it comes to me—as something distinct from me. Similarly, the world comes to us in sense perception as an authority confronting us: it *is,* we find it so, we accept it as something that is really there and relate ourselves to it as such. That is how it is, and it is valid just the way it is. Doctrine, which is spiritual, is not present as a sensible authority of that kind; it must be *taught,* and it is taught as valid truth. Custom is something that is valid, an established conviction. But because it is something spiritual, we do not say, "It is," but rather, "It is right." However, because it confronts us as what is real, we also say, "It is." And because it presents itself to us as something valid, we call its way of being "authority."

Just as people have to learn sensible content from authority, and to be content with the way things are just because they are so—

230. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* although still unconsciously, nonetheless

231. *Thus L; precedes in* W_1 *(1831), similar in* W_2*:* Even though the individual is not spared the real, infinite anguish of being unfit in its relationship to God, it is nonetheless eased; but this is no longer the real struggle from which the community arose.

the sun is there, and because it is there I must put up with it—so also they have to learn doctrine, the truth.[232] What is learned in
259 this way must | be taken up by individuals into themselves in order to assimilate it, to appropriate it. As we have already said,[233] the inner spirit is the absolute possibility of this knowledge; it conforms to this content that is itself spirit. What is there in human inwardness, i.e., in one's rational spirit, is therefore brought to consciousness for the individual as something objective; or what is found within the individual is developed so that one knows it as the truth in which one abides. This is the concern of education, practice, cultivation. With such education and appropriation it is a question merely of becoming habituated to the good and ˜the true [*Wahrhafte*].˜[234] To this extent it is not a matter of overcoming evil because evil has been overcome in and for itself.[235] The child, inasmuch as it is born into the church, has been born in freedom and to freedom. For one who has been so born, there is no longer an absolute otherness; this otherness is posited as something overcome, as already conquered. The sole concern of such cultivation is to prevent evil from emerging, and the possibility of this does in general reside in humanity. But insofar as evil does emerge among human beings when they do evil, at the same time it is present as something implicitly null, over which spirit has power: spirit has the power to undo evil.

Repentance or *penitence* signifies that, through the elevation of human beings to the truth, which they now will, their transgression

232. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* The latter, however, arises not through sensible perception, through the activity of the senses on us, but rather through doctrine as what is really there, or through authority.

233. [*Ed.*] See above, p. 332.

234. *B reads:* truths [*Wahrhaften*]. *L reads:* the rational [*Vernünftige*]. *W (Var) reads:* the true [*Wahre*].

235. *Thus L; W (1831) adds:* It is a question only of contingent subjectivity. Linked with that element of faith consisting in the determination that the subject is not as it ought to be, there is simultaneously the absolute possibility that the subject can fulfill its destiny, can be received into the grace of God. This is the concern of faith. The individual must lay hold of the implicitly subsisting unity of divine and human nature; this truth is laid hold of through faith in Christ. Thus God is no longer a beyond for the individual; and the laying hold of this truth is opposed to the basic determination referred to above, namely, that the subject is not as it ought to be.

is wiped out. Because they acknowledge the truth over against their evil and will the good—through repentance, that is to say—their evil comes to naught. Thus evil is known as something that has been overcome in and for itself, having no power of its own. The undoing of what has been done cannot take place in a sensible manner; but in a spiritual | manner or inwardly, what has been 260
done can be undone.[236] Therefore it is the concern of the church that this habituating and educating of spirit should become ever more inward, that this truth should become ever more identical with the self, with the human will, and that this truth should become one's volition, one's object, one's spirit. The battle is now over, and the consciousness arises that there is no longer a struggle, as in the Parsee religion or the Kantian philosophy,[237] where evil is always sure to be overcome, yet it stands in and for itself over against ˜the supreme good, so that in these views there is nothing but˜[238] an unending progression.[239]

˜The subsistence of the community is completed by sharing in the appropriation of God's presence [i.e., the *communion*]. It is a question precisely of the conscious presence of God, of unity with God, the *unio mystica,* [one's] self-feeling of God, the feeling of God's immediate presence within the subject. This self-feeling, however, since it exists, is also a movement, it presupposes a movement,

236. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* The sinner is forgiven; he is reckoned as one accepted by the Father among human beings.

237. [*Ed.*] On Hegel's criticism of the Kantian idea of an unending improvement in ethical conditions, see above, 1824 lectures, n. 194; and on the comparison of Iranian (Parsee) and Kantian dualism, see Vol. 2 of this edition. On the concept of an unending progression, see Hegel's *Science of Logic,* pp. 227–228 (cf. *GW* 11:140–142).

238. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* the good, and the highest thing is

239. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* Here, by contrast, evil is known in the Spirit to be overcome in and for itself, and because it is overcome in and for itself, the subject has only to make its own will good in order for evil, the evil deed, to disappear. *After an insertion from the 1824 lectures, W (1831) continues:* Acting in the belief that reconciliation has been implicitly achieved is, on the one hand, the act of the subject, but on the other hand it is the act of the divine Spirit. Faith itself is the divine Spirit that works in the subject. But the subject is not a passive receptacle; rather the Holy Spirit is equally [*ebenso*] the subject's spirit to the extent that the subject has faith. In such faith the latter acts in opposition to its natural life, sets it aside, puts it away.

a sublation of difference, so that a negative unity issues forth.[240] This unity begins with the host.˜[241] [242]Concerning the latter, three kinds of view are now prevalent. According to the first, the host—
261 this external, sensible thing | —becomes by consecration the present God, God as a thing in the manner of an empirical ˜thing.˜[243] The second view is the Lutheran one, according to which the movement does indeed begin with something external, which is an ordinary, common thing, but the communion, the self-feeling of the presence of God, comes about only insofar as the external thing is consumed—not merely physically but in spirit and in faith. God is present only in spirit and in faith.[244] Here there is no transubstan-

240. *W (1831) adds:* Thus the Lord's Supper is also the midpoint of Christian doctrine, and from this point all the differences within the Christian church receive their coloration and definition.

241. *Thus L; among the extant sources only the following is found in Hu (probably added later):* Communion [*Genuss*] is the consciousness of God's immediate presence in the subject's heart: *unio mystica. W (Var) reads:* The ultimate in this sphere is sharing in this appropriation, in this presence of God [*der Genuss dieser Aneignung, der Gegenwärtigkeit Gottes*]. It is precisely a matter of the conscious presence of God, of unity with God, the *unio mystica,* [one's] self-feeling of God.

242. *In B's margin:* 10 August 1827

[*Ed.*] Since *B* lacks the preceding passage, it is obvious that Hegel's final lecture began with the topic of this paragraph, the sacrament of communion, for which he uses the difficult-to-translate term *Genuss.*

243. *Thus Hu; L reads:* existence. *W (1831) reads:* thing [*possibly from 1824 (G):* —likewise partaken of empirically by human beings]. Since God is thus known as something external in the Lord's Supper—this midpoint of doctrine—this externality is the foundation of the whole Catholic religion.[a] Thus arises the servitude of knowledge and activity [in this religion]; this externality pervades all further characteristics [of it] since the true is represented as something fixed and external. As something existing outside the subject, it can pass into the control of others; the church is in possession of it as well as of all the means of grace. In every respect the subject is a passive, receptive subject that knows not what is true, right, and good, but has only to accept the standard from others.

[*Ed.*] [a]See Hegel's defense against the reproach of his having defamed the Catholic religion in *Berliner Schriften,* pp. 572–575.

244. *Thus L; W (1831) adds:* Sensible presence is nothing on its own account, nor does consecration make the host into an object of veneration; rather the object exists in faith alone, and thus it is in the consuming and destroying of the sensible that we have union with God and the consciousness of this union of the subject with God. Here the grand awareness has arisen that, apart from communion and faith, the host is a common, sensible thing: the process is genuine only within the subject's spirit.

tiation, or at any rate only one by which externality is annulled, so that the presence of God is utterly a spiritual presence—the consecration takes place in the faith of the subject. The third view is that the present God exists only in representation, in memory, and to this extent he does not have this immediate subjective presence.[245]

"The subject is expected to *appropriate* doctrine, the truth, and hence | the third aspect of the community's self-maintenance is the 262
partaking of the presence of God."[246]

3. The Realization of the Spirituality of the Community

The third [aspect] is the *realization* of the spirituality of the community in universal actuality. This involves the *transformation* of the community at the same time. The standpoint is this: in religion the *heart* is reconciled. This reconciliation is thus in the heart; it is spiritual. It is the pure heart that attains to this partaking [*Genuss*] of God's presence within it, and consequently reconciliation, the enjoyment [*Genuss*] of being reconciled. At the same time, however, this reconciliation is abstract and has the world as such over against it. The self that exists in this reconciliation, in this religious communion, is the pure heart, the heart as such, universal spirituality; but at the same time the self or subject constitutes that aspect of spiritual presence in accord with which there is a developed worldliness present in it, and thus the kingdom of God, the community, has a relationship to the worldly. In order that reconciliation may be real, it is required that it should be known in this development, in this totality; it should be present and brought forth [into actuality]. The principles for this worldly realm are ready to hand in the spirituality of the community; the principle, the truth, of the worldly *is* the spiritual.

The spiritual is the truth of the worldly realm in the more prox-

245. *Thus L; W (1831) adds (adopting a statement from the 1824 lectures and the Ms.):* [it is] a merely moral relationship.

[*Ed.*] The reference here, of course, is to the Reformed view (see the *Ms.*, p. 155), but it applies properly only to Zwingli, not to Calvin. See below, 1831 *Excerpts*, n. 29.

246. *Thus L; Hu reads:* These are the three modes of the community.

[*Ed.*] The three are doctrine, repentance, and communion.

imate sense that the subject, as an object of divine grace and as one who is reconciled with God, already has infinite value in virtue of its vocation; and this is made effective in the community. On the basis of this vocation, the subject is known as spirit's certainty of itself, as the eternity of spirit. The vocation to infinitude of the subject that is inwardly infinite is its *freedom*. The substantial aspect of the subject is that it is a free person, and as a free person it relates itself to the worldly and the actual as a being that is at home with itself, reconciled within itself, an utterly secure and infinite subjectivity. This vocation of the subject ought to be foundational in its relation with what is worldly. This freedom of the subject is its rationality—the fact that as subject it is thus liberated and has attained this liberation through religion, that in accord with its
263 religious vocation it | is essentially free. This freedom, which has the impulse and determinacy to realize itself, is rationality. "Slavery contradicts Christianity because it is contrary to reason."[247] What is required, therefore, is that this reconciliation should also be accomplished in the worldly realm.

The first form of this reconciliation with worldliness is the immediate one, and just for this reason it is not the genuine mode of reconciliation. It appears as follows: at first the community contains the element of spirituality, of being reconciled with God, within itself, in abstraction from the world, so that spirituality renounces the worldly realm, placing itself in a negative relation to the world and also to itself. For the world is in the subject; it is there as the impulse toward nature, toward social life, toward art and science. What is concrete in the self, its passions etc., certainly cannot be justified vis-à-vis the religious aspect just because they are natural impulses; but on the other hand, monkish withdrawal means that the heart is not concretely developed, that it exists as something undeveloped, or that spirituality, the state of being reconciled, and the life of reconciliation are and ought to remain concentrated within themselves and undeveloped. But the very nature of spirit is to develop itself, to differentiate itself even unto worldliness.

The second way of defining this reconciliation is that worldliness and religiosity do indeed remain external to each other, but they

247. *Thus An*

have to enter into relation all the same. Hence the relation in which they stand can itself only be an external one, or more precisely, a relation in which one prevails over the other, and thus there is no reconciliation at all. The religious, it is felt, should be the dominant element; what is reconciled, the *church,* ought to prevail over what is unreconciled, the worldly realm. Accordingly, this is a uniting with a worldly realm that remains unreconciled. In itself, the worldly sphere is uncultured, and as such it ought only to be dominated. But the dominating power takes this same worldliness up into itself, ˜including all of its passions; as a result of its dominion, there emerges in the church itself a worldliness devoid of spirit˜[248] 264
| just because the worldly realm is not in itself reconciled. A dominion predicated on the lack of spirit is posited, in terms of which externality is the principle and humanity in its relatedness exists at the same time outside itself—this is the relationship of *unfreedom* in general. In everything that can be called human, in all impulses, in all attitudes that have reference to the family and to activity in public life, a cleavage enters into play. The ruling principle is that humanity is not at home with itself. In all these forms, it exists in a general condition of servitude, and all these forms count for nothing, they are unholy. Inasmuch as human being subsists in them, it is essentially a finite and ruptured being which has in that form no validity; what is valid is something else. This reconciliation with the worldly realm, and with the human heart, comes about in such a way that it is precisely the opposite of [genuine] reconciliation. The further development of this condition of rupture within reconciliation itself is what appears as the corruption of the church, the absolute contradiction of the spiritual within itself.

The third way is that this contradiction is resolved in the *ethical realm,*[249] or that the principle of freedom has penetrated into the

248. *Thus An:* including . . . passions; *and L:* as . . . spirit W_1 *is similar to L;* W_2 *(Var) reads:* all inclinations, all passions, whatever is worldliness devoid of spirit emerges in the church as a result of this very dominion

249. [*Ed.*] This theme is explicitly developed by Hegel under the category of "objective spirit" in the *Encyclopedia* (1830), §§ 483 ff., and in the whole of the *Philosophy of Right.* The terms used here are *Sittlichkeit* (ethical realm, ethical life, social ethics) and *Sittliche* (ethics, the ethical), not *Moralität,* which refers to the subjective morality of conscience.

worldly realm itself, and that the worldly, because it has been thus conformed to the concept, reason, and eternal truth, is freedom that has become concrete and will that is rational.[250] The institutions of ethical life are divine institutions—not holy in the sense[251] that celibacy is supposed to be holy by contrast with marriage or familial love, or that voluntary poverty is supposed to be holy by contrast with active self-enrichment, or what is lawful and proper. Similarly, blind obedience is regarded as holy, whereas the ethical is an obe-
265 dience in freedom, a free and | rational will, an obedience of the subject toward the ethical. Thus it is in the ethical realm that the reconciliation of religion with worldliness and actuality comes about and is accomplished.

Thus reconciliation has three *real* stages: the stage of immediacy [or of the heart], which is more an abstraction than it is reconciliation; the stage in which the church is dominant, a church that is outside itself; and the stage of ethical life.

The second [moment] is that the *ideal* side emerges explicitly in religious consciousness. Inwardness knows itself as subsisting with itself[252] precisely in this reconciliation of spirit with itself; and this knowledge of being at home with itself is precisely thinking. Thinking means reconciledness, being at home or at peace with oneself, even though the peace is a wholly abstract, undeveloped one.[253]

250. *Thus L; W (1831) adds:* It is in the organization of the state that the divine has broken through [*eingeschlagen*] into the sphere of actuality; the latter is permeated by the former, and the worldly realm is now justified in and for itself, for its foundation is the divine will, the law of right and freedom. The true reconciliation, whereby the divine realizes itself in the domain of actuality, consists in the ethical and juridical life of the state: this is the authentic discipline [*Subaktion*] of worldliness.

[*Ed.*] See *Philosophy of Right,* trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford, 1952), §§ 257–258, 260, 270 remark.

251. *Thus L, W_1; W_2 (Var) adds:* according to which the holy is opposed to the ethical

252. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* and being at home with itself

[*Ed.*] The distinction is between *bei sich selbst seiend* in the main text and *bei sich selbst zu sein* in the footnote. The latter phrase occurs subsequently in the main text.

253. *Thus L; W (1831) adds:* Thus arises the infinite demand that the content of religion should be confirmed by thought, and this requirement should not be turned aside.

Thinking is the universal, the activity of the universal, and it stands generally in contrast with the concrete, as it does with the external. It is the freedom of reason that has been acquired in religion and now knows itself to be for itself in spirit. This freedom now turns against merely spiritless externality and servitude, for the latter is utterly opposed to the concepts of reconciliation and liberation. Thus thinking enters in, defying and destroying externality in whatever form it appears. This is the negative and formal mode of acting which, in its concrete shape, has been called the *Enlightenment.*[254]

This thinking first emerges as abstract universality as such, and is directed not merely against the external but also against the concrete in general. For this reason, it is also directed against the idea of God, against the idea that God as triune is not a dead abstraction but rather relates himself to himself, is at home with himself, and returns to himself. In concreteness there are of course determinations and distinctions. Since abstract thinking turns against | externality in general, it also is opposed to distinction as 266
such because in distinction a reciprocally opposed externality is indeed present—but in the idea of God, in the *concrete* truth, this externality is likewise resolved.[255] Abstract identity prevails as the rule for this abstract thinking, for understanding. Genuine identity is the truth of the concrete. When everything concrete in God has been thus eradicated, this is expressed by saying: "We cannot know God"—i.e., know something specific about God.[256] For to know God cognitively means to know him according to his attributes; but [on this view] he is to remain a pure abstraction. The principle of freedom, inwardness, and religion itself is grasped by this formal perspective, but at first only abstractly.

But then the other way in which determination enters into universality, according to this abstraction, is the characteristics that reside in the natural impulses and inclinations of the subject. From

254. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* It consists in this: that thinking has turned against externality, and that the freedom of spirit that resides in reconciliation is maintained.

255. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* This thinking therefore proceeds to annul everything that is concrete and determinate in God.

256. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 253.

this standpoint it is said that human being by nature is good.[257] This pure subjectivity indeed clings to the category of the good, since the latter coincides with this identity and pure freedom; but the good itself must by the same token remain for it an abstraction. Here the category of the good is nothing other than the caprice and contingency of the subject as such. This is the extreme of this form of subjectivity and freedom, which renounces the truth and its development and moves within itself, knowing that what it regards as valid is only its own definitions, and that it is the master of what is good and evil. This is an inward weaving of spirit within itself, which can just as readily assume the form of hypocrisy and extreme vanity as it can peaceful, noble, pious aspirations. This is what is called the pious life of feeling, to which *Pietism* also restricts itself.
267 Pietism acknowledges no objective | truth and opposes itself to dogmas and the content of religion, while still preserving an element of mediation, a connection with Christ, but this is a connection that is supposed to remain one of mere feeling and inner sensibility.[258] Such piety, together with the vanity of subjectivity and feeling, is then turned polemically against the philosophy that wants cognition. The result of this subjectivity is that everything fades away in the subject, without objectivity, without firm determinacy, without any development on the part of God, who in the end no longer has any content at all.

˜The mode [of thought] first designated [i.e., the Enlightenment] is the ultimate pinnacle of the formal culture of our time.˜[259] But the two extremes opposing each other in the further development of the community are, first, this unfreedom and servitude of spirit in the absolute region of freedom, and second, abstract subjectivity or ˜subjectivity˜[260] devoid of content.[261]

257. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 106.

258. *Thus L; W (1831) adds:* For such piety, everyone has his own God, his own Christ, etc. This privatism [*Partikularität*], in which everyone has his own individual religion, worldview, etc., is certainly present among humanity. But in [true] religion, by means of life in the community, this privatism is consumed, it no longer has validity for truly pious people, it is set to one side.

259. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* This ultimate pinnacle of the formal culture of our time is simultaneously the greatest crudity since it possesses only the *form* of culture.

260. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* subjective freedom

261. *This paragraph is found only in L; among the extant sources, only the*

The third [moment], then, consists in the fact that subjectivity develops the content from itself, to be sure, but in accord with necessity. It knows and acknowledges that a content is necessary, and that this necessary content is objective, having being in and for itself. This is the standpoint of *philosophy,* according to which the content takes refuge in the concept[262] and obtains its justification by thinking. This thinking is not merely the process of abstraction and definition according to the law of identity; it does not have the concrete "over there," but rather is itself essentially concrete, and thus it is comprehension, meaning that the concept determines itself in its totality and as idea. It is free reason, which has being on its own account, that develops the content in accord with its necessity, and justifies the content of truth. This is the standpoint of a knowledge that recognizes and cognizes a truth. ˜The Enlightenment of the understanding and Pietism volatilize all content. The purely subjective | standpoint˜[263] recognizes no content and hence no truth. 268
The concept indeed produces the truth—this is subjective freedom—but it recognizes this truth as at the same time not produced, as the truth that subsists in and for itself. This objective standpoint is alone capable of bearing witness to, and thus of expressing the witness of, spirit in a developed, thoughtful fashion.[264] Therefore, it is the justification of religion, especially of the Christian religion, the true religion; it knows the *content* [of religion] in accord with its necessity and reason. Likewise it knows the *forms* in the devel-

following is found in Hu: These are the two extremes in the life of the community.

[*Ed.*] The two extremes are, in other words, the religion of the Enlightenment (the "servitude of spirit in the absolute region of freedom") and of Pietism ("subjectivity devoid of content"). Between these two extremes, speculative philosophy will find the mean.

262. [*Ed.*] *in den Begriff flüchtet.* This famous metaphor inspired the title of a recent collection of essays on Hegel's philosophy of religion, *Die Flucht in den Begriff* ("The Flight into the Concept"), ed. F. W. Graf and F. Wagner (Stuttgart, 1982); to which W. Jaeschke has offered the appropriate rejoinder, "Die Flucht vor dem Begriff: Ein Jahrzehnt Literatur zur Religionsphilosophie (1971–1981)" ("The Flight from the Concept . . ."), in *Hegel-Studien* 18 (1983), 295–354.

263. *Thus An with L; W reads, similar in L:* The purely subjective standpoint, the volatilization of all content, the Enlightenment of the understanding, W_2 *(Var) adds:* as well as Pietism,

264. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* and it is contained in the better dogmatic theology of our time.

opment of this content. The two belong together: form and content. We have seen these forms: the modes of the appearance of God, the ways in which it is represented for the sensible consciousness and for the spiritual consciousness that has arrived at universality and thought, this whole development of spirit we have seen. The content is justified by the witness of spirit, insofar as it is thinking spirit. The witness of spirit is thought. Thought knows the form and determinacy of the appearance, and hence also the limits of the form. The Enlightenment knows only of negation, of limit, of determinacy as such, and therefore does an absolute injustice to the content. Form and determinacy entail not only finitude and limit; rather, as totality of form, determinacy is itself the concept, and these various forms are themselves necessary and essential. In the appearance of God, God determines himself. Sustained by philosophy, religion receives its justification from thinking consciousness.

Ingenuous piety has no need of [justification]; the heart gives the witness of spirit and receives the truth that comes to it through authority; it has a sense of satisfaction and reconciliation through
269 this truth.[265] But insofar as thinking begins | to posit an antithesis to the concrete and places itself in opposition to the concrete, the

265. *Thus L; W (1831) adds:* In faith the true *content* is certainly already found, but it still lacks the *form* of thinking. All the forms that we have considered earlier[a]—feeling, representation, etc.—are indeed capable of having the content of truth, but they themselves are not the true form, which makes the true content necessary. Thinking is the absolute judge, before which the content must verify and attest its claims.

Philosophy has been reproached for placing itself above religion. But as a matter of fact this is surely false because philosophy has only this and no other content, although it gives it in the form of thinking; it places itself only above the *form* of faith, while the *content* is the same in both cases.

The form of the subject as one who feels, etc., concerns the subject as a single individual; but feeling as such is not eliminated by philosophy. The question is only whether the *content* of feeling is the truth and can prove itself to be true in thought. Philosophy *thinks* what the subject as such *feels,* and leaves it to the latter to come to terms with its feeling. Thus feeling is not rejected by philosophy but rather receives its true content through philosophy.

[*Ed.*] [a]See Vol. 1:390–403. Not much material on this topic has been preserved from the 1831 lectures; see the excerpts by D. F. Strauss in Vol. 1:465–469.

process of thinking consists in carrying through this opposition until it arrives at reconciliation.

This reconciliation is philosophy. Philosophy is to this extent theology. It presents the reconciliation of God with himself and with nature, showing that nature, otherness, is implicitly divine, and that the raising of itself to reconciliation is on the one hand what finite spirit implicitly is, while on the other hand it arrives at this reconciliation, or brings it forth, in world history. This reconciliation is the peace of God, which does not "surpass all reason,"[266] but is rather the peace that *through* reason is first known and thought and is recognized as what is true.[267]

Two positions are opposed to philosophy. First there is the vanity of the understanding, which is displeased by the fact that philosophy still exhibits the truth in religion and demonstrates that reason resides within it. This Enlightenment wants to have nothing further to do with the content, and therefore is highly displeased that philosophy, as conscious, methodical thinking, curbs the fancies, the caprice, and the contingency of thinking. In the second place, ingenuous religiosity [is opposed to philosophy]. The different positions are as follows: | (a) immediate religion; (b) the Enlightenment 270
of the understanding; and (c) the rational cognition of religion. ˜It is this last that I have sought to exhibit in these lectures.˜[268] [269]

266. [*Ed.*] An allusion to the German translation of Phil. 4:7, which uses *Vernunft* ("reason") rather than *Verstand* ("understanding"): "And the peace of God, which surpasses all reason, will keep your hearts and minds in Christ Jesus."

267. *L (1827?) adds:* This reconciliation by means of the concept is also the goal of these lectures.

268. *Thus Hu, similar in B; L (1827?) reads:* It is my hope that these lectures have afforded a guide and contributed to this rational cognition of religion as well as to the general advancement of [genuine?] religious piety [*Religiosität*].

269. *Follows below in B, similar in Hu:* Concluded 10 August 1827.

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APPENDIXES

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THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF
ACCORDING TO THE LECTURES OF 1831[1]

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The first thing to be considered in the sphere of the revelatory religion is the *abstract concept* of God; the basis is the free, pure, revelatory concept. God's *determinate being* [*Dasein*] consists in his manifestation, his being for an other, and the soil in which he has determinate being is finite spirit. This is the second thing to be considered; finite spirit and finite consciousness are concrete. The main point in regard to this religion is to cognize this process, that God manifests himself in finite spirit and is identical with himself in it. The identity of the concept with determinate being is the third thing to be considered. (Properly speaking, identity is here a misleading expression, for what is essentially involved is organic life within God.)

In the previous forms we have had an ascending, a starting from a determinate being characterized in various ways. In the one case,

1. [*Ed.*] In the 1831 lectures, Hegel once again treated the proofs for the existence of God in relation to the various religions, as he had done in the *Ms.* and the 1824 lectures. In an appendix at the end of volume 12, following the text of Hegel's *Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God* (1829), the *Werke* printed materials on the proofs extracted from the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion.* It gave the text treating all the proofs from *The Concept of Religion* in the 1827 lectures, preceded by the text on the teleological proof from *Determinate Religion* in the 1831 lectures, and followed by the text on the ontological proof from *The Consummate Religion* also in the 1831 lectures. In our edition, the first of these groups of texts is contained in Volume 1 (using Lasson's text of the 1827 lectures, however, rather than the *Werke*'s); the second is contained in Volume 2; and the third in the present volume. Our text follows W_2 12:546–553; it may be compared with Strauss's excerpted version of the same section (Sec. I. The Abstract Concept of God), printed below.

being was characterized in the most comprehensive way, as contingent being, in the cosmological proof: the truth of contingent being is being that is in and for itself necessary. Determinate being was also characterized as containing within itself purposive relations, and this yielded the teleological proof: here there is an ascending, a starting from a presently given, determinate being. So these proofs fall under the finite aspect of the definition of God. But the concept of God is what is boundless, not boundless in the bad sense but rather as what is at the same time most determinate, pure self-determination. Those first proofs fall on the side of a finite coherence, or of finite determination, inasmuch as the starting point is something given. Here, on the contrary, the starting point is the free, pure concept, so it is at this stage that the ontological proof of God's existence comes in. This proof constitutes the abstract, metaphysical foundation of this stage, and was first discovered, in
272 Christendom, by Anselm of Canterbury.[2] It is then adduced | in all later philosophers—Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff—but always alongside the other proofs, though it is the only genuine one.

The ontological proof has the concept as its starting point.[3] The concept is regarded as something subjective and characterized as opposed to the object and to reality. Here the concept is the beginning, and what matters is to show that being also pertains to this concept. In more detail the argument runs as follows: The concept of God is set up, and it is shown that it cannot be grasped except as including being within itself; to the extent that being is distinguished from the concept, the concept exists only subjectively, in our thinking. As thus subjective, it is what is imperfect, what falls only within finite spirit. That it is not just *our* concept but also *is*, irrespective of our thinking, has to be demonstrated.

Anselm states the proof in the following simple form:[4] God is what is most perfect, beyond which nothing can be thought; if God is mere representation, he is not what is perfect; but this is to contradict the first premise, for we deem as perfect that which is

2. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 30.
3. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 36.
4. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 30.

not just representation but which possesses being as well. If God is only subjective, we can adduce something higher, possessed of being as well. This has then been further elaborated, as follows: We begin with what is most perfect, defined as the quintessential reality, the essential sum of all reality.[5] This has been called possibility, the concept as subjective, inasmuch as it is distinguished from being as the *merely* possible concept—or it should, at least, *be* possible. According to traditional logic, possibility is found only where no contradiction can be exhibited.[6] On this view realities are to be apprehended in God only in their most affirmative aspect, without any restrictions, or in such a way that negation is to be left aside.[7] It can easily be demonstrated that all that is then left is the abstraction of what is one with itself. For when we speak of realities, we mean different characteristics, such as wisdom, justice, omnipotence, omniscience; and these are properties that can easily be exhibited as standing in contradiction to one another. Goodness is not justice, absolute power runs counter to wisdom, for wisdom presupposes purposes while power is totally unrestricted in its negating and producing activity. So if (according to the | stipulation) 273
the concept is not to be self-contradictory, all determinacy must fall away, for every difference is driven into an opposition. God, so we say, is the essential sum of all reality; being is also one form of reality, so being is inseparably bound up with the concept.

This proof has survived down to recent times; we find it expounded in a particularly circumstantial fashion in Mendelssohn's *Morgenstunden.*[8] Spinoza defines the concept of God as that which cannot be conceived without being.[9] The finite is that whose existence does not correspond to its concept. The genus is realized in existent individuals, but they are ephemeral; the genus is the uni-

5. [*Ed.*] See above, 1824 lectures, n. 43.

6. [*Ed.*] Hegel apparently is referring to the Leibnizian-Wolffian school philosophy. See, e.g., Christian Wolff, *Philosophia prima sive ontologia methodo scientifica pertractata* (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1736), § 85.

7. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 47, as well as Wolff, *Theologia naturalis,* Part II, § 16.

8. [*Ed.*] See Moses Mendelssohn, *Morgenstunden oder Vorlesungen über das Dasein Gottes,* Part I (Berlin, 1786), esp. pp. 284–305, 306–328.

9. [*Ed.*] See Spinoza, *Ethics,* Part I, Prop. xi (*Chief Works* 2:51).

versal on its own account, so its determinate being does not correspond to the concept. In the inwardly determined infinite, on the other hand, the reality *must* correspond to the concept—for this is the idea, the unity of subject and object.

This proof was criticized by Kant;[10] his objection is as follows. If God is defined as the essential sum of all realities, this does not include being, for being is not a reality; it makes no difference to the concept whether it is or is not—it remains the same. Even in Anselm's day the same point was made by a monk;[11] as he put it, what I represent to myself does not yet exist simply on that account. Kant maintains[12] that a hundred thalers remain of themselves the same thing whether I merely imagine them or have them; this means that being is not a reality, for it does not add anything to the concept. We may concede that being is not a predicate, but we are not supposed to be adding anything to the concept. Rather we are removing from it the shortcoming that it is only something subjective, not the idea. (In any case it is already very misleading to call each and every existent entity, however bad, a concept.) The concept that is only something subjective, separate from being, is a nullity. In the form of the proof as Anselm gives it, infinitude consists precisely in not being something one-sided or merely subjective, to which being would not belong. The understanding holds being and concept rigidly apart, each as self-identical. But even according to the ordinary view, the concept devoid of being is something one-sided and untrue, just as being in which there is no concept is too—the being that is devoid of concept. This antithesis that is found in finitude can in no wise occur in what is infinite, God.

10. [*Ed.*] See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 620–630.

11. [*Ed.*] An allusion to Gaunilo (see above, *Ms.*, n. 32). However, Gaunilo's objection to Anselm's proof is not that being is not among the realities included within the concept of the *ens realissimum*, but rather that, because of the difference between thought and being, actual existence cannot be proved. The objection that being is not among the perfections included within the concept of the most perfect being is brought by Gassendi against Descartes; see Descartes, *Objections contre les Méditations, avec les Réponses* (1641) (*Œuvres*, ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery [Paris, n.d.], 7:323, 325).

12. [*Ed.*] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 627.

But there is the following circumstance in this case, which makes the proof unsatisfactory. | That most perfect and most real of all 274
things is a *presupposition,* and being and the concept, on their own account, are one-sided when measured against it. Descartes and Spinoza[13] define God as self-caused, *causa sui.* His concept and determinate being are identical, or in other words God cannot be grasped as concept apart from being. What is unsatisfactory is that this is a presupposition, so that when measured against it the concept must of necessity be something subjective.

But the finite and subjective is not just something finite as measured against that presupposition. It is finite in itself, and hence it is the antithesis of itself; it is the unresolved contradiction. Being is supposed to be distinct from the concept. We believe that we can regard the concept as strictly subjective, as finite; but the characteristic of being is in the concept itself. The finitude of subjectivity is sublated in the concept itself, and the unity of being and concept is not a presupposition vis-à-vis the concept, against which it is measured.

Being in its immediacy is contingent; we have seen that its truth is necessity. In addition, the concept necessarily includes being. Being is simple relation to self, the absence of mediation. The concept, if we consider it, is that in which all distinction has been absorbed, or in which all categorial determinations are present only in an ideal way. This ideality is sublated mediation, sublated differentiatedness, perfect clarity, pure transparency and being-present-to-self. The freedom of the concept is itself absolute self-relatedness, the identity that is also immediacy, unity devoid of mediation. Thus the concept *contains* being implicitly; it consists precisely in the sublating of its own one-sidedness. When we believe that we have separated being from the concept, this is only our opinion. When Kant says that reality cannot be "plucked out" of the concept,[14] then the concept is there being grasped as finite. But

13. [*Ed.*] See Descartes, *Objections contre les Méditations, avec les Réponses* (*Œuvres* 7:119); and Spinoza, *Ethics,* Part I, Def. i (*Chief Works* 2:45), Props. vii, xi (pp. 48, 53).

14. [*Ed.*] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* B 631.

the finite is what sublates itself, and when we were supposed to be treating the concept as separate from being, what we had was the self-relatedness that is implicit in being itself.

However, the concept does not only have being within itself implicitly—it is not merely that we have this insight but that the concept is also being on its own account. It sublates its subjectivity itself and objectifies itself. Human beings realize their purposes, i.e., what was at first only ideal is stripped of its one-sidedness and
275 thereby made into a subsisting being. The | concept is always this positing of being as identical with itself. In intuiting, feeling, etc., we are confronted by external objects; but we take them up within us, so that they become ideal in us. What the concept does is to sublate its differentiation. When we look closely at the nature of the concept, we see that its identity with being is no longer a presupposition but the result. What happens is that the concept objectifies itself, makes itself reality and thus becomes the truth, the unity of subject and object. God, says Plato,[15] is an immortal living thing whose body and soul are posited together, and those who separate the two sides have not advanced beyond the finite and the untrue.

Our present standpoint is that of Christianity. Here we have the concept of God in all its freedom. For this concept is identical with being, which is the poorest of all abstractions; no concept is so poor as not to have this determination in it. We do not have to consider being in the poverty of its abstraction, or in false immediacy, but as the being of God, as wholly concrete being, distinct from God. The consciousness of finite spirit is the concrete being, the material in which the concept of God is realized. We are not here talking about any adding of being to the concept or about a simple unity of concept and being—expressions like that are misleading. The unity in question is to be grasped rather as an absolute process, as the living activity of God—but in such a way that both sides are also differentiated in it so that it is the absolute activity of eternally producing itself. We have here the concrete representation of God as spirit. The concept of spirit is the concept that

15. [*Ed.*] See Plato, *Phaedrus* 246b–d.

has being in and for itself—or *knowledge;* this infinite concept is negative relation to self. Related negatively to itself, it becomes the process of dividing and differentiating itself; but what has been thus distinguished, though it may at first appear as something external, devoid of spirit, extradivine, is identical with the concept. Absolute truth consists in the development of this idea. In the Christian religion it is known that God has revealed himself, and the very being of God consists in revealing himself. Self-revealing is self-differentiation; *what* has been revealed is precisely that God is revelatory.

Religion must be for all of humanity as a whole—˜for those who have so purified their thinking that they know what is [present] in the pure element | of thinking, [i.e., for] those who have attained 276
to speculative cognition of what God is, as well as˜[16] for those who have not advanced beyond feeling and representation.

Humanity does not just exist as pure thinking; instead, thinking itself is manifested as intuiting, as representing. Hence the absolute truth, as revealed to human beings, must also be [present] for them as representational, intuitive beings, as beings engaged in feeling and sensation. This is the form that distinguishes religion in general from philosophy. Philosophy *thinks* what otherwise only *is* for representation and intuition. In representing, human beings are also thinking, and the content of truth comes to them as thinking beings. Only what thinks can have religion, and thinking includes representing; but it is only thinking that is the free form of truth. The understanding is also a form of thinking, but does not advance beyond the identity: "concept is concept" and "being is being." These categories always keep this one-sided form for it, whereas in *truth* these finite forms do not count as [independently] self-identical [simply] because they are; on the contrary they are only moments of a totality.

16. *Thus W; cf. S:* not just for . . . but also

[*Ed.*] This variant occurs in the transitional section at the beginning of Sec. II, "The Idea of God in Representational Form," in Strauss's excerpts (below, pp. 361–62). In fact, the last four paragraphs of text in the *Werke* do not pertain to the ontological proof proper but serve as a transition from conceptual to representational ways of thinking about God.

Those who are angry with philosophy for *thinking* religion do not know what they are asking. Hatred and envy are both at work here under the outward show of humility. True humility consists in sinking one's spirit in the truth, in what is most inward, in having the object, and nothing but the object, in oneself; in this way everything subjective that is still present as sensation disappears.

Our task is to consider the idea from a purely speculative standpoint and justify it against the understanding—against the understanding that rebels against every content for religion in general. Any such content is said to be a mystery[17] because it is concealed from the understanding; the understanding does not attain to the process that is this unity, so that the whole range of speculation is for it a mystery.

17. [*Ed.*] See above, 1827 lectures, n. 83.

EXCERPTS

BY DAVID FRIEDRICH STRAUSS FROM A TRANSCRIPT OF THE LECTURES OF 1831[1]

PART III. THE CONSUMMATE RELIGION[2]

Introduction[3]

The content of religion is that God is simply object to himself, but is purely and simply identical with himself in this differentiation; and so he is spirit, *absolute* spirit. Consciousness knows itself to be entwined in this content; it knows itself as a moment of this movement; it knows God only insofar as God knows himself in it. So God is [present] as spirit in his community, and we are in the

1. [*Ed.*] On the Strauss excerpts of the 1831 lectures, see the Editorial Introduction to Volume 1. In Part III of the lectures, Hegel appears in 1831 to have returned to the structural arrangement of the 1824 lectures, although the differences between 1824 and 1827 are not great at this point. The change was necessitated primarily by his decision to treat the proofs for the existence of God once again in relation to the various historical religions rather than in a single section in *The Concept of Religion,* as in 1827 (see below, n. 4). All section headings are editorial unless otherwise noted. For Part III of the lectures especially, the editors of the *Werke* included a number of substantial passages from no-longer-extant transcripts of the 1831 lectures. In accord with the principles of this edition, these have been footnoted in relation to corresponding passages of 1827 text. Reference is made to these materials at appropriate points below.

2. [*Ed.*] This heading is in Strauss.

3. [*Ed.*] The Introduction appears to discuss two themes: the definition of the consummate or revelatory religion, and the transition to this stage. See the first paragraph of the 1831 Introduction as transmitted in *W* (1827 lectures, n. 3). Gone is the lengthy discussion of the positivity and spirituality of this religion (1827 lectures, Sec. 2), as well as the bulk of the survey of previous developments (Sec. 3) and the division of the subject (Sec. 4) (the latter is moved to the beginning of Part II, as in 1824).

presence of the *revelatory* religion. The transition to this level was that in Greek religion humanity knew God as free spirit, which was, however, still infected with finitude; but in the Roman world this finitude was elaborated on the side of subjective spirit, so that in this regard the way was paved for passing over to the consciousness of this absolute, free spirit.

I. THE ABSTRACT CONCEPT OF GOD[4]

The *abstract foundation* of this standpoint is the *concept of God.* In the previous religions we had the ascent to God from being as *contingent* and as *purposive.*[5] These proofs pertain to the side of finitude, proceeding as they do from something given. The *ontological* proof, on the other hand, pertains to the religion of the infinitude of the free concept, and constitutes its foundation.[6] The starting point here is the concept of God, but still as subjective concept, and the point is to demonstrate that determinate being [*Dasein*] also accrues to it. God is what is most perfect; but that to which being also accrues is more perfect than that to which it does not; therefore being also accrues to God. In other words, God is the concept informing all realities.

Kant criticized this proof as follows. Being is no reality; it adds nothing to the content of a concept; a hundred imagined thalers have the same content as a hundred actual thalers, but the fact that I imagine them, think them, does not mean that I have them. In this connection, the distinction between finite and infinite is dis-
280 regarded. The finite does not correspond | to its concept, the in-

4. [*Ed.*] Since in 1831 Hegel is once again treating the proofs of the existence of God in relation to the various religions, the proper locus for the ontological proof is the Christian religion. W_2 gives the text for this section in an appendix to volume 12, which we have reproduced above, thus making it possible to compare Strauss's excerpts with a secondary transmission of the full text.

5. [*Ed.*] That is, the cosmological and teleological proofs, which Hegel discussed in relation to the determinate religions of Vol. 2 (see the Appendix containing the 1831 text for the teleological proof).

6. [*Ed.*] For an indication of the sources to which Hegel alludes in his presentation of the ontological proof, see the footnotes to the preceding section.

dividual is not identical with its genus, and consequently it passes away; but in the infinite this difference is sublated. The imperfection of this proof, however, lies in the fact that the unity of concept and object in God—or that what is most perfect must also *be*—is merely presupposed. It has therefore to be demonstrated that the concept already includes being within itself. Being is this relation to self that is itself without mediation. But the concept is itself that in which all differentiatedness is only ideational; it is perfect transparency and identity with itself—and this is nothing other than immediacy. So the concept has being implicit in it. We too, the ones who think, in striving to realize our concepts, show forth this striving of what is [only] ideational to be rid of its one-sidedness and pass over into reality. The concept knows itself as not true if it is not also posited.

However, we do not here have the abstract logical identity of concept and being as immediates; what we have in this relationship between the two sides of the ontological proof is God as spirit itself. Spirit is the concept that has being in and for itself. What this concept then differentiates from itself by a process of diremption, of primal division, is devoid of spirit, is [mere] being; but in this distinction, spirit is simply identical with itself—it is pure light. In this way God has revealed himself, in this way he is manifest.

II. THE IDEA OF GOD IN REPRESENTATIONAL FORM[7]

As revelatory religion, however, this religion is for the whole of humanity. It is not just for those who engage in speculative thought and know God in the pure element of thinking. Because thinking

7. [*Ed.*] According to Strauss, at the beginning of Part II in 1831, Hegel stressed the representational form of the consummate religion qua revelatory religion, contrasting it with the abstract form of the ontological proof or of sheer knowledge of God's being. (This is confirmed by the last four paragraphs of the *Ontological Proof* [see n. 16], which do not pertain to the proof as such but are transitional, corresponding to the first paragraph of Strauss's excerpts below.) Here Hegel approximates the *Ms.*, which is reflected by our editorial section heading. There follows immediately the "division of the subject," as in the *Ms.* and the 1824 lectures. But this division introduces another innovation, namely, the designation of the three spheres or elements as the "kingdoms" of the Father, Son, and Spirit, respectively.

is not merely pure but also manifests itself in representing and intuiting, the absolute truth must also be [present] for human beings as feeling, intuiting, and representing beings. This then is the form under which religion distinguishes itself from philosophy. Representing is a mode of thinking too, but it is not thinking in its free form. The content of religion, like that of speculation, transcends the understanding; for the understanding there is, for example, no identity of thinking and being, and it makes the judgment that thinking is thinking and being is being.

We shall have to consider this idea, this content, in three spheres:

1. the idea in free universality, or the pure essence of God—the *kingdom of the Father;*
2. the inward diremption of the idea, held fast for a moment in its
281 differentiation—the *kingdom of the Son;* |
3. the reconciliation of this finite spirit with spirit that has being in and for itself—the *kingdom of the Spirit.*

The relationship between these spheres is more specifically as follows: in all three the idea is *divine self-revelation.*

(1) This occurs first in the element of pure *ideality* and *universality,* in the silent abode of the thinking spirit. The revelation here is the simple conclusion that God is immediately present to himself through his differentiation, which, however, is not yet externalized at this stage. It is by virtue of this [inner] movement that God is spirit. Thus the *doctrine of the Trinity* pertains to this sphere, although it is preferentially termed the *kingdom of the Father.*[8]

This language is not found in the earlier lectures, although there are some anticipations of it. For example, references to the "kingdom of the Spirit" are found in the *Ms.,* pp. 135, 142, and in the 1824 lectures, p. 247. It is the representational language in which the distinctively Christian idea of God is set forth; it is, in other words, the language of the Trinity, and it has reference to the "economic" or world-encompassing Trinity at that. This terminology was adopted by the *Werke* in its presentation of Part III, presumably on the assumption that it was Hegel's latest articulation of the subject. W_2 transmits the full text of the 1831 division, which we have given above as a footnote to the 1827 lectures, n. 67.

8. [*Ed.*] This statement indicates Hegel's awareness that the first of the trinitarian symbols, "Father," properly signifies the inner dialectic of the divine life or the "immanent" Trinity, rather than a divine "person" related to other divine "persons."

(2) The second element is that of *particularity,* of *representation.* The Son, which in the first sphere was the other as undifferentiated from the First,[9] comes now to be determined as something external, as world and nature, to which finite spirit (as natural) belongs. But because [we are here] in the realm of religion, this is a *religious* consideration of nature and humanity; in other words, the unity [of humanity] with God again asserts itself, and we see the Son coming forth upon the stage of nature—this emergence being the beginning of faith. Initially the Son as human has an external, natural history; but then it loses this character and becomes the divine history, the history of the manifestation of God. This constitutes the transition from the *kingdom of the Son* to

(3) The *kingdom of the Spirit.* The distinctive element of this is the self-conscious awareness of human beings that they are reconciled with God, and the fulfillment of this consciousness in church and cultus.

A. The Kingdom of the Father[10]

In the first instance, then, God is for human beings as *thinking* beings. This cognition comes to them as dogma in such a way that where they do not *conceptualize* dogma, they can take it up in belief in the form of *representation.* This [representation] is the dogma of the Trinity. As spirit, God is the activity of free knowing present to itself; as an activity this must posit itself in [different] moments, and as concept it must divide itself in judgment—but in such a way that what is differentiated is, without mediation, that from which it was differentiated. In the dogmatic image this is expressed by saying that God as Father eternally begets his Son. We say, "God does this in order to beget a Son for himself." But all of this "doing"

This inward dialectic is outwardly reenacted in God's relation to the world, as signified by the kingdoms of the Son and of the Spirit.

9. [*Ed.*] In the inward divine life, the Son is "other" than the First (the Father) but is not yet outwardly differentiated or distinguished from God in the same sense that the world is. This supports the distinction Hegel draws in the *Ms.* between the "eternal Son of the Father" and the historical, incarnate Son, or the *kingdom of* the Son, the world of nature and finite spirit. See above, p. 87, and n. 79.

10. *S reads:* 1.

is God himself; he is only the totality, and taken abstractly as the
282 Father, he is not the true | God. And this is only the abstract truth—in religion it is believed, in philosophy it is conceptualized.[11]

But this is where the understanding brings its categories into play—the determinate category of number, which is of all things the most lacking in conceptual grasp, or the identity that involves no differentiation. There is, we are told, a division of judgment in this [dogma]; and in any case the differentiation of spirit can go as far as a primal division, although this happens only in the second sphere.

Traces of the awareness that the triad embraces only a totality are to be found abstractly even in earlier times, in the Pythagorean τρίας—the thrice-holy;[12] [cf.] the Kantian trichotomy.

God as Father is the first universality, that which is indeterminate and unknowable, which is why the Gnostics called him βυθός. But he is also that which differentiates itself, the λόγος, the Son, the moment of manifestation, which is doubtless why the Gnostics also called him πρώτη κατάληψις ἑαυτοῦ.[13] At this initial stage the idea does not develop into any further determinations, only that God is comprehended as a subject with many properties. These, being differentiated, inevitably yield primal division; and the understanding seizes on the information that it abstracts from this determinacy so that only abstract reality remains. But in the idea of God thus indicated, the eternal positing and resolving of the primal judgment is given, not as our subjective activity, but as the objective or rather the absolute activity of spirit itself. The further result of this initial pure form is that the idea is the truth when characterized in this way as the act of self-mediating with self.

11. [*Ed.*] An amplification of this theme is transmitted by *W* (see 1827 lectures, n. 93).

12. [*Ed.*] *das Dreimalheilig*. Hegel appears to be thinking less of the liturgical *trishagion* than of a description of the Pythagoreans found in Aristotle. In the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 1:221–222 (*Werke* 13:256–257), he quotes Aristotle to the effect that the Pythagoreans believe that the gods are properly addressed only "when we call upon them three times in prayer—thrice holy [*dreimal heilig*]." In other words, the threefold calling upon the gods and the liturgical *trishagion* are understood analogously by Hegel. On the Pythagorean *trias*, see above, *Ms.*, n. 57; on the triad in Kant, *Ms.*, n. 62.

13. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 71.

B. The Kingdom of the Son[14]

1. Differentiation

The differentiation, which in the first [moment] of the idea was only a show [*Schein*], now comes into its right. This sphere consists in the determination of the Son. What is differentiated is in the form of other-being. Spirit relates itself to the other; this means that it is no longer absolute but finite spirit that is posited; and inasmuch as what is differentiated is itself something internally differentiated into nature and finite spirit, we have the creation of the world, the form in which the Son actually becomes the other. God is creator, but as λόγος, or as he who externalizes himself. For human beings, the world is at first something presupposed, an immediate being and a manifold; but secondly they cognize God in it too, as we have seen in regard to the earlier religions and the proofs of God's existence. But there is always something inappropriate about cognizing God from nature in this way, | in that the 283
limited character of the appearance one takes as one's starting point is also transposed to God. God thunders awesomely with his thunder, yet he is not recognized.[15]

2. Reconciliation

a. The Idea of Reconciliation and Its Appearance in a Single Individual

God must reveal himself in spiritual, not merely in natural fashion. And for him to reveal himself thus as spirit for a humanity

14. *S reads:* 2.

[*Ed.*] This is the longest section of the excerpts for Part III, comprising about half the total. Of it, however, only one paragraph concerns the theme of differentiation, and the remainder is given over to reconciliation, where the topics familiar from 1824 and 1827 are elaborated in considerable detail—the idea of reconciliation and its appearance in a single individual, the historical, sensible presence of Christ, and the death of Christ and the transition to spiritual presence. This focus of attention could of course reflect Strauss's own christological interests, and one can detect nuances that were to appear shortly in his own *Life of Jesus* (1835). If Strauss's excerpts are accurate, one of the innovations of the 1831 lectures is that the discussion of natural humanity and good and evil, treated under the theme of differentiation in Sec. B.1 of the earlier lectures, is transferred to Sec. C.1 (see below, n. 26). The treatment of the story of the fall drops out completely.

15. [*Ed.*] Cf. Job 37:5: "God thunders wondrously with his voice; he does great

that is finite, sentient, and intuitive, he must appear in the flesh, he must become human. This is possible only because of the unity of divine and human nature. We have already encountered a becoming-human of God in the Hindu incarnations, in the Dalai Lama, and also in the deifications of Greek heroes and Roman emperors. In all this there is a struggle toward this definition of the implicit unity of divine and human nature. But in these Oriental forms, humanity is only a mask, it is nothing essential. What lies at the basis of this representation is that spirit is cast down into the alien ὕλη and that its embodiment is a kind of imprisonment.[16] This contains an element of truth; but on the other hand, it is the ultimate refinement of spirit to be defined in terms of such subjectivity, and this is a moment that must not be lacking in the life of God. Since spirit involves the characteristic of immediacy within its infinite relation to self, this moment of immediacy must also be present in God if he is to be revealed to humanity as spirit. But God no longer appears in natural immediacy—in which, for that matter, he was not even truly immanent, as in the burning bush[17]—but in spiritual immediacy, in human shape. And whereas in pantheism countless incarnations occur because subjectivity is only accidental, God can appear as spirit on only one unique occasion because uniqueness is a [logical] moment of spirit.[18]

b. The Historical, Sensible Presence of Christ

When we have reached this point in [the development of] the concept, its otherness [takes the form] that the unity of divine and human nature becomes universal consciousness too, since a single human being is known as "God-man." On the one hand, then, we have here a single human being, born to just these parents, one who eats, drinks, etc. But on the other hand this individual is known

things which we cannot comprehend." See the fuller version of this passage transmitted by the *Werke* (1827 lectures, n. 128).

16. [*Ed.*] See above, 1827 lectures, n. 173 (editorial addition).

17. [*Ed.*] Cf. Exod. 3:2 ff. According to the story, it is the *angel* of the Lord who appears in the flame of fire, not the Lord himself; it is only when God *speaks* that Moses knows he is there.

18. [*Ed.*] See the fuller version of this paragraph transmitted by the *Werke* (1827 lectures, n. 173).

as God, and the beyond of God [is] sublated in this characterization. The first way of considering the matter, on its own account, is the nonreligious way, while the second is [that of] faith, and one must be led from the former to the latter. If one starts from the appearance of Christ in external form, | one can follow it up to the point of 284
his death; but at this point a definite divorce occurs between faith and unbelief.

What has to be considered first, then, is the *human side*, but in the sense that it is already the start of our being led over to what is higher. The *teaching* of Christ belongs here; this is still something human, but its role is to lead belief on to the soil of inner spirituality. The *miracles* belong here too.

Initially the history of Christ is a purely external one—he is simply a *teacher*. But when we look more closely at the *content* of his teaching, it is a *moral* teaching, a teaching especially of *love* for humanity. This is, at first sight, an abstraction: I cannot love human beings who are in no way in touch with me. What is closer to the mark is the love of one's neighbor. But this commandment is also to be found in other religions. What Christ's teaching includes in addition is the proclamation of the *kingdom of heaven*, i.e., the awakening of consciousness to inwardness, to this native soil of humanity, this absolute value, as against which all earthly things are seen to be valueless. This exaltation to inwardness is an outstanding feature of Christ's teaching, and it is brought before our representational imagination in an infinitely forceful manner in his teaching—[for instance, in the words with which] Christ begins his ministry in the Sermon on the Mount: "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God" [Matt. 5:8]. This is the greatest thing that can be said. Moreover, all unfreedom, all externality, and all superstition are superseded in these words. That is why it is infinitely important for the people to have the Bible in their hand; it is the absolute book of the people. Further on, it is brought out that only the absolute disposition (but not any abstract opinion) has value. We are to seek first the kingdom of God [Matt. 6:33]; compared with this ascent into pure inwardness, talent and power or lack of culture are secondary matters. The infinite value of this inwardness, of this drawing away from everything external, is also expressed

when Christ says to the rich young man, "Give all that you have to the poor and follow me" [Matt. 19:21], or when he says, "Those who do the will of my Father are my mother and brothers" [Matt. 12:50]. When Christ calls himself the Son of God and the Son of Man, and when he says, "No one knows the Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal him" [Matt. 11:27], this has directly the general sense that human beings *are* children of God and that they should *make themselves* children of God. This
285 teacher | collected friends around him and instructed them in his teaching. But because his teaching was revolutionary, he was accused, and so he sealed his teaching with his death.

Unbelief can go this far. Then Christ is similar to Socrates, who also opposed the gods of his people with the inwardness of his teaching and was consequently condemned to death.[19] But not only does Christ's teaching have a different hue from that of Socrates because he belonged to a different people; his teaching regarding the kingdom of heaven has an infinitely greater depth than the inwardness of Socrates. This then is the external history of Christ, as it exists for unbelief.[20]

c. The Death of Christ and the Transition to Spiritual Presence

But with the death of Christ the reversal begins, and the contemplation of faith, of the Holy Spirit, enters into play—the *divine view* [*göttliche Betrachtung*], according to which it is the nature of God that is revealed in Christ. This believing consciousness is now reflected in expressions similar to those quoted above: "Whoever sees me sees the Father" [John 14:9].[21] Initially such sayings have an indeterminate universality, but faith *is* their correct exegesis, just

19. [*Ed.*] On the condemnation of Socrates, see Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.1.1, and Plato, *Apology*. On the comparison of Socrates and Christ, see above, 1824 lectures, n. 215. This comparison was of importance to Strauss later on, in his essay "Vergängliches und Bleibendes im Christenthum," *Freihafen* 1/3 (1838), 1–48, as well as in the 3d edition of *The Life of Jesus*, also published in 1838.

20. [*Ed.*] See the fuller version of this paragraph transmitted by the *Werke* (1827 lectures, n. 196).

21. [*Ed.*] The passages quoted earlier were from the Gospel of Matthew rather than John, but this seems to be of no significance to Hegel. He construes this as an actual saying of Jesus, but its proper interpretation (he suggests) requires the perspective of post-Passion and post-Easter faith, namely, that Jesus is the God-man.

as it is the correct exegesis of Christ's death in particular. For to be precise, faith is nothing else than the consciousness of the absolute truth, the consciousness of what God is. God is the Trinity, i.e., he is the course of life that consists in being the universal that has being in and for itself, or in differentiating itself and then in setting itself over against itself, yet in so doing, being identical with itself—in a word, it consists in being this syllogism. Now the faith that God is in Christ is the certainty that this course of the divine life is and has been envisaged in the course of this [human] life. In order for it to be possible that the divine life should be so envisaged, there are certain conditions [*Bedingungen*]—for example, the teaching of Christ and especially what he has to say about himself. These sayings are prima facie his assurances [with respect to himself, but] in terms of their content they are such that they can also be reduced exegetically to the general representational sphere. The other criterion is that we do see divine power in this individual—his *miracles*. Against these, people can raise all manner of objections, saying that this was the age of belief in miracles, that there have been other miracle workers, etc. But the other view of the matter is that of faith. If Christ is the God-man, the miracles no longer present any difficulty. On the other hand, the miracles exist only for faith anyway; and for faith they become something of little account once more, being self-explanatory. | 286

It is always faith resting on the witness of the Holy Spirit that gives to the appearance of Christ its full meaning. The disciples had lived with him, heard all his teachings, seen all his works, and yet Christ undertakes first to send the Holy Spirit to them;[22] in other words, the conviction they had gained about him during his life was not yet the real truth. This pouring out of the Holy Spirit is then represented at the feast of Pentecost. The witness of the Spirit is a subjective disposition. It is the infinite need of the spirit of that age—the impulse, generated by the shattering of the particular folk-spirits and of the natural deities of the people, to know God in a universal form as spiritual.[23] This impulse requires the appearance

22. [*Ed.*] See, e.g., John 15:26; Acts 1:7–8.

23. [*Ed.*] From this point to the end of the subsection, the *Werke* transmits a lengthy text (1827 lectures, n. 199) which confirms Strauss's version in detail.

of God in this way, it demands a manifestation of the infinite spirit in the form of an actual human being.

The infinite subjectivity of God is [present] for the intuiting consciousness in the form of singularity. Faith now explicates itself [in] the life of Christ as it has already been told by those upon whom the Spirit fell. But it is particularly the death of Christ that can be understood only through this witness of the Spirit; his death is the touchstone upon which faith proves itself. It has *first* the sense that Christ was God, the God who had human nature implicit in him. He had it in full, even unto death—and he had it therefore in absolute finitude, even unto the death of the transgressor. This death is the testimony that humanity is in Christ even to the most extreme point. But then the *second* determination enters into play: God himself is dead—despair as to any higher truth. But then at once there enters, *thirdly,* the reversal. The death of God is *infinite* negation, and God maintains himself in death, so that this process is rather a putting to death of death, a resurrection into life. We are told that Christ himself appeared to his disciples again after his death, and that this was followed by his ascension and his sitting at the right hand of God.[24]

This history is the same explication of the divine nature itself that was present in the first sphere [that of the Father], except that here it begins in immediacy for the intuition, and runs its course in singular individuality. The abstractness of the Father is given up in the Son—this then is death. But the negation of this negation is
287 the unity of Father and Son—love, or the Spirit. Thus we have | here the same course of the divine nature as before, but now it is made explicit for consciousness.

It is essential to consider one further point about the death of Christ. The humiliation and [the extreme of] humanity [associated with the death of the cross] is something alien to Christ, something that he takes upon himself, since he was [with] God from eternity. This alien element in Christ is as such what pertains to others; these others are the human race, so Christ has taken their finitude to and

24. [*Ed.*] See Matt. 28:9, 17; Mark 16:9 ff.; Luke 24:13 ff.; John 20–21; Acts 1; 7:55.

upon himself in all its forms—the chief of these forms being evil. Thus humanity is known as a moment of the divine life on the one hand; but inasmuch as Christ puts it to death, it is equally recognized as something that does not pertain to God [on the other]. Or in other words, Christ bore the sin of the world and slew it. This conflicts with [the theory of] juridical (= moral) imputation, which requires that each of us must take the stand for him- or herself. But this imputation has its place only upon the field of finitude, not upon that of the free spirit in itself. Already in morality, and still more in the religious sphere, spirit is known as *free:* the barrier comprised in evil is of no account for it, since it can undo what has been done. Thus it is finitude in general, evil in general, that has died for faith in Christ's death; in this way his death acquires a universal significance, it is the reconciliation of the world. But this is where mere "consideration" comes to a halt; the subject itself is at the same time drawn into the anguish of its own estrangement, and this is the transition to the third part.

C. The Kingdom of the Spirit[25]

1. The Self-Consciousness of the Community[26]

This part contains the relationship of the subject to this whole sphere. The subject has to traverse in itself the cycle encompassing these three moments; it has to bring itself conclusively together with its original spiritual nature, or with the divine *imago* imbuing it. This process begins with the consciousness that humanity is by nature not what it ought to be, i.e., that humanity is by nature evil.

The soil upon which this movement occurs is the *community,* God knowing himself in this other. We have seen how the com-

25. *S reads:* 3. The Kingdom of the Spirit, the Community

26. [*Ed.*] The third part appears to fuse together the separate discussions of the "origin" and "subsistence" of the community that are found in the earlier lectures into the general theme of "the self-consciousness of the community" (a phrase that occurs at the end of the sixth paragraph). Included here are elements of the problem of natural humanity and good and evil, which were treated in Sec. B.1 of the earlier lectures. The *Werke* transmits several shorter passages relating to the treatment of the community, especially of communion (1827 lectures, nn. 235, 239, 240, 243, 244). These are insufficient to confirm Strauss's arrangement and content, but there is no reason to question it either, and indeed, internal analysis confirms it.

munity is founded through the establishment of faith. Individuals are members of the community through baptism, and it is in the community that they have to live the spiritual life, which we have seen to be the movement of what is true. This is the proper beginning
288 of the community, and from this moment the subject | is in the community. Inasmuch as subjects are brought up in this faith, they are thereby already in the element of conquered evil, or in the kingdom of reconciliation. This does not save them from the infinite anguish or from the battle, but merely alleviates it. Because the faith is *taught* to individuals, it comes to them as something external, ready-made, the positive doctrine of the church.

Hence the subject is not by nature as it should be; but at the same time the possibility is there for it to become so, and to be admitted by God into his grace. To this end, the individual grasps the truth of the implicitly subsisting unity of divine and human nature, taking hold of it in faith and representational imagination. It is in this faith, this presupposition, that the subject then works off its naturalness, does battle with it. On the one hand, this is the doing of the subject, and on the other of the Holy Spirit; but the Holy Spirit is nothing external to the subject—it is its own spirit, whereon it believes.

In the third place, the subject receives the assurance of its unity with God, of its reconciliation. This is conditional upon the second point that we have just been considering, namely repentance and penance—in other words, upon the putting aside of natural will. Provided this condition is fulfilled, persons are assured of such unity in the second sacrament, the *Lord's Supper,* which is the enjoyment of this unity. Into this last midpoint of religion differences enter, which endow all the other differences in religion with their significance. For the Lord's Supper is not merely the assurance of unity with the divine but the actual vouchsafing [of it]; the divine is enjoyed in bodily fashion.[27] According to the one doctrine, the divine is posited initially in distinction from the subject as something other, as the host, as an external [thing] that people are to enjoy.

27. *Follows, canceled:* Thus the divine is initially distinct from the subject, and it is on this basis that unity has to be posited.

This is the *Catholic* religion, and all of its externality and lack of freedom depends upon this externality of God in it.[28] The *Lutheran* attitude is that it is only in consuming the sensible elements and in faith that the subject is united with God; and that outside of its being partaken of the host is nothing out of the ordinary. The third view, that of *Zwingli* or *Calvin*,[29] is | that the Eucharist is a mere 289
representation and remembrance, a purely moral relationship.

Such then is the community, and the three stages of God's process in it are as follows: (1) immediacy, (2) the sublation of immediacy, (3) the assurance of reconciliation. The community consists in this faith being available for everyone as a presupposition—that is how spirit is universally present. The opposite view is that all of us possess our own doctrine for ourselves; but this is a mere matter of chance, and in religion this privacy of belief is consumed.

This is the absolute truth wholly explicated: *first,* God as the eternal inward life of love; *second,* this absolute truth is portrayed as subject for the representing finite spirit in such a way that the sensible shape of that subject is interpreted through the Spirit. *Third,* there is the explication of this life of love—of the same process which *is* God and which is *represented* in Christ—in the self-consciousness of the community.

2. *The Realization of Religion*

But since the field of *worldliness* is also present alongside religion, religion must realize itself in this field too. And since in Catholicism the subject is something external, under the sway of the church, we find the Catholic Church demanding that the secular field should be under its sway too. But since the secular world also constitutes human freedom, it resists this demand fiercely. So the true realization of religion in the worldly sphere is the inward realization,

28. [*Ed.*] See above, 1827 lectures, n. 243.

29. [*Ed.*] In this passage from the excerpts, the identification of the Zwinglian and Calvinist doctrines of the Lord's Supper, which Hegel repeatedly hints at elsewhere, is stated explicitly. It is justified to the extent that Calvin, like Zwingli, rejects the Lutheran assumption of a real presence of Christ in the sacrament and of the validity of the sacrament for just and unjust alike; but Calvin does not hold to a merely symbolic or significative view of the sacrament, and accepts a mystical activity or presence of the transfigured heavenly body of Christ.

namely, that a just and ethical civil life should be instituted. But inasmuch as such a civic life is now established, it absorbs all of this expansion of the divine, being itself divinity in this field, so that the entire content shrinks.[30] Once the laws of the state are known as *universal* laws, thought attacks the content of God too, requiring that it must stand the test of thought. Thought is now spirit seeking to bear witness. Faith comprises the true content, but in the form of representation; what is still needful is to give the form of thought to the content. Philosophy, which achieves this, does not thereby place itself above religion but only above the form of faith as representation.[31]

30. [*Ed.*] See the passage transmitted by the *Werke* that supplements this point (1827 lectures, n. 250).

31. *S adds below:* Fin. 5 February

[*Ed.*] This is the date, in the winter of 1832, on which Strauss finished these excerpts. See the *Werke*'s version of the concluding remarks (1827 lectures, n. 265).

LOOSE SHEETS

RELATING TO HEGEL'S LECTURE MANUSCRIPT[1]

[155a]

Disposition [of heart and soul], elevation of human will – gathering ears of corn on the Sabbath, healing of withered hand[2]

Love – not the general soft-headed, individual sentiment

"Thus do you love one another"[3] – *infinitude* as transcending the finitude

⟨(α) of *laws*

(β) of offenses – forgiveness of sins, *undoing what is done* – Mary Magdalene: *much* forgiven because she loved *much* (transcending morality) – anointed instead of giving to the *poor.*[4]

(γ) Substantive relationship to God – forgiveness of sins

Death of Christ: (a) external story (b) religious story – Son of God

Divinity passed through actuality and disgrace – this passing through, this human pain and abasement, is the supreme moment. The eternal life of God is this.

On the other side the *blessed gods* – we in this abasement (which itself is hallowed).⟩

1. [*Ed.*] See the Editorial Introduction to this volume. Sheets 155 and 162–165 contain preparatory materials for Hegel's treatment of the Christian religion in the *Ms.* The order of the text does not follow the sheet numbers but rather the original folding of the sheets and the sequence of lettering and headings within the text. We are designating by angle brackets all passages that are written alongside or above or below the main text, whether or not these additional passages are actually in the margins.

2. [*Ed.*] See Matt. 12:1–13.

3. [*Ed.*] See esp. John 13:34; 15:12.

4. [*Ed.*] See Luke 7:36–50 (esp. v. 47) and John 12:1–8. Hegel has combined the reports of the two anointings and therefore has identified (as church tradition has done in part) the woman who was a sinner (in Luke's account) with Mary the sister of Lazarus (in John's account) on the one hand and with Mary Magdalene (Luke 8:2; Mark 15:40, 47) on the other.

Underlying ground – love of God, embracing consciousness of the highest, and humility

Objectivity of love – *I*, for myself – individuality

Forgetfulness of self in *cognizing* God

Love

(1) Purely natural moral sentiment

(2) Forgiveness of sins – deeper unity, elevation above the purely natural and finite, which is the domain of (1), for which everything finite, everything transient, is valid [as overcome]

(a) Nature – sin

(b) Transient, natural, external *punishment* – *punishment* as such in
292 general |

(c) *Eternal* punishment – inwardly, in heart and mind; no forgiveness in (b); its nothingness annulled [through] his majesty and love

(3) Substantive relationship – thought *otherworldly*, abstract, universal; Love subjective, individual, seemingly quite different – to sublate absolute separation.

Intuition of this identity in Christ not an individual matter – Son of Man. (Stephen saw him face to face at the right hand of God)[5]

Reconciliation – come about in and for itself

Church for each and every one

In Christ the unity of human and divine nature (a) life and passion, (b) resurrection and ascension – whether actually happened, doubts arising from circumstances and individual features – puerile and pitiful

Steeping oneself in Christ's sufferings

Extremes – nobility and lowliness

Gueux, beggars, Low Country noblemen[6]

Anguish exalted to the highest, source [of happiness]

[Do] not look at what is contemptible or foolish

5. [*Ed.*] See Acts 7:55.

6. [*Ed.*] The Gueux was a league of patriotic nobles and gentlemen of the Netherlands formed in 1566 to resist Spanish tyranny and defend religious freedom. They referred to themselves as Gueux (French, "beggars") in allusion to a remark by an opponent that they were only beggars; they were ready, they said, to become "beggars" in their country's cause. These "Low Country noblemen" (*niederländische Edelleute*) thus combined both nobility (*Hoheit*) and lowliness (*Niedrigkeit*). They even adopted the emblems of beggarhood, the wallet and the bowl, as trinkets to be worn on their hats and girdles. This may be what Hegel has in mind later (p. 383) when he suggests that what is "utterly despised" is made "of highest account," such as the "beggar's sack by the Gueux in Holland." This allusion, with its word play and double meanings, did not find its way into the *Ms.*

⟨In an individual
Universal Holy Spirit
(a) Behold the individual
(b) Anguish, nothingness
(c) Universal⟩
[155b]
Holy Spirit
(a) God's kingdom, an invisible church – from all areas, different religions
(b) The outward church – Protestants and Catholics – distinction between laity and *priests* – church a solid *actuality* – Protestants no priests and [only] teachers
Church and *state*
The church opposed to the brutality of *secular power* | 293
Church represents the "higher life"
Sunday observances – *teaching* – acceptance within the *actually present* community – assurance of being so accepted
(α) Baptism
(β) Holy Communion:
(α) Catholics – as a thing outside of faith and partaking
(β) Lutherans – an actual communion in *faith* and *partaking* – subjectivity, actuality
(γ) Reformed
Catholics in general more unspiritual
Action devoid of spirit, works – mysticism the Catholic's inwardness
Faith, subjectivity, disposition – the Protestant's hallmark
⟨Christendom [is] the people of God – pope and emperor – Egyptian, Indian: theocracy. Temple, lights, external sun extinguished – one's own inward nature⟩
That evil [is] vanquished in and for itself [is] Christian – only laid hold of by heart and mind – *actuality*
No priests in Protestantism – Protestants practice personally through the truth, divine strength and authorization
Protestant ministers – minister in the name of God
Christian religion – religion of spirit, history
Resurrection, *eternal* life – Christ alone
Spirit eternal because it encompasses itself in its infinitude.
[163b][7]
LOVE – distinguished from SPIRIT – love the mode of sentiment – *relation-*

7. [*Ed.*] The first half of sheet 163b is concerned with Roman religion and therefore is included among other sheets relating to Greek and Roman religion in Vol. 2.

ship only to one another – *I* love *you*. But love itself as distinct from these extremes – spirit – relationship to two – love

(α) God [is] this *distinguishing* – abstract definition – comprised in wisdom, activity, spirit, self-consciousness

294 (β) *within himself* – for he is unity |

(γ) The differentiated *totality* – as in natural birth – genus – dissemination of thoughts

Abstract mode of the understanding – the One – abstract, dead, cold One – differentiating, distinguishing characteristics [are] only properties

(δ) Sophia, Logos – determinacy of *person*

(α) God [as] *universality* (producing, active) – relationship to *love* (itself what is differentiated) – by Sophia the Son begotten, the world created

(β) This follows – as activity God already [implies] return – infinite negativity – matter, inorganic, what is worst – this itself – is *difficult*

"The last shall be first"

Taking back [of what is posited] – the last [is first] and the first [is last]

(ε) That this [is] the truth – all philosophy the proof

Faith, immediate acceptance

If to be proved, all philosophy

(α) One [God] (β) A person

(ζ) An echo or forms of this in all religions

Number (Pythagoras), Plato – Aristotle[8]

Triplicity – [for the] understanding (α) number – *one,* resistance, matter, difficult [to comprehend]

[162a][9]

Christian religion – truth

Purposiveness – determinate concept – not limited, but within itself a universal absolute determination – spirit

(α) in predicative fashion: wisdom – providence – general representations, predicates

(α) metaphysical concept – abstract concept and being. Not a foundation – presupposition, finite starting point

8. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, nn. 57, 59.

9. [*Ed.*] The first three lines of sheet 162a are concerned with Roman religion and therefore are included among other materials relating to Greek and Roman religion in Vol. 2.

[Starting point] the concept of *God* – [of] what is most real.
In itself the highest, *absolute* concept. But a concept that was finite, i.e., was opposed to being, would not be the absolute concept | – this is correct – but there is a further presupposition – [which] occurs in two ways in our knowing, representing, thinking. 295
Christian: (α) [What is] affirmed – the reconciliation of subjectivity and objectivity – unity of divine and human nature
Speculative truth is religious truth
(β) [What] configuration [it takes] – spirit shaping its character inwardly for itself – conferring objectivity [upon itself]
Variety of forms
For representation the distinct spheres can be distinguished:

⟨(α) absolute objectivity	(α) objectivity of pure thought – God is spirit – Trinity
(β) finite objectivity, nature	(β) external (physical) objectivity – creation of nature – wisdom – concept maintaining itself therein
(γ) in finite spirit	(γ) objectivity as of finite spirit –
(αα) as God's appearing, no longer mere wisdom⟩	an objectivity in which God returns into himself in self-consciousness – cultus

Miracles [pertain] to temporal life – but [are the work of] the Spirit
This an aspect of the infinitely manifold forms of self-consciousness
For this [one] the divine history must be objectified in self-consciousness itself
⟨Image of God – divine and human nature – not like a coat or mere semblance of a body but an actual human being
Thus human nature is divine, recognized as identical with the divine⟩ | 296
(α) as Son of God, in common temporal actuality
(β) suffering and dying
Divestment – two senses
(α) of divinity
(β) of finite natural state – in anguish – experience of nothingness – negative experience of oneself
(α) Divestment of divinity is:
Passing through the human state and in it and from it returning to self⟩
[(γ) Cultus – formation of the community
(α) Starting point – evil by nature – cognition – separation

(β) Belief in mediator – in this everlasting inward divine grace – to lay hold of and be laid hold of – in representation leave obscure – metaphysics of the understanding

(γ) External cultus

[162b]

The Son of God

Creation, world – as can be said – the same as the Son

This appearance – the mode of being – that eternal truth

Creation – an *other* act than the begetting of the Son, namely, stopping at the stage of other-being

(α) Second sphere – for representation – another act

Transition – necessity

Ditto – eternal truth

Here therefore God, without further qualification – [we are] not to ask which is the Creator – heresies – Demiurge[10] – because world [is] bad

Christ appeared "in the fullness of time" – but only transiently in time

History in finite spirit – moment of return – conversion – from other-being

What is meant by this return? The concept of finite spirit:

(α) The universal (corresponding to Father) is – immediacy of being –

297 But positivity is something abstractly universal |

Finitude (αα) Natural spirit – (ββ) Consciousness of an object

Definition based *on the idea* – that [human beings] are *not* as they are intended to be.

This is how religion represents nature, according to how [human beings] are on the basis of the idea. Evil by nature – but *antithesis* (of what they are *in themselves*) – i.e., the concept – image of God

The progenitor of the human race – Adam Kadmon[11] – the divine Son

Originally [things were] so, this represented as *first* state, and sin as second – by virtue of cognition (α) evil (β) "has become like one of us" – in Christ – cognition is this middle and turning point

(β) Image – in and for self. Cognition's task to grasp the truth, the truth is intended to be for cognition

Unity of divine and human nature appeared for consciousness

(α) That it appeared in *time* – [was] necessary. The building up of consciousness for it

(β) Thus this concrete individual human being [appears] in immediate form for consciousness

10. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 86.

11. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 105.

How his divinity is proved for human beings – (α) in human manner – miracles – starting point for the community

[163a]

(γ) Passion, death, and resurrection

(αα) Sublation of the natural state – and only

(ββ) as divine history

Anguish of (mortality) – natural state – itself an absolute moment

The two are combined, both being intuited in one person:

(α) Suffering, dying – divestment of divinity – acme and highest expression of mortality, finitude, the human state.

Anguish – not merely finitude but feeling – knowledge of this is for the first time true finitude

(β) Divestment of finitude, of the natural state (its dying off) – not remaining in the tomb

⟨No other mode of appearing, i.e., becoming for immediate consciousness |

298

At an earlier stage: (α) Immediate nature – in itself

(β) reflection, entailing *separation* – human being is only natural

Definition on the basis of the idea –

Opposition of idea and immediate being

(α) positing evil

(β) positing and cognizing evil⟩[12]

⟨This is an act of cognition, and such an act is tantamount to equality with God. What does this mean?⟩

⟨God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob – led them out of Egypt – this litany – and nothing beyond – evil nowhere in prophets, only Sirach 25:32⟩[13]

Actual appearance – i.e., only in this way [is it] not just a theoretical doctrine – in thoughts – the particular cultural preparation presupposed, but something universal for all humanity, whatever their cultural background

Doctrine as a story for immediate representation and immediate sensibility

Universality, according to the concept – unity of human and divine nature – human nature envisaged in the divine nature

All particularity fallen away

Equality of human beings before God

Humanity sanctified – human being as in and for itself

This form of history is itself essential *for* the community, i.e., God's appearance in finitude

12. [*Ed.*] This passage is transferred from sheet 162b by reference marks.

13. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 119.

[165b]

Review of the three spheres
For subjects
(α) Faith – miracles, testimony of the Spirit
(β) Formation of the community – do away with the revolutionary element
Laying hold on, tradition
The lowest, highest – for the highest [is] lowest – bringing low
Complete reversal of disposition
299 Roman Emperor for his part – slaves the supreme power |
All the majesty of the world authority dragged in the dust
⟨Stress the category of death
The ignominy of *death*
The cross transfigured
Then the ties of human coexistence are loosed – this sort of slogan and cockade [belongs to] world revolution⟩
The final act the resurrection and ascension
Natural history from a formal standpoint – *natural life*
The child
In itself
The youth
Rupture of his projects (subjective idea) – of his subjectivity
Externalization
Entering into opposition
Duplicated
The adult
Objective idea
Works in a set framework
To maintain what is and so reproduces it
Old age and death
Opposition surrendered
Life of Christ – to envisage in divine idea
God – divested unto death – deep anguish
Humanity exalted in the life and death of Christ – the supreme finitude transfigured – love – supreme love in deepest anguish
God and humanity seen to be reconciled
Consciousness in Christ's death
Look back at 3 spheres
Combine (α) everlasting God – inwardly pure idea
(β) issuing forth in nature
300 (γ) in finite spirit |
Return of the *finite to* the eternal idea – the right hand of God
Scission (α) Return to God – idea – full
(β) Individuality, exclusive, turned against other individuality

"For itself" the idea and highest moment

But this third sphere, thus regarded, [is] imperfect – individual – but universal individuality

Individuality as such – community, *spirit*

[164a]

Doctrine

(α) The absolute content not itself explicitly the content of its teaching – "the Spirit will lead you into all truth"[14] – speculative intuition

(β) Love – universal basic moral principles already found in the Old Testament

(γ) But – kingdom of God – human intelligence in the highest degree

(δ) Complete severance, withdrawal from the world – ⟨heals the withered hand on the Sabbath, plucks the ears of corn⟩[15]

Heavenly Father – the way in which his divinity is defined in his words is matter for historical exegesis – no direct concern of ours here.

"Your sins are forgiven" (Luke 7:48)

Utterly despised – of highest account

Despised like the beggar's sack by the Gueux in Holland

For them as immediate consciousness – not exclusive – as something other than themselves

Doctrine the universal soil – kingdom of God – love – complete severance from the world

(α) Death – confirmation [of] the intuition of *utter finitude* – and of utter love – anguish of death

(β) Spirit – Natural state dies away, barrier raised – divestment is human nature – and natural death sublates this divestment

Sensibility [is] consciousness of finitude, barrier – death the utmost sensation and dissolution of the barrier | 301

The sensibility of the community is tied to [Christ's] death, knowledge of finitude

God is dead – has delivered himself up to death – wholly for others, as appearance

Delivered up for us – objection: another cannot stand in [for us]

[164b]

Community

(α) The concept [is] its defining characteristic – *for such* as enter into the process absolutely – made their own what is *for them* – Actual kingdom of God – God as spirit in his community – Region of the *Holy Spirit*

⟨Immortality [is] *infinite value within oneself* – Slavery – emancipation – "flesh of my flesh, spirit of my spirit"[16] – *Suffering,* abase-

14. [*Ed.*] See John 16:13.
15. [*Ed.*] See Matt. 12:1–13.
16. [*Ed.*] See Gen. 2:23.

ment the highest [moment] – banner of the cross⟩
"Whosoever [sins] against the Spirit, his sin cannot be forgiven him"[17] – A pregnant saying

(β) Faith – attestation – through *faith* to objective truth
Miracles, witness of spirit to the formation of the community ⟨on the basis of the Spirit – in the form of tradition or exposition of the Scriptures⟩ – objectivity, secular existence – sublation, falling away of the negative orientation

(γ) Death – ascension – withdrawal of sensible presence – past – outpouring of the Holy Spirit – now left to their own devices – ⟨in the church, history not something *past* – polemics eschewed⟩ – "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there I am in the midst of them"[18]

(δ) (α) Doctrine – objective shape of truth – through

(β) Cultus, sacraments – partaking – baptism and Holy Communion – not made something particular
Difference between confessions concerns *relationship, life in the*
302 *community* – not doctrine. Such relationship in the | community also reappears as doctrine – but [a matter of] form, the content is a question of relationship

Truth

(α) in form of *abstract* objectivity – host, works, merit

(β) essentially in spiritual subjective form

(γ) Reformed church – no mysticism, purely prosaic, merely for veneration – psychological

⟨(a) Formation of the community – a continuing process
(b) Being of the community – cultus – confessions
(c) Passing away of the community
Ending on a note of discord – take refuge in philosophy
As in the time of the Roman Empire
Preaching the gospel to the poor[19]

17. [*Ed.*] See Matt. 12:31; Mark 3:28.
18. [*Ed.*] See Matt. 18:20.
19. [*Ed.*] An allusion to Jesus' reply to the question of the Baptist, Matt. 11:5.
20. *In upper right margin:* 24

$$\frac{16\text{ th}\quad 16}{7\text{ th}\quad 8}$$

[*Ed.*] This is probably a calculation of the number of lecture hours remaining—namely, twenty-four—between 16 July 1821 (16/7) and 16 August (16/8). Hegel made this calculation as he completed these preliminary notes and planned the remaining lectures for the course. Since the notes are concerned primarily with the third part of the lectures and must have been completed before the *Ms.* was written, the date of 16 July 1821 would be the *terminus post quem* for the composition of

Middle classes – spirituality
Ordinary people still Christian⟩
[165a]
Ending on a note of discord[20]
Age of Roman Emperors
Leveling down – Roman law – private property
Whosever head is not cut off
Testamentary dispositions
Unconcern about truth – Pilate: "What is truth?"[21]
(α) Representational form – argumentation
Cultus, moral improvement, linked in the sacraments with the divine.
Is something done by the individual, and at the same time something divine. Contradiction in regard to *freedom* and grace.
Temporal, secular life – at the same time life in the church, i.e., individual private life – interfere in everything, advise, pious
The divine – in objective EXTERNAL shape, as grace of God – the Devil
Doctrine firmly fixed – churches and continuing education – laity mere receivers, without insight of their own | 303
Church externally vested with grace
⟨α) Divine in and for itself – idea
⟨β) Church – for itself – communal quantum of external merits – surplus
⟨(α) Private rights and morals
(β) Secret worship – to seek in this and that⟩
⟨γ) Laity
⟨α) Moral
⟨β) Pious, general, nonspeculative relation to God
⟨γ) Churchly, mystical

Part III. The calculation of twenty-four lecture hours between 16 July and 16 August assumes the necessity of lecturing five hours per week rather than the customary four for the remainder of the semester. However, the summer semester ended on 25 August in 1821, and there are twenty-four hours between 16 July and 25 August on a four-hour-per-week basis. In 1820 the term ended on 16 August, and Hegel may have assumed the previous year's dates in making this calculation, only to discover that he had more time than originally estimated. Nevertheless, he fell behind in his lecture schedule, and a great deal of material remained to be covered in the last six lectures of the course, from the 17th to the 25th of August (see above, Ms., n. 88). Quite likely he began composing this material shortly after completing these sketches in mid-July.

21. [*Ed.*] See John 18:38.

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FRAGMENTS

FROM THE MICHELET TRANSCRIPTS[1] 305

Fragment 1

This development does not occur without the faith of others.[2]

Fragment 2

In [the sphere of] representation, God's activities are of two kinds. It is necessary to hold fast to the *other* as the mode in which God is outside himself, but it is also necessary to know that this is not God's *genuine* determination.[3]

Fragment 3

Eternity is not mere duration, as mountains endure. On the contrary, it is *knowing,* and, thus understood, it is what spirit is in itself.[4]

1. [*Ed.*] Source: Carl Ludwig Michelet, *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel,* Part 2 (Berlin, 1838), pp. 649–650 (Fragment 1), 652 (Fragment 2), 639 (Fragment 3), 651–652 (Fragment 4). For further details, see the Editorial Introduction.

2. [*Ed.*] This fragment from Michelet's transcript of the 1821 lectures was incorporated by him into a text from the lectures of 1831 in order to reinforce D. F. Strauss's interpretation of Hegel. See the end of the 1831 text contained in n. 196 to the 1827 lectures.

3. [*Ed.*] This fragment from Michelet's transcript of the 1821 lectures was incorporated by him into the fourth of these fragments in order to reinforce Strauss's emphasis on the inferiority of representation. Its authenticity is confirmed by the *Ms.;* see above, *Ms.,* n. 79.

4. [*Ed.*] This fragment from Michelet's transcript of the 1824 lectures was introduced by him in order to sharpen two statements contained in the lectures of 1824 and 1827; see above, 1824, n. 121, and 1827, n. 150. Probably, therefore, Bruno Bauer introduced this variant into the text of W_2.

Fragment 4

In love the Son is identical with the idea in the form of universality. But there is also present the determination of other-being. The two determinations are to be posited as distinct, as it were for an instant, for they are not genuinely distinct. The being, the distinction of the concept is such that this being, negation, immediacy is only a moment. But for representation the two are held apart; otherwise the representation would not be religious. Representation holds them apart in time: now the other has fallen away, and the divine idea comes forth in this other-being.[5]

5. [*Ed.*] This fragment from Michelet's transcript of the 1824 lectures was introduced by him to supplement the statement concerning the "analysis" of the Son found on p. 199. Michelet recognized that a passage was missing from the text transmitted by W_1 and W_2. His version confirms and corrects the text given by *G* and *D* (see above, 1824 lectures, n. 104), and at the same time the authenticity of Michelet's fragments is verified.

PAGINATION OF

THE ORIGINAL SOURCES

HEGEL'S LECTURE MANUSCRIPT

The *Ms.* numbers ("a" = recto, "b" = verso) are given in the text in square brackets but are reproduced here for the sake of convenience.

	Manuscript
The Consummate Religion	
Introduction	
1. Definition of This Religion	73a
2. Characteristics of This Religion	73a–73b
A. Abstract Concept	74a–75b
B. Concrete Representation	76a–77a
a. The Idea In and For Itself: The Triune God	77a–80a
b. The Idea in Diremption: Creation and Preservation of the Natural World	80a–81b
c. Appearance of the Idea in Finite Spirit: Estrangement, Redemption, and Reconciliation	82a
α. Estrangement: Natural Humanity	82b–87b

β. Redemption and Reconciliation: Christ	88a–95a
C. Community, Cultus	
Standpoint of the Community in General	95b–98a
α. The Origin of the Community	98a–101a
β. The Being of the Community; the Cultus	101b–103b
γ. The Passing Away of the Community	104a, 103b, 104a

THE LECTURES OF 1824

The pagination given here is that of the Griesheim transcript (volume 2). While our basic text is *G*, it has been supplemented and corrected by *P* to the end of Div. I (where *P* terminates), and to a minor extent by *D* throughout. These supplementary transcripts are not noted either in the text itself (except where there is an uncertainty about the reading) or in this listing.

	Griesheim (vol. 2)
The Consummate Religion	
Introduction	
1. The Consummate Religion	169–177
2. The Revelatory Religion	177–178
3. The Religion of Truth and Freedom	178–180
4. Relation to Preceding Religions	180–181
I. The Metaphysical Concept of God	182–198
II. The Development of the Idea of God	198–203
A. The First Element: The Idea of God In and For Itself	203–218

B. The Second Element: Representation, Appearance
1. Differentiation
a. Differentiation within the Divine Life and in the World 218–223
b. Natural Humanity 223–229
c. Knowledge, Estrangement, and Evil 229–232
d. The Story of the Fall 232–240
2. Reconciliation
a. The Idea of Reconciliation and Its Appearance in a Single Individual 240–247
b. The Historical, Sensible Presence of Christ 247–253
c. The Death of Christ and the Transition to Spiritual Presence 253–259
C. The Third Element: Community, Spirit 259–261
1. The Origin of the Community 261–275
2. The Subsistence of the Community 275–281
3. The Realization of Faith 282–297

THE LECTURES OF 1827

The pagination given here is that of the Lasson edition (volume 2/2). When Lasson's text has been supplemented or replaced by two or more sentences from one of the extant sources (*An, B, Hu*), this is noted in the following list by the symbol "Q" (meaning *Quelle*, source). Commas indicate breaks in Lasson's text.

	Lasson (vol. 2/2) + *Q*
The Consummate Religion	
Introduction	
1. Definition of This Religion	3–5
2. The Positivity and Spirituality of This Religion	5, 19–27
3. Survey of Previous Developments	6–14
4. Division of the Subject	28–30
A. The First Element: The Idea of God In and For Itself	74–77, Q, 47–48, 77–84
B. The Second Element: Representation, Appearance	
1. Differentiation	
a. Differentiation within the Divine Life and in the World	92–95
b. Natural Humanity	112–116
c. The Story of the Fall	126–129
d. Knowledge, Estrangement, and Evil	116–118, 117, 118–121
2. Reconciliation	
a. The Idea of Reconciliation and Its Appearance in a Single Individual	138–142
b. The Historical, Sensible Presence of Christ	154–155, 150–151, 150, 151, Q, 151–152, 153–154
c. The Death of Christ and the Transition to Sensible Presence	169, 170–172, 173–174
C. The Third Element: Community, Spirit	
1. The Origin of the Community	194–196, 198–199, 203, 199

2. The Subsistence of the Community	207–208, 202–204, 205–206, 214–215
3. The Realization of the Spirituality of the Community	Q, 216–219, 225–228, 232, Q

THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF ACCORDING TO THE LECTURES OF 1831

	Werke, 2d ed. (vol. 12)
The Ontological Proof	546–553

STRAUSS EXCERPTS – THE LECTURES OF 1831

	Strauss
The Consummate Religion	
Introduction	39
I. The Abstract Concept of God	39–40
II. The Idea of God in Representational Form	40–41
A. The Kingdom of the Father	41–42
B. The Kingdom of the Son	
1. Differentiation	42–43
2. Reconciliation	
a. The Idea of Reconciliation and Its Appearance in a Single Individual	43
b. The Historical, Sensible Presence of Christ	43–45
c. The Death of Christ and the Transition to Spiritual Presence	45–47

C. The Kingdom of the Spirit
1. The Self-Consciousness of the Community 47–48
2. The Realization of Religion 48–49

LOOSE SHEETS RELATING TO HEGEL'S LECTURE MANUSCRIPT

	Rosenkranz Papers
Loose Sheets, Consummate Religion	155a–155b, 163b, 162a–163a, 165b, 164a–165a

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GLOSSARY

The glossary contains a selection of frequently used and/or technical terms, especially those posing problems in translation. General principles of translation are discussed in Sec. 6 of the Editorial Introduction to Vol. 1. In its successively amended versions, the glossary has served only as a guide, to which the translators have not felt obliged to adhere when context or English idiom have required different renderings. When more than one English word is given, the generally preferred terms are listed first, while terms following a semicolon may be suitable in less technical contexts. "Cf." indicates related but distinguished German terms, which generally are translated by different English equivalents. Adjectives are listed without endings. This glossary is indexed only on German terms; the indexes to each volume serve partially as English-German glossaries.

German	*English*
absolut	absolute
Absolute	the absolute
allgemein	universal, general
Allgemeine	the universal
Andacht	devotion, worship
Anderssein	other-being, otherness
anerkennen	recognize, acknowledge (cf. "erkennen")
Anerkenntnis	recognition (cf. "Erkenntnis")

angemessen	suitable, appropriate, commensurate, fitting
anschauen	intuit, envisage
Anschauung	intuition, envisagement (cf. "Wahrnehmung")
an sich	in itself, implicit (cf. "in sich")
Ansich	in-itself, implicit being
Ansichsein	being-in-self
Anundfürsichsein	being-in-and-for-self
Arbeit	labor (cf. "Werk")
auffassen	comprehend, grasp (cf. "begreifen," "fassen")
Auffassung	comprehension
aufheben	sublate; transcend, supersede, annul
Aufhebung	sublation; transcendence, supersession, annulment
auflösen	resolve, dissolve
Auflösung	resolution
Bedeutung	meaning, significance (cf. "Sinn")
Begierde	desire, appetite
beglaubigen	verify, attest, confirm
Beglaubigung	verification, attestation
begreifen	conceive
Begreifen	conception, conceiving
Begriff	concept
bei sich	with self, present to self, at home
Beisichsein	presence with (to) self, self-communion, at home with self
beobachten	observe
Beobachtung	observation (cf. "Betrachtung")
Beschäftigung	occupation, concern
besonder	particular
Besonderheit	particularity
bestehen	subsist
Bestehen	subsistence

bestimmen	determine, define, characterize
bestimmt	determinate, definite
Bestimmtheit	determinateness, determinacy
Bestimmung	determination, definition; character(-istic, -ization), destination, vocation, specification
betrachten	consider, treat, deal with
Betrachtung	consideration, treatment (cf. "Beobachtung")
Bewusstsein	consciousness
beziehen	relate, connect
Beziehung	relation, connection, reference (cf. "Verhältnis," "Zusammenhang")
Bild	image
bildlich	imaginative, figurative
Bildung	culture, formation, cultivation
bloss	mere, simple, sheer
Boden	soil, ground, territory
Brahm	Brahman (ultimate reality)
Brahma	Brahmā (first member of the Hindu triad)
Brahman, Brahmine	Brāhman (member of the priestly caste)
darstellen	present, portray, set forth
Darstellung	presentation, portrayal, exposition (cf. "Vorstellung")
Dasein	determinate being, existence (cf. "Existenz," "Sein")
Denkbestimmung	category, thought-determination
denken	think
Denken	thinking, thought (cf. "Gedanke")
denkend	thinking, thoughtful
Einbildung	imagination (cf. "Phantasie")
Eine (der, das)	the (personal) One, the (neuter) One
einfach	simple

Einzelheit	singularity, single (or singular) individual (cf. "Individuum")
einzeln	single, singular
Einzelne	single individual (cf. "Individuum")
Element	element (cf. "Moment")
empfinden	sense
Empfindung	sensibility, sensation (cf. "Gefühl")
entäussern	divest, externalize
Entäusserung	divestment, externalization
Entfremdung	estrangement
entgegensetzen	oppose
Entgegensetzung	opposition
Entzweiung	cleavage, rupture, severance; cleaving, split
erheben	elevate, raise up
Erhebung	elevation, rising above
Erinnerung	recollection (cf. "Gedächtnis")
erkennen	cognize; recognize (cf. "anerkennen," "kennen")
Erkenntnis	cognition (cf. "Anerkenntnis," "Kenntnis," "Wissen")
erscheinen	appear (cf. "scheinen")
Erscheinung	appearance, phenomenon (cf. "Manifestation")
Erziehung	education
Existenz	existence (cf. "Dasein"—when the distinction is important, "Existenz" is given in square brackets)
existieren	exist (cf. "sein")
fassen, erfassen	grasp (cf. "auffassen," "begreifen")
Form	form (cf. "Gestalt")
für sich	for (by, of) itself, on its own account, explicit
Fürsich	for-itself
Fürsichsein	being-for-self, explicit being

Gebiet	field, realm
Gedächtnis	memory (cf. "Erinnerung")
Gedanke	thought, thoughts (cf. "Denken")
Gefühl	feeling (cf. "Empfindung")
Gegensatz	antithesis, contrast; antipathy, opposition (cf. "Entgegensetzung")
Gegenstand	object
gegenständlich	objective
Gegenwart	presence, present
Geist	spirit
Gemeinde	community
Gemüt	disposition; mind, soul, heart (cf. "Gesinnung")
Genuss	enjoyment, partaking, communion
geoffenbart	revealed (cf. "offenbar")
Geschichte	history; story (cf. "Historie")
geschichtlich	historical (often used as synonymous with "historisch")
Gesinnung	conviction, disposition
Gestalt	figure, shape
Gestaltung	configuration
Glaube	faith, belief
glauben	believe
Gleichgültigkeit	indifference
Gleichheit	equivalence
Glück	fortune
Glückseligkeit	bliss, happiness
Grund	ground, reasons
Grundlage	foundation
herabsetzen	degrade, reduce
hinausgehen	overpass, go beyond
Historie	history (cf. "Geschichte")
historisch	historical (often used as synonymous with "geschichtlich")
ideal, ideell	ideal

Idee	idea
Individuum	individual (cf. "Einzelne")
in sich	within itself, into self, inward, internal, self-contained (cf. "an sich")
jenseitig	otherworldly
Jenseits	the beyond, the other world
kennen	know (cf. "wissen")
Kenntnis	information, acquaintance (cf. "Erkenntnis," "Wissen")
Kraft	force, strength, energy (cf. "Macht")
Kultus	cultus
Lehre	teaching, doctrine
lehren	teach
Leidenschaft	passion
Macht	power (cf. "Kraft")
Manifestation	manifestation (cf. "Erscheinung")
Mannigfaltigkeit	manifold(ness)
Mensch	human being
Menschheit	humanity
mit sich	with self; integral
Moment	moment (cf. "Element")
Moral	morals
Moralität	morality (cf. "Sittlichkeit")
nachdenken	deliberate, meditate, ponder
Nachdenken	deliberation, meditation, meditative thought
Natur	nature
natürlich	natural
Natürliche	the natural
Natürlichkeit	natural life, natural state, naturalness; simplicity, unaffectedness
offenbar	revelatory, manifest (cf. "geoffenbart")
Offenbaren	revealing
Offenbarung	revelation
partikulär	private (cf. "besonder")

Phantasie	phantasy; fanciful imagination (cf. "Einbildung")
Positive	the positive, positivity
Räsonnement	argumentation, reasoning
realisieren	realize (cf. "verwirklichen")
Realität	reality (cf. "Wirklichkeit")
Recht	right
reflektiv	reflective
Reflexion	reflection
rein	pure
Sache	matter, subject matter; thing, fact, cause
Schein	semblance, show
scheinbar	seeming
scheinen	seem
schlechthinnig	utter, simple (cf. "absolut")
schliessen	conclude, infer
Schluss	syllogism, conclusion
Schmerz	anguish, sorrow; pain
seiend (part. and adj.)	having being, subsisting
Seiende(s)	actual being (God and cognates); a being, entity, subsisting being (finite objects)
sein (verb)	be: is (God and cognates); is, exists, occurs, etc. (finite objects)
Sein (noun)	being
setzen	posit
Setzen	positing
Sinn	sense, meaning (cf. "Bedeutung")
sinnlich	sensible, sentient, sensuous
Sinnlichkeit	sensuousness, sensible nature
sittlich	ethical
Sittlichkeit	ethics, ethical life, ethical realm (cf. "Moralität")
spekulativ	speculative
Spekulative	the speculative, speculation

Subjekt	subject
Subjektivität	subjectivity
substantiell	substantive, substantial
teilen	divide
Teilung	division, separation (cf. "Urteil")
trennen	separate
Trennung	separation
Trieb	drive, impulse, instinct
Übergang	transition, passing over
übergehen	pass over
übergreifen	overreach
überhaupt	generally, on the whole; altogether, after all, in fact, etc.
Überzeugung	conviction
umfassen	embrace, contain
unangemessen	incongruous, unsuitable, inadequate, incommensurate
Unglück	misery, unhappiness
unmittelbar	immediate (cf. "unvermittelt")
Unmittelbarkeit	immediacy
unterscheiden (verb)	distinguish, differentiate
Unterscheidung	differentiation, distinction (cf. "Unterschied")
Unterschied	distinction (cf. "Unterscheidung")
unterschieden (past part. and adj.)	distinguished, differentiated (part.); distinct, different (adj., cf. "verschieden")
unvermittelt	unmediated (cf. "unmittelbar")
Urteil	judgment, primal division (cf. "Teilung")
urteilen	judge, divide
Vereinzelung	singularization
sich verhalten	comport oneself, relate oneself
Verhalten	attitude, comportment
Verhältnis	relationship, relation (cf. "Beziehung," "Zusammenhang")

Verhältnisse (pl.)	conditions, circumstances, state of affairs
vermitteln	mediate
Vermittlung	mediation
Vernunft	reason
vernünftig	rational
verschieden (adj.)	different, distinct (cf. "unterschieden")
Verschiedenheit	difference, diversity
versöhnen	reconcile
Versöhnung	reconciliation
Verstand	understanding
verwirklichen	actualize (cf. "realisieren")
Verwirklichung	actualization (cf. "Wirklichkeit")
vollendet	consummate; perfect, complete, final
Vollendung	consummation
vorhanden	present, at hand, extant
vorhanden sein	be present, be at hand, exist (cf. "sein")
vorstellen	represent; imagine
vorstellend	representational, representative
Vorstellung	representation; image, imagination, view, notion
wahr	true
Wahre	the true
wahrhaft(ig)	true, genuine, authentic
Wahrheit	truth
Wahrnehmung	(sense) perception (cf. "Anschauung")
Werk	work (cf. "Arbeit")
Wesen	essence; being
Widerspruch	contradiction
Willkür	caprice, arbitrariness; free choice, free will
wirklich	actual
Wirklichkeit	actuality (cf. "Realität")

wissen	know (cf. "kennen")
Wissen	knowledge, knowing (cf. "Erkenntnis," "Kenntnis")
Wissenschaft	science, scientific knowledge
Zeugnis	witness, testimony
Zufall	chance
Zufälligkeit	contingency
Zusammenhang	connection, connectedness, nexus, coherence (cf. "Beziehung," "Verhältnis")
Zweck	purpose; end, goal, aim
zweckmässig	purposeful, expedient
Zweckmässigkeit	purposiveness, expediency

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NAMES AND SUBJECTS

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ERRATA

To Volume 1:

Page 340, line 7, instead of "to change over from Jerusalem" read "by [the Abbot] Jerusalem to change over"

Page 340, note 157, line 3, instead of "the Jewish religion" read "the Abbot Jerusalem"

To Volume 2:

Page 449, lines 3-4 up, instead of "commandements" read "commandments"

To Volume 3:

Page 141, line 20, instead of "*prona*" read "*poma*"

Page 141, note 210, instead of the present text read 210. [*Ed.*] "We apples swim." A medieval Latin proverb. See Bengt Löfstedt's note on this citation in *Orpheus: Rivista di Umanità Classica e Cristiana* 19-20 (1998–99): 99–100.